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ABSTRACT 
The mandate to regulate the hedge fund industry in Australia is motivated by the need to 
protect retail investors and the requirement to maintain market integrity while not 
impeding economic growth. As such, regulators have taken a light touch supervisory 
approach based on the premise that the hedge fund sector is not a large portion of the 
Australian funds management industry and hence, does not pose a risk to the financial 
system. This assumption is contingent to the theory that hedge fund investment activities 
are carried out with no link to the unregulated shadow banking system and the prevalence 
of dark pools, where transparency is limited and risks cannot be easily detected or 
appropriately quantified. However, a key issue which has been overlooked is the ability of 
hedge fund managers to conduct investing activities under the purview of regulators 
facilitated by the evolution of financial innovation which enables fraud risks posed by 
rouge hedge fund managers to evade detection. 
  
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the regulatory framework governing the hedge 
fund industry in Australia and its ability to mitigate fraud. The collapse of Trio Capital 
Limited in 2009 identified gaps within this regulatory architecture which had failed to 
protect certain retail investors against huge financial losses. Further, a future mandate to 
increase disclosure of hedge fund activities to mitigate fraud may prove to be less than 
effective if the information provided is too complex to understand and articulate and will 
serve little purpose in mitigating the risks of fraudulent conduct pertaining to the 
operational activities within hedge funds. The findings of this thesis suggest that a positive 
way forward is to promote the employment of independent hedge fund administrators 
proficient in forensic accounting analytics based on the assertion that active asset 
management requires active due diligence in an environment where investing in illiquid 
assets and valuation mismatches are the norm. 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
“Like a trapeze artist, the financial system can perform miraculous tricks but 
experience a bone-shattering fall if allowed to perform without a net” 
 
Barry Eichengreen (2004)1. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis identifies the weaknesses within the international financial market regulatory 
architecture which facilitates the riskier investing activities of the hedge fund industry. It 
unveils the level to which the systemic stability of the global financial system and the 
financial security of retail investors can be threatened by the risks of fraudulent conduct 
posed by rogue hedge fund managers. These risks which are inherent within the Australian 
financial system, and indeed globally, place retail investors at tremendous vulnerability to 
financial losses. This study finds that conduct-of-business and disclosure regulations serve 
little purpose in protecting retail investors against the risk of fraud and any future mandate 
for increased disclosures on hedge fund activities will not necessarily mean that they will 
be adhered to without adequate enforcement by regulatory authorities. Analysis of the 
collapse of Trio Capital Limited (Trio Capital) in 2009 reveals failure in multiple facets of 
the Australian financial market regulatory architecture. This thesis emphasizes the 
increasing and ever present risk of fraudulent and deceptive conduct such as 
misrepresentation and manipulation of information, particularly pertinent to valuation 
                                                        
1 Eichengreen, B. (2004), Capital Flows and Crises, MIT Press, United States, p.282. 
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methodologies in hedge fund portfolios. The conclusion is therefore the need to 
substantially promote the use of independent fund administrators who are proficient in 
forensic accounting analytics of complex organisational structures and investment 
strategies. 
 
At the macro level, risks relate to hedge fund investment activities within the financial 
system as a whole, known as systemic risks, and at the micro level the focus is the risk of 
hedge fund operations which may contribute to fraudulent and deceptive conduct, 
exposing retail investors to financial losses. The complexity of hedge fund investment 
strategies requires advanced knowledge not necessarily available to retail investors which 
means that with the increasing retailization of hedge funds, unsophisticated investors and 
the unwary are increasingly exposed to hedge funds though their pension funds, invariably 
exposing them to similar risks. Proposals for increasing risk transparency of hedge fund 
investment strategies to investors are unlikely to offer complete protection for investors 
who may not necessarily be able to understand or take the time to understand these 
strategies. Central to this study is the non-financial risks that hedge funds activities present 
to Australian investors which have resulted in financial losses due to fraud, 
misrepresentation and misappropriation. The risk of fraud within hedge funds is not an 
issue which has been widely researched despite the rising level of investment in hedge 
funds worldwide and the massive losses which investors have incurred from hedge fund 
failures. A comprehensive study by Capco2 in 2003 on the risks of hedge fund investments 
                                                        
2 Capco (2003), “Understanding and Mitigating Operational Risks in Hedge Fund Investments: A Capco White 
Paper, The Capital Markets Company Limited, p.5, 
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found that 50 percent of hedge fund failure was due to operational risks attributed to fraud. 
In the United States (US) alone, hedge funds were responsible for over an estimated 
USD$100 billion3 in losses as a result of fraud and operational failure in 2009. Indeed, the 
hedge fund industry itself has been elusive in nature, structured as unregulated investment 
vehicles which traded in the shadows of financial systems globally but with a level of 
financial capacity that could destabilize markets and be a cause of systemic risks. The 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC 2008) brought the hedge fund industry to the attention 
of regulators and investors as one by one numerous hedge funds collapsed due to fraud, 
misconduct and failure resulting in trillions of dollars of investment losses which also 
jeopardizes natural economies. The events in the aftermath of the GFC 2008 highlighted 
extreme vulnerabilities in the regulatory architecture of financial systems around the 
world and failed to protect investors against the financial catastrophes which ensued. 
These financial losses required governments to intervene and resort to monetary easing, 
protectionist economic policies and to take a hardline approach to the enactment of new 
financial market regulations in an attempt to regain investor confidence and restore 
financial stability. 
 
The contagion impact of the financial crisis was presented to the world as the largest 
financial debacle to face modern day finance and numerous comparisons of the GFC 2008 
were made with the Great Depression of 1929 depicting similar causal effects (Reinhart 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.castlehallalternatives.com/upload/resources/Understandingmitigatinghedgefund.pdf, Accessed 
25 July 2013. 
3 Castle Hall Alternatives (2009), “From Manhattan to Madoff: The Causes and Lessons of Hedge Fund 
Operational Failure”, Castle Hall Alternatives, 
http://www.castlehallalternatives.com/upload/publications/2507_ManhattantoMadoffPaper.pdf, Accessed 
25 July 2013. 
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and Rogoff, 2008, pp.3-10). While a major reason for the Great Depression was a ‘run on 
the banks’ by households who had lost confidence in the US financial system, the GFC 2008 
was a result of failure within the financial system itself. Five years on, its impact has not 
abated and there does not seem to be any resolution in sight. The European Union (EU) in 
2013 is still experiencing economic instability while Japan, in a decade long recession, has 
introduced extreme measures to boost its ailing economy and China, the only major 
economy which was able to maintain consistent growth, is bracing for a slowdown and on 
the fringe of a possible real estate debt bubble (Guan, 2013, p.2030; Roll, 2011, pp.12-13; 
Kawalec and Pytlarcyzk, 2013, p.32). 
 
1.2 Financial Liberalisation 
An important principal of financial market regulation adapted globally is the maintenance 
of a safe and stable economic environment where investor protection regulation promotes 
confidence in the soundness and efficiency of the financial system. However, financial 
liberalization and the deregulation of financial systems impeded the effectiveness of these 
protections as the pursuit of growth superseded the enforcement of safety and soundness. 
The regulatory changes initiated after the Great Depression of 1929 in the US led to heavy 
regulation of all financial systems globally and notably the separation of commercial and 
investment banking activities4. From the mid-1970s onwards, however, liberalization 
triggered many changes that would profoundly alter the face of the global financial system 
and the nature of its operations as we see it today (Ashraf et al, 2011, pp.73-75). The last 
                                                        
4 Ludwig von Moses Institute, “The Hoover New Deal of 1932”, Ludwig von Moses Institute: Advancing Austria 
Economics, Liberty and Peace; Chapter 11, http://mises.org/rothbard/agd/chapter11.asp, Accessed 1 Jan 
2013. 
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thirty years has been a period of enormous transformation in financial services and the 
manner in which financial intermediation has been carried out. The complex web of 
interconnectedness between financial markets of today and the technological 
infrastructure which links all financial exchanges around the globe has progressed at such 
an accelerated pace that financial market regulators have been unable to keep up with, let 
alone supervise and regulate, these developments effectively. The swiftness with which the 
GFC 2008 spread from the US to Europe and the rest of the world proves that these 
linkages do not see any boundaries between jurisdictions, industries or individuals. The 
risks of future financial crisis will only increase more because of this interconnectedness, 
especially if regulators do not respond to this harmonization unanimously. 
 
The safety and stability of the international financial system is vulnerable, insecure and 
protection from future crises is limited to the amount of supervisory control regulators 
exercise and enforce. The evolution of innovative financial practices such as advances in 
financial theory, information technology, the rise of the shadow banking5 sector and 
globalization has also limited the ability of regulators to react effectively without 
international cooperation. An article6 by Kevin Rudd (2009), the former Prime Minister of 
Australia, sums up the current state of the global economy, though dire and confronting, 
stated that: 
                                                        
5 Pozsar et al (2012) define shadow banking as financial activities carried out by non-bank institutions that 
create leverage and/or engage in credit intermediation such as maturity and liquidity transformation without 
access to public sources of liquidity such as government guarantees. A more detailed discussion of the 
definition of the shadow banking sector is presented in Chapter Two. 
6 Rudd (2009), “The Global Financial Crisis”, The Monthly, dated Feb 2009, 
http://www.themonthly.com.au/monthly-essays-kevin-rudd-global-financial-crisis--1421, Accessed 1 Jan 
2013. 
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This is a crisis spreading across a broad front: it is a financial crisis which has 
become a general economic crisis; which is becoming an employment crisis; 
and which has in many countries produced a social crisis and in turn, a 
political crisis. It is a crisis which is simultaneously individual, national and 
global. It is a crisis of both the developed and the developing world. It is a 
crisis which is at once institutional, intellectual and ideological. It has called 
into question the prevailing neo-liberal economic orthodoxy of the past 30 
years, the orthodoxy that has underpinned the national and global regulatory 
frameworks that have so spectacularly failed to prevent the economic 
mayhem which has now been visited upon us. 
 
The GFC 2008 established its prominence in mid-2007 when the global credit markets 
came to an abrupt standstill as the US housing market began to collapse due to a lack of 
confidence. There are three important variables which contributed to the crisis: a 
deregulation of financial markets in the US and the UK which began in the 1980s; extremely 
low interest rates that facilitated access to cheap credit which trickled down throughout 
the financial system resulting in excess liquidity and, lastly, an interconnected financial 
system with the unregulated shadow banking sector participating as counterparties in the 
construction of complex financial instruments which saw risk spread throughout the global 
financial system (Davis, 2011, p.4). This lethal combination led to unsustainable growth 
over a thirty year period before the GFC 2008 where investors participated with the 
attitude that the availability of credit was infinite and demand for financial assets would 
continue to rise. Amongst the numerous causes of the GFC 2008 identified is that the 
collapse was a result of a valuation failure within the credit intermediation processes 
which securitized and sold complex financial instruments such as Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBS) and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO). More importantly, the 
securitization of these financial assets facilitated the shifting of risks to the broader, global 
financial system and into the unregulated shadow banking sector where leveraged 
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investment funds participated in its growth, to further inflate valuations to unsustainable 
levels. The financial crisis quickly spread across the world and brought into question the 
benefits of international linkages and the contagion impact of future crises. 
 
Cross-border capital flows, lax counterparty credit risk management and leverage were 
facilitated by the use of off-balance sheet transactions and special purpose vehicles that 
enabled financial institutions to accumulate and hide losses. Kalemil-Ozcan et al (2012, 
p.285) found that large banks in the US, and to a lesser extent in Europe, raising funds in 
short-term markets were able to increase their leverage before the GFC 2008 and avoid 
maintaining regulatory capital requirements by using off-balance sheet investment 
vehicles, thus hiding the real value of their liabilities from counterparties. As the losses 
accumulated a crisis of confidence was experienced within the financial system, inter-bank 
lending came to a standstill and the structured credit market simply vanished. The liquidity 
problem spread across borders, leveraged financial intermediaries faced solvency 
problems as valuations dislocated and market quoted prices were deemed unrealistic, 
triggering margin calls and further dislocation. This spiral eventuated into a full blown 
global crisis which was still being experienced in late 2013. 
 
Assets bubbles are formed because of maturity mismatches, enabled by financial 
exuberance and precipitated by investors with a high appetite for risk in pursuit of larger 
returns. It was this huge gap in valuation which was a predominant cause of the financial 
crisis. Valuation gaps are a result of information asymmetries within financial sectors 
which have always existed, whereby crucial information in relation to the true value of a 
8 
 
security is protected based on the rhetoric of competitive advantage. There is no argument 
that the need to remain competitive is crucial for the viability of financial intermediaries 
but when it results in a lack of transparency and an inability of market regulators to 
adequately supervise and monitor, the risks of fraudulent conduct, manipulation and 
misrepresentation are elevated. 
 
The internalized nature of the GFC 2008 meant that manipulation and misrepresentation 
were effectively controlled by the same agents who packaged and sold the securities. 
Taking into consideration that investing is a zero sum game, a possible explanation is that 
the accounting mismatches of derivative contracts between counterparties lead to defaults 
and bankruptcies which resulted in write downs (Edwards, 1999, pp.190-192; Stevenson, 
2012, p.17). Like every asset bubble which is inflated over a period of time, the issue of 
sustainability was disregarded. 
 
The deregulation of capital markets and the globalization of finance has facilitated the ease 
of international capital flows for profitable investments and enabled risk diversification 
across borders while also increasing systemic risks as financial systems contract financial 
commitments through the use of derivative financial instruments. Unlike individuals, who 
would be pursued by lawmakers for default and prosecuted, the financial market actors 
who were responsible for these problems were bailed out by governments, given more 
money to assist further growth, to the position now where they have become ‘too big to 
fail’. Although the vast amounts provided by governments were meant to address the 
mounting threats, there are two questions which have been left unanswered. Firstly, if we 
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are still experiencing the financial crisis, where did all the bail-out money go? Secondly, if 
this financial crisis was caused from within the financial system, did the financial market 
actors commit a fraud from within? Without substantiating evidence, these questions will 
remain unanswered. 
 
The influence of hedge funds in exacerbating the GFC 2008 has been aggressively debated 
since the beginning of the crisis on both sides of the Atlantic. However, most studies on the 
financial crisis have exposed banks and not hedge funds as the main perpetrators and 
hedge fund managers themselves have averted blame by hiding behind the defense of 
ignorance. A paper by Prof. Photis Lysandrou published in the Journal of Keynesian 
Economics, entitled “The Primacy of Hedge Funds in The Financial Crisis” (2012), refuted 
this claim with substantial data confirming the direct participation of hedge funds in the 
CDO market. Lysandrou further stated in an article in the Financial Times, UK7, that: 
 
Had it not been for hedge funds’ intermediary position between the investors 
seeking yield on the one hand and the banks that created the high yielding 
securities on the other, the supply of these securities, known as collateralised 
debt obligations (CDO), would never have reached the proportions that were 
critical in precipitating the near collapse of the whole financial system. 
Wealthy individuals did not have the requisite expertise to participate in the 
CDO market while liquidity and risk control considerations prevented 
institutional asset managers from having more than a limited participation. 
In both cases, one of the preferred solutions to the yield problem, which was 
becoming increasingly acute from about 2002, was to pour money into hedge 
funds that in turn diverted substantial amounts of this money into the 
subprime-backed securities. 
 
                                                        
7 Lysandrou, P. (2012), “The Real Role of Hedge Funds In the Crisis”, Financial Times, UK, dated April 1 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e83f9c52-6910-11e1-9931-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Et973x4n, Accessed 
1 June 2012. 
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This statement, although a convincing argument which directly blames hedge funds as a 
root cause of the financial crisis, also includes evaluative gaps which have been the focus of 
the debate. An important argument against the role of hedge funds for the GFC 2008 was 
that, collectively, the hedge fund industry represented only a small proportion of the global 
assets under management (AUM) and did not have the financial capacity to move markets 
so abruptly. However, it is not clear whether the data in relation to the financial holdings of 
hedge funds included leveraged facilities provided by banking and other financial 
intermediaries or hidden in off-balance sheet transactions, which would invariably 
increase the total worth identified. Therefore, isolating the hedge fund industry alone as a 
cause would be unsubstantiated without considering the contributions of the regulated 
banking sector as leverage providers and facilitators of financial exuberance. It is this lack 
of information which has significantly contributed to so much confusion.  
 
The fallout of the GFC 2008 has highlighted several of the weaknesses of a host of 
previously unchallenged examples of ‘financial innovation’, calling into question the 
wisdom of the gradual deregulation of the financial services sector and a review of 
contemporary financial market regulation so as to fill perceived regulatory gaps and, 
through that, restore confidence in financial markets. While the ongoing crisis has shown 
some regulatory changes to be apposite, mainly in order to rein in the activities of 
unregulated and significant financial market players such as hedge funds, the unregulated 
hedge fund industry and its impact on financial markets is not a new phenomenon but 
shows a lack of understanding of the intricacies within the shadow banking industry, the 
unregulated part of a financial sector, and linkages to the broader financial system which 
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will never be totally resolved. The following section theorizes the position of this thesis by 
conceptualizing the public interest theory of regulation to explain the need for regulatory 
intervention by governments to act in circumventing the risks of hedge fund activities and 
upholding the investor protection mandate of financial market regulation. It begins with 
explaining the contextual dynamics of regulatory theory and subsequently extends the 
argument to the public interest theory of regulation which is enforced by the theory of 
market failure and the need for regulatory intervention in protecting investors against 
financial losses as a result of market misconduct, fraud and systemic failure. 
 
1.3 Regulatory Theory 
Regulatory theory is defined as a set of propositions or hypotheses about why and how 
regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that emergence and typical patterns of 
interaction between regulatory actors. It often contains a mixture of explanatory and 
prescriptive elements to justify the goal or goals which regulation should pursue (Morgan 
and Yeung, 2007, pp.16-18). Regulation is a concept that is difficult to define with precision. 
Ogus (1994, p.1) in his book entitled Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory states 
that “regulation is not a term of art, and unfortunately has acquired a bewildering variety of 
meanings”. In its most general sense, regulation may be said to include “all acts of 
controlling, directing or governing according to a rule, principle or system”. This broad 
notion of regulation as systematic control embraces rules restricting behavior, together 
with targeted rules or specific sets of commands accompanied by mechanisms for 
monitoring and promoting compliance and includes forms of state intervention such as 
subsidies and taxation, policy instruments entailing control by standards, licensing, and 
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inspection (Prosser, 1997; Baldwin et al, 1998; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Vincent-Jones, 
2002, pp.611-628). A functional approach to regulation, often referred to a cybernetics 
perspective recognizes that:  
  
Any control system in art or nature must by definition contain a minimum of 
the three components. There must be some capacity for standard-setting to 
allow a distinction to be made between more or less preferred states of the 
system. There must also be some capacity for information-gathering or 
monitoring to produce knowledge about current or changing states of the 
system. On top of that there must be some capacity for behavior-modification 
to change the state of the system (Hood et al, 2001, p.23; Morgan and Yeung, 
2007, p.3). 
 
Thus, at its most general level, the concept of regulation refers to the means by which any 
activity, person or institution is guided to behave in a particular fashion, or according to 
rule (Picciotto, 2002, p.1). Regulation is a politico-economic concept and, as such, can best 
be understood by reference to different systems of economic organization and the legal 
forms which maintain them (Majone, 1990, pp.1-2). In all developed societies there is a 
tension between two systems of economic organizations. Under the first, the market 
system, individuals and groups are left free, subject only to certain basic restraints, to 
pursue their own welfare goals. The legal system underpins these arrangements 
predominantly through instruments of private law; regulation has no significant role. The 
second is the liberal democratic state where the state seeks to direct or encourage behavior 
which is assumed would not occur without such intervention. The aim is to correct 
perceived deficiencies in the market system in meeting collective or public interest goals 
(Ogus, 1994, pp.1-2).  
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The term ‘regulation’ is sometimes used in a broad sense to denote governing, the ways in 
which public purposes are decided on and implemented. However regulation has taken on 
a more specific meaning as achieving public goals using rules or standards of behavior 
backed up by the sanctions or rewards of the state (James, 2000, p.327). In this sense, 
regulation is normally thought of in terms of government regulation of the private sector, 
particularly in business (Wilson, 1980; Majone, 1994; Ogus, 1994; Doern and Wilks, 1998; 
James, 2000, p.327). Regulation is also explained as efforts to correct market distortions or 
‘market failures’ which prevent markets from operating in the public interest and is seen as 
a desirable activity in these circumstances (Noll, 1989; Ogus, 1994; James, 2000, p.330). 
Thus, the term ‘regulation’ is used to denote the enforcement of the rule of law but there is 
a distinction which needs to be made from the functions of ‘regulation’ and that of ‘the law’. 
 
Ingram (2006, p.1) states that unlike bullying commands, laws are meant to be morally 
justified and reasonable. For example, laws prohibiting fraud and deception appear to 
express reasonable moral commands. In some cases, however, a law may command us to 
do something that we think is morally wrong and unreasonable. Other laws may command 
us to do things that are reasonable but not morally obligatory. Furthermore, some laws, 
such as those granting permission to obtain a financial services license, do not command us 
to do anything. Instead, they authorize acts, or lay down procedures for performing acts, 
that we might choose or not choose to do. Finally, there are laws that do not appear to 
command or authorize anything, but instead express judgments. They cannot be said 
definitely to command or authorize anything here and now because they are about 
particular actions that happened in the past. Whether a judgment prohibits or permits a 
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present action depends on the resemblance between that action and the past action 
(Ingram, 2006, p.1). In contrast, Ogus (1994, p.2) explains that regulation contains the idea 
of control by a superior and has a directive function. To achieve the desired ends, 
individuals are compelled by a superior authority, the state, to behave in particular ways 
with the threat of sanctions if they do not comply. It is public law in the sense that it is for 
the state or its agents to enforce the obligations which cannot be overreached by private 
agreement between the parties concerned and because the state plays a fundamental role 
in the formulation as well as the enforcement of the law (Ogus, 1994, p.2). 
 
In the context of socio-legal studies, the concept of regulation has two main advantages. 
First, it leaves a useful ambiguity over the extent to which regular behavior is generated 
internally or entails external intervention. Secondly, it embraces all kinds of rules, not only 
formal state law (Picciotto, 2002, p.1). This context of regulation and enforcement is 
elaborated in Chapter Two which discusses the approaches to financial market regulation 
and the related tools of enforcement which are available to regulators. The distinction 
between private law and public regulation is an important one in relation to the hedge fund 
industry where a crucial strategy contributing to the success of hedge funds has been to 
seek exemptions from registration requirements through financial services authorities due 
to provisions available within legislation attributed to privately managed investment 
vehicles. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter Four and Chapter Six which 
analyse the regulation of hedge funds in the US, UK and Australia.  
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The importance of understanding the collective interaction of law, economics and finance 
has grown to be an area of substantive importance and the relevance of regulating actors 
within financial systems has been pronounced, especially after the GFC 2008. Not only has 
the financial crisis helped to expose economics to the important implications of the 
evolving legal environment but it has also brought to the forefront the fact that legal 
decisions often have important economic implications that can be uncovered with the 
application of economic theory (Oppenheimer and Mercuro, 2005, p.3). Law and economics 
rely on the standard economic assumption that individuals are rational utility maximizers, 
and studies of the role of law as a means for changing individual actions is based on the 
approach that a change in the rule of law will have an effect or alter behaviour (Parisi 2004, 
p.262). Wealth maximization, serving as a paradigm for the analysis of law, can thus be 
promoted or constrained by legal rules (Posner and Parisi, 1997, p.xi; Parisi 2004, p.262). 
Thus, regulation is a mechanism to insist that public purposes be respected by businesses 
and other non-governmental institutions in their operations (Aikin, 2009, p.26).  
 
Public interest theory can be explained as concerned with achieving the best possible 
allocation of scarce resources which promotes the best interest of the public. In western 
economies the allocation of resources is coordinated by the market mechanism. In theory, 
it can even be demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, the allocation of resources 
by means of the market mechanism is optimal. However, these conditions are not 
frequently met in practice; the allocation of resources is not optimal, markets are not 
efficient and a demand for methods for improving the allocation arises (Arrow, 1985; den 
Hertog, 1999, p.225). A solution for maintaining the optimal allocation of resources is by 
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government intervention and regulation, especially when market failures are present and 
private law does not offer a remedy. A market failure is a situation where scarce resources 
are not put to their highest valued uses. In a market setting, these values are reflected in the 
prices of goods and services. A market failure thus implies a discrepancy between the price 
or value of an additional unit of a particular good or service and its marginal cost or 
resource cost (den Hertog, 2010, p.5; Ogus, 1994; Adler, 2010, p.595). Baldwin and Cave 
(1999, pp.9-13) state that regulation in cases of market failure is argued to be justified 
because the uncontrolled market place will for some reason fail to produce behavior or 
results in accordance with the public interest, for example in instances of fraud and 
prevalence of informational asymmetries. The precise nature of a market breakdown will 
dictate what is best suited to either restore the market or to compensate for its absence 
(Fellmeth, 1985, p.4; Li, 2008, pp.526-529).  
 
In summary, government intervention and regulatory actions during a market failure can 
be interpreted as an efficient instrument to correct imperfect competition, unbalanced 
market operations and undesirable market results. Government intervention due to market 
failure in a crisis scenario can be justified as being in the interest of the public and upholds 
the investor protection mandate which expounds intervention as a requirement to 
maintain investor confidence, market stability and promote economic efficiency. The 
“Public Interest Theory of Regulation” was theorized to justify this claim, that when the 
public interest is to be protected governments should intervene. 
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1.3.1 Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theories of regulation attribute to legislators and others responsible for the 
design, intervention and implementation of regulation, a desire to pursue collective goals 
with the aim of promoting the general welfare of the community. This can be further 
subdivided into those that articulate regulatory goals in terms of economic efficiency and 
those which include other political goals (Morgan and Yeung, 2007, pp.17-18). The concept 
of public interest is as old as the political philosophy of government intervention. Indeed, 
this concept appears in the works of political philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, 
and Rousseau. Government intervention and public interest coexist in the political, 
philosophical, economic and legal spheres of society (Hantke-Domas, 2003, p.166).  
 
The prevailing public interest theory of regulation until the early 1960s was what Joskow 
and Noll (1981) have called the “normative analysis as a positive theory” (Peltzman, 1989, 
p.4). This theory regarded market failure as the motivating reason for government 
intervention in enacting regulation. Once established, regulatory bodies were meant to 
lessen or eliminate the inefficiencies engendered by market failure (Peltzman, 1989, p.4). 
In these earlier developments of the public interest theory of regulation, it was assumed 
that a market failure was a sufficient condition to explain government intervention. 
However, the theory was criticized as a ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, implying that it assumed 
theoretically efficient institutions could be seen to efficiently replace or correct inefficient 
real world institutions. The term ‘nirvana fallacy’ was popularized by Harold Demsetz 
(Demsetz, 1969; Kirzner, 1978, p.231) who stated: 
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The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly 
presents the relevant choice as between an ideal and an existing ‘imperfect’ 
institutional arrangement. This ‘nirvana’ approach differs considerably from 
a ‘comparative institution’ approach in which the relevant choice is between 
alternative real world intuitional arrangements (Demsetz, 1969, p.1). 
 
The neo-classical school of economics is divided over the relative merits of the market and 
the state in achieving the objectives of efficient allocation of resources, for example to 
strengthen the financial sector, to reverse the downturn of the economy and to ensure high 
economic growth. Proponents of the free-market system argue that without government 
intervention the dynamics of demand and supply will help the economy adjust to recession 
and automatically correct its imbalances, by purging inefficiencies within the system, and 
then move toward equilibrium and the strengthening of the overall economy (Aikins, 2009, 
p.24). Bushman and Landman (2010, pp.261-263) explain that this critique of public 
interest theory proceeds in three basic steps.  First, competition in the market and private 
orderings or the coming together of non-governmental parties in voluntary arrangements, 
significantly mitigate market failures, obviating most of the need for government 
intervention. Next, where competition and private orderings do not adequately address 
market failures, contracts supported by impartial courts and the enforcement of tort rules 
resolves remaining market failure issues. In the absence of unresolved market failures, 
regulation is undesirable. However, these arguments rely on courts being motivated, 
unbiased, informed, and incorruptible (Bushman and Landman, 2010, pp.261-263).  
 
The ‘Nirvana Fallacy’ of refuting public interest theory is further supported by arguments 
based on capture theory which questions public interest theory’s main assumptions that 
governments are benevolent and competent (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974). This theory 
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contends that regulators are often captured by those whom they are charged to regulate, 
and even if the regulator is independent and wants to ‘do good’ by acting in the public 
interest, they are generally incompetent and likely to fail.  Capture theory often models 
regulators as self-interested agents that seek to maximize their own welfare with their 
primary concern being their own wealth and power (Peltzman, 1976).  Thus, even if a 
market failure exists, capture theory is skeptical that government intervention is the 
solution.  To avoid the ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, a case has to be made that regulation would in fact 
achieve better outcomes than the status quo or a market-based solution (Bushman and 
Landman, 2010, pp.7-9). These criticisms led to the development of a more serious public 
interest theory of regulation by what has been referred to as the ‘New Haven’ or 
‘Progressive School’ of Law and Economics based  on the concept that regulation seeks to 
protect and benefit the public at large and defines it as a system of ideas which proposes 
that when markets fail economic regulation should be imposed in order to maximize social 
welfare (Demsetz, 1968; den Hertog, 2010, p.5; Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Hantke-Domas, 
2003, p.166). 
 
Richard Posner (1974), a fellow of the Chicago School, was the first academic to 
substantively attribute the traditional rationale for regulation based on the concept of 
public interest. He recognized two arguments commonly used to support regulation 
namely, that financial markets are prone to fail and that regulation was costless or had 
‘zero transaction costs’ (Hantke-Domas, 2003, p.165). Ensuing authors (Josjow and Noll, 
1981; Viscusi et al, 1995 and den Hertog 2000) extended this assumption and identified 
public interest theory as part of welfare economics (Hantke-Domas, 2003, p.165). 
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Fundamental to the public interest theories are market failures and efficient government 
intervention to maximise social welfare (den Hertog, 2010, p.2). In simple terms, it 
suggests that regulation is a response to imperfections in the market, correction of market 
failures measures, the community’s general welfare and is thus in the public interest. 
Correlatively, those who press for regulation and in response to market failures are agents 
of the public interest (Orgus, 1994, p.18). Although market failure was recognized by 
Posner as part of the public interest theory of regulation, the idea of market failure is the 
premise of welfare economics advocated by A.C. Pigou, W.J. Baumol and F.M. Bator 
(Hantke-Domas, 2003, p.181). 
 
1.3.2 Market Failure 
The theory of market failure is concerned with the establishment of conditions where 
competitive market allocation of resources will be inefficient. The theory suggests that 
under certain conditions, the production and distribution of a good or service through a 
competitive market in which all the relevant agents are pursuing their own self-interest 
will result in an allocation that is socially inefficient and may result in market failure 
(Lehne, 2006; Aikins, 2009, p.26). In essence, welfare economics is employed to prescribe 
legal and institutional changes when market failure occurs. The more prominent examples 
of market failure cited in public interest theory studies involve the presence within an 
economy of natural monopoly, information asymmetry and externalities (Vicusi et al, 1995; 
Hantke-Domas, 2003; Aikins, 2009; Lehne, 2006; Ogus, 1994). 
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A natural monopoly exists in circumstances when there is room for only one corporation to 
operate efficiently, usually because of economies of scale limiting the number of firms that 
can function in a market, restricting competition and allowing monopolists to force up 
prices and limit output, which results in allocative inefficiency (James, 2000, p.330; 
Fellmeth, 1985, p.7). To generate allocative efficiency, there needs to be enough firms so 
that competition would drive price down to marginal cost (Vicusi et al, 1995, pp.323-324; 
Hantke-Domas, 2003, p.184). Thus, competition is a crucial assumption of overcoming this 
‘natural monopoly’ market model and where it is seriously impaired by monopolies and 
anti-competitive practices there is market failure and regulatory intervention is necessary 
(Ogus, 2004; Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p.19). Informational asymmetries are situations 
where market participants do not have or are not able to attain adequate information 
about a product or service being exchanged. Consumer choice lies at the heart of the 
economic notion of allocative efficiency (Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p.24). In a fair and 
efficient market, consumers have sufficient information to make informed decisions and 
hence, are given choices. To aim at a state in which resources move to their most highly 
valued use implies that choices between sets of alternatives may be exercised. Individuals 
prefer some commodities to others and such preferences are reflected in demand (Morgan 
and Yeung, 2007, p.24). The market system of allocation is fuelled by an infinite number of 
expressions of these preferences (Ogus, 1994, p.38). This assertion depends on the 
assumption that consumers have the required information to process and evaluate their 
decisions in a rational manner so as to maximise expected utility. A significant failure of 
this assumption may set up a prima facie case for regulatory intervention (Ogus, 1994, 
p.38; Beales et al, 1981, pp.501-513). Hence, legislators and regulators are essentially 
22 
 
benevolent, designing and operating regulatory systems to correct these failures and 
bringing about improvements to general well-being in the public interest (James, 2000, 
p.330). 
 
Externalities are the effect of decisions or actions by individuals or organisations on others 
who do not have a choice or are not equal participants in the decision making processes 
which invariably affect them. The theory was developed by British economist A.C. Pigou 
and examines cases where some of the costs or benefits of activities ‘spill over’ onto third 
parties. When it is a cost that is imposed on third parties it is known as a negative 
externality and when third parties benefit from an activity in which they are not directly 
involved, the benefit is considered a positive externality8. The impact of externalities in the 
context of public interest theory focuses on negative externalities as a result of commercial 
activities.  An often cited textbook example concerns the discharge of waste material by a 
factory such that downstream drinking water companies must incur costs of water 
purification (den Hertog, 2010, pp.15-16). The rationale for regulation here is to eliminate 
this waste and to protect society or third parties suffering from externalities, by compelling 
the internalization of spillover costs onto the polluter (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p.12). In all 
such cases, the market failure is accompanied by a private law failure and regulation may 
be the more efficient solution if the costs of regulatory intervention are lower than the 
benefits in terms of welfare loss control (Gruenspecht and Lave, 1989, pp.1510-1525; den 
Hertog, 2010, pp.15-16). 
 
                                                        
8 Callahan, G. (2001), “What Is An Externality?”, The Free Market, Mises Institute Monthly, August 2001, 
vol.19(8), http://mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=367, Accessed 12 Aug 2013 
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1.3.3 Regulatory Intervention 
The forms which regulation takes based on the public interest theory can be described as 
non-economic and economic regulation to overcome market failure, best presented by 
Funnell (2001, p.166) in Figure 1.1 below. The aim of regulation is either to control service 
delivery according to approved rules designed to ensure equity and high-quality service, or 
as one of the means available to implement government policy (Funnell, 2001, pp.166-
167). Regulatory intervention to prevent market failure in the public interest can include 
attempts to control prices and stop monopolists exploiting their position, placing 
restrictions on behaviours and requirements to market information about product quality 
and risks made available to consumers (Noll, 1989; Ogus 1994; James, 2000, p.330). Non-
economic form of regulation centres on the instances of regulating information asymmetry 
and externalities while economic regulation applies to industries with monopolistic 
tendencies which are generally regarded as undesirable and prohibited under competition 
law (Ogus, 1994, p.5).  
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To deal with these problems, policy-makers can choose from a range of regulatory 
instruments, classifiable according to the degree of state intervention required. 
Administrative and judicial law will be considered as adequate in periods where economic 
efficiency is maximized and there is less risk of market failure as a non-economic form of 
regulation. However, should the economic environment change and tendencies towards 
market failure move towards the higher end of the table shown in Figure 1.1, intervention 
can take the form of imposing standards and strict criterion on service, safety and product 
quality. The non-economic forms of regulation are aimed at enhancing public interest 
where the failure of ‘private’ regulation advocates intervention. Ogus (1994, p.5) states that 
the principal function of economic regulation is to provide a substitute for competition in 
relation to natural monopolies. Broadly speaking, there are three alternatives. The firm can 
be publicly owned, the expectation being that the mechanics of political direction and 
accountability will be sufficient to meet public interest goals. Firms desiring to obtain a 
monopoly right may be forced to compete for it. As part of their competitive bid, they may 
be required to stipulate proposed conditions to supply, relating especially to prices and 
quality, and those conditions then become terms of the license or franchise under which 
they exercise their monopoly right. Alternately, the firm may remain in, or be transferred 
to, private ownership but be subjected to external constraints in the form of price and 
quality regulation (Ogus, 1994, p.5). 
 
The purpose of identifying the contributors to market failure is to substantiate the need for 
government intervention in safeguarding the interests of the public. Dodd (2002, pp.2-4) 
finds that imperfections, incompleteness or inefficiencies in financial markets are 
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detrimental to the investor protection mandate and inconsistent with public interest 
theory. Regulatory intervention by government enables proposal policies to remedy these 
faults. He states that the existence of negative externalities in financial markets contributes 
to social costs, for example contagion from credit losses and relying on market equilibrium 
theories will not provide the optimal level of production and consumption. The presence of 
imperfect markets means to recognize that financial market exchanges, whether for stocks 
or derivatives, are natural monopolies whose control of trading rules and contract design in 
which there is a public interest, is not disciplined by perfect competition. Furthermore, 
Dodd states that the existence of imperfect markets facilitates in the costly effect of fraud 
and manipulation, this behavior should be prohibited and policed. The systemic failure of a 
financial crisis as a result of these imperfections will contribute to broad social costs 
whereby government cannot avoid intervention if they are interested in maintaining a 
well-functioning and efficient marketplace (Dodd, 2002, pp.2-4). 
 
The GFC 2008 elevated the importance of regulating the hedge fund industry as investors 
lost billions of investment income due to the risky investing activities which has long been 
a contributory factor to their ability to generate absolute returns. Advocates of regulatory 
intervention argue that the current recession and financial crisis constitute a manifestation 
of market failure and that the role of government is to mitigate the undesirable 
consequences of market activity through regulation and appropriate fiscal policy 
instruments without losing the benefits of a competitive economy, while protecting the 
public interest (Aikins, 2009, p.25). It is important to emphasise that any regulatory 
intervention has to bear in mind the evolution of 21st century financial systems and include 
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oversight of the shadow banking system. The next section presents the research problem of 
the thesis which develops the motivations of the research and this is subsequently 
elaborated in section 1.5 which presents the key themes. 
 
1.4 Research Problem 
The need to regulate the hedge fund industry, which has been regularly debated in the US 
and the United Kingdom (UK) over the past twenty years, is much more evident after an 
episode of a financial turmoil. For example, the Asian Financial Crisis 1997 and the 
subsequent collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 resulted in 
extensive inquiries and investigations by regulatory agencies which focused on the 
systemic risks posed by hedge funds, in particular the increasing exposure which hedge 
fund investing activities had for counterparties in the regulated banking sector. However, 
the resultant inquiries which recommended registration requirements and increased 
disclosure of hedge fund activities never led to any substantive regulatory actions. The 
general consensus by market regulators was that the hedge fund industry was a small, 
privately funded sector of the overall financial system and hence did not have a significant 
impact to warrant regulatory actions9. Political pressure dissipated amidst industry 
advocacy which promoted a self-regulatory approach to supervising the hedge fund 
industry, an aspect which is addressed in more detail in Chapter Three. It was only after the 
                                                        
9  European Commission Consultation Paper (Undated) “Working Document of the Commission Services (DG 
Internal Market) Consultation Paper on Hedge Funds” p.5 stating;  Hedge funds have not traditionally 
been considered to be of systemic relevance. Losses incurred by hedge funds and the risk of their 
failure are borne directly by investors and their immediate counterparties. For this reason, capital reserves 
are not part of the regulatory 'tool-box' for hedge funds, or indeed other investment vehicles. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/consultation_paper_en.pdf, Accessed 
24 Nov 2012. 
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GFC of 2008 that the risks of hedge fund activities as systemic contributors to financial 
market turmoil came to be recognized as a political and regulatory concern which needed 
attention in a unified manner at an international level. 
 
The GFC 2008 has had the most widespread impact on financial market turbulence 
compared with previous similar crises. The risks of a lack of political action initiated an 
overhaul of the global financial market regulatory architecture as governments sought 
solutions to appease the investing public and regain market confidence with much of the 
regulatory actions directed to the use of financial derivatives and the shadow banking 
sector, in particular hedge funds. These changes meant that investors will be provided with 
increased regulatory protection against misconduct and fraudulent activities, while at the 
same time dictating strict responsibilities for agents within the financial services industry 
with expanded disclosure requirements. However, repeated crises over the past three 
decades indicate that financial market regulators have not effectively upheld the investor 
protection mandate profusely advocated in market regulations. Increased disclosure of 
hedge fund activities will not be effective if the information disclosed is not understood by 
the agents in charge of supervision and enforced proactively. Indeed, it is the complexities 
of these very investing activities which lead to valuation mismatches and the consequent 
asset bubble in the first place. 
 
The difference between ‘regulatory content’, the specific statutes and administrative rules 
governing financial markets, and ‘regulatory strategy’, or techniques employed by the 
regulatory system to achieve its goal, is central to understanding the functions of financial 
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market regulation globally and determining its future path. The dichotomy between 
desirable and achievable regulatory goals is reliant on successful execution. Thus the 
complexity of regulatory initiatives developed over time to rectify deficiencies in the law is 
very much shaped by the practical constraints placed on enforcement agencies. As shown 
in Chapter Two, the global financial regulatory architecture we face today reflects a 
complex division where authority is segregated across various regulatory agencies 
mandated by supervisory responsibilities dependent on variables such as an agency’s 
charter, organisational structure and limitations on the services it provides. As a 
consequence, this fragmented approach separates different financial intermediaries from 
administration across agencies, even though their overall functions and actions may be 
effectively similar in a connected financial system. This is further exacerbated by the 
adaptive shift in attitudes towards regulation within agencies as a result of changes in 
personnel and political pressures. Implementing regulation requires a lot more than just 
policing violations and includes the development of techniques for long-term monitoring 
and control of the regulated industry.  For example, the regulatory approaches previously 
established in the US and the UK had failed to adequately protect investors against fraud 
and failure of hedge fund activities during the period leading up to the financial crisis based 
on two prominent reasons. Firstly, hedge fund activities are so complex and flexible that 
they span many different sectors and the use of off-balance sheet transactions and special-
purpose vehicles meant that regulators were eluded or unable to identify the true nature of 
risky activities. Secondly, the principles which motivated these regulatory approaches 
offered hedge funds the opportunity to seek registration exemptions from direct 
supervision. The reasons for this failure vary but two things are clear about pre-GFC 2008 
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international regulatory arrangements: their over-reliance on private sector input and lack 
of even rudimentary institutional infrastructure to handle cross-border crises were 
contributing factors both in building up the conditions that led to the GFC 2008 and in 
exacerbating its consequences. These observations do not tell the full story (Avgouleas, 
2012, p.3). 
 
The unavailability of information pertaining to hedge funds has been one of the most 
important reasons why research in this area has been limited. Regulatory exemptions 
available to hedge funds and the need to protect proprietary investment strategies to 
maintain competitiveness has enabled hedge funds to hide behind a veil of secrecy since 
the industry gained prominence in the early 1980s. However, this lack of transparency and 
risk disclosure has made effective supervision impossible and contributed to the collapse of 
thousands of hedges funds, more so during the first five years of the GFC 2008. Chapter 
Five will show that information obtained by a few specialist organizations which conducted 
commercial research on the operational risks within hedge funds has identified non-
financial risks as a salient cause of hedge fund failures, in particular misappropriation of 
assets, misrepresentation of information and misleading investors, all fraudulent activities 
related to having the ability to manipulate a hedge funds’ Net Asset Value (NAV). 
Misunderstanding a major knowledge revolution, as recent financial innovations should be 
held to be, is nothing new. Avgouleas (2012, p.4) suggests that: 
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Not only do communities of experts tend to be confused about the actual 
epistemological properties of new knowledge or technology, but they have 
also traditionally under-estimated its value. Therefore, the possibility of 
financial innovation (perceived here as a knowledge revolution) being used 
as a benevolent force to achieve global welfare objectives should not be 
discarded. On the contrary, proper research and knowledge structures with a 
global reach should be built to help policy-makers and possibly the markets 
to gain a better understanding of the properties and risks of financial 
innovation and of the financial revolution in general in order to manage them 
in a way that would not endanger financial stability and would even facilitate 
the achievement of other global welfare systems. 
 
 As strong as this statement may sound, the potential future risks will be multiplied should 
adequate action not be taken. More importantly, changes within the financial 
intermediation process and regulatory structure have resulted in an increase in the flow of 
funds into the hedge fund industry. As identified earlier, hedge funds indeed did play a role 
in the financial crisis and, although the entire industry is not solely to be blamed, the 
various ways in which hedge funds contributed to the financial crisis cannot be overlooked. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the lack of specific regulation and registration requirements 
governing hedge fund activities in the US and the UK could be still viewed as much more 
progressive when compared to the non-existent rules in Australia. 
 
This study is significant because, to date, there has been little research conducted on the 
manner in which hedge funds are regulated in Australia or the risks which they pose to 
retail investors. Indeed, regulatory approaches have been ambiguous and hidden behind a 
veil of complex Corporations Act 2001 (As Amended) requirements which have enabled 
hedge funds to voluntarily structure themselves in ways which would be most financially 
beneficial to them. The problem was avoided when the hedge fund industry exclusively 
served institutional investors who are knowledgeable partners in investment philosophies, 
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identified in regulation as ‘sophisticated investors’. However, it is a completely different 
situation when retail investors begin to directly participate in hedge fund investments 
without a thorough understanding of the risks they are undertaking. There is a very good 
reason why investor protection and disclosure requirements mandates are placed on 
market participants through regulation and supervisory initiatives. The proviso within the 
sophisticated investor rules across these jurisdictions acknowledges a sophisticated 
investor as a knowledgeable participant who understands investment philosophies and the 
risks they are undertaking and, hence, do not require the protection afforded to retail 
investors. Thus, sophisticated investors are willing and knowledgeable participants in the 
risk and acceptance of losses on default. This problem is further intensified with the 
participation of superannuation funds which invest in hedge funds and, hence, indirectly 
expose unknowledgeable retail investors to the higher risk profiles which hedge funds 
undertake. The collapse of Trio Capital in Australia in 2009 is a prominent example, which 
is analysed in Chapter Six, where retail investors lost billions of investment income, 
retirement savings and most were not protected by the Australian Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993, by making their investment decisions trusting the financial advice 
they were given. The reason for this research is not to make a claim that these risks are 
exclusive to the hedge fund industry nor does it make a claim that all hedge fund managers 
act in a fraudulent and deceptive manner. Rather, the focus is that part of the hedge fund 
industry in Australia which has subjected investors to fraudulent conduct, deception and 
misappropriation. Should a large enough hedge fund fail, the possible systemic effects are 
usually immeasurable and counterparty exposure could invariably have a contagion impact 
as seen in the GFC 2008. This warrants research on hedge fund regulation in Australia. 
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1.5 The Study’s Central Themes: Definitions and Explanations 
1.5.1 Risk 
The manner by which hedge funds are regulated in the US and the UK before and after the 
GFC 2008 has enabled the researcher to gain an appreciation of the various strategies that 
have availed hedge funds to be left largely unregulated in two of the biggest financial 
markets globally. More importantly, the research enabled a comparative analysis to 
benchmark regulatory actions which could be undertaken in Australia proactively. A 
crucial theme of this thesis is the investor protection mandate, motivated by large financial 
losses of investors in the aftermath of the collapse of Trio Capital in which one of its related 
funds, Astarra Strategic Fund, had defrauded retail investors of their life savings. 
 
The GFC 2008 has shown varying reasons why the risk of hedge fund activities has come 
into the spotlight of regulatory spheres and the broader society. A particular emphasis is on 
the need to restore confidence in the aftermath of the mismanaged GFC 2008 and to 
improve the manner in which hedge fund investment strategies and their related risks are 
being communicated to their investors. Techno-scientific approaches to risk management, 
emerging from statistics, actuarial sciences and, indeed, finance, bring together the notion 
of danger or hazard with calculations of probability and consequences in magnitude and 
severity of an adverse event (Bradbury, 1989, p.382). Debates over risk in these fields tend 
to revolve around issues of how well a risk has been identified or calculated, the level of 
seriousness of a risk in terms of its possible effects, how accurate is the ‘science’ that has 
been used to measure and calculate risk and how inclusive are the causal or predictive 
models that have been constructed to understand why risks occur and why people respond 
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to them in certain ways (Lupton, 1999, p.19). Accordingly, risk is viewed as a controllable, 
intricate part of investing where knowledge of scientific measurement enables its 
quantification and mitigation. There is a contrary view by political scientists which suggest 
that the adoption of the language and practices of risk reflects a deeper, more complex 
process, that of ‘political isomorphism’ (Gray and Hamilton, 2006, p.5). According to this 
view, risk becomes accepted and embedded in one organisation or institution such that it 
requires recognition within other organisations and institutions even though different 
institutions utilise risk management variedly (Ojo, 2009, p.1). One possible explanation 
suggests that late modern society has created a culture of control, accountability and 
responsibility as a means to emphasise the centrality of risk (Rothstein et al, 2006, p.92). 
There are two prominent theoretical views which approach these issues, namely, risk 
society theory by Ulrich Beck and governmentality theory, drawn from the works of 
Foucault.  
 
Risk-society theorists focus their analysis on macro-structural factors influencing what 
they see to be an intensified concern in late modern societies about risks which is 
“manufactured”, that is, generated by humans as part of economic progress and 
technological change, for example the collapse of a financial institution, rather than a 
natural catastrophe (Harvard, 2008, p.116; Lupton, 1999b, pp.3-4; Chang, 2011, p.2). They 
argue that risks produced under the conditions of late modernity have increased in 
magnitude and become globalized and, therefore, are more difficult than in the past to 
calculate and, therefore, manage or avoid (Chang, 2011.p.3; Lupton, 1999b). A central 
theme of this theory is the concept of ‘reflexive modernity’. The concept holds that a 
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modern, well-educated society emerged from the ashes of the industrial age where 
information availability and confidence within the educated created an individualistic bias 
towards corporate institutions and structures of the 20th century (Aiken, 2000, p.5). The 
reflexive modernity has to solve human constructed problems which arise from the 
development of industrial society; to tackle how risks produced as a consequence of 
modernity can be prevented, minimised and cancelled (Aiken, 2000, p.5).  Among these 
risks they identify a loss of faith in institutions and authorities and a greater awareness of 
the limits and uncertainties associated with science and technology (Gray and Hamilton, 
2006, p.6). Risk society theory suggests that the preoccupation with risk in government 
and regulatory circles is a response to a general recognition that there are limits to the 
ability to know or to control the uncertainties associated with late modernity, and to a 
public wanting to hold public decision-makers to account. Risk is now viewed as a political 
rather than a metaphysical phenomenon (Gray and Hamilton, 2006, p.6). 
 
An alternative view to explain the growing emphasis of risk in investment management is 
governmentality theory. At the ‘risk’ of oversimplifying these extremely influential 
perspectives, the term ‘governmentality’ is akin to the words ‘governing mentality’. 
Foucault posits that the government uses different tools to govern the mentality of its 
citizenry (Lemke, 2002, p.50). For example, the term of risk management can be used to 
encapsulate investors’ acceptance of the risk of a loss in investing activities without directly 
affecting market confidence. The view that ‘actions are in place’ in mitigating the risk which 
an unsuspecting financial calamity could pose to investors’ income is central to the 
motivations within the responsibilities of financial market regulators and prudential 
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supervisory bodies. In Foucault’s terms, governmentality refers to a distinctive modality 
for exercising power, one which is not reducible to the state. Governmentality is 
understood to work ‘at a distance’ by seeking to shape ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Barnett, 
2010, pp.280-283). The theorists do not focus on the quantification of risks in society nor 
its effects on the economy as a whole but rather how the concept is used as a ‘tool of 
governance’ to shape behaviours through which to exercise control over its citizens 
(Hodgson, 2002, pp.320-322).  
 
It has been suggested that the proliferation of risk rationalities and reliance on the prudent 
individual means that authorities of all sorts, including governments, have found a way of 
governing without governing society (Lupton, 1999b, pp.150-151). Hence, risk is 
conceptualised and its management is shifted away from the government onto individual 
investors who have to take responsibility for managing their own investment risks. This 
theory refutes the responsibility of governmental authorities for the financial system, for 
example in ensuring a safe and efficient financial market where investors are protected 
through various regulatory structures against fraud and manipulation and eventual loss of 
income. The GFC 2008 has also shown the ease with which private losses can be converted 
to public debt which thus invariably shifts the risks related to imprudent investing 
activities to the public but privatising the gains as was the case in the US with government 
bailouts of ‘too big to fail’ financial institutions at the height of the crisis in 2008. More 
importantly, the risks which reckless hedge fund activities pose to a financial system and 
individual investors has been highlighted as a recurrent theme as an effect of the fallout 
from the GFC 2008. This study will approach these risks at the macro and micro levels.  
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At the macro level, hedge fund activities have been identified as posing a risk to the system 
or systemic risks. Studies in the area have identified effects of systemic risks to 
counterparties within the banking and non-banking system. At the micro, institutional 
level, the collapse of a hedge fund poses the risk of financial loss to individual investors 
who have historically not been protected by investor protection regulation because of 
sophisticated investor exemptions. This exemption is built on the caveat that sophisticated 
investors, which included institutional and high net worth individuals (HNWI), who chose 
to invest in hedge funds, are knowledgeable participants who have adequate financial 
literacy to understand the risks they are committing to. The prevalence of fraud risk within 
hedge fund activities whereby non-financial risks or the loss of investments due to the 
fraudulent conduct of fiduciaries has added a new paradigm into risk management is a 
prominent focus of this thesis, highlighted throughout the study within the cases analysed.  
 
1.5.2 Regulation of Hedge Funds 
The second theme of the thesis is the approach to regulating hedge funds in the US, the UK 
and Australia before and after the GFC 2008. In particular, the exemptions provided to 
registration requirements especially after the proposals under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) in the US and changes in the 
regulatory structures in the UK following the introduction of the Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). Gaps are identified which cannot be solely addressed 
with regulation in protecting investors against fraud and misconduct by fiduciaries. These 
relate to the reasons for and the manner in which hedge funds have been able to largely 
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carry out their business ‘under the radar’, privately in an unsupervised nature notably. The 
largely unregulated nature of hedge funds and the problems in valuing hedge fund 
portfolios have directly impacted investors, exposing them to fraud, manipulation, 
misconduct, misappropriation and misrepresentation. 
 
Hedge funds as private investment vehicles have been left unregulated for reasons which 
evolved over the decades from regulatory initiatives to promote flexibility in investment 
activities after the Great Depression of 1929. The most prominent reason for not extending 
regulation to hedge funds was recognition of the ‘sophisticated investor rule’ which 
enabled hedge funds to seek exemptions from registration requirements as financial 
advisers or investment professionals and thus provided them with the flexibility in making 
investments through their various investment strategies which were not available to 
regulated funds. Chapter Four identifies the recognition of sophisticated investors is 
widespread in financial market regulation and uniformly mandated in all three 
jurisdictions researched in this thesis, the US, UK and Australia. The decisions to seek 
exemptions from registration requirements is a very important proviso or strategy in the 
success of hedge funds as it has been a contributory driver in their growth and their 
continued existence. The absence of any disclosure requirements in relation to the 
investment mandate of hedge funds has enabled them to refrain from revealing proprietary 
information of investment strategies. This has been a critical success factor for hedge funds 
which seek absolute returns by betting against the market. In addition, the non-restrictive 
approach to hedge fund activities has meant that the only real information provided is 
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within their investor prospectus which does not have any substantive deterrence impact 
and is largely ineffective with problems revealed only after a crisis, fraud or failure. 
 
The debate revolving around the regulation of hedge funds has in itself been very 
conflicting with notable scholars arguing that hedge funds are not regulated largely 
because of the ability to incorporate their structures in tax havens while trading in 
regulated financial markets and, hence, the need for regulation. Others state that the 
regulatory structures are in place but the availability of exemptions has enabled hedge 
funds to escape direct regulatory oversight. As will be shown in Chapter Four, this study 
notes that there has always been regulation available in all the jurisdictions analysed but 
hedge funds have been able to take advantage of exemptions to escape registration 
requirements and hence direct regulatory oversight. The exemptions available within 
financial market regulation have enabled hedge funds to seek exemptions from regulation 
which were originally enacted to cater to a wide range of investors and, in this case, 
knowledgeable private investors who are considered able to withstand the risks they are 
taking. This ‘light-touch’ approach has largely been mistaken for a lack of regulation which 
has certainly not been the case. It has also been stated that there is a need for increased 
regulatory disclosure requirements and transparency in valuation practices. Such varieties 
of disclosure requirements have also been in existence for a long time in various forms 
catering to the regulated part of the asset management industry and, due to registration 
flexibilities, have enabled hedge funds to generally not disclose information. 
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The valuation issues pertaining to hedge funds investing generally relate to the manner in 
which the portfolio of a hedge fund is managed, in particular if the fund invests 
predominantly in illiquid assets where ‘marked-to-model’ instead of ‘marked-to-market’ 
methodologies is chosen. Valuation determines the manner in which hedge fund managers 
are compensated and directly reflects on the performance of a manager through which 
forecasted investment decisions are made by investors. Research conducted on hedge fund 
failure and attrition suggests that there is generally no direct relationship between the net 
worth of hedge fund positions and their realizable value at any time. There has been 
dispute over the pricing models which hedge funds use and that this flexibility has meant 
that investors are kept in the dark in regards to the true performance of the fund and the 
value of their investments. The lack of specific procedures and reliance on economic 
models which are not necessarily accurate points to the need for more direct regulatory 
oversight to be enforced within the hedge fund industry. Chapter Five analyses these issues 
in greater detail and in particular the valuation of illiquid financial assets which is a major 
source of operational risks within hedge fund and an area where the risks of manipulation 
and misrepresentation is prevalent. 
 
1.5.3 Protection of Retail Investors 
The third theme of this thesis is the protection of retail investors from the risks through the 
regulation of hedge funds. Retail investors are much less able and likely to seek adequate 
information or adequate protection from hedge funds. Financial market regulators in the 
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US have expressed concern10 at the increasing retailization of hedge funds and the ability of 
unsophisticated investors to be exposed to hedge fund investments (Edwards, 2006).  The 
wealth thresholds that restrict investor access to hedge funds in accordance with the 
accredited investor standard have been eroded by a general rise in income and wealth 
levels. In the US, the UK and Australia, the accredited investor definition is not linked to 
inflation and has not been adjusted to reflect changes in income levels. This means that 
many more, potentially millions, of individuals now qualify and thus a far larger segment of 
the investing public are now able to meet the accredited investor standard necessary to 
access hedge funds as compared to when the standard was established in the respective 
jurisdictions. 
 
The proportion of investments in hedge funds by pension fund investors has increased 
greatly. For example, the global investment in hedge funds by pension funds increased 
from a 5 percent share of capital to a 15 percent share between 1996 and 2004 (Edwards, 
2006). Presumably mutual and pension fund managers are not ‘unsophisticated’, but the 
beneficiaries of the funds they manage will often be and they are the people who are 
ultimately taking on the risk of the investments (Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008). It has also 
become much easier for individual investors to invest in entities which replicate hedge 
fund strategies or incorporated solely to invest in hedge funds known as funds of hedge 
funds. In both the US and the UK funds of hedge funds are treated differently from hedge 
funds; they have lower buy-ins and are available to less-well accredited investors even 
                                                        
10 Brown-Hruska, S. (2004), “Keynote Address: Hedge Fund Best Practices Seminar”, Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Sharon Brown-Hruska, Chairman, CFTC, The Explorer’s Club, New York, New York, 
September 14, 2004. 
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though there is no significant difference between funds of hedge funds and hedge funds 
(Bollen and Pool, 2008). Funds of hedge funds, consisting of investments in two or more 
hedge funds which does not necessarily reduce risk and increases fees, have grown 
recently, now accounting for over 20 percent of the global investment in individual hedge 
funds (Edwards, 2006). 
 
Another method of individual investment is via indexes that ‘clone’ hedge fund strategies, a 
practice used successfully by Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank (Kat, 2007). 
They benefit from not having the exorbitant performance fees, but can suffer from the same 
lack of transparency as hedge funds. Goldman Sachs, the first bank to launch such a 
replication index, keeps its ‘Absolute Return Tracker11’ proprietary; investors know little of 
the strategy that they are investing in. These developments have led some commentators to 
suggest that hedge funds must be regulated more closely as the ‘sophisticated investor’ 
justification no longer holds firm (Pekarek, 2007). The secretive nature of hedge funds 
means they do not have to disclose information regarding their holdings. As such, they can 
diverge from stated investment strategies without investor knowledge, or simply engage in 
fraud. 
 
1.6 Hedge Fund Failures 
This thesis will incorporate several prominent and controversial cases of hedge fund fraud 
and failure to develop themes which will detail the risks certain hedge fund activities may 
                                                        
11 Kat, H.M. (2007), "Alternative Routes To Hedge Fund Return Replication", Global Money Management, dated 
29 Jan 2007, 
http://ezproxy.uow.edu.au/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/docview/203540719
?accountid=15112, Accessed 27 Jan 2013. 
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pose to investors and financial systems globally. The cases include LTCM and Bear Stearns 
Hedge Funds12, Bernard Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Trio Capital. Baxter and Jack 
(2008, p.544) state that “incorporating case analysis in research facilitates the exploration 
of a phenomenon within its context by using a variety of data sources which ensures that 
the issue is not explored through one lens but rather a variety of lenses and allows for 
multiple facets of a phenomenon to be revealed and understood”. The motivation of utilizing 
these cases is in congruence with this theory. The primary data sources used in this study 
were derived from case law, submissions and reports by financial market regulators and 
governmental agencies in the US, UK and Australia as well as international governing 
bodies which are identified in the Figure 1.2 below. This is complemented by an extensive 
literature review, submissions from industry bodies and research agencies, newspaper 
articles and internet searches. Reference to numerous internet sites has been an especially 
important source of information, in particular those provided by regulatory agencies. In the 
dynamic, ever changing financial environment which increasingly characterizes world 
financial markets in an age of technological exuberance, reliance must be increasingly 
placed on sources where information arises from immediate and ephemeral events and 
which may find its way into more enduring media.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 The Bear Stearns Hedge Funds analysed were the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund (HGCF) 
which was incorporated in 2003 and the High-Grade Structured Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund (HGLF) 
created in 2006. 
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Figure 1.2 Regulatory Agencies 
 
United States United Kingdom Australia International 
Regulatory Agencies 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
 
Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) 
 
Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission 
(CFTC) 
 
Federal Reserve 
System (Fed) 
 
Federal Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) 
 
Office of the 
Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) 
 
Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) 
Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) 
 
Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) 
 
Prudential 
Regulation Authority 
(PRA) 
 
Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) 
 
Australian Securities 
and Exchange  
Commission (ASIC) 
 
Reserve Bank Of 
Australia (RBA) 
 
The Australian 
Treasury 
Parliament Of Australia 
– Senate 
Committee/Hansard 
 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) 
 
World Bank (WB) 
 
International 
Organisation of 
Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) 
 
Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) 
 
European Central Bank 
(ECB)  
 
The use of several prominent examples of hedge fund fraud and failure allows a multi-
perspective analysis, a form of triangulation (Feagin and Orum, 1991; Tellis, 1997). 
Triangulation has been generally considered as a process of using multiple perceptions to 
clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation but 
acknowledging that no observations or interpretations are perfectly repeatable. 
Triangulation serves to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is 
being seen (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.444). Denzin (1984) identifies four types of 
triangulation: data source triangulations, when a researcher is looking for a way the data 
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will remain the same in different context; investigator triangulation, a situation where 
several researchers are conducting researches into the same subjects; theory triangulation 
which is a situation where researchers with different viewpoints interpret the same 
results; and methodology triangulation where one approach is followed by another, to 
increase confidence in understanding (George, 2011, p.142; Baxter and Jack, 2008, p.556).  
 
Case research can involve single and multiple examples. A single example may form the 
basis of research on typical, critical or deviant cases while multiple examples may be used 
to compare and contrast different cases (Schell, 1992). The problem of single cases is 
limitations in generalizability and several information-processing biases (Meyer, 2001, 
p.333). Leonard-Barton (1990, p.250) identifies one response to these biases as use of a 
number of prominent examples provides the means to augment external validity. The use 
of multiple cases provides a more rigorous and complete approach than a single case 
analysed due to the triangulation of evidence (Christie et al, 2000, p.15). By looking at a 
range of similar and contrasting cases it is possible to understand a single case finding, 
grounding it by specifying how, where and why it behaves as it does. Using multiple 
examples is useful for investigation, description, and explanation of complex social 
phenomena and the triangulation of multiple cases analysed provide results that are more 
robust than single case design because of the diversified perspectives available (Yin, 1994). 
More importantly, the focus on variety in the type of cases provides for superior analysis 
(Jensen and Jankowski, 1991, p.88). Given the limitations of using a single case in 
emphasizing the impact of the risks within hedge fund operational activities and 
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substantiating appropriate regulatory initiatives in this research, a multiple-case approach 
is more applicable. 
 
A key analytic method used in analysis of multiple cases is replication. The primary focus of 
the analysis is on the overall pattern of results and the extent to which the observed 
pattern of variables matches a predicted one. The researcher examines a single example for 
the pattern and, if it is found, then looks to see if it is found in subsequent cases (Kohn, 
1997, p.6). Yin (2003, p.47) states that multiple case analysis can be used to either predict 
similar results identified as literal replication or predict contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons or theoretical replication. In analyzing multiple cases, replication can 
be achieved within the types or ‘families’ of cases, with predicted variation observed across 
groups (Kohn, 1997, p.6). Although this type of design has its benefits and short comings, 
Baxter and Jack (2008, p.550) state that such a study is considered robust and reliable, 
although time consuming and expensive to conduct. The use of purposefully selected, 
multiple cases was considered critical to this study as it allowed a broader view to be 
undertaken to understand prevalent risks across the hedge fund industry. This approach 
enabled the researcher to achieve a level of saturation that ultimately revealed common 
issues and themes pertaining to the risks within the industry in general. Thus, the use of 
multiple cases enabled the researcher to obtain comprehensive evidence to substantiate 
facts relevant to the motivations of this study. It was also crucial in explaining the impact of 
inadequate regulations in upholding investor protection mandate and the systemic risk 
threats posed by hedge funds, which substantiated the constructs specified in the research 
issues used to guide the study. 
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Chapter Three analyses the collapse of LTCM in 1998 which was the first high profile hedge 
fund failure that posed a risk to the global financial system. Investigations by regulatory 
authorities highlighted operational risk deficiencies which included conflicts of interest 
and misrepresentation of valuation information as a cause of the collapse. The resultant 
proposals recommended increased transparency through a self-regulatory approach to 
hedge fund supervision meant to solve the problem and prevent further crises. However, 
ten years later, the collapse of Bear Stearns Hedge Funds which effectively triggered the 
GFC 2008 showed that this was ineffective. Hence, the motivation for analyzing the collapse 
of Bear Stearns Hedge Funds in Chapter Three is to identify this failure. More importantly, 
the analysis also highlights a common theme in both collapses, that both hedge funds had 
manipulated valuations and misrepresented themselves to investors and counterparties. In 
Chapter Five the Bernard Madoff Investment Securities LLC hedge fund fraud which was 
uncovered in December 2008 is examined. This case was selected primarily to emphasise 
the importance of the need for increased transparency in the hedge fund industry. The 
Madoff fraud was one of the largest hedge fund fraud case costing investors approximately 
USD$50 billion in losses, executed through a simple Ponzi scheme which was perpetrated 
over a period of twenty years. The length of time over which Madoff was able to elude 
investors and carry out these fraudulent activities is presented as testimony to the need for 
increased transparency within the hedge fund industry. The manner in which the fraud was 
committed resonates with similar circumstances as those identified within LTCM and Bear 
Stearns and is extended to the analysis of the collapse of Trio Capital in Chapter Six. The 
collapse of Trio Capital in Australia and its ensuing fraud seeks to detail weaknesses within 
its regulatory framework in adequately protecting retail investors and is the motivation 
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behind this research. The Australian financial market regulatory framework is shown to 
have failed to keep up with the changes and growth within its financial system which has 
surpassed traditional financial intermediation processes and contributed to the rise of the 
shadow banking industry. Although this problem is not isolated to Australia, the level of 
direct participation of its citizenry in the investment management industry is cause for 
concern. Indeed, the financial loss sustained by investors in Trio Capital, especially self-
managed superannuation fund investors, is testament to this fact.  
 
The objective of selecting the cases mentioned was to demonstrate the risks that fraudulent 
activities within hedge fund operations pose to investors and the global financial system.  
The research issues that prompted a need for investigating the fundamental risks which 
hedge funds pose to the Australian financial system due to lack of regulatory oversight or 
transparency requirements have still not been adequately addressed within the financial 
market regulatory framework, by financial market regulators nor industry participants. 
Indeed, this problem is not exclusive to the Australian context as identified in the case 
studies which reveal that the unregulated investing activities of hedge funds have exposed 
investors and the global financial system to tremendous risks, especially after revelations 
of fraud, abuse and misconduct after the global financial crisis.  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
This section explains the structure of the research which is divided into seven Chapters, as 
shown in Figure 1.3.  Chapter Two explains the financial intermediation process and  
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strategies for regulatory supervision undertaken by prudential and conduct-of-business 
market regulators. More importantly, the chapter seeks to emphasize the growth of the 
unregulated shadow banking sector within financial systems globally and show its 
interconnectedness with the regulated banking sector through the credit intermediation 
process. The most obvious hazard of this interconnectedness is the systematic threat posed 
to a financial system should a major party within the intermediation chain collapse. The 
purpose is to present inconsistencies in the approach to financial market supervision by 
understanding the actions taken in defining a regulatory framework for financial markets, 
intermediaries and evaluating the evolutionary dynamics in the innovation of financial 
instruments. This evaluation prescribes the need for strategically formulated regulatory 
policies pertaining to oversight of systemically important financial intermediaries, namely 
hedge funds, and the tremendous risks posed to retail investors, not only in Australia but in 
any financial system where the vulnerabilities of lax regulatory oversight can provide 
loopholes for fraudulent activities.  
 
Chapter Three is an introduction to the hedge fund industry in theory and practice. It is 
important to fully appreciate the dynamics of the hedge fund industry in order to 
understand and effectively analyze the regulatory framework governing hedge funds in the 
US, UK and Australia which will be presented in Chapter Four and Chapter Six.  The 
function and related risks to the financial system associated with their investment 
strategies encapsulates the dichotomy which presents its systemic importance. However, 
this is not restricted to their trading strategies. Hence, operational risks related to 
fraudulent conduct are also analyzed in two case studies, LTCM and Bear Stearns Hedge 
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Funds. The vulnerabilities of hedge funds to fraud risk are subsequently expanded in 
Chapter Five which considers risk transparency within a hedge fund’s operations, including 
valuation risks. 
 
Chapter Four provides a comparative analysis of the approaches of hedge fund regulation 
in the US and the UK before and after the GFC 2008. This chapter has relied on standards 
benchmarking procedures in its analysis of the respective hedge fund regulatory 
approaches which was also applied in identifying best practice initiatives applicable to 
hedge fund risk transparency in Chapter Five. The approach is to learn from the difference 
in policy objectives and specific regulatory language in each jurisdiction and also focus on 
the quality of the regulatory environment in terms of actual practices, from the point of 
view of the hedge fund industry. The evaluation presented the researcher with valuable 
insight into the direction of regulatory initiatives undertaken by financial market 
regulators in two of the largest financial markets globally. An understanding of these 
approaches was fundamental in analyzing the regulatory framework governing hedge 
funds in Australia under the Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998 and in identifying 
possible areas of weaknesses, presented in Chapter Six. 
 
Chapter Five details the central theme of the thesis from the micro perspective: risk 
transparency and informational disclosure to investors. Risk management is about 
mitigating the ‘unknown unknowns’ within the multi-faceted risk profiles of hedge funds. 
Information in this area is limited and hence knowledge is drawn from submissions by 
public organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Presidents 
51 
 
Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG), European Central Bank (ECB) and relevant 
industry organisations. The focus is on promoting transparent hedge fund informational 
procedures, the success of which has been slow in growing. A new dynamic approach to 
supervising hedge funds is proposed where there is information transparency with 
emphasis through disclosure requirements and effective due diligence by suitably qualified 
and knowledgeable professionals. The chapter is extended to evaluate the operational risks 
of hedge funds by analyzing hedge fund failures and subsequently the risks inherent in net 
asset valuation procedures. It begins with an introduction to the available research 
statistics of hedge fund failures. This is followed by an analysis of the notion of ‘operational 
risks’ within hedge funds. Although an area of limited academic research, the fallout from 
the GFC 2008 has brought to light the need of investors to focus on this area of knowledge 
and hence increase awareness, especially in the NAV of hedge funds, which is addressed. 
The collapse of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities LLC, one of the largest hedge fund 
fraud in financial history, has been chosen as a basis of analysis as the fraud itself was 
uniquely different and defies the feasibility of current regulatory and disclosure capacity of 
hedge funds in, ultimately, protecting investors.  
 
Chapter Six provides, examines and evaluates the manner in which hedge funds are 
regulated in Australia, in particular the effectiveness of the ‘twin peaks’ model of financial 
market supervision carried out within the jurisdiction and the success of the conduct and 
disclosure rules under the Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998 in establishing a safe 
investing environment for retail investors in Australia. An important aspect of conducting 
this research is the collapse of Trio Capital and complexities in which the fraud was carried 
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out. The chapter concludes with a detailed analysis of this case in substantiating argument 
of regulatory failure as opposed to a failure of government in preventing what has been 
described as the largest hedge fund fraud in Australia’s history. 
 
The final chapter, Chapter Seven, summarizes the findings of this research and the lessons 
learnt pertaining to the hedge fund industry. Analysis of the future regulatory agenda in the 
US and the UK presents a case of increased disclosure and conduct-of-business rules which 
would be considered as mere rhetoric if not enforced effectively. Indeed, more importantly, 
a similar perception will be encountered in Australia should adequate actions not be taken 
as the superannuation fund industry grows and its collective funds under management 
exceeds expectations. Following the issues identified in Chapter Five, a definitive solution is 
to extenuate the fraud risks which certain hedge fund activities pose. As the industry 
evolves, new fraud risks will emerge and this chapter extends the discussions while 
addressing its relevance for future research in this discipline of study. 
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CHAPTER 2   
 FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND REGULATORY 
ARCHITECTURE 
 
“Is finance a game, or is it much more important than that? It should be 
something else entirely. Finance ought to provide an economy with an efficient 
means of allocating capital. It should provide a means of price discovery of 
assets, whether real or financial. It should provide a safe and reliable payments 
system. Financial innovations are worthwhile if, and only if, they help in those 
areas. All too often, players see financial innovation as providing ways to 
manipulate the system and make money off less savvy traders” 
  
- Floyd Norris, New York Times, August 25, 20111 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a detailed analysis of the evolving complexities within financial 
intermediation processes of the 21st century which have advanced at a faster pace than the 
related financial market regulatory architecture has been able to keep up with. The aim is 
to establish the necessary linkages which will enable an understanding of the intricacies 
involved in regulating the hedge fund industry. Drawing upon an article published on the 
World Bank2 website, this section provides an introduction to the current debt crisis to 
emphasise the gravity of the ongoing risks within the global financial system.  
                                                        
1 Norris, F. (2012), “South Korea Clamps down on Traders”, New York Times, dated 25 Aug 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/business/south-korea-clamps-down-on-traders.html?_r=4, Accessed 
25 Aug 2012. 
2. Canuto, O. (2012), “Goodbye Financial Engineers, Hello Political Wonks” blogsWorldBank.org, dated 08 Sept 
2012, http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/goodbye-financial-engineers-hello-political-wonks, Accessed 8 
September 2012. 
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The aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929 led to changes in the regulatory architecture 
of financial markets in the US, and today we are seeing similar actions after the GFC 2008 
but on a global scale. The approaches to financial market regulation to date have been 
based on the premise of the traditional form of business categories with little reflection of 
the changes in the manner financial intermediation has been transformed over the last 
thirty years.  Chief among the changes has been convergence in the financial products and 
services offered by traditional intermediaries and new market entrants, as well as a shift in 
capital raising and risk-bearing methodologies from the traditional financial intermediaries 
to the capital markets and extending into the shadow banking sector.  This market-based 
intermediation has enable transactional exchange to evolve and change the manner in 
which business is conducted (Whitehead, 2010, pp.2-4).  
 
The growth of the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model meant that banks no longer held the loans 
they originated on their balance sheet, but sold them off into the unregulated or shadow 
banking sector of the financial system (Bord and Santos, 2012, p.25). The segmentation of 
the US banking industry, a legacy of earlier banking laws that persisted through the 
deregulation movement between the 1970s to the 2000s, also contributed to the 
development of equity and bond markets in the United States, which are now the main 
source of finance for non-financial organizations in the US and an extension of this practice 
into the UK through the interconnectedness of both financial centres. Significant 
advancements in financial innovation over the last decades have resulted in a shift of 
financial resources into the shadow banking sector, facilitated by credit intermediation 
strategies which are not entirely within the control of current regulatory approaches. 
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These risk transformation processes has also increased the demand for more innovative 
financial practices and the use of special purpose vehicles which facilitate transactions. The 
rise of the hedge fund industry over the past 30 years has been fuelled by this demand, the 
hunger for higher yield and returns. Statutory limitations placed on bank financial 
intermediaries have always been an issue widely debated as impeding financial innovation 
and efficiency which encouraged the rise of the shadow banking industry (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2010; Poschmann, 2012;  Poszar et al 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Farhi and 
Cintra, 2009; Poszar 2008).  The emergence is a result of arbitrage opportunities stemming 
from the imposition of regulations and the inevitable tendency of firms and market 
participants to minimize the impact of regulations and their concomitant cost (IIF, 2012, 
p.5). The unregulated nature of such investment vehicles has been enabled by regulatory 
frameworks which prescribe innovation and growth, some might say, at all cost.  
  
This chapter provides a primer of the nexus between regulatory approaches taken by 
governments and financial market regulators and the financial intermediation processes 
which have evolved into a globally interconnected financial system to include the shadow 
banking sector. This evolution prescribes the need for strategically formulated regulatory 
policies pertaining to oversight of systemically important financial institutions, namely 
hedge funds, and lays the foundations for analysis of subsequent chapters in particular the 
tremendous risks posed to retail investors in Australia. The purpose of financial market 
regulation is identified in section 2.2 to explain the current supervisory approaches 
promoted by regulatory agencies globally. This substantiates the inapplicability of such 
supervisory approaches and regulatory tools within the modern financial system, one 
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which is not segmented to specific functions or forms of financial intermediaries. The 
analysis of market regulators is extended to the tools used in enacting regulation, 
consistent with the principles-based versus rules-based regulatory philosophy and 
analysed in terms of costs and benefits. The supervisory approaches and regulatory tools 
used subsequently will be applied to distinguish their respective validity for modern 
financial intermediation processes, in theory and practice.  In particular, an analysis of the 
functions of financial intermediation is conducted and the relationship between the 
regulated financial sector and the extension of activities into the unregulated shadow 
financial system is conceptualised in section 2.3. This is elaborated by firstly establishing 
and explaining the traditional financial intermediation process as an integral part of 
financial markets by analyzing its functions. The argument is extended to include the 
shadow banking sector through credit intermediation processes to gain an understanding 
of the transformation of financial intermediation into its modern interconnected form 
globally substantiating that hedge funds are key players. The sections of the chapter are 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 below. 
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2.2 Regulation, the Financial System and the Economy 
A stable and efficient financial system has a potentially powerful influence on a country’s 
economic development by having an impact on the level of capital formation, the efficiency 
with which capital is allocated and the confidence that investors have in the integrity of the 
financial system (Llewellyn, 2006, p.5). Developed financial systems ease the exchange of 
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goods and services by providing payment services, help mobilize and pool savings from a 
large number of investors, acquire and process information and thus allocate society’s 
savings to its most productive use (Braasch, 2010. p.98). Financial intermediaries have the 
necessary resources and developed systems to enable the monitoring of enterprises and 
analyzing possible investment projects, exerting corporate governance, and help in 
diversifying and reducing risks through financial markets (Levine, 1997 and 2005). 
According to Merton and Bodie (1995, p.2 and pp.15-21), a financial system performs six 
basic functions.  It provides facilities for the clearing and settlement of securities through 
which financial resources are pooled and portfolio risk diversification is achieved. Risk 
diversification is enhanced through efficient risk management services which provide price 
information to help coordinate decentralized decision making in the various sectors of the 
economy. It intermediates the transfer of economic resources across sectors and 
jurisdictions and provide ways of dealing with the incentive problems created by 
information asymmetry. However, measures that assure greater financial robustness may 
also make financial intermediation less efficient or innovative. For example, efforts to 
promote financial innovation may erode transparency, safety and soundness (Walter and 
Cooley, 2010, p.35). 
 
For more than four decades, financial markets and the development of the regulations that 
govern them were largely underpinned by a theory known as the efficient markets 
hypothesis 3(EMH).  First expounded by the economist Eugene Fama in 19654, the theory 
                                                        
3 Cohen, N. (2012), “Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Inefficient”, Financial Times; dated 24 Jan 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb7e1b6e-46bc-11e1-bc5f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27eNU9IFa; Accessed 
24 January 2012. 
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holds that investors respond rationally to publicly available information, that market prices 
for assets fully reflect all the publicly known information about a security and that when 
prices are too high, given expected returns, rational investors sell (Ball, 1989, p.4). The 
validity of this theory in modern day finance has been argued consistently, especially in 
light of the volatile asset price movements during the periods after the GFC 2008. At a 
conference at Princeton University, US Federal Reserve Bank Chairman, Ben Bernanke, 
made a speech entitled “The Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economists5” where he 
stated that: 
Economic principles and research have been central to understanding and 
reacting to the crisis. That said, the crisis and its lead up also challenged 
some important economic principles and research agenda. Most economic 
researchers continue to work within the classical paradigm that assumes 
rational, self-interested behavior and the maximization of ‘expected utility’, a 
framework based on a formal description of risky situations and a theory of 
individual choice that has been very useful through its integration of 
economics, statistics, and decision theory. However, during the worst phase 
of the financial crisis, many economic actors, including investors, employers, 
and consumers metaphorically threw up their hands and admitted that, given 
the extreme and, in some ways, unprecedented nature of the crisis, they did 
not know what they did not know. 
 
It is undeniable that these theoretical philosophies contributed more to the growth of an 
asset bubble rather than acting as an effective mechanism of price discovery as over-
reliance on the principles of demand and supply refute the need for a higher-standard of 
care in regulating financial markets, a point of view which greatly motivated the financial 
market deregulatory strategies of the US and the UK in the 1980s. In encouraging 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4 Fama, E. (1965), “The Behavior of Stock Market Prices”, Journal of Business, vol.38(1), pp.34-105. 
5 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Speech By Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, 
“Implications of The Financial Crisis For Economics”, At a Conference Co-Sponsored by The Centre for 
Economic Policy Studies and the Bendheim Centre for Finance, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100924a.htm, Accessed 24 January 2012. 
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deregulation, politicians effectively disregarded the benefits which a well-structured 
regulatory regime has in promoting the efficiency and stability of financial systems. 
 
There are four pillars of effective regulatory architecture that are common across all 
financial systems. Good architecture should encourage innovation and efficiency, provide 
transparency, ensure safety and soundness and promote competitiveness in global markets 
(Acharya et al, 2010, p.33). A central issue therefore is whether the institutional structure 
of financial regulation and supervision has any bearing on the efficiency of financial 
regulation and supervision itself and its impact on the wider financial risks (Llewellyn, 
2006, p.5).   
 
Globalization resulted in interconnected financial markets and increases in their risk 
correlation but market regulators have continued to maintain a myopic focus on their 
supervisory responsibility, restricted by jurisdictions. Caprio et al (2008, p.43) showed that 
the main reason behind the recent GFC 2008 and financial instability was a failure of 
regulators and supervisors to protect investors in various countries where contradictory 
political and bureaucratic incentives undermined their capacity for effective financial 
regulation and supervision and not the actions of greedy individuals or the unexpected 
weakening of major institutions in various countries (Moshirian, 2011 p.3). Indeed, the GFC 
2008 has shown that lightly regulated financial markets are inherently unstable and, more 
importantly, regulators are increasingly faced with the difficult task of trying to balance the 
immeasurable against the unknowable. Therefore, the theoretical foundations 
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underpinning public intervention6 in financial markets, which are based on the need to 
correct market imperfections, protect market actors against fraud, regulatory failure7 and 
to ensure that true and fair information8 is disseminated to attain stability and the efficient 
use and distribution of resources has to consider the very imperfections which bind its 
existence. 
 
A chief objective of regulating financial markets and services is to protect investors by 
creating a stable environment which is functionally transparent while promoting 
competition, innovation and growth. This has to be achieved through sustainable controls 
of financial intermediaries without curtailing financial liberalization9 (Arner and Buckley, 
2010, pp.11-15). The measures pertaining to the stability of financial intermediaries to date 
can be subdivided into two categories; general rules on the stability of all business 
enterprises and entrepreneurial activities, for example the legally required amount of 
capital, borrowing limits and integrity requirements, and more specific rules which have to 
                                                        
6 Stiglitz, J. (1993), “The Role of The State in Financial Markets”, World Bank Research Observer, Annual 
Conference on Development Economics Supplement, March 1993, pp.19-63, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1994/03/698575/role-state-financial-markets, Accessed 1 
January 2012. 
7 IMF (2010), “Market Interventions During the Financial Crisis, How Effective and How to Disengage?”, 
International Monetary Fund  Chapter 3, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/chap3.pdf, 
Accessed 1 January 2012. 
8 EU (2011), “EFSF Guidelines on Interventions in Secondary Markets”, European Union, European Financial 
Stability Mechanism, dated 29 November 2011 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_guideline_on_interventions_in_the_secondary_market.pdf, 
Accessed 1 January 2012. 
9 Financial liberalization and liquidity constraints are not the same thing. Liquidity constraints arise when 
consumers who would like to borrow are not able to. Liberalization, in its broadest context, represents the 
situation where financial institutions make more credit available to consumers and firms. Thus, although 
financial liberalization can affect the probability that a consumer be liquidity constrained, the opposite is not 
true: i.e. liquidity constraints are endogenous, whereas financial liberalization is taken to be exogenous. 
Fernandez-Corugedo and Price (2002), “Financial Liberalization and Consumer Expenditure: “FLIB” Re-
examined”, Bank of England, UK, Working papers, 2002, p.9, footnote 1, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/workingpapers/wp157.pdf, Accessed 7 July 2013. 
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be introduced due to the special nature of financial intermediaries, such as limits to 
portfolio investments and the regulation of off-balance sheet activities (Di Giorgio et al, 
2000, p.6). However, these objectives have been enacted to specifically apply to the 
regulated sector of a financial system where information is accessible and transparency is 
mandated. Investing activities which involve considerable risks are usually carried out in 
the unregulated or shadow banking sector where transparency is secondary to 
profitability. Thus it is important for financial market regulators to consider the risk impact 
of the shadow banking system in its investor protection mandate (Schwarcz, 2013, pp.6-9). 
This can be carried out by laying the foundations of rational supervision, quick intervention 
and spreading financial awareness among the public while promoting increased 
transparency. Transparency rules within financial systems facilitate equitable conduct and 
reduce information asymmetry, protectionism and collusion amongst market participants 
(Cseres, 2008, pp.81-83). Such rules also enhance market efficiency through the price 
discovery process developing trust in the system, and the eventual enhancement of the 
competitiveness in financial services. Another objective of financial market regulation, 
linked with the general objective of efficiency, is the safeguarding of promotion of 
competition in financial intermediation (Di Gorgio, 2000, p.8).  
 
Financial markets have undergone rapid transformation brought about by financial 
liberalization, technological innovation and by globalization leading to greater 
interconnectedness, for example, through the assets and liability management10 strategies 
                                                        
10 Asset Liability Management (ALM) can be defined as a mechanism to address the risk faced by a bank due to 
a mismatch between assets and liabilities either due to liquidity or changes in interest rates. Liquidity is an 
institution’s ability to meet its liabilities either by borrowing or converting assets. Apart from liquidity, a 
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of sovereigns, financial institutions and corporations (IMF, 2010, pp.6–11). Financial 
liberalization, in turn, has unleashed competitive forces in financial intermediation, first 
within the regulated banking systems and subsequently within shadow banking, leading to 
a blurring of boundaries among previously delineated subsectors such as banking, 
securities markets and insurance (Quintyn, 2012, p.1). Financial globalization has made 
cross border capital flows highly mobile while also enabling riskier, toxic assets to move 
from one financial centre to another instantaneously (Moshirian, 2011, p.509). This has 
also led to increases in vulnerabilities to systemic failure and contagion, which in turn, has 
become more evident because of financial liberalization (Stiglitz, 2010, pp.1-5). 
 
Fundamental changes in the nature of financial intermediation have exposed the 
shortcomings of financial market supervisory approaches which have not been updated to 
react to changes in business structures (G30, 2008, p.12). The increasing need for effective 
financial governance will require response to these changes by building regulatory 
capacity. This includes rules for control over the structure of competition in the markets 
and regulations in the matter of concentrations, cartels and abuse of dominant position. 
Specific controls over financial intermediation are justified by the forms that competition 
can assume in that field. They relate to the promotion of competition as well as to limiting 
possible destabilizing excesses generated by competition itself (Di Giorgio, 2000, p.7-8).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
bank may also have a mismatch due to changes in interest rates as banks typically tend to borrow short term 
(fixed or floating) and lend long term (fixed or floating). Oracle Financial Services, (Undated), “Asset Liability 
Management: An Overview”, http://www.oracle.com/us/industries/financial-services/045581.pdf, 
Accessed 3 January 2012 
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Hence, in order to improve the investor protection mandate of financial market regulators, 
an understanding of the systemic significance of the shadow banking industry should focus 
on addressing the extent to which a failure could cause disruption to key financial markets 
and loss of confidence. Specifically, entities such as hedge funds, which engage in financial 
activities on a leveraged basis, should be regulated regardless of the legal status of the 
institution in order to capture all entities that contribute to systemic risk on a significant 
scale (Carvajal et al, 2009, p.8). An appreciation of the financial market supervisory models 
is a crucial element in developing appropriate contingencies against future systemic 
failures of hedge funds. Effective regulatory policies must focus on the principal problems 
that financial regulation is intended to address relating to financial stability and risk-taking. 
Doing so, however, requires a prospective assessment of the markets as a whole and a 
review of the supervisory tools available to regulators, in order to formulate proactive 
rather than the reactive procedures that characterize much of financial regulation today. In 
enacting hedge fund regulation objectively, legislators have to balance the regulatory tools 
available and facilitate effective enforcement through credible supervisory models, a task 
which has been difficult to implement because of the elusiveness of the industry. The 
following sections will discuss approaches to financial market regulation and present an 
analysis of the available tools. 
 
2.3 Financial Market Supervisory Models 
The GFC 2008 has shown that regulators are faced with a difficult task of keeping up with 
the constant changes in the evolution of financial services, the different incorporated 
structures and innovative financial instruments available. Few would argue that the failure 
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of regulation or supervisory approaches was partly to be blamed for the crisis (Jickling and 
Murphy, 2010, p.1). In February 2009, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner summed 
up two key problems stating that the US financial system operated with large gaps in 
meaningful oversight and without sufficient constrains to limit risk. Even institutions that 
were overseen by complicated, overlapping systems of multiple regulators were faced 
with difficulties in managing the extreme risk events, the failures which helped lay the 
foundation for the worst economic crisis in generations11. It is more evident now than ever 
that changes need to be made in the manner in which financial market regulatory 
supervision is conducted to prevent a continual reoccurrence of asset bubbles and 
consequent financial crises. There are four main approaches to financial market 
supervision applied by regulators worldwide namely, the Institutional Approach, the 
Functional Approach, the Integrated Approach and finally, the Twin Peaks approach. The 
following provides a detailed analysis of these distinct methods.  
 
The Institutional Approach is one of the classical forms of financial regulatory oversight 
based on the legal-entity concept. A financial intermediary’s legal status, for example, an 
entity registered as a bank, a broker-dealer or an insurance company, essentially 
determines which regulator is tasked with overseeing its activity both from a safety and 
soundness and business conduct perspective (van Grinsven, 2010, p.19; G30, 2008, p.24). 
This legal status also determines the scope of the entity’s permissible business activities 
                                                        
11 Bloomberg (2009), “Timothy Geithner’s Feb 10 Speech on Financial Recovery (Text)”, dated 10 Feb 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahSJwkdThtlo,  Accessed 5 January 2012; 
Department of Treasury, US Government, (2010), “Financial Regulatory Reform – A New Foundation: 
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation”, Department of Treasury, United States Government, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf, Accessed 5 January 2012 
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(G30, 2008, p.24). Therefore, supervision of each financial intermediary is based on the 
concept that there is one supervisory authority as a counterpart with the requisite 
specialist knowledge about that segment and, hence results in effective realization of 
controls with the intention of avoiding duplication and reducing costs of regulation (Fein, 
1995, pp.90-91; Kumulachew, 2011, p.38). This model is effective as long as coordination 
among agencies is achieved and maintained when business models of financial 
intermediaries are uniform and there is strict separation of responsibilities between 
financial intermediaries within the financial system (Llewellyn, 2005, pp.339-342).  
However, financial liberalization has led to suboptimal oversight by regulatory agencies 
resulting in inefficiencies of enforcement as regulators are restricted by form rather than 
function of the financial intermediaries in carrying out their responsibilities, even though 
the operational capacities of such firms have continued to remain similar (Thakor, 2012, 
p.143). Regulatory unevenness and inconsistency will result, leading to unfair treatment if 
financially identical products are treated differently depending on the traditionally defined 
sector of the institutions that have produced them. Regulatory arbitrage may therefore 
occur from the institutional approach to supervision, for example financial products 
offered under the banking regime are often treated differently than if they were offered as 
an insurance product, although intrinsically they may be largely identical (Wymeersch, 
2007, pp.253-255). There is also the risk that financial intermediaries may choose a 
specific jurisdiction to incorporate their legal form in order to escape regulatory oversight, 
enabled by the interconnectedness of financial markets (Butler and Macey, 1988, p.681; 
Scott, 1977). 
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The Functional Approach12 of market supervision is where supervisory oversight is 
determined by the business that is transacted, without regard to its legal status, and each 
type of business will have its own functional regulator (Cunningham and Zaring, 2009, 
p.64; G20, 2008, p.34). The concept of a functional approach was developed based on 
theories by Nobel Laureate Robert C Merton (1995)13 which viewed the supervision of 
financial functions as more stable than financial institutions as functions change less over 
time and vary less across borders (Merton, 1995, pp.23-41). The functional perspective 
views financial innovation as driving the financial system towards its goal of economic 
efficiency14. This is particularly relevant as competition within financial systems has 
enabled institutions to evolve into new and more efficient forms and hence developing a 
supervisory structure which focuses on the functions of financial intermediaries may lead 
to more effective oversight. Within the functional supervisory model, regulators are 
delegated authority in their areas of functional specialization. 
 
According to the Functional Approach, the legal form of the organization is not as relevant 
as the services it provides. For example, an organization incorporated as a bank may 
provide many services which would include deposit taking, insurance and engage in 
proprietary trading. Regulators are segmented according to these specific functions and are 
meant to provide uniform oversight (Di Giorgio et al, 2000, pp.6-7). The advantage of this is 
                                                        
12 SFC (Undated), “Regulatory Structure for Financial Supervision”, Securities and Futures Commission Hong 
Kong, Appendix 1, p.78, 
http://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Appendices.pdf, Accessed 12 
May 2012. 
13 Merton, R. (1995), “A Functional Perspective to Financial Intermediation” Financial Management, Silver 
Anniversary Commemoration (Summer 1995), vol.24(2), pp.23-41. 
14 Theories of financial innovation that are consistent with this view are: Allen and Gale (1988, 1990, 1994), 
Benston and Smith (1976), Diamond (1984), Fama (1980). 
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that rules and policies initiated would be non-discriminatory, provide assurance to 
financial intermediaries of consistency in supervision and hence confidence in regulators. 
One of the drawbacks of this approach is that there would be an over reliance on a 
complicated model of financial regulatory agencies with the risk of excessive division of 
competencies. Furthermore, the functional approach does not take into account that fraud 
and failure within a financial intermediary may not be because of individual activities but 
rather the institution as a whole. For example, the ‘London Whale’ debacle within 
investment bank JP Morgan saw investor losses of approximately USD$6.2 billion and was 
identified as a “widespread failure of risk management within the firm15” as opposed to a 
rogue trader, as was initially identified. 
 
The Integrated Approach to financial supervision is based on the premise that all 
supervision for financial services and intermediaries comes under one regulator (G30, 
2008, p.24). The impetus for the integrated approach has been the recognition of the rise of 
the financial services conglomerate model and centres around the ‘principles of good 
regulation’ which focuses on efficiency and economy, the role of management, 
proportionality, innovation, the international character of financial services and 
competition16.  The Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the UK was established as a single 
regulator that conducted both safety and soundness oversight and conduct-of-business 
regulation for all sectors of the financial services business. One of the advantages of such an 
                                                        
15 Sliver-Greenberg, J. (2012), “JP Morgan Says Traders Obscured Losses in First Quarter”, dated 13 July 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/jpmorgan-says-traders-obscured-losses-in-first-quarter/, 
Accessed 13 July 2012. 
16 FSA (Undated),”Principles of Good Regulation”, Financial Services Authority, United Kingdom, 
www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Aims/Principles/index.shtml, Accessed 16 July 2012. 
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approach is that one regulator confronts all types of financial intermediaries and synergies 
in the execution of supervision which can be exploited by combining different supervisory 
activities within the one institution, which might also generate efficiency gains by 
combining support services for different supervisory tasks (Kremers et al, 2003, p.234). 
These synergies enable swift and decisive action to be taken in the event of a crisis 
situation. Crisis management usually requires key decisions to be taken within hours, 
rather than days, hence combining both conduct-of-business and prudential supervision 
within a single institution ensures that relevant information is available at short notice and 
that a speedy decision to act can be taken if necessary (Schoenmaker, 2003, pp.45–46). The 
synergy between prudential and conduct-of-business supervision enables a regulator to 
confront all types of financial institutions with a uniform approach or strategy (Arner and 
Buckley, 2010, pp.50-51). This might also generate efficiency gains by combining support 
services for different supervisory tasks (Masciandaro, 2005, pp.436-437). However, there 
are trade-offs to such an approach which may arise due to the different nature of 
supervisory objectives. Conflicts of supervisory interest may evolve, for example the 
prudential supervisor will be interested in the soundness of financial institutions, including 
their profitability, while the conduct-of-business supervisor will focus on the interests of 
clients (de la Torre and Ize, 2009). Mixing up the responsibilities of financial stability and 
conduct-of-business could create incentives for the supervisor to give preference to one 
objective over the other (Kremers et al, 2003, pp.234-236). Furthermore, preserving public 
confidence and stability will require discretion and confidentiality which may be 
counterproductive to the transparency objective of regulated financial systems (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2003; Kremers et al, 2003, p.236). 
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Finally, the Twin Peaks Approach, a model which is not uniformly applied internationally, 
was developed on principles to overcome deficiencies within the three other approaches. It 
is based on the principle that financial services supervision should evolve according to a 
theory that there should be two regulators, one responsible for prudential regulation of 
financial intermediaries and one responsible for market conduct-of-disclosure regulation 
of financial products being offered to retail and institutional investors (G30, 2008, p.188). 
Under this approach, there is generally a split between the wholesale and retail activity and 
oversight of retail activity by the conduct-of-business regulator and does not take into 
consideration or discriminate against the legal form or the functions of the intermediaries 
(GAO, 2009, pp.11–13). This enables functional efficiency in a complex market 
microstructure environment where financial conglomerates and specialist financial 
intermediaries exist coherently, extending to various business sectors (Masciandro, 2004, 
pp.161-164). The duplication of supervision is aimed to be avoided as respective regulators 
focus on specific functions within business units and consistency in regulatory enforcement 
is achieved. However, this approach could invariably lead to a duplication of supervisory 
efforts and possibly even lax regulatory enforcement, if effective coordination and 
communication between authorities is not established (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2007, 
pp.348–349). In practice, prudential and conduct-of-business regulation requires the 
examination of very similar issues and, therefore, there would be significant overlap 
between both regulatory agencies (Taylor, 2009, p.80). Briault (1999, p.25) explains that 
this overlap is also inherent within financial intermediaries where conduct-of-business and 
prudential controls are managed directly by designated compliance committees 
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responsible for ensuring that management responsibilities are properly allocated with 
essential internal control systems in place.  
 
In short, prudential and conduct-of-business regulation essentially focuses on the same 
fundamental issues. It is important to appreciate that the effectiveness of supervisory 
strategies assumed by legislators is inherently reliant on the regulatory approaches 
available. The following section discusses two of the more prominent regulatory 
approaches and aims to clarify specific vulnerabilities and possibly obstacles faced by 
financial market regulators in efficiently supervising financial intermediaries of the 21st 
century.  
 
2.4 Regulatory Approaches: Principles v. Rules Based Regulation 
The debate over the best regulatory approach to be taken in the surveillance of financial 
markets has gained increasing attention as the global financial crisis deepens and 
regulators respond to tighten controls and tackle the problem of ineffective regulation 
which was inherent within fragmented regulatory structures which were unable to cope 
with new financial products and circumstances in a changing world (Brunnermeier et al, 
2009, p.74). Effective regulatory design should reflect an appropriately granulated 
understanding of the complexities which have evolved within financial intermediation 
processes and the adaptive nature of financial intermediaries which extends into the 
shadow banking sector of financial systems globally (Ford, 2010, p.261). The primary 
objective of any regulatory regime is to achieve legislative congruence, namely, to induce 
industry actions that are in compliance with statutory requirements and the choice 
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between rules and principles based regulation has to be reactive to changing circumstances 
(Diver, 1983, p.67; Di Lorenzo, 2012, p.47).  
 
Principles-based regulation is focused on the application of a broad set of standards which 
aim at certain specific outcomes17. It places greater reliance on principles and is outcome-
focused with high level directives as a means to drive at regulatory aims and relies less on 
prescriptive rules18. To be effective, there needs to be close engagement between the 
regulators and the regulated, based on mutual trust. Firms would need to go beyond 
minimal compliance with regulatory requirements, outcomes and goals have to be clearly 
communicated by the regulator, the enforcement regime has to be predictable and the 
culture of litigation has to be restrained (Black, 2008, p.427). According to Black et al 
(2007, p.192) principle-based regulation has the following features. It is written in a broad 
manner so it is appropriate for flexible use. The purpose of each article within a regulation 
contains qualitative terms and not quantitative terms and is applicable to the whole spectre 
of activities. It contains behavioral standards such as experience, integrity, care and 
violation of standards which should be based on guilt; sanctions are civil but under the 
administrative or criminal law. In the context of statutory drafting, principles-based 
regulation means legislation that contains more directives that are cast at a higher level of 
generality. A principles-based system looks to principles first and uses them, instead of 
detailed rules, wherever feasible (Ford, 2010, p.265).  
                                                        
17 Smith, H. (2007), “Principles Based Regulation in Principle and Practice” 
http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/1EA2E1A0-B64C-4F20-8719-
7DA072C0AE28/3731/5924PBRBrochureD3.pdf, Accessed 15 June 2012. 
18 FSA (2007), “Principles-Based Regulation – Focusing on the Outcomes that Matter” Financial Services 
Authority UK, April 2007, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf, Accessed 17 August 2011. 
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Rules-based regulation, as the name implies, is based on detailed, definitive requirements 
or rules. As defined by Sunstein (1995, p.961), rules-based regulations are approaches to 
law that try to make most, or nearly all, legal judgments under the governing legal 
provision in advance of actual cases. Rules situate actors in the same condition and state a 
determinate result that follows from one or more triggering facts (Sullivan, 1992, p.58). 
Thus, a rule generally entails an advance determination of what conduct is permissible, 
leaving only factual issues to be determined by the frontline regulator or decision maker 
(Ford, 2008, p.7). In turn, rules-based statutory drafting relates to legislation that contains 
more directives with specific details. There are more concrete factors and definite details 
required for compliance than general principles of conduct (Shao, 2010, p.45). 
 
A number of scholars have used the relatively straightforward rules-principles dichotomy 
as a vehicle for evaluating the structural and analytical choices that go into lawmaking 
(Kaplow, 1985, Kennedy, 1976, Schlag, 1985, Sunstein, 1995). Arguments about, and 
definitions of, rules and principles-based regulation commonly emphasize the distinction 
between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post (Kaplow, 1992, p.951). For 
example, a rule may entail an advance determination of what conduct is permissible, 
leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator while principles may result in leaving both 
specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator (Kaplow, 
1992, p.590). In the context of securities regulation, rules tend to implement technical 
regulatory policy while principles reflect a wider array of values (Park, 2012, p.119). Thus, 
it can be implied that the only real distinction between rules and principles is within the 
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content of the law which gives force to regulatory action before or after the act of a possible 
breach or misconduct. Accordingly, the debate for and against rules and principles are set 
forth based on three distinct arguments: deterrence, cost and enforcement. 
 
Legislation is designed and promulgated based on the need to prevent the occurrence of a 
particular conduct or activity which may be detrimental to the wellbeing of societal norms. 
It is thus possible that both rules and principles when applied in an appropriate manner 
will best serve this cause. The application of principles instead of strict rules as a deterrent 
to unacceptable conduct through evaluative terms allows individuals to make judgments 
about the gravity of their action. Principles-based regulation enables flexibility in 
interpretation and because the distinction between permissible and impermissible conduct 
is not fixed, but is case specific, individuals will be deterred from engaging in borderline 
conduct and encouraged to substitute less offensive types of conduct (Black et al, 2007, 
p.195; Sclag, 1985, p.3). However, if uncertainty over the interpretation of the principle 
prevails, the supervised entity or individual may cautiously interpret the principle as a rule 
(Di Lorenzo, 2006, p.268; Park, 2012, p.130). The vagueness of principle-based regulations 
in detailing permissible and impermissible conduct may also discourage risk averse 
individuals from engaging in permissible activities and motivate those who are receptive to 
risk to push the boundaries (Nelson, 2003, pp.99-100). Adjudicators are also placed in a 
dilemma as the unavailability of detailed guidelines for inappropriate conduct creates 
confusion and produces inconsistent judgments. 
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Rules draw a distinct line between forbidden and permissible conduct, allowing persons 
subject to the rule to determine whether their actual or contemplated conduct lies on one 
side of the law or the other (Schlag, 1985, p.2). Individuals who are thus aware of the 
details of any prohibited conduct will take the necessary actions to refrain from 
participating (Sunstein, 1995, p.961). Rules also provide detailed information about 
acceptable actions enabling individuals to carry out their actions with confidence. 
Alternatively, the details set out in rules-based regulation do not provide flexibility in 
actions and extend the risk taking capacity of individuals up to the point of permissible 
conduct (Burgemeestre et al, 2009). Hence, the application of uniform regulatory actions 
against illegal activity regardless of the gravity of the act fails to distinguish between 
offenses as opposed to a technical violation. This will enable individuals and organizations 
to take advantage of prescribed boundaries within the law and the deterrent potential of 
said rules may be rendered fruitless. 
 
Comparative analysis of principles versus rules-based regulation in legal academe seldom 
extends to the cost effectiveness of such regulatory approaches. It is understandable to 
accept that the provision of regulation is a social good as it deters illegal conduct and hence 
should not be quantified by value, that is, the costs involved. In reality, enforcement and 
judicial action carries with it substantial costs where agencies are limited in their reach and 
hence value is an important consideration. In his seminal paper “Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis’’, Louis Kaplow (1992) conducted a detailed analysis of the extent to 
which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or principles. His findings state that 
rules are more costly to promulgate than principles because rules involve advance 
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determination of the law’s content, whereas principles are more costly for legal advisors to 
predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require determinations of the 
law’s context. To illustrate this analysis in a financial system, consider the complexities of 
regulating derivatives. For derivatives which are used frequently in settings with common 
characteristics, such as options, forwards and futures contracts, a rule will tend to be 
desirable. If there will be many enforcement actions against a particular financial product 
or strategy, the added cost from having resolved the problem uniformly at the 
promulgation stage will be outweighed by the benefit of having avoided additional costs 
repeatedly incurred in giving content through principles-based regulation by initiating 
individual enforcement actions (Kaplow, 1992 p. 563; Gavison, 1991, p.750).  
 
A rule will better serve an industry stakeholder group which is affected by regulatory 
actions because learning about a rule will be cheaper as the law’s content is readily 
ascertained and those affected may be better guided by the set rules.  In contrast, for 
complex financial instruments such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS) or financial instruments 
created over-the-counter (OTC), which are not transacted as frequently and in settings 
which vary substantially, enforcement actions based on prescriptive rules would not be 
effective and end up being a waste of resources. In such circumstances, it would be logical 
for regulators to resort to establishing general principles for example, added disclosure 
requirements and consistent monitoring for riskier financial products. Therefore, for 
products which are transacted with lower frequency, a principles-based regulatory 
approach would be more effective. It should be noted in this regard that a law may still 
govern much behavior even though adjudications, which receive more emphasis in legal 
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commentary, are rare whether because most legislation do not give rise to a lawsuit or 
because most cases are settled out of court (Kaplow, 1992, pp.563–564).  
 
Financial intermediaries’ decisions on acquiring legal advice before they act is dependent 
on whether they are confronted by rules or principles-based regulations and ultimately the 
associated costs (Diver, 1983, pp.67–68). If the benefits of learning the law’s content are 
substantial and the cost, whether of hiring legal experts or learning more on one’s own, is 
not too great, individuals’ behavior under both rules and standards will tend to conform to 
the law’s commands (Kaplow, 1992, p.627). The costs of learning the law are comparatively 
reduced under rules-based regulation. If however, the costs of predicting principles are 
high, financial intermediaries will not choose to become as well informed about how 
principles would apply to their behavior (Sunstein, 1995, p.978; Kaplow, 1992, p.627).  The 
advantage of rules over principles in this case would be improved legal compliance. Thus, 
even if an enforcement authority were to give the same content to a principle as might have 
been included in a rule, the rule might induce behavior that is more in congruence with 
legislative goals (Schlag, 1986, pp.383–389). 
 
The success of any regulatory framework lies in its effective enforcement. Principles and 
rules-based regulation are rendered ineffective if they are not enforced substantively to 
deter unacceptable behavior. In order for enforcement to be effective under a principles-
based regulatory structure, the regulators have to be in a position where they are 
responsive not only to the attitude but also the operating and cognitive frameworks of 
firms, the institutional environment and performance of the regulatory regime, the 
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different logic of regulatory tools and strategies and to changes in each of these elements 
(Baldwin and Black, 2008, pp.60-61). Principles-based regulation is ideally suited for such 
a structure because of its non-prescriptive approach but it can only be effective if there is 
adequate communication about acceptable conduct and actions between the financial 
intermediaries and the regulator (Ford, 2008; Black et al, 2007, p.191). The collapse of 
Bernard Madoff’s hedge fund, which will be analysed in detail in Chapter Five, is a prime 
example of failure to enforce anti-fraud legislation which eventually led to approximately 
USD$60 billion in investment losses. Sophisticated investors were defrauded based on a 
Ponzi scheme which lasted more than twenty years because the SEC19 never enforced their 
powers even though regulatory provisions were available.  
 
One important benefit of principles-based regulation is the freedom this approach avails 
firms in carrying out their functions advocating a culture of compliance. Enforcement 
responses need to be carefully calibrated to encourage firms to develop effective internal 
control frameworks adhering to the principles, perform due diligence and thus create a 
relationship of trust rather than control (Black et al, 2007, p.202). The flexibility invariably 
encourages innovation and eventually economic growth. The motivation behind this theory 
is admirable, but is not without its conflicts. Industry participants may feel that principles-
based regulation is uncertain and difficult to comply with, leaving gaps for increasing 
chances of abuse (Brummer, 2011, p.290). There will also be the possibility of inconsistent 
enforcement by regulators as decision making on fault is based on arguable variables of 
                                                        
19 McCrum, D. (2012), “Batoo Charged Withholding Madoff Losses” Financial Times, dated 8 September 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f85ce028-f933-11e1-945b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27R0pD8ik, Accessed 
19 September 2012. 
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which there are no specific guidelines to follow. Walsh (2010, p.385) states that this 
uncertainty will also work against the regulator, making it difficult for the regulator to 
enforce and punish on the basis of principles that can be interpreted in so many different 
ways. 
 
Enforcement in a rules-based regulatory approach is less complicated where boundaries 
are fixed and all agents are aware of acceptable conduct through detailed directives. 
Regulators are given a fixed paradigm to work with and penalties for illegal conduct are 
strictly enforceable without recourse. This approach, however, inhibits entrepreneurship 
and freedom to innovate within the financial system (Park, 2012, pp.137-138; Ehrlich and 
Posner, 1974, p.217). An argument would be that transparency creates consistency and 
hence those regulated can carry out their core business activities while regulators can 
focus their attention on supervising misconduct, an efficient use of resources, a clear ‘black 
and white’ regulatory approach. In reality, this is seldom the case in financial markets and 
should such a regulatory approach be implemented there is a risk of concentrated efforts 
by regulators placed on past methods of fault without attention given to new, innovative 
methods of circumventing rules. 
 
2.4.1 An Optimum Model? 
Regulatory approaches in the modern financial market system require an appreciation and, 
indeed, the acceptance by market regulators that financial transactions extend into the 
shadow banking sector. An important mandate of financial market regulation is the 
protection of investors against fraud, manipulation and misconduct. Conduct-of-business 
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rules dictate practices aimed at promoting fair and transparent market processes, assisted 
by the enforcement of prudential regulation. To date, however, this has only been directly 
applied to the regulated sphere of a financial system. Further, making a choice between a 
rules-based or principles-based regulatory approach fails to address the dynamism in 
financial systems of the 21st Century. Financial markets are too fast-moving and complex 
to be regulated in a command-and-control manner with prescriptive rules and, 
alternatively, principles-based regulation which is based on the premise that enforced self-
regulation leads to opportunism by market actors based on self-interest in the absence of 
meaningful regulatory oversight and engagement (Ford, 2010, p.261).  
 
The experience of the GFC 2008 is a lesson about what happens when regulators fail to 
participate actively and skeptically in this interpretive community (Ford, 2010, p.262). 
While the choice between principles or rules suggests a unified approach to regulation in 
either case, the reality is that financial market regulation in common law regimes are 
comprised of both principles and rules (Anand, 2009, p.112).  The complexity of financial 
systems also means that rules or guidelines are needed to support principles to evidence 
the operational effectiveness of regulations. The task of the regulator and supervisor is not 
to predict market developments, but rather to create an infrastructure that is robust to 
different kinds of development, such as the bundling or unbundling of financial activities 
(Kremers et al, 2003, p.227). Regulators should approach market regulation through 
efficient monitoring, keeping abreast of new and innovative market developments and 
tactful in their response while managing their ultimate objectives of protecting investors 
and maintaining efficiency. Thus, ideally, an overall objective of financial market regulation 
81 
 
should emphasize a flexible, network integrated supervisory approach which enables 
regulators to react effectively in a constantly evolving environment rather than creating 
strict supervisory approaches which might steer market developments in a certain 
direction. Over the past decades, continuous pressure for efficiency has led to an 
interconnected and innovative financial system with the developments in the financial 
intermediation process to enable the growth of the shadow banking sector. 
Disintermediation and the disappearance of traditional sectoral boundaries between 
banking, securities, and insurance can be seen as particular forms of organizational 
evolution, just as is the unbundling of different kinds of financial activity within a group 
(Kremers et al, 2003, p.227). An important aspect of financial market regulation is for 
regulators to understand and appreciate the functional dynamics of financial 
intermediation and the funds-flow process without neglecting the shadow banking 
industry. The next section seeks to illustrate this evolutionary dynamic. In particular, it 
emphasizes that the globalized and interconnected nature of modern day finance has 
increased the systemic importance of the hedge fund industry and the need for substantial 
regulatory oversight. 
 
2.5 Financial Intermediation; Theory and Practice 
The growth and development of financial intermediation over the past 70 years has been a 
reaction to the changes in consumer demand for financial products and services, 
competition as well as in response to developments in regulatory approaches in financial 
systems globally. The GFC 2008 has its roots in the financial sector and manifested itself 
first through disruptions within the channel of financial intermediation where financial 
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intermediaries have borne a large share of the losses, particularly from securitized 
subprime mortgages, even though securitization was intended to parcel out and disperse 
credit risk to investors who were able to better absorb losses (Adrian and Shin, 2010, p.1; 
Cetorelli et al, 2012). Thus, contrary to beliefs, financial intermediaries are far from passive 
but rather are the engine which drives boom-bust cycles even though adequate attention 
has not been given to the intermediation process or the interconnectedness of financial 
systems.  
 
The evolution of academic research in the area of financial intermediation can be 
segmented into two main categories: the institutional framework or theoretical approach 
and a functional approach of financial intermediation (Philippon, 2012, p.2). The purpose 
of this section is to explain both approaches, which are interrelated, and is aimed at 
extending this study to explain the evolution of the linkages into the shadow banking 
industry through credit intermediation processes.  
 
The modern theory of financial intermediation examines the main functions of financial 
intermediation and is based on the concept that the financial system is a bridge which links 
buyers and sellers whereby, a well-developed, smoothly functioning financial system 
enables the efficient allocation of household consumption to its most productive use in an 
uncertain environment (Merton and Bodie, 1995, p.14; Andries, 2009, p.254).  In its 
simplest form, financial intermediaries enable this link facilitated by bank and non-bank 
financial institutions which pool assets to create investment opportunities (IMF, 2005, 
pp.171-172). This model of pooling of assets to create investment income from 
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opportunities which may not necessarily arise without collective support is the premise of 
any financial system and has become more prevalent within the funds management 
industry. Traditional research on the theory of financial intermediation has focused on a 
combination of efficiencies which financial intermediaries provide, particularly the 
informational asymmetry argument. This can be of an ex ante nature generating adverse 
selection, they can be interim, generating moral hazard and they can be an ex post nature, 
resulting in auditing or costly state verification and enforcement (Scholtens and van 
Wensveen, 2003, p.15). The argument states that financial intermediaries have 
comparative advantages over individual investors in attaining crucial information for 
investment decisions, especially because of active monitoring. These efficiencies 
subsequently extend to cost advantages where the theory of transaction costs and 
incentive alignments enable resource allocation and growth (Benston and Smith, 1976; 
Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond and Dybig, 1983; Allen, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2004; 
Gorton and Winton, 2002).  
 
Over the past twenty years, the concept of financial intermediaries as facilitators of risk 
management and mitigation has been increasingly accepted as a contributing factor in 
understanding its institutional framework. The theory was introduced by Scholtens and 
van Wensveen (2003) as part of a growing group of academics contributing to the 
development of the modern theories20 which would encapsulate a dynamic market 
engaged in financial product innovation. Financial intermediaries manage and mitigate 
risks within the financial system through risk and reward transformation and focus on 
                                                        
20 The more prominent writers in this area have been Allen, F. (1990, 2001, 2003, 2012), Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), Tobias, A (2010, 2012). 
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efficient value creation where the originate-to-distribute model was developed as a risk 
management and income producing methodology (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003). 
Historically, banks originated loans and kept them on their balance sheets until maturity. 
However, this changed over time with financial innovation and they began to distribute the 
loans they originated, resulting in an increase in the growth of non-bank financial 
intermediaries as banks managed their balance sheets and credit risks through loan 
syndication (Boyd and Santos, 2012, p.21). This risk management concept has also 
contributed to the evolution of the shadow banking industry and subsequently changed the 
functional roles of banks as managers and distributors of risks, information and facilitators 
of capital market growth. Thus, financial intermediaries and capital markets together with 
the regulatory arrangements to govern their activities constitute the institutional structure 
of the financial system and the dynamic process by which this institutional structure 
changes is called financial innovation (Merton, 1993, p.22). Financial innovation and the 
growth of the shadow banking sector has led to change in the functions of financial 
intermediaries even though their form has substantially remained the same. It is through 
these functions that systemic risks are created and invariably, can be avoided. Subsequent 
sections below analyse the functions of financial intermediation and is extended into 
explaining the dynamics of financial intermediation in order to explain clearly the linkages 
between the regulated banking sector and the shadow banking industry. 
 
2.5.1 Functions of Financial Intermediation 
An understanding of the functional attributes of financial intermediation provides insight 
into information which can enable regulators to direct supervisory efforts in isolating risk 
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profiles of financial intermediaries for effective regulation. Financial intermediaries 
perform a number of functions including maturity transformation, monitoring and 
information processing and liquidity transformation. An appreciation of the process 
through which savings are channeled into productive activities will enable an appreciation 
of a crucial issue in the operation of financial systems, that is, the way in which information 
is gathered, distributed and used (ECB, 2012a, pp.59-60; Allen and Carletti, 2008). 
Information will hence empower regulators to efficiently isolate the riskier activities within 
financial intermediaries which may require more direct supervision. 
 
Financial intermediaries provide services to overcome market imperfection due to 
information asymmetries because they have superior information and the capabilities, 
skills and invested infrastructure to produce information about investment opportunities 
which would be too costly for the individual investor to venture into herself, particularly if 
information about investment opportunities requires specialist knowledge (Burnside et al, 
2009; Das, 2005; Bernanke et al, 1999; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).  The traditional view of 
financial intermediation where banks would predominantly be facilitators of savings and 
loan activities was that they were able to offer information-intensive loans at a lower cost, 
thus reducing information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (Diamond, 1984; 
Fama, 1985). But the desire to maintain competitive advantage meant that this process also 
contributed to a rise in informational asymmetries between banks and their less well 
informed competitors (Breton, 2002). These competitive pressures contributed to conflicts 
of interest in the provision of true and fair information and gave rise to the problem 
attributed to the risks of reliability in the information generated (Hirshleifer, 1971).  
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Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) found that even if financial intermediation was shown to 
improve welfare within an economy, if informational asymmetries were present there are 
also situations where the information generated to overcome these asymmetries can 
generally be unreliable. Leyland and Pyle (1977) suggest a solution to overcome this 
problem by the intermediary credibly producing information, investing its wealth in assets 
about which it claims to have produced valuable information. However, this can create a 
conflict of interest as identified by Palazzo and Rethel (2007, pp.194-201) who state that if 
an intermediary is involved directly in the security it is producing information about, be it 
through in-house research, underwriting or advisory services, when the issuer trades with 
the investor, market breakdown occurs. The inability of a financial intermediary to 
ethically balance its reputational risk while continuing in its profit motive has been a 
widely contested problem over the past decade. This reliability issue was particularly 
prevalent in the recent London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) scandal, considered the 
biggest interest rate manipulation scam in history worth approximately USD$350 trillion21. 
Between January 2005 and May 2009, the banks involved in the scandal submitted false 
information which hid the true nature of credit and risk profiles within these 
intermediaries, information which was used by counterparties to make investment 
decisions22. The investigations pertaining to the scandal were still ongoing in 2013 but the 
gravity of this situation has called for an overhaul of the rate determination process and 
increased regulation and transparency. The debacle and ongoing investigations by the US 
                                                        
21 Toronto Media Co-op, (2012), “The Lebowski Blog: The LIBOR Scandal is the Largest Financial Scam in 
History _ $350 Trillion”, published 25 August 2012 http://toronto.mediacoop.ca/blog/gwalgen-dent/12324, 
Accessed 5 Sept 2012. 
22 BBC (2013), “Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal”, BBC UK, dated 6 Feb 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255, Accessed 8 Feb 2013. 
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Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations23 has brought to light the dishonest and 
fraudulent conduct within JP Morgan, increased its reputational risks within the finance 
industry and indeed has led to calls for more intensive operational risks controls. 
 
Further, theories on financial (dis)intermediation have put forward the notion that in the 
‘digital-age’ informational services performed by financial intermediaries were no longer 
feasible with advancements in information technology where information is now freely 
available, enabling investors to deal directly in open markets (French and Leyson, 2004). 
This function of information technology has promoted the exchange of tradable, uniform 
information and leads to the commoditizing of financial assets but also provokes effect, 
namely the customizing of financial products and services, the risks of which are difficult to 
ascertain. Information is attracting a pivotal role in the intermediation function because it 
is mostly the intermediaries, not the ultimate investors, that develop these new products 
and services (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003, p.27). The function of information in this 
process differs from the traditional model of alleviating asymmetric information by 
offering proprietary information to stakeholders as an essential component of their 
financial service where disclosure to competitors can reduce the private value of such 
information. Thus, although innovation in the analysis and dissemination of information 
has increased competition between financial intermediaries, it has also improved efficiency 
and assisted in the progressive development, growth of economies and in certain instances, 
reduced transactional costs tremendously. 
                                                        
23 US Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2013), “JP Morgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History Of 
Derivatives Risks and Abuses”, United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, dated 13 March 2013, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chase-
whale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses, Accessed 1 Dec 2012. 
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Financial intermediaries have to be compensated for providing services and the income 
received measures the cost of financial intermediation (Philippon, 2012). The comparative 
advantage of intermediaries’ lies in their ability to internalize costs due to economies of 
scale and scope and to enable a cost efficient means of attaining information about 
potential investments (Levine, 1997, p.694). Benston and Smith (1976, pp.223-225) view 
the role of financial intermediaries as creators of specialized financial commodities which 
are availed whenever there is a demand and, more importantly, at prices which would be 
expected to cover all direct and opportunity costs of production. Financial intermediaries 
are able to extend services to customers at a lower transaction cost and hence the raison 
d’etre of their continual existence even with changing business models. Economies of scale 
enable intermediaries to further develop expertise in the evaluation of investment projects, 
incentives in gathering information and firm monitoring (Salehi, 2008, p.100). Transaction 
costs in this case are interpreted as costs of research, evaluation and monitoring amongst 
others (Hasman et al, 2009, p. 3). Hasman et al (2009) extends this argument further by 
analyzing unavoidable ‘shoe leather costs24’ and found that efficient intermediaries enjoy 
economies on transaction costs that can also occur through asset rebalancing.  Research by 
Nalukenge (2003, p.iii) on the impact of lending relationships on transaction costs incurred 
by financial intermediaries finds that the costs incurred by intermediaries in a financial 
exchange with smaller sized businesses positively respond to exchange hazards associated 
with credit risks in the form of collateral requirements, uncertainty, investment in specific 
                                                        
24 One general class of inflationary consequences is sometimes referred to as the ‘shoe-leather’ costs of 
inflation: To avoid the erosion of their purchasing power due to inflation, people have to spend more time and 
effort protecting the value of their nominal assets—wearing out their shoes on the way back and forth to the 
bank, Pakko (1998), “On the Shoe-Leather Costs of Inflation”, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/articles/?id=1565, Accessed 1 July 2012.  
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assets and difficulty in measuring the performance of manpower employed for monitoring 
small loans. 
 
It is important to note that these traditional theories of financial intermediation based on 
transaction costs and asymmetric information were designed to account for institutions 
which take deposits or issue insurance policies and channel funds to firms in its simplest 
form (Allen and Santomero, 1998, pp.1464-1465). On the other hand, there have been 
noteworthy vicissitudes where costs of transactions and informational gathering have 
declined but intermediation has increased as deregulation and globalization reduce 
inefficiencies. This has led to a shift in the focus that financial intermediaries play to that of 
facilitators of risk transfer in dealing with the increasingly complex maze of financial 
instruments and markets (Allen and Santomero, 1998, p.1462). Risk management has 
become a key area of intermediary activity as financial intermediaries evolve, allocate 
decision power and risk management effectively and the financial market grows, extending 
into the shadow banking sector and harmonizing the globalized financial system (Allen and 
Santomero, 2001, p.284). 
 
A condition of the commoditization of money is a need for trading and managing financial 
risk (Clark, 1976, pp.12-13). The notion of risk to a financial intermediary can be a 
consequence of financial distress and the existence of capital market imperfections, both of 
which relate to information asymmetry, competition and deficiencies within the financial 
system (Allen and Santomero, 1998, p. 1475). Whitehead (2010, p.10) states that financial 
intermediaries and institutions in the business of managing money are more likely than 
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other businesses to expose customers to fraud, self-dealing and other misconduct. These 
institutions are also in a unique position and incentivized as delegated monitors with the 
ability to perform risk management functions in a cost effective and efficient manner 
(Diamond, 1984). The standard diversification argument in modern portfolio theory 
encourages individuals to exchange assets so that each investor holds a relatively small 
amount of any one risk (Allen and Santomero, 2001, p.286). For example, the extension of 
loans to borrowers brings with it the risk of fraud, default and substantial financial loss. 
Lending institutions are incentivized to manage risk, monitor and protect their diversified 
loan portfolio for which they provide finance, thus seeking to obtain the information 
necessary for an efficient allocation of resources (Allen and Carletti, 2008, p.4). The basis of 
this qualitative asset transformation is risk transformation (Entrop, 2012, p.1; Mayr, 2007, 
p.8; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003, p.17). By transforming risk, through on or off-
balance sheet obligations, the intermediary transforms assets offered following their risk 
preferences into assets usable by entrepreneurial investors. Thus, the benefits of 
intermediary activity in risk transformation is taken advantage of where supply and 
demand of capital cannot be fully met according to the risk preferences of market parties in 
the public market (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003, pp.38-41; Demirgüc-Kunt et al, 
2003, p.13).  
 
Investigations of the causes of the GFC 2008 have shown that global financial systems are 
implicitly connected through an interlinked web, comprising the regulated financial 
markets and the unregulated shadow banking industry. The next section traces the 
evolution of this link and explains the interconnected dynamics of financial intermediation 
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to emphasize the importance of the hedge funds as a key systemic industry participant 
within the global financial system. It is important to understand the evolution of financial 
intermediary interconnectedness and the interaction between the institutions to 
appreciate the intricacies within the modern financial market architecture. Understanding 
this dynamic is crucial to evaluating the workings of the shadow banking system and the 
regulation of hedge funds, more specifically because a substantial portion of the funds 
within the shadow banking system originated from the regulated banking system through 
banks selling wealth management products to customers or through off-balance sheet 
vehicles25(Adrian and Shin, 2010, p.604). 
 
2.5.2 Financial Intermediation Dynamics  
The operational activities of financial intermediaries have evolved from philosophies and 
practices developed in the US and the UK and their structures have been reorganized and 
restructured over time to influence the manner in which financial intermediation is 
conducted globally. The fundamental role financial intermediaries’ play is based on one 
basic principle, that there will always have to be some mechanism for channeling the 
sources of funds into the investments for firms (Cecchetti, 1999, p.1). Businesses need 
capital and will supply assets to the financial market as collateral to attain this capital. 
Households are the ultimate holders of these assets, either directly or through various 
types of investment pools and also provide the ultimate demand (Cecchetti, 1999, p.1). The 
financial intermediary moves resources between these two groups, businesses and 
                                                        
25 Zarathustra (2012), “Signs of Shadow Banking Problems Surfacing in Formal Banking System”, dated 10 
July 2012, http://www.alsosprachanalyst.com/financials/signs-of-shadow-banking-problems-surfacing-in-
formal-banking-system.html, Accessed 1 May 2012. 
92 
 
households, regardless of their legal form, a function which will always continue.  This is 
the most basic and traditional form of the funds flow process in financial intermediation 
which is effectively outdated. A recent International Monetary Fund paper shows this and 
found that the growth of the shadow banking system may have been the result of a search 
for safe and sensible cash management by cash managers who were pressured in the 
search for value outside the traditional methods when they were faced with limits on 
insurable bank deposits and a shortage of short-term government-guaranteed instruments 
such as US Treasury Bills (Poszar, 2011; IFF, 2012, p.5) 
 
A guide to a model of financial contracting and the role of financial intermediaries and 
markets is summarized in Figure 2.3. Adapted from Walter (2012, p.115; 2002, Exhibit 1) 
and Mishkin (2008), it shows the flows of funds through a typical financial system in terms 
of its underlying environmental and regulatory determinants and the generic advantages 
needed to create value from three primary linkages labeled Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 
respectively.  Traditionally, banks appear as intermediary between the ultimate lender and 
the ultimate borrower of financial capital (see Tier 1). The sources of funds (savings) are 
held within depository and credit institutions in the form of demand deposits, commercial 
certificates from households, corporations and governments. These savings invariably 
finance themselves by placing their liabilities directly with the general public in the form of 
loans. The financial intermediaries or depository institutions also invest these funds 
through asset purchases issued by entities defined as users of funds.  
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Tier 2 intermediation extends or allocates the available financial assets within the balance 
sheets of Tier 1 financial intermediaries investing in financial products such as structured 
assets facilitated by investment banks or fiduciaries and collective investment vehicles in 
the purchase and sale of securities issued publicly and privately within the globalized 
financial infrastructure, a point at which intermediation becomes entirely global. The 
global transaction process extends to Tier 3 intermediation which is based on the premise 
that savings surpluses of the lenders of funds who intend to allocate their resources in 
seeking higher than normal returns, through various direct sales mechanisms, such as 
private placements, usually involving fiduciaries, including hedge funds and private equity 
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funds, as intermediaries. Value to ultimate savers and investors, inherent in the financial 
processes described here, occurs in the form of a combination of yield, safety and liquidity 
(Walter, 1999, p.6). Value to ultimate users of funds is availed in the form of a combination 
of financing cost, transactions cost, flexibility and liquidity (Walter and Sisli, 2006, p.4). 
This value can be enhanced through credit backstops26, guarantees and derivative 
instruments (Walter, 2009, p.591). Furthermore, markets are linked across jurisdictions 
internationally and by function. These functional linkages enable banks to securitize 
financial assets to be sold to non-bank intermediaries in the shadow banking industry. 
 
The rapid growth of the market-based financial system has changed the nature of financial 
intermediation and has resulted in the traditional originate-to-distribute model extending 
into the modern shadow banking system.  Thus, the traditional business processes within a 
financial system have become obsolete and do not fully incorporate the rise of the funds 
management industry as a major source of funding for banks through the shadow financial 
system, which is now a substantial portion of the global financial system estimated at 
approximately USD$67 trillion in 2011 (FSB, 2012, p.3). 
 
                                                        
26 A backstop in financial terms refers to a type of insurance or last-resort support. When stocks or bonds are 
issued in order to raise capital, a backstop can be put in place to make sure that the security will be bought. In 
order to do this a group of underwriters together with a group of sub-underwriters (usually institutional 
investors) guarantee that they will buy whatever parts of the offering are not sold. A backstop is also used to 
describe the safety procedure put in place by a government or loan guarantee program which insures the 
debt of a company or its credit line. Cambridge University Press Online,  
 http://peo.cambridge.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=489:new-
backstop&catid=10:jargon-buster&Itemid=4, Accessed 1 Jan 2012. 
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2.6 Shadow Banking System 
The term “shadow banking” was first coined by Paul McCulley of Pimco in August 2007 to 
describe a large segment of financial intermediation that is derived outside the balance 
sheets of regulated commercial banks and other depository institutions (AIMA, 2012, p.3). 
The implication is that such organisations have been engaging in “bank-like activities” out 
of the sight of regulators, creating unmonitored risks to the global financial system (AIMA, 
2012, p.3). The ambiguity of the shadow banking industry has led to confusions in defining 
and, hence, enacting appropriate legislation to regulate its activities (Claessens et al, 2012, 
p.4). There have been a number of arguments by regulatory authorities in relation to a 
valid definition of shadow banking. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has broadly defined 
the sector as a process of credit creation involving activities outside the regular banking 
system (FSB, 2011, p.3). Similar views have been held by noted scholars in the US Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank. Pozsar et al (2012, pp.4-5) and Bakk-Simon et al 
(2012, p.5) respectively define shadow banking as “financial activities carried out by non-
bank institutions that create leverage and/or engage in credit intermediation such as 
maturity and liquidity transformation without access to public sources of liquidity such as 
government guarantees”. Further, the role of hedge funds as a part of the shadow banking 
system has also been subject to scrutiny. 
 
The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) in its research report entitled, 
“The Role of Credit Hedge Funds in The Financial System: Asset Managers, Not Shadow Banks” 
disputed the inclusion of hedge funds as part of the shadow banking system stating that 
“hedge funds collectively should not be included while defining the unregulated shadow 
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banking sector because hedge funds are extremely diverse and engage in activities which 
would be considered as part of the asset management sector and not necessarily 
participate in credit intermediation” (AIMA, 2012, pp.3-5). Alternative views tabled by the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) state that the definition of shadow banking should 
take a broader approach by, “focusing on non-bank financial activities with the potential to 
create systemic risk regardless of whether they are deemed to be shadow banking 
activities or not and combining an analysis from the activity with a macro prudential view 
of the risks from the system as a whole” (IIF, 2012, pp.1-2).   
 
Although varied, it is clear that the shadow banking sector or shadow financial system is a 
financialization process analogous to the purchase and sale of assets or financial securities 
in the regulated banking sector enabled by financial innovation to transact beyond the 
regulated financial system, advocating risk transference and wealth creation. The term 
‘credit intermediation’ has been used frequently and isolated for emphasis within this 
definition. However, its relevance for definitional purposes is disputable given that there is 
an element of credit intermediation processes in almost all financial intermediaries, be it 
within the regulated sector or the unregulated shadow banking sector.  For example, in its 
simplest form, investments in a hedge fund are based on the promise of a financial return, 
similar to that of a loan provided by a bank, in which parties to a contract would expect a 
return based on respective loan agreements. Similarly, the leverage extended by financial 
institutions to hedge funds for investing activities is also based on credit agreements and, 
thus, can be construed as credit intermediation. An important point is that the unregulated 
nature of the shadow financial system within the global financial markets poses risks to the 
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latter’s stability and efficiency because the rapid pace of financial innovation has increased 
the attractiveness of performing certain types of financial intermediation outside 
traditional financial intermediaries (BIS, 2012, p.67). The evolution of the shadow banking 
system has enhanced the resilience of financial systems globally by offering unique 
financial products and services through a range of special purpose vehicles for managing 
credit, liquidity and maturity risks. However, the same system has also created risks that 
can undermine financial stability in the absence of prudential safeguards (BIS, 2012, p.67).  
 
Since the GFC 2008, credit intermediation activities within the shadow banking system 
have been of particular focus (FSB, 2011, p.1). The European Systemic Risk Board’s (ESRB) 
response to an ECB (2012) green paper on the shadow banking industry stated that the 
GFC 2008 demonstrated that the shadow banking industry was a potential source of 
significant risks, including systemic risk both in its cross-sectional and time dimensions 
(ESRB, 2012, p.1). The cross-sectional dimension resulted from the interconnectedness 
between the ‘regular’ banking sector and the shadow banking sector and between the 
shadow banking entities and activities, leading to complex and opaque intermediation 
chains. The time dimension, for example pro-cyclicality and leverage, arises from within 
the shadow banking sector owing to less stringent restrictions and maturity and liquidity 
mismatches  as well as the prevalence of securities-based financial and market price-based 
valuation activities in the sector (ESRB, 2012, p.1). According to Poschman (2012, p.3) 
financial regulation to date has focused on protecting investors rather than the safety and 
soundness of financial intermediaries. The financial intermediaries within the shadow 
banking system have therefore been barely regulated, have few reporting obligations and 
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need to meet only a few governance standards which contribute to excessive risk taking 
activities within the system. 
 
This thesis defines the shadow banking system, in correlation with the shadow financial 
system, as an interconnected network of financial intermediaries and instruments 
operating outside of the regulated financial system but is an integral part of it. More 
importantly, the aim is to emphasise the need for regulating financial intermediation in the 
shadow banking sector. At the heart of the shadow banking system are activities within the 
funds flow process which link the regulated financial sector to the unregulated sector 
through credit intermediation processes and financial instruments such as securitization 
and repurchase agreements (Repo) which will be discussed further and explained in more 
detail graphically in the following section. 
 
2.6.1 Shadow Banking Credit Intermediation 
Credit intermediation within the shadow banking system involves credit, maturity, and 
liquidity transformation (ECB, 2012, p.5). The shadow banking system deconstructs the 
familiar credit intermediation process of deposit-funded, hold-to-maturity lending by 
traditional banks into a more complex, wholesale-funded, securitization-based 
intermediation chain of discrete operations typically performed by separate specialist 
non-bank entities which interact across the wholesale financial market (ICMA, 2012, p.6; 
Luttrell et al, 2012, p.8). In the traditional banking system, intermediation between savers 
and borrowers occurs in a single institution. Through the process of funding loans with 
deposits, banks engage in credit, maturity and liquidity transformation (Adrian and 
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Ashcraft, 2012, p.2). Shadow banking credit intermediation is functionally similar to 
traditional banking but the financial flows occur in multiple steps rather than within one 
institution’s balance sheet where a range of entities using various market funding 
instruments intermediate credit (Luttrell et al, 2012, p.8). Pozsar et al (2012, p.10) explain 
the process stating credit transformation in the shadow banking sector refers to the 
enhancement of the credit quality of debt issued by an intermediary through the use of 
priority of claims or taking the risk of a borrower’s default and transferring it from the 
originator of the loan to another party.  Maturity transformation refers to the use of short-
term deposits to fund long-term loans, which creates liquidity and liquidity 
transformation refers to the use of liquid instruments to fund illiquid assets (Pozsar et al, 
2010; Pozsar et al, 2012, p.10). For example, a pool of illiquid whole loans might trade at a 
lower price than a liquid rated security secured by the same loan pool, as certification by a 
credible rating agency would reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and 
savers (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012, p.5).  
 
Shadow banks are interconnected along a vertically integrated, long intermediation chain, 
which intermediates credit though a wide range of securitization and secured funding 
techniques such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), asset-backed securities (ABS) 
and CDOs as shown in Figure 2.5 (Pozsar et al, 2010, p.1; Pozsar et al, 2012). Securitization 
is at central to the shadow banking credit intermediation system and enables 
intermediaries to address liquidity and solvency risks by transforming illiquid loans into 
liquid securities which can then be sold onto investors in the financial market. Asset 
managers are a dominant source of demand for investment income and serve as a source of 
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collateral for the shadow banking system while banks receive funding through the re-use of 
‘pledged’ collateral from asset managers (Pozsar and Singh, 2012, pp.4-5). In the shadow 
banking credit intermediation process, loans, leases, and mortgages are securitized and 
thus become tradable instruments (Pozsar et al, 2012, p.10).  The system applies the 
securitization-based lending process where it transforms risky, long-term loans into 
predominantly risk free short-term instruments with stable net asset value issued by 
money market funds. The process shown is not exclusive and certain intermediation chains 
may be a lot more complex for example, the repackaging of ABS CODs into CDO^227 
(Polzsar, 2010, p.12). Pozsar et al (2010, pp.11-14; Adrian and Ascraft, 2011, pp.15-16) 
explain the seven steps in the shadow banking credit intermediation process as show in 
Figure 2.4. 
 
                                                        
27 Nomura (2005), “CDO-Squared Demystified”, Nomura Fixed Income Research, dated 4 February 2005, 
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/Nomura/CDO-Squared_4Feb05.pdf, Accessed 4 July 2012. 
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The loan originator28 (Step I) performs credit, maturity and liquidity transformation of 
loans which are transferred as portfolio assets through loan warehousing29, (Step II) and 
packaged as ABS (Step III) in special purpose vehicles30 (Step IV) (Pozsar et al, 2010, 
pp.11-14; Adrian and Ascraft, 2011, pp.15-16). This process, known as ABS Warehousing31, 
enables financial intermediaries to issue rated securities backed by the portfolio of loans 
and is funded by repurchase agreements32 which function as collateral in transactions 
between financial intermediaries in the conversion of loans (Step V) that have been held 
on-balance sheet into marketable securities (ABS) subsequently sold and traded through 
the SPV (Poschman, 2012, p.16). The funding (Step VII) of these entities and activities is 
carried out in the wholesale money markets by investors such as banks, mutual funds and 
hedge funds through short-term repo, commercial paper and asset backed commercial 
paper instruments (Adrian and Ascraft, 2011, p.16). Financial intermediaries (Step VI) that 
sell their loans into the securitization market are able to distribute the risks associated 
with the assets across a wider range of investors, rather than taking on the entire risk 
themselves (Stein, 2010, p.44). 
                                                        
28 Finance companies which are titled to leases and loans (eg. mortgages) funded through commercial 
paper/medium term notes. 
29 The packing of loans into single or multi-seller conduits financed by asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
(Pozsar et al, 2010, p.12). 
30 The pooling and structuring loans into term asset-backed securities is conducted by broker-dealers’ ABS 
syndicate desks (Pozsar et al, 2010, p.12). 
31 The packaging of asset-backed securities into single or multi-seller conduits facilitated through trading 
books and is funded through repo agreements/total swap or hybrid and repo/TRS conduits (Pozsar et al, 
2010, p.12). 
32 Repurchase agreements/transactions are where a borrower sells a security at below the current market 
price and agrees to repurchase it at an agreed-upon, higher price in the future. This sale and repurchase 
provides the same economics as a secured loan with the security being sold serving as collateral. The 
difference between the current market price of the security and the price at which the borrower sells it 
represents the haircut. Larger haircuts (when the security is sold to the lender for far below market price) 
mean more collateral for the lender and lower leverage for the borrower. Smaller haircuts translate into less 
collateral and more leverage. Using illiquid collateral for loans, even short term loans, represents effective 
maturity transformation (Gorton and Metrick 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2011, p.602). 
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On the demand side of institutional cash pools that ultimately hold the ‘riskless’ end-
products of these chains which is privately guaranteed, such chains of activities resemble 
process of risk-stripping whereby underlying pools of long-term, risky loans are stripped 
of their component risks and turned into safe, short-term liquid instruments or money 
which complements the securitization and credit intermediation process33. Primarily, 
money demand is the result of securities borrowers posting cash as collateral to asset 
managers for securities lent (Perotti, 2012, pp.3-6). Thus, the funds flow process of 
financial intermediation has changed tremendously from the traditional form depicted in 
Figure 2.3 to include a more complex credit intermediation process. The advent of active 
asset management through reverse maturity transformation34 and the need for collateral 
in the shadow banking industry has completed and complicated this link (Poszar and 
Singh, 2011, pp.7). 
 
                                                        
33 Pozsar, Z. (2011), “Can Shadow Banking be Addressed without the Balance Sheet of the Sovereign”, Vox, 
dated 16 Nov 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/article/shadow-banking-what-do, Accessed 25 Dec 2012. 
34 Maturity transformation, typically done by banks, refers to the transformation of short-term deposits into 
long-term loans. Reverse maturity transformation refers to the transformation of long-term savings into 
short-term savings. Much of this occurs in the shadow banking system, arising from at least three activities. 
First, asset managers always hold a certain portion of their funds in short-term instruments. These holdings 
reflect both technical and tactical considerations. On the technical side, fund managers have to manage 
constant inflows and outflows of funds. Inflows are not always immediately invested in risk assets, but first in 
short-term instruments. Similarly, short-term instruments may be held in reserve to cope with withdrawals. 
On the tactical side, allocations to short-term instruments may serve as a source of return for fund managers 
that are active in market timing. Second, funds with synthetic (or derivatives-based) investment strategies 
typically invest their client’s funds in short-term instruments and overlay derivatives (such as futures and 
swaps) onto them to gain their desired exposure to duration, foreign exchange or credit risk. Lastly, collateral 
mining via securities lending occurs primarily against cash collateral. Securities borrowers wire cash to 
securities lenders as collateral, which securities lenders transfer into a cash collateral reinvestment account 
and invest in short-term instruments. According to the Risk Management Association, demand for money 
from this corner of asset management was in the U.S. $1.2 trillion and $800 billion at end-2007 and 2010 
respectively. Pozsar and Singh (2011), “The Non-Bank Nexus and the Shadow Banking System”, International 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper Series WP/11/289, pp.7-11, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11289.pdf, Accessed 1 July 2012. 
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There are a number of consistencies between the regulated banking sector and the 
shadow banking industry as it relates to the ultimate goal of financial intermediation, 
which is the channeling of funds to create value. The environmental drivers and 
advantages which have been historically inherent in traditional financial intermediation 
process, for example, informational advantages, transaction costs and the function of risk 
transformation remains the same. However, the modern financial system today has 
evolved into a nexus which includes the unregulated shadow banking sector, enhanced 
through financial innovation, as an integral part of the global financial markets. Figure 2.5 
is a diagrammatic representation of this nexus which develops from the theory 
established in Section 2.5.2 (Figure 2.3) to include participation of the shadow banking 
sector. 
 
Asset managers, including the unregulated alternative investment sector, have created a 
deepening of the global financial system which, on the positive side, increases liquidity 
and reduces transactional costs but also creates and transfers unwanted risks through this 
interconnectedness. Institutional demand for short-term liquid instruments mainly arises 
from the day-to-day management of long-term savings in the modern asset management 
complex (Pozsar and Singh, 2011, p.7). Even though asset managers invest households’ 
long-term savings into long-term instruments, their day-to-day management and return 
mandates effectively requires them to transform a portion of these long-term savings into 
short-term savings, which in turn drives the money demand for asset managers and implies 
that in many instances what seems to be institutional cash is ultimately retail cash (Pozsar 
and Singh, 2011, p.7). 
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The previous notion that asset managers manage long-term savings of ultimate creditors 
by investing in long-term bonds or equities and holding them till maturity is not as 
feasible in modern day finance.  
 
The complexity of the shadow banking system and the movement of funds through various 
forms of intermediation processes have resulted in detrimental consequences for the 
global financial system. For example, assets managers who frequently trade and invest for 
their own account fund themselves from the short-term markets, allowing them to take on 
volatile, illiquid assets which are proportionately riskier. Coupled with excessive leverage, 
such investments could pose systemic risks to a financial system. It was the proliferation 
of the shadow banking sector that was perhaps the single biggest driver of the GFC 2008. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers showed the extent of the systemic risks which was 
hidden in the shadow banking sector. When the credit crisis erupted in August 2007 with 
the failure of two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns, the shares of investment bank Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman Brothers) fell sharply35 as it was exposed to counterparty 
risks inherent in the system. As the correction in the US housing market gained 
momentum, Lehman Brothers continued to be a major participant in the mortgage market. 
In 2007, Lehman Brothers underwrote more mortgage-backed securities than any other 
firm, accumulating an USD$85-billion portfolio, or four times its shareholders' equity36. In 
the fourth quarter of 2007, Lehman Brothers's stock rebounded, as global equity markets 
                                                        
35 Wong, G. (2007), “Deadly Ripple Threatens Subprime Funds” CNNMoney, dated 21 June 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/21/markets/bear_fallout/, Accessed 15 September 2012. 
36 Anantharaman, M. (2008), “AIG Shares Crash Means More Pain for US Funds”, Reuters, dated Sep 17 2008, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/17/aig-funds-idUKGRI72400220080917, Accessed 16 September 
2012. 
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reached new highs and prices for fixed-income assets staged a temporary rebound. 
However, the firm did not take the opportunity to trim its massive mortgage portfolio 
which, in retrospect, would turn out to be its last chance. On 15 September 2008, Lehman 
filed for bankruptcy with USD$639 billion in assets and USD$613 billion in debts37. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Regulating risk within a complex financial system is an onerous task for regulators who 
have to dig into the depths of financial transactions to distinguish activities and conduct 
which may eventuate in fraud. As confronting as it may sound, the business of money 
management is the search for yield and is motivated by financial gain which induces rent 
seeking individuals to push the boundaries set in investor protection laws, often through 
fraudulent activities such as misrepresentation and manipulation. Financial market 
regulation is a construct of prudential supervision and conduct-of-business rules bound 
together as tools to enforce regulators tasked with the responsibility of protecting an 
economy against irresponsible and reckless behavior by market participants. The 
interconnectedness of financial systems is built on financial promises based on the 
demand and supply of financial products which translates to financial gains through 
investment activities and protected by risk management strategies through which 
uncontrollable losses can be mitigated and managed efficiently.  
 
                                                        
37 Mamudi, S. (2008), “Lehman Folds with Record $613 billion in Debt”, The Wall Street Journal, dated 15 Sept 
2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt, Accessed 16 Sept 
2012. 
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The concept of risk management in finance is in itself uniquely vague because effective 
risk management is usually quantified based on historical data which may not have any 
impact on future price movements. In turn, it is this task of ‘controlling the uncontrollable’, 
the ‘unknown, unknowns’, that has precipitated the rise of excessive risk taking and the 
utilization of derivatives and complex financial instruments. Financial commitments can 
now be packaged and repackaged into securities of value through credit intermediation 
and risk transformation processes which have been developed to converge the traditional 
funds flow processes with the unregulated sphere of economies where the majority of 
business dealings are conducted over-the-counter. These financial contracts are 
subsequently transacted by non-bank financial intermediaries such as hedge funds which 
are in turn funded by private investors and banks investing in a myriad of derivative 
instruments currently valued at over USD$600 trillion dollars. Thus, equivocally, these 
risk transference strategies have resulted in an exacerbation of risks within the global 
financial system where one risky asset is managed by another, with reflections of what 
may be construed as a Ponzi scheme.  
 
Financial market regulators are in turn tasked with the responsibility to manage this 
complex maze with outdated enforcement strategies formed for a system within closed 
economies. The tools and regulatory approaches available sufficiently catered to 
traditional forms of financial intermediation where the most complex of structures were 
financial conglomerates which participated in commercial and investment banking 
activities within the same organisation. In these structures, market supervision strategies 
were effective and the approaches, be it the functional, institutional or twin peaks 
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regulatory structure, enabled regulators to effectively regulate as well as facilitate growth. 
The relative soundness of financial markets for the 30 years before the GFC 2008 is 
testament to the fact that it was much easier to control such a structure through 
disclosure, compliance and securities regulation. However, over the past decade the 
growth of the shadow financial system with the use of off-balance sheet transactions and 
special purpose vehicles has enabled financial innovation to take a new form, outside the 
purview of regulators. A simple yet unattainable solution would be to ban in its entirety 
the shadow financial system but this would result in the collapse of the global credit 
system to a greater extent than what was experienced in the GFC of 2008. The only 
probable option for regulators is effective management and enforcement of a financial 
system which has to take into account the growth of the shadow financial system. 
However, the effectiveness will only be tested when markets turn around and regulators 
are tested in their abilities to manage excessiveness within markets. 
 
 A very crucial component of the shadow banking system is the hedge fund industry. The 
growth in demand for alternative asset management strategies which seek to attain 
absolute returns will continue at an exponential rate. One important reason behind this 
growth in the post-crisis period is the search for yield which has become non-existent in 
the fixed-income markets, what used to be the safest investment. Hedge funds, which are 
effectively unregulated investment vehicles, are now filling this gap by promoting their 
proprietary investment strategies as unique and active management as the new normal. 
The demand is evidenced by increased investments from institutional and retail investors. 
It should always be bore in mind that active management does not necessarily translate to 
109 
 
higher returns, but it is assured that an investor will be exposed to higher risks. Chapter 
Three is an introduction into this ambiguous but systemically important sector of the 
shadow banking system which has gained much negative attention since the global 
financial crisis but has still managed to remain elusive and unregulated, until now. 
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CHAPTER 3   
HEDGE FUNDS – THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The significance of the hedge fund industry as a critical part of the global financial system 
has increased considerably since the onset of the GFC 2008. Hedge funds account for 
almost half of the trading volume in New York and London, two of the largest financial 
centers in the world1, with approximately USD$2.1 trillion in assets under management 
(AUM) and it is estimated that this will increase in value to USD$5 trillion by 20162. The 
influence which hedge funds have within global financial systems and their ability to have 
an impact on the funds flow process should not be underestimated. This growing influence 
has meant that such investment vehicles have become systemically important within any 
financial system and to the investor protection mandate of financial market regulators.   
 
This chapter provides an overview of the theory and practice of the hedge fund industry. In 
order to understand and effectively analyze the regulatory framework governing hedge 
funds, it is important to fully appreciate the dynamism of the industry, its function within 
financial systems and the associated risks of the expansive investment strategies. The 
                                                        
1 Main, C. (2012), “Hedge Funds, Credit Cards, Trading Review: Compliance”, Bloomberg, dated 21 Sept 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-21/hedge-funds-leader-credit-card-rule-trading-review-
compliance.html, Accessed 15 June 2012. 
2 Touryalai, H. (2012), “Watch Out Asset Managers, Hedge Funds Will Top $5 trillion By Taking Your Clients, 
Forbes, dated 12 June 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/12/watch-out-asset-
managers-hedge-funds-will-top-5-trillion-by-taking-your-clients, Accessed 15 June 2012. 
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chapter begins with an introduction to hedge funds by visiting their origins and growth, an 
analysis on the difficulties faced by financial market regulators in formulating a legal 
definition of hedge funds and a brief discussion of the complex structures and investment 
strategies which hedge funds incorporate and execute respectively. This is followed by an 
examination of the systemic risks posed by the industry to investors, which is part of the 
central theme of this thesis. The systemic risk which hedge funds pose is illustrated 
through two cases, the collapse of LTCM in 1998 and subsequently, Bear Stearns Hedge 
Funds in 2008. The purpose of analyzing these cases is to exemplify a critical point, that 
after the collapse of LTCM there were numerous regulatory initiatives recommended as a 
result of the investigations into its collapse by the US government Presidents Working 
Group on Financial Markets. These investigations were a reaction to loss of investor 
confidence in the financial markets. One result was to mandate registration of hedge fund 
managers and to require increased disclosure and transparency of hedge fund activities. 
However, these were not implemented stringently with a preference for industry self-
regulation instead.  
 
Ten years after the initial warnings of the level of risks which hedge funds can pose to a 
financial system, the GFC 2008 was precipitated by the collapse of Bear Stearns Hedge 
Fund, an event which occurred because of misrepresentation and fraudulent conduct by 
the funds’ investment managers. These events distinctly highlight that industry self-
regulation is an ineffective approach to regulating hedge funds. Further, a growing trend 
within the hedge fund industry is that of hedge fund activism. Hedge funds have become 
increasingly active in the management of the corporations they invest in, having controlling 
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influence in the decision making processes and hence making crucial commercial decisions 
which may not be in the best interest of the broader investor group. There have been 
instances of conflict of interest and collusive controls by certain activist hedge fund 
managers which have led to financial losses by smaller, less powerful investors. These 
occurrences should not be taken lightly by financial market regulators and stakeholders 
alike. It has to be pointed that this statement is not directed towards activities which have a 
positive impact on the efficient allocation of resources of such organisations but rather 
emphasizes those which are motivated by self-interest to the detriment of less powerful 
retail investors precipitated by the risk of fraud, misconduct, manipulation and 
misrepresentation, which will always be prevalent in unregulated industries are which 
motivated by financialization.  
 
3.2 The Origins and Growth of Hedge Funds 
The concept of hedge funds was developed based on an investment methodology 
formulated by Alfred Winslow Jones (Jones) in 1949, a sociologist and financial journalist 
who combined two specific investment techniques; leverage and short selling, to create a 
conservative investment strategy (Caldwell, 1995, p.7). Conservative, in this context, 
referred to an investing system that was designed to better able to cope with risks within 
financial markets and, in particular, it was the way Jones combined these characteristics 
that made his hedge fund a unique investment model (Kaal, 2005, p.6; Robotti, 2009, p.6). 
In Jones’ model, short-selling was used to eliminate part of the market risk involved with 
holding long stock positions and a modest amount of leverage was utilized to increase the 
level of financial exposure to the invested security. In this way, Jones sought to balance 
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market risk and produce a net return that depended on his ability to select “the relative 
best and worst” investments (Antoszewski, 2007, p.381).  
 
Short selling is accomplished by selling shares not owned in order to buy them back at a 
lower price in the future that is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or 
for the account of, the seller3. In order to deliver the security to the purchaser, the short 
seller borrows the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. The 
short seller later closes out the position by returning the security to the lender, typically by 
purchasing equivalent securities on the open market, or by using an equivalent security that 
they already own4.  In general, short selling is utilized to profit from an expected downward 
price movement, to provide liquidity in response to unanticipated demand or to hedge the 
risk of a long position in the same or a related security (SEC, 2003, pp.39-40). Leverage is a 
crucial element of hedge fund investment strategies and can be viewed as a means of 
potentially increasing an investment’s value or return without increasing the amount of 
invested capital (Patel, 2008, p.11). The concept of leverage will be elaborated in the next 
section. 
 
Jones’s financial acumen was well in advance of both Wall Street practitioners and the 
academic community in developing an understanding of market risk as well as the 
relationship between individual stocks and the market (Landau, 1968, pp.20-24). Jones had 
                                                        
3 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked 
Questions Concerning Regulation SHO, at Part I, Introduction, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm, Accessed 2 Jan 2011. 
4 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked 
Questions Concerning Regulation SHO, at Part I, Introduction, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm, Accessed 2 Jan 2011. 
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developed his own measure of market risk and formulated strategies deciphering the 
manner in which individual stocks interacted within financial markets before the academic 
community had codified the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with its notion of above 
average returns5.  Even more astonishing is that he was actively managing the exposure of 
a risk-adjusted portfolio with this system (Landau, 1968, pp.20-24). The success of Jones’s 
hedge fund model did not gain much attention in the wider investor community until the 
mid-1960s when public interest in managers’ highly profitable strategies brought a surge 
to its popularity (Loomis, 1966, pp.237-242). However, early into the process of their 
growth and development, hedge funds experienced substantial setbacks, suffering heavy 
losses and massive asset outflows which, in several cases, resulted in closures and 
subsequently faded away (Loomis, 1970).  
 
The re-emergence of hedge funds into the investment vehicles of today begun in the mid-
1980s with renewed investor interest because of their historically impressive performance 
record and ability to generate absolute returns, particularly viable with the use of complex 
derivative financial instruments which were previously unavailable. This subsequently 
contributed to the establishment of thousands of new hedge funds as investment vehicles 
taking advantage of regulatory exemptions made available to sophisticated investors in the 
US and the UK. The deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s, advancements in 
technological developments and financial innovations further fueled its growth onwards 
for the next 30 years (Dichev and Yu, 2011, p.249). However, the liquidity crisis during the 
GFC 2008 and a loss of investor confidence in financial markets lead to a ‘run’ on hedge 
                                                        
5 Jones, A.W. (Undated) “Measuring Market Risk”, A.W. Jones LLC, 
http://www.awjones.com/measuringmarketrisk.html, Accessed 1 July 2012. 
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funds which saw assets under management (AUM) fall to all-time lows and the collapse of 
numerous loosely funded vehicles due to margin calls, excessive risk exposure and 
fraudulent activities6. This has been proven a transitory short-term downturn as the most 
recent data7 indicate a resurgence of AUM held by hedge funds and a substantial growth in 
the industry (van Eechoud et al, 2010, p.269; Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008, p.6). The fallacy 
cried by news media about the end of an era was simply that, a fallacy, hedge funds have 
come back stronger and are here to stay, so are the risks to the financial system8. 
 
3.3 Definition and Characteristics 
The hedge fund industry is made up of a diverse range of unregulated private investment 
vehicles with a wide array of investment strategies not generally available to most 
regulated funds (Pekarek, 2007, pp.917-918). Product differentiation is an important factor 
in the case of the hedge fund industry and this is distinguished by the unique investment 
strategies developed commensurate with acceptable investor risk profiles, achieved mainly 
through investing in complex derivative financial instruments. However, even though 
differentiation is an important element to remain competitive, hedge funds managers 
market themselves exclusively to sophisticated investors under a veil of secrecy because of 
a desire to protect their investment strategies as proprietary information. It is this 
                                                        
6 Reier, S. (2007), “Subprime Crisis Tests Hedge Funds”, New York Times, dated 7 Sept 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/your-money/06iht-mhedge.1.7411707.html?pagewanted=all, 
Accessed 1 January 2011. 
7 Marketwired (2013), “Global Hedge Fund Assets Equal $2.35 Trillion As Big Firms Drive Growth”, 
Marketwired, dated 4 Oct 2013, http://www.sys-con.com/node/2821193, Accessed 10 Oct 2013; Hersch, W.S. 
(2013), “Hedge Funds Maintain Positive Growth”, LifeHealthPro, 9 Oct 2013, 
http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/10/09/hedge-funds-maintain-positive-growth, Accessed 10 Oct 2013. 
8 Brummer, A. (2008), “End of the Hedge Fund Ear”, The Daily Mail UK, dated 16 Dec 2008, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1095148/ALEX-BRUMMER-End-hedge-fund-era.html; Creshwell, 
J. and White, B. (2008), “Wall Street, R.I.P: The End of an Era, even at Goldman”, The New York Times, dated 27 
Sept 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28lloyd.html, Accessed 1 January 2011. 
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exclusivity which has ultimately contributed tremendously to the growth of the industry 
and its attractiveness to sophisticated investors in search of exceptional returns for their 
money, not available to the wider retail investor community until more recently. More 
importantly, a combination of these factors has also obfuscated the ability to understand 
their form and function, resulting in difficulties of enacting appropriate legal definitions for 
hedge funds. The constant development in financial markets and innovative investment 
strategies has further complicated the ability to formulate specificities which would enable 
consistency in defining hedge funds. 
 
The term ‘hedge fund’ automatically creates a relationship with the concept of ‘to hedge’. 
‘To hedge’, in accordance with Jones’s investment philosophy, translates to the application 
of investment strategies which would result in a reduction in the risk of a financial loss if 
unfavorable movements occur in the value of an owned financial asset, usually carried out 
by purchasing positions in derivative contracts (Ineichen, 2004, p.22; Edwards, 1999, 
p.189).  The modern day hedge funds differ in this focus as they seek to achieve absolute 
returns which do not necessarily include hedging strategies (Evans et al, 2005, p.53). An 
absolute return refers to investment strategies devised to target a return that is more than 
a market benchmark rate, for example, the Dow Jones Industrial Index. It signifies above 
average performance standards which are the result of undertaking financial risks not 
normally pursued by regulated investment funds or conservative investors. The aim is to 
perform better than regulated funds, to attain returns that remain positive under all 
market conditions and financial cycles and those which are not substantially correlated 
with the overall market performance. 
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The impetus of effective and efficient regulation necessitates specific definitions of the 
universe of institutions over which supervisory authority is to be exercised. These 
definitions need to be logical and consistent as well as robust enough to be used against 
actions designed to avoid regulatory oversight (Crockett, 2007, p. 20). However, defining a 
hedge fund is not simply a question of semantics. For example, if hedge funds constitute a 
separate and identifiable asset class then it would be logical to take account of this 
specificity in asset allocation decisions and regulate them as financial products. On the 
other hand, if they are simply an alternative way to gain exposure to risks and returns 
already inherent in other financial instruments, they should be considered as alternative 
investment vehicles and thus regulated as entities (Crockett, 2007, p.20). The ability to 
adequately define a hedge fund is further complicated by the conflict of interest arising 
from other market participants engaging in many of the same practices. For example, 
individuals and some institutions are also able to buy stocks on margin, commercial banks 
use leverage on a regular basis and the proprietary trading desks of investment banks take 
positions, buy and sell derivatives, and alter their portfolios in the same manner as hedge 
funds (Eichengreen and Mathieson, 1999). Thus any line between hedge funds and other 
financial intermediaries has become increasingly arbitrary (Eichengreen and Mathieson, 
1999; Cumming and Johan, 2008). The inability to appropriately define a hedge fund or 
separate the uniqueness of its investing activities from other investment vehicles within a 
financial system poses problems for financial market regulators and legislators intending 
to carry out supervision effectively. 
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There have been numerous authors who have endeavored to define what hedge funds are 
and what they do but restrict themselves to the enumeration of typical characteristics as 
opposed to specific definitions (Oesterle, 2006, p.3; Stulz, 2007, p.177, van Eechoud et al, 
2010, p.273; Kaal, 2005, p23; Oppold, 2008, p.834). Oesterle (2006, p.3) defines a hedge 
fund as privately held, privately managed investment funds which are designed to 
maximize the traders’ freedom to employ complex trading strategies, structure themselves 
by minimizing their exposure to direct regulatory supervision by market regulators. He 
concludes by saying that the most accurate definition of a hedge fund is a fund that is not 
registered under a list of specific market regulations. Stulz (2007, p.177) defines hedge 
funds as unregulated pools of money managed by an investment advisor, the hedge fund 
manager, who has a great deal of flexibility in his investment strategies. The US Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC, 2003, p.viii) defines hedge funds in its staff report entitled 
“Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds”, as “an entity that holds a pool of securities and 
perhaps other assets that does not register as an investment company under the 
Investment Company Act 1940”. The confusion in setting out a clear definition of hedge 
funds is best explained from a statement by the FSA (2002, p.8) which stated: 
 
There is no universally accepted meaning of the expression 'hedge fund'; 
indeed, many competing and sometimes partially contradicting definitions 
exist. The term first came into use in the 1950s to describe any investment 
fund that used incentive fees, short-selling, and leverage. A summary 
definition frequently used in official sector reports is ‘any pooled investment 
vehicle that is privately organised, administered by professional investment 
managers, and not widely available to the public’.  
 
These varying approaches in efforts to define hedge funds have meant that a common 
definition has not been easy to achieve. An ideal approach to formulating a definition would 
be to distinguish these unique characteristics from traditional investment funds. 
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A key difference between hedge funds and traditional funds is their return objective. Hedge 
funds seek to deliver absolute returns while maintaining capital preservation regardless of 
prevailing market conditions (Gawron, 2007, p.35). Their success is largely dependent on 
the skill of the manager in trying to exploit market inefficiencies and is measured by how 
they perform relative to selected benchmarks regardless of whether these rise or fall (van 
Berkel, 2008, p.200; Riviere, 2010, p.31). This is enabled by a very loose investment 
mandate which means that they are unconstrained in terms of the investment strategies 
employed and the markets they may enter, in contrast to traditional managers who are 
seeking relative returns in rated financial instruments and specific markets. They can also 
be distinguished by the activity levels of their investments; hedge funds have a much more 
active investment mandate than regulated funds. Consequently, hedge fund managers are 
less dependent on direct market performance as compared to traditional fund managers’ 
eventhough they transact in the same market (Fung and Hsieh, 2004a, p.67). 
 
Hedge funds use substantial leverage and usually hold both long and short positions and 
often employ complex financial instruments in their portfolios (Eichengreen and 
Mathieson, 1999; Fung and Hsieh 2000, p.293). They typically leverage their investments 
by margining their positions and through the use of short sales strategies which are not 
available to traditional investment funds because of regulatory limitations based on 
investor protection rules (Ang et al, 2011, pp.103-105). Leverage measures the extent of 
the relative size of the long and short positions in risky assets relative to the size of the 
portfolio where the long position represents short-term lending and the short position 
represents short-term borrowing (Gorovyy, 2012, pp.4-5). The use of leverage allows a 
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hedge fund to commit more than the capital that it has under management and may have a 
significant impact on investment results because, while it may enhance investment gains, it 
may also magnify investment losses (Patel, 2008, p.13). For example, a highly leveraged 
hedge fund investing in illiquid securities may be exposed to increased risk in a ‘credit 
freeze’ market condition where the full value of its investments cannot be realized and 
forced to close out illiquid positions at unfavorable prices (Diamond and Rajan, 2011, 
p.558). These losses received substantial attention in the popular press both around the 
LTCM collapse in 1998 and Bear Stearns during the GFC 2008 (Titman, 2009, pp.2-3). In 
both instances, the use of leverage had been extensive. 
 
The compensation structure of hedge funds is another defining characteristic which 
differentiates them from traditional investment funds. Hedge funds typically charge a 
management fee equaling two percent of the value of the assets under management and a 
performance fee of 20 percent based on a predetermined benchmark which is usually 
calculated monthly or quarterly (SEC, 2003, p.9; Lederman, 2007, pp.2-8). The 
management fee covers expenses for operating and administering the fund, for example, 
expenses for overhead, personnel and capital costs (Lhabitant, 2007, p.228). The managers 
are commonly compensated through a flat percentage of assets and carried interests9. The 
term ‘carried interest’ generally refers to a hedge fund manager’s right to part of the gains 
and income received from the performance of the fund identified by the level of investment 
returns (Bullard, 2008, p.293). In addition, some funds may also employ ‘hurdle rates’ and 
                                                        
9 US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Joseph 
Bankman, Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, November 13, 2008, p.1, 
http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20081113102023.pdf, Accessed 15 June 2012. 
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‘high-water marks’.  A hurdle rate relates to the performance fee which is calculated based 
on profit above a certain rate, such as the risk-free rate (Connor and Woo, 2004, p.20; 
Kambhu et al, 2007, p.2). If returns for the period are below that rate, the fund manager 
will not collect a performance fee.  A high-water mark means that the fund will charge a 
performance fee only when the returns of the fund reach a level at or above which it 
was previously (Preiserowicz, 2006, p.811). Further, hedge funds also implement a ‘lock-
up’ period restriction that prohibits a capital contribution from being withdrawn after it is 
first invested in the fund. Lock up periods are typically less than one quarter, but may be as 
long as two years, determined through a contractual agreement between the hedge fund 
manager and the investor (Agarwal and Naik, 2000, pp.328-329). In addition, hedge fund 
managers may impose withdrawal restrictions whereby investors will be required to give a 
specified period of notice before being able to withdraw capital (Ang and Bollen, 2010, 
p.1072). Finally, hedge funds may also implement withdrawal restrictions based on a ‘gate’ 
to limit how much capital can be withdrawn at any given date, which is usually based upon 
a fraction of the net asset value of the fund (Shadab, 2009, p.9). Shabab (2009, p.9) states 
that hedge funds limit the liquidity of their shares for several reasons. Limitations on 
liquidity may benefit the fund in the long run because capital redemptions at a given point 
may be disruptive to the fund’s operations and inconsistent with the fund’s investment 
objectives or trading strategy. Restrictions on the resale of hedge fund shares are required 
for a hedge fund to qualify for certain regulatory exemptions relating to raising capital in 
most jurisdictions. They place restrictions on the trading of their shares so as to not be 
deemed a publicly traded partnership that must pay higher corporate taxes. Most hedge 
fund managers have a significant portion of their wealth invested in the fund they manage 
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(Frankel, 2008, p.659). This co-commitment gives investors additional confidence, 
ensuring that investor’s and manager’s interests are closely aligned. 
 
An ongoing contentious difference between hedge funds and traditional investment funds 
is the lack of transparency and disclosure requirements which will be further elaborated in 
detail in Chapter Five and is briefly addressed here for completeness. Hedge funds refrain 
from disclosing any information about their investment strategies and activities based on 
the stance that doing so will impede their competitive advantage and result in duplication 
of trades and ultimately eliminating profit opportunities if revealed to the general public  
(Thompson, 2009, p.997; Partnoy and Thomas, 2007, p.35). This is also the reason why 
hedge funds seek exemptions from registration requirements with financial market 
regulators which has historically meant that they have only been able to market themselves 
to sophisticated investors. However, the retailization of hedge funds and the growth of the 
pension fund industry has seen a growing trend of retail investors increasingly exposed to 
hedge fund investing activities.  For the purpose of this thesis, hedge funds can be 
collectively defined as eclectic investment fund pools, typically organized as private 
partnerships and structured to take advantage of exemptions within financial market 
regulations. Hedge funds invest in financial markets executing financial strategies with the 
use of financial instruments, structured in varied complexities across numerous markets 
globally and can also be located in offshore tax havens. Their managers, who are paid on a 
fee-for-performance basis, are generally free to use a variety of investment techniques 
including short positions and leverage, to raise returns and achieve superior performance. 
A crucial component of the hedge fund investing model is the manner in which they are 
123 
 
structured and organised. Thus, it is important to explore these different structures in 
order to provide a rationale for the way hedge fund partnerships are organized (Fung and 
Hsieh, 1999). 
 
3.4 Hedge Fund Structures 
Hedge funds are more popularly recognized in the financial community by their legal 
structures which are organized to take advantage of regulatory restrictions. The unique 
characteristics of these investment vehicles require flexibility as a result of their highly 
speculative, information-motivated, trading strategies which conflict within a highly 
regulated legal environment (Connor and Woo, 2004, p.8). Most hedge funds, having 
originated and structured in common law jurisdictions such as the US and the UK take the 
form of limited partnerships with certain funds structured as corporations or trusts in 
order to give the hedge fund manager maximum control over the investment activities 
(Wider and Scanlan 2004; Fioretos, 2010, p.702). The fund manager will be legally separate 
from the fund itself, although the management entity may serve as the general partner for a 
fund organized as a limited partnership (Cumming and Dai, 2010, p.1003). Another 
important virtue of this type of investment vehicle is that it allows more flexibility in 
establishing capital accounts for each participant to calculate and reallocate performance-
based fees back to the fund manager (Krug, 2010, p.664). The fund’s investors are bound 
by a governing document, for example a limited partnership agreement, an operating 
agreement or a product disclosure statement to provide the foundation for the 
organisation, management and investment mandate of the fund (August and Cohen, 2006, 
p.18). This is dependent on the jurisdiction in which the fund is incorporated. The 
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document must conform to the requirements of the jurisdiction of formation and will set 
forth the method of governing the fund, the nature of the capital accounts, the mechanics of 
investment and qualifying for entry into the fund, redemptions, withdrawals, transfers, 
dissolution, indemnifications, and dispute resolution (August and Cohen, 2006, p.18). 
 
Hedge funds are located in a mixture of onshore major financial centers and offshore low 
tax and light-touch regulatory regimes to take advantage of more favorable tax incentives, 
auditing and accounting regulation (Oppold, 2008, p.835). They are typically open-ended 
and actively managed and issue and redeem units or shares directly with investors based 
on the net asset value10. In comparison, closed-ended funds are not eligible for liquidity 
withdrawals and are either required to be held till liquidation or traded on exchange 
(McVea, 2007, p.714; Spangler, 2007, pp.33-34). Different aspects such as tax efficiency, 
proximity to financial markets, access to skilled professionals, access to potential investors 
and beneficial regulation determine the optimal location of each entity within the structure 
(Hagerman, 2007, p.15; Spangler, 2009, p.1199).  
 
Figure 3.1 depicts a typical domestic hedge fund structure also known as a stand-alone 
structure which is incorporated within the jurisdiction where the primary business is 
conducted and funding is sourced. The hedge fund manager serves as a general partner 
adhering to the regulatory requirements applicable to incorporated onshore structures, its 
governing documents and, should the fund expand to structure itself as a multi-fund, there  
                                                        
10 Money Marketing (2011),"Investment Matters: An Open and Shut Case?" dated 10 Mar 2011, Money 
Marketing, p. 48. Highbeam Research, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-264410097.html, Accessed 16 Jan 
2012. 
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will be a need to incorporate special purpose vehicles or management vehicles to 
adequately separate the legal ownership of investors and separable investment 
strategies11. Further, hedge funds also generally incorporate themselves by linking to 
offshore regulated jurisdictions and offshore tax havens.  Fund structures for investment 
managers which establish an offshore link generally fit into two further categories, a side-
by-side or master-feeder structure. The side-by-side structure (Figure 3.2) encapsulates 
the common traditional form of hedge fund structure incorporated within the jurisdiction 
where the principal business is conducted and funding sourced but also includes an 
                                                        
11 Vaughan, D. and Bancroft, M. (Undated), “Structuring Issues For Hedge Funds” Chapter 4, David Vaughan, 
Partner, Dechert LLP, Washington DC and Margaret Bancroft, Partner, Dechert LLP, New York, 
http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/060982da-1924-4afb-bab9-
,dc0bcb916c9d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/96475a86-7acf-492d-9220-
f1103e7d0350/US2004Structure.pdf, Accessed 1 June 2012. 
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offshore limited partnership12. This type of structure is formed to address the mutual 
interest of domestic and offshore investors where the fund manager advises each fund 
within the side-by-side structure separately but each fund makes the same or substantially 
the same types of investments13. 
 
In a master-feeder structure all of the investment monies, both from offshore and onshore 
investors, is invested in the feeder fund to be aggregated together in the master fund and 
subsequently invested by the fund manager according to a single set of investment 
objectives and restrictions. There are economies of scale benefits in combining pools of 
investments raised by different classes of investors cross-jurisdictionally (Aggarwal and 
Jorion, 2010, p.241).  
                                                        
12 Barth, M.H. and Blanco, M. (2003), “US Regulatory and Tax Considerations for Offshore Funds”, The Capital 
Guide To Hedge Funds, pp.122, 
http://www.curtis.com/sitefiles/publications/d2ca07a14ca94dfc1daad5293970e197.pdf, Accessed 15 Aug 
2012. 
13 Walkers Global (Undated), “Guide to Hedge Funds in Cayman Islands”, Walkers Global, p.4, 
http://www.walkersglobal.com/Lists/News/Attachments/290/(Cayman)%20Guide%20to%20Hedge%20F
unds%20in%20the%20Cayman%20Islands.pdf, Accessed 15 Aug 2012. 
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The investments enable fund manager to leverage against credit lines and meet asset sized 
based investment qualifying tests14. Further, economic efficiencies also arise in the manner 
in which investments are made since only a single trading entity is used, thereby avoiding 
the need for the investment manager to split trades or engage in ‘re-balancing’ trades as 
between parallel structures and, thereby, lower operational costs (Ng, 2009, p.54). 
Although in many structures the master fund and the feeder fund will have similar boards 
of directors, arguments in favor of separate boards include minimizing conflicts of interest 
and promoting independent oversight15. 
                                                        
14 Vasilopoulos, E. and Abrat, K. (2004), “The Benefits of Master-Feeder Fund Structures for Asian-based 
Hedge Fund Managers”, EurekaHedge, April 2004, 
http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/04apr_archive_Sidley_master_feeder.asp, Accessed 12 April 2012. 
 
15 Teo, M. (2009), “Lessons from Hedge Fund Fraud”, Eureka Hedge, Hedge Fund Monthly, dated Oct 2009, 
http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/09_Oct_BNP_Paribas_HFC_SMU_Lessons_from_Hedge_Fund_Fraud.asp, 
Accessed 17 Aug 2012. 
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The master fund is typically incorporated in a tax and investment friendly jurisdiction 
which pools assets from various kinds of investors, depicted here as ‘Domestic Taxable 
Investors’ and ‘Foreign and Domestic Tax Exempt Investors’ for ease of reference. Thus, a 
common strategy within an incorporated hedge fund structure is the creation of an 
investment vehicle meant for the pooling of assets under an agreed investment strategy, 
usually investable in a portfolio of financial instruments, with varied degrees of 
diversification. 
  
3.5 Hedge Fund Strategies 
Hedge funds are classified as entities that focus almost exclusively on the speculative role 
of investment management, that is, they attempt to outperform the market average by 
superior security valuation and successful trading strategies (Connor and Woo, 2004, p.26). 
It is important to appreciate the vast variations of hedge fund strategies which are never 
identical but differentiated based on variables such as required returns and exposure to 
risk and volatility of invested financial instruments. However, it is virtually impossible to 
identify all the different strategies which hedge funds typically employ. For example, hedge 
funds are known to incorporate a multitude of different strategies within one investment 
portfolio and diversify through various organisational structures within the global financial 
system which makes determining specifics ineffective. Thus, it is appropriate to approach 
this subject with an overview and focus on three main strategies which hedge funds are 
known to execute as identified by the SEC (2003, p.34) namely, market-trend or tactical, 
event-driven and arbitrage strategies. 
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Market-trend or tactical strategies seek to generate returns by predicting major market 
trends and other significant market movements, often as a result of changes in government 
policy, which will have an impact on equities, interest rates or commodities (SEC, 2003, 
p.34). Hedge funds which employ these strategies are commonly known as ‘global macro’ 
funds where such funds identify investment opportunities globally based on macro-
economic variables (Crockett, 2007, p.21). Global macro hedge funds do not have limits on 
the multiplicity of strategies they can employ as they are able to invest ‘long and short’ in 
stocks, bonds, currencies, and derivatives, including options and futures (Cole et al, 2007, 
p.8). They traverse national boundaries, investing among developed countries as well as 
emerging markets and use leverage as the opportunity arises to increase returns 
(Pruchnicka-Grabias, 2010, p.151). They execute their investment strategies in different 
asset classes taking advantage of changes in trends and profiting from unidentified 
opportunities such as movements in unemployment rates, political instability and interest 
rate decisions (Pruchnicka-Grabias, 2010, p.151). The best-known global macro hedge fund 
is the Quantum Fund managed by hedge fund manager George Soros.  
 
Event-driven strategies, by contrast, seek to exploit investment opportunities involving 
mispricing of securities associated with discrete events concerning corporate activity, such 
as corporate insolvencies, reorganizations, mergers or takeovers, for example, merger 
arbitrage and distressed investing16. It has a much more micro view as compared to global 
macro strategies and hedge funds usually focus these strategies in markets in which they 
                                                        
16 Barclay Hedge Funds, (Undated), “Event Driven Strategies Explained”, Barclay Hedge Alternative 
Investments Database, http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-
definition/hedge-fund-strategy-event-driven.html, Accessed 1 January 2012. 
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are located. Merger arbitrage generally involves acquiring the securities of a company that 
is subject to a special event such as a takeover or reorganization while distressed investing 
primarily concerns the purchase of debt securities which originate from companies that are 
in the process of reorganization or liquidation or companies engaged in other transactions 
such as balance sheet restructuring17. Hedge fund managers will purchase the securities or 
debt of companies that are announced as acquisition targets which often trade at a 
discount to the proposed acquisition price due to the uncertainty that the acquisition will 
actually be consummated (Oltchick, 2002, p.46). The risk to hedge funds which focus on 
even-drive strategies is the unpredictable nature of corporate events. For example, a 
merger or acquisition may not be finalized, there may be an unfavorable counter-bid on a 
takeover and even in situations where the outcome of a particular transaction is clear, it 
may not have the expected impact on securities pricing. As a result, the difference in 
performance between event-driven managers can be significant18. 
 
Arbitrage strategies meanwhile seek to identify and exploit pricing disparities between 
securities that are closely related, while at the same time attempting to insulate investors 
from the effects of adverse market-wide movements (McVea, 2008, p.7; AIMA, 2012, p.6; 
SEC 2003, p.35). The use here of the term ‘arbitrage’ varies somewhat from its traditional 
form, since hedge fund arbitrage strategies are associated with trades that entail some risk 
of loss or uncertainty about total profits (McVea, 2008, p.7; ECB, 2005, p.9). In the hedge 
                                                        
17 Man Investments (2008), “Hedge Funds Investing in Distressed Securities”, Man Group, dated April 2008, 
http://www.opalesque.com/files/ManDistressed_investing_Final.pdf, Accessed 1 June 2012. 
18 Reynard, C. (2013), "Event-Driven Investing - September 2013", Investment Adviser, dated 23 Sept 2013, 
http://ezproxy.uow.edu.au/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/docview/143696612
5?accountid=15112, Accessed 24 Sept 2013. 
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fund world, arbitrage more commonly refers to the simultaneous purchase and sale of two 
similar securities whose prices, in the opinion of the trader, are not in sync with what the 
trader believes to be their “true value.” Acting on the assumption that prices will revert to 
true value over time, the trader will sell short the overpriced security and buy the 
underpriced security. Once prices revert to true value, the trade can be liquidated at a 
profit19. Although their low volatility makes such strategies attractive, they nevertheless 
require medium to high leverage in order to benefit from small pricing distortions, 
particularly in fixed income markets (ECB, 2005, p.9). 
 
The investment strategies identified is an attempt to portray the dynamism of hedge fund 
investing executed by fund managers to achieve absolute returns, and is not an exhaustive 
list. Hedge fund investment strategies are generally more complex, utilize in-depth 
research and proprietary knowledge in an attempt to differentiate and attain a competitive 
advantage. However, it is this very flexibility and dynamism, coupled with the use of 
leverage and short sales which has posed tremendous risks to global financial systems 
creating unwelcomed volatility and increased danger. The GFC 2008 has exposed the 
ability of the hedge fund industry to distort financial markets and its unregulated nature 
coupled with lack of transparency agenda makes the containment of a possible systemic 
risk event difficult to ascertain. The following section analyses the relationship between 
systemic risk and the threat which hedge funds pose to a financial system with a detailed 
analysis of the collapse of LTCM in 1998 and Bear Stearns Hedge Funds ten years later. 
                                                        
19 Barclay Hedge (Undated), “Understanding Merger Arbitrage”, 
http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fund-
strategy-merger-arbitrage.html, Accessed 12 Aug 2012. 
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3.6 Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds 
The term ‘systemic risk’ is used to describe the possibility of a series of correlated defaults 
among financial intermediaries which occur over a short period of time, often caused by a 
single major financial turmoil (Chan et al, 2005, p.1; Abraham, 2011, pp.16-17). Hedge 
funds have been singled out as one of the contributors of the GFC 2008 by financial market 
regulators and their investing activities have been identified to potentially be a cause of 
systemic risks within financial systems (Simkovic, 2009, pp.258-262). The Financial 
Stability Forum (2007) identified three main sources of concern from the hedge fund 
industry: a systemic risk arising from their excessive leverage, the potentially disorderly 
impact of their failures on banks and markets, and a market dynamics issue related to their 
concentrated market positions (ECB, 2009, p.5). One of the major reasons the hedge fund 
industry has become a cause of concern has been the tremendous growth of the 
unregulated shadow banking sector over the past decades, fuelled by the demand for 
higher returns in alternative investments in the face of stock-market volatility and 
mounting pension-fund liabilities (Patel, 2008, p.61). This search for yield has meant that 
the massive inflow of funds, especially into the hedge fund industry has also obfuscated the 
true risk profile within financial systems. The regulated banking sector is ultimately 
exposed to these risks through proprietary trading activities, credit arrangements of 
structured products, and prime brokerage services (Lo, 2009, p.11). Accordingly, the risk 
exposures of financial intermediaries has become considerably complex and 
interdependent, especially in the face of globalization and the increased consolidation 
between banking, the financial services sector and the shadow banking industry 
(Munteanu, 2010, p.1). This concern is not only in regards to the funds’ investors but also 
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the impact on the funds’ counterparties and especially prime brokers who often finance the 
funds whereby a significant failure can have serious negative implications on price 
information and liquidity in the markets, curtail market confidence and lead to financial 
contagion and crises (Hagerman, 2007, p.18). 
 
Governments have become increasingly concerned about the potential of systemic failure 
stemming from hedge fund collapses, originally brought to attention by the near-collapse of 
LTCM and more recently prompted by the increasing popularity of hedge funds as a 
favored investment tool (Schwarz, 2008, p.196). In a speech20 by Mary Schapiro, the 
Chairperson of the SEC, addressing the impact of the GFC 2008 on regulatory gaps within 
the financial system, she warned that: 
 
[T]he road to investor confidence requires a concerted effort to fill the 
regulatory gaps that have become so apparent over the last 18 months. One 
of the most significant gaps likely to be filled relates to hedge funds – which 
have flown under the regulatory radar for too long. And without even a 
comprehensive database about hedge funds and their managers, it is 
virtually impossible to monitor their activities for systemic risk and investor 
protection purposes. 
 
The debate encapsulating the definition of systemic risk and the link to hedge funds is 
widespread as academics and market regulators scramble to reason the complicated 
interconnectedness of global financial systems. Nickerson and Kupiec (2004, p. 123) define 
systemic risk as the potential for a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility 
                                                        
20 Schapiro, M. (2009), “The Road To Investor Confidence” by Chairperson Mary Schapiro, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, SIFMA Annual Conference, dated 27 October 2007, New York, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102709mls.htm, Accessed 14 July 2012. 
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in asset prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and 
efficiency losses. The Group of Ten (2001, p.126) proposes the following definition: 
 
Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic 
value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a 
substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite 
probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy. Systemic risk 
events can be sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence 
can build up through time in the absence of appropriate policy responses. 
The adverse real economic effects from systemic problems are generally seen 
as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and from 
the destruction of asset values. Two related assumptions underlie this 
definition. First, economic shocks may become systemic because of the 
existence of negative externalities associated with severe disruptions in the 
financial system. If there were no spillover effects, or negative externalities, 
there would be, arguably, no role for public policy. Second, systemic financial 
events must be very likely to induce undesirable real effects, such as 
substantial reduction in output and employment, in the absence of 
appropriate policy responses. In this definition, a financial disruption that 
does not have a high probability of causing a significant disruption of real 
economic activity is not a systemic risk event (Gerlach, 2009, p.2). 
 
This definition highlights three important characteristics of systemic risk. It has a 
substantial impact on a financial system with spillovers to financial intermediaries and 
related counterparties due to the interconnectedness of financial systems and hence 
resulting in a rise to counterparty risks, an impact which materializes because of highly 
adverse macro-economic effects in the absence of strong regulatory responses. However, 
while this definition is clear, it is also rather abstract. In order to measure and to control 
systemic risks, the definition must be made operational and, in the case of the threat which 
the hedge fund industry poses to systemic stability, it is the enforcement of operational risk 
assessment and mandating increased transparency of such investment vehicles so that 
risky and fraudulent activities can be effectively monitored  (Gerlach, 2009, p.2).  Schwarz 
(2008, p.197) take a similar interconnected view of financial intermediaries, explaining 
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that systemic risks are risks that arise due to a default by one market participant which will 
have repercussions on other participants due to the interlocking nature of financial 
markets. Kaufmann (1996) explains this interconnectedness and its links to systemic risks 
as to occur because “all economic agents are interconnected”, stating: 
 
The interconnection provided a chain along which shocks to any one agent 
are transmitted to others. The personal or institutional balance sheet of each 
agent includes assets that are either liabilities of other agents or whose 
values depend on the behavior of other agents. Likewise, the liabilities of 
each agent are the assets of others. If an agent suffers a decline in the value of 
its assets, the value of its capital will decline. This will likely reduce the 
spending behavior of the agent and thereby also the income and asset values 
of other agents. Moreover, if the loss in asset values were sufficiently large to 
exceed an agent's capital, it would cause the agent to default on their debt 
obligations. This, in turn, will reduce the values of assets on the balance sheet 
of the agent's creditors and ignite a chain reaction of reduced spending and 
defaults (Kaufmann, 1996, p.25; Liu and Mello, 2011, pp.491-494). 
 
An important distinction should be made in differentiating systemic risks from financial 
risks. According to Kambhu et al (2007, pp.8-9) financial risk is the effect of misplaced and 
wrongly calculated investment strategies and concentrates on one or two organizations 
while systemic risks result in financial shocks which have the potential to lead to 
substantial, adverse effects on the real economy or the transmission of financial events to 
the real economy.  
 
Another prominent cause of the increasing concern for systemic risks within financial 
markets is financial innovation and the use of special purpose entities, which is common 
practice within the hedge fund industry. Simkovic (2009) found that the roots of the GFC 
2008, and indeed all past crises, is based on one of the most fundamental problems of 
commercial law; hidden financial leverage. A prominent reason for this was legislation for 
136 
 
financial instruments incentivized fund managers to transfer complex and opaque financial 
products into separate entities so as to segregate the risks they posed from the parent 
entity. This method of risk management meant that such transactions were structured 
separately, while also allowing financial intermediaries to hide the extent of their leverage 
and thus obfuscate the real value of financial risks. An OECD (2011, p.55) investigation 
revealed that the higher the leverage levels get the more extreme price movements have to 
be expected and this increases the probability of crashes. Thus, if there is hidden financial 
leverage in the mix, the true nature of risks within the financial system is obfuscated.  
 
In a publication entitled the “Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk”, the authors argue three principal points; that the current 
international and domestic efforts to contain the generation of systemic risk in financial 
systems are inadequate; this inadequacy increases systemic risk; and that an 
international regulatory response is required (Alexander et al, 2006, p.14; Banaei, 2007, 
p.548). Thus, systemic risks can be defined as the risk of a financial shock within the 
financial system that has a systemic effect on the rest of the economy, globally through the 
interconnected financial markets and hence affecting financial intermediaries and related 
counterparties collectively. Like other participants in the financial system, hedge funds 
invested in many of the financial instruments linked to the GFC 2008. As a consequence, 
their role in the financial crisis and potential contribution to systemic risk have drawn 
increased attention from the, financial market regulators, participants in the financial 
system, and researchers.  
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According to the FSA hedge funds are able to contribute to systemic risk through two main 
channels: the credit channel and the market channel (FSA, 2010, p.2). This was explained in 
Chapter Two as part of the credit intermediation processes within the shadow banking 
industry. Hedge funds pose systemic risks through the credit channel when losses arise due 
to default to creditors and related financial intermediaries or counterparties. These losses 
are extended into the broader financial system through the funds flow process 
exacerbating the systemic exposure through securities transactions and related 
counterparty derivative trades (Pirrong, 2011, pp.13-15).  If the contagion effect of this by 
a systemically important single fund or across multiple smaller funds is large enough, the 
destabilizing impact of losses across affected counterparties will be multiplied.  
 
Systemic risks through the market channel are also significant when hedge funds 
participate in an asset bubble which collapses. In a number of asset classes, hedge funds 
may be significant investors and providers of liquidity and it is possible for their collective 
impact to be one of the drivers of unsustainable asset price upswings or asset bubbles in 
financial markets (FSA, 2010, p.1). For example, a report  by the United Nations (UN) in the 
aftermath of the GFC 2008 of the effects of information on price formation in the 
commodities market stated that hedge fund investment strategies eventuates in herding 
behavior which directly contributed to commodity price bubbles. Thus, when the ‘bubble 
burst’ a converse reaction and herd behaviour led to the downside swings which amplified 
price volatility of such financial instruments (UN, 2011, pp. 32-47). Like a tragedy of the 
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commons21, no individual market participant has sufficient incentive, absent regulation, to 
limit their risk taking in order to reduce the systemic danger to other participants and third 
parties (Schwarcz, 2008, p.198). Furthermore, the impact which hedge funds have had as 
contributors to systemic risks within financial systems has largely been disregarded even 
though there were significant events before the GFC 2008 which indicated the systemic 
significance of the hedge fund industry. An initial sign of the negative externalities caused 
by hedge funds was identified in the collapse of LTCM which, although it invited 
investigations, did not result in any meaningful regulatory actions to mitigate the problem. 
The events are a strong indication that the no-action by regulators eventually resulted in 
the collapse of Bear Stearns Hedge Funds ten years later and the implosion of systemic 
risks leading to the GFC 2008.  
 
3.6.1 The Failure of Long-Term Capital Management  
The 1998 failure of LTCM is said to have nearly been the cause of a contagion which set to 
spread across the global financial system as the financial losses of the hedge fund 
threatened to a create major liquidity crisis amongst its counterparties (Jorion, 2000, p.1). 
The crisis brought the problem of hedge funds as contributors of systemic risks into the 
spotlight and to the attention of the financial market regulators with much of the focus 
placed on the need to control the risk and leverage of unregulated financial firms, raising 
questions about improving counterparty risk management and regulating hedge funds 
(King and Maier, 2009, pp.286-287; Athanassiou, 2009, p.67). The problem was so large 
                                                        
21 The original concept of a tragedy of the commons can be traced back to Aristotle cited in Schwarcz (2008, p. 
198, Footnote 15) stating; “[T]hat which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon 
it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest”. 
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that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Fed) had to intervene and bailout LTCM to 
stop the contagion from spreading across the financial system (Zimmerman, 2000, p.124). 
 
LTCM was designed to be the ‘ultimate hedge fund’ by two of the most illustrious scholars 
in economics and finance managing it, Myron S. Scholes and Robert C. Merton. They shared 
the 1987 Noble Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for “a revolutionary method to 
determine the value of derivatives” known as the Black-Scholes Model. With an AUM of 
approximately US$4.8 billion, the hedge fund utilized trading strategies which included 
convergence trading22 and dynamic hedging23 and specialized in high-volume arbitrage 
trades in bond and bond-derivatives markets (Partnoy and Thomas, 2007, pp.34-36). As the 
hedge fund grew, it gradually become more active in international financial markets and was 
more willing to speculate. LTCM primarily specialized in a strategy known as ‘market-neutral 
arbitrage’ where it had long positions in bonds that it considered undervalued and short 
positions in bonds that it considered overvalued, but more specifically, it bought high-
yielding, less liquid bonds, such as the Danish mortgage-backed securities, bonds issued by 
                                                        
22 Convergence traders take risky positions against noise trading. When they face capital losses from 
unfavorable stocks, they liquidate positions due to their reduced risk bearing capacity, resulting in 
amplification of the original shocks. Although convergence traders reduce asset price volatility and provide 
liquidity most of the time, in certain extreme circumstances the wealth effect can cause them to be 
destabilizing, i.e. they can trade in exactly the same direction as noise traders when they are liquidating losing 
positions (Kaal, 2005, p. 52, footnote 123). Xiong (2001), pp.248-249 – “Convergence trading strategies were 
made popular by the Hedge Fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). A typical convergence trading 
strategy is to be that the price difference between two assets with similar, but not identical, characteristics 
will narrow in the future.” 
23 Benninga and Wiener (1998, p.1) – A dynamic hedging strategy typically involves two positions: Firstly, a 
static positions in a security or a commitment by a firm. For example – a financial institution has written a call 
on a stock or a portfolio – this call expires it or not? Secondly, an offsetting position in a financial contract. 
Typically, this counter-balancing position is adjusted when market conditions change; hence the name 
dynamic hedging strategy. To hedge its written call, the issuing firm decides to buy shares of the underlying 
stock or portfolio. The number of shares purchased at the time will depend on the price of the underlying 
stock or portfolio and on the amount of time remaining until the expiration of the call. Another way of 
viewing this is that the amount of stock held against the call positions depends on the probability that the 
option will be exercised.  
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emerging market countries, and ‘junk’ corporate bonds, and sold short low-yielding, more 
liquid bonds such as the US government bonds (Edwards, 1999, p.198). At the time prior to 
its collapse, it had approximately 80 percent of its balance sheet positions invested in 
bonds of the G7 countries which were in turn collateralised in repo and reverse repo 
agreements through a number of counterparties (Kaal, 2005, p.53, Dowd, 1989, p.3). The 
overriding cause of the failure of LTCM was the gradual erosion of its risk management 
practices during a period when competition for hedge fund business by banks and 
securities firms were more aggressive towards hedge funds which were viewed as 
desirable trading partners (PWG, 1999, p.23; Fioretos, 2010, p.708). 
 
This focus on hedge fund business meant that the counterparties were willing to 
circumvent crucial risk management practices to accommodate the demands of their 
customers. LTCM was able to achieve a high level of leverage in large part because of 
practices in the derivatives market and the market for repurchase agreements (Brice, 2010, 
p.5). At the time of its failure, LTCM was the most highly leveraged hedge fund, with a 
leverage-to-equity ratio exceeding 25:1, reporting to the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) (PWG, 1999, p.14; GAO, 1999, p.14; Bullard, 2008, p.310). The large 
size of LTCM’s trading positions in several markets exposed it to significant unhedged 
financial risk which resulted in extreme losses with the festering of the Russian Ruble 
Crisis in 1998, caused by an unanticipated declaration of default by the Russian 
government as it was unable to service its sovereign debt commitments. This confounded 
LTCM’s risk-management models, making an orderly building-down of its positions and the 
acquisition of fresh capital injections exceptionally difficult (Anthanassiou, 2009, pp.68-
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69). As a result of the turmoil in the international bond market, the fund was forced to 
liquidate its assets to meet margin requirements and hence suffered extreme losses. 
 
This failure was even more threatening because the commitment of LTCM’s trades was 
material and spanned across a variety of systemically important counterparties who were 
substantially active in the collapsing government bond market and had already 
experienced huge financial losses after Russia’s default (van Eechoud et al, 2010, p.289). In 
order to prevent LTCM from bringing down a core part of the financial system, the Fed 
stepped in. Two factors influenced the Fed’s involvement. First, in the rush of LTCM’s 
counterparties to close-out their positions, other market participants, investors who had 
no dealings with LTCM, would have been affected as well (McVea, 2008, p.71). Second, as 
losses spread to other market participants and LTCM’s counterparties, this led to 
tremendous uncertainty about how far prices would move (Ordower, 2010, p.299). Under 
these circumstances, there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate 
markets would experience extreme price volatility and possibly cease to function. This 
would have caused a contagion, loss of investor confidence, and to a rush out of private 
credits, leading to a further widening of credit spreads, deeper liquidations of positions 
(Overmyer, 2010, p.2200 n.108; Zimmerman, 2000). 
 
The findings from the President Working Group on Financial Markets which investigated 
the failure of LTCM showed significant failures in operational risks whereby published 
financial statements did not reveal to LTCM’s counterparties, meaningful details of the 
fund’s risk profile and the concentration of position exposure in certain markets because of 
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the limitations inherent in a typical financial statement for the timely assessment of LTCM’s 
trading risks (PWG, 1999, p.8). Another problem identified was the failure of counterparty 
credit risk management (CCRM). As with many hedge funds, LTCM did the bulk of its 
borrowing in the repo market. LTCM would sell an asset to an investment bank or other 
counterparty with the promise to buy it back later (Thompson, 2009, p.8; PWG, 1999, p.D-
10). It was allowed to carry out its investing activities in OTC trades that were cleared with 
inadequate collateral margins or ‘haircuts24’ on repurchase agreements which 
subsequently allowed it to build leverage and increase its risk exposure. The requirement 
for a haircut is meant to reduce the risk to the seller that the underlying asset declines in 
value during the course of the repurchase agreement. This, however, was effectively 
disregarded in the case of LTCM (Jorion, 2000, pp.2-7). The deficient credit management 
procedures and inadequate collateral margin requirements meant that LTCM was able to 
increase its leverage risks and which subsequently exacerbated counterparty credit risks. 
 
Further, the findings of the U.S. Hearing on Hedge Fund Operations before the Committee 
on Banking and Financial Services25 (U.S.CHFO) identified two operational issues which 
would have had significant implications for the financial system if LTCM was not bailed-out. 
The first issue was the manner in which LTCM was structured. It was incorporated as a 
Delaware Limited Partnership but the fund it operated, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P, 
was incorporated in a tax haven, organized as a Caymans Island limited partnership 
                                                        
24 A ‘haircut’ is the reduction of value to securities used as collateral in a margin loan. That is, when one places 
securities as collateral, the brokerage making the loan treats them as being worth less than they actually are, 
so as to give itself a cushion in case its market price decreases (Roulet, 2011, p.14, n.11). 
25 U.S. Hearing on Hedge Fund Operations before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th 
Congress 2nd Session dated 1October 1988, William J, McDonough, President Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000043015047;view=1up;seq=1, Accessed 27 March 2010. 
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(Gatsik, 2001, p. 599; PWG, 1999, p.10). According to Haubrich (2007, pp.2-4) this complex 
structure meant that any buyout of the fund would be a complicated cross-jurisdictional 
process and if both entities were allowed to declare bankruptcy in different jurisdictions, 
this would have exacerbated problems in seeking any substantive resolution (U.S.CHFO, 
1998, pp.25-28). The second issue was related to LTCM’s large holding of financial 
derivatives. In the U.S., bankruptcy usually triggers an ‘automatic stay’ that would prevent 
creditors from seizing the borrower’s assets. However, OTC derivative contracts were 
exempt from this provision and, in case of bankruptcy, the creditors would have been able 
to terminate the contract, taking the collateral for partial payment (U.S.CHFO, 1998, p.E.6). 
If this was allowed to take place, the creditors would have subsequently sold all the 
remaining liquid securities. Taking into account the size of LTCM’s portfolio, such 
liquidation would have been very disruptive for all related counterparties within the global 
financial system (Haubrich, 2007, p.2).  
 
The LTCM collapse brought into light the failure of risk management practices and 
significant conflict of interests between banks and the hedge fund industry. It was clear 
that banks lent heavily to LTCM in order to finance its leverage positions and that the 
bailout was orchestrated primarily in their own interest. LTCM’s seventeen biggest 
counterparties, which include banks such as Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
Salomon Smith Barney, would have lost at least USD$2.8 billion had the bailout not been 
organized (Robotti, 2004, p.119). In general, two main explanations of counterparties’ 
involvement were given. The first was that the role of banks is one of meeting their clients’ 
requests and that, by so doing, they can fail to judge the riskiness of their operations 
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(Dunbar, 2000). In the case of LTCM, the allure of geniality that surrounded the fund’s high 
profile managers confused the judgments of counterparties (Robotti, 2003, p.199). The 
second explanation was that the interconnectedness of their financial transactions in turn 
made them vulnerable to substantial losses which thus led to purposefully hiding the true 
financial risks of these transactions. More importantly, the outcomes of the investigations 
made recommendations for increased transparency and registration requirements for 
hedge funds and their managers but this was subsequently not implemented, with 
responsibility given to the hedge fund industry to self-regulate. Supervisory inaction has 
invariably been the consequence of regulatory failure due to continual inaction by the SEC, 
one of the leading causes of the collapse of Bear Stearns and the GFC 2008.  
 
3.6.2 The Collapse of Bear Stearns 
Ten years after the LTCM debacle, the collapse of Bear Stearns & Co. Inc. (Bear Stearns) in 
2008 emphasized the systemic risk problems which hedge funds pose to the integrity of a 
financial system back into the purview of regulators. Bear Stearns was one of the pioneers 
of, and the fifth largest investment bank on, Wall Street. By year end 2007, its balance sheet 
showed USD$395 billion in assets supported by USD$11.1 billion in equity, a leverage ratio 
of approximately 33:1 (Tammero, 2010, p.598). Notional contracts amounted to around 
USD$13.4 trillion in derivative financial instruments of which around 14 percent were in 
listed futures and options contracts26. Its collapse in 2008 proved to be the beginning of a 
                                                        
26 United States District Court, Southern District of New York: In RE: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 
Securities, Derivative, And ERISA Litigation; Consolidation Class Action Complaint for the Violation of the 
Securities Laws, p.62-63, http://securities.stanford.edu/1039/BSC_01/2011119_r01x_08CV02793.pdf, 
Accessed 1 January 2012. 
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financial crisis which will see no end if the true risk of leveraged positions and derivative 
contracts within financial systems are not consolidated.  
 
One of the causes of the demise of Bear Stearns was two of its hedge funds, the High-Grade 
Structured Credit Strategies Fund (HGCF) which was incorporated in 2003, and the High-
Grade Structured Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund (HGLF), created in 2006, both of 
which were sponsored through its subsidiary, Bear Stearns Asset Management (BSAM), in 
2007. The funds were part of a growing industry in investment vehicles that specialized in 
illiquid assets such as exotic securities (Patel, 2008, p.42). An important selling point for 
investors in the hedge funds was the reputation of both funds’ and their relationship with 
Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns was known as a leader in CDOs and other exotic securities 
within the financial industry. The hedge funds were marketed as safe investments because 
of Bear Stearns’s reputation and the use of the company’s proprietary systems to identify 
and manage risk27. Moreover, Bear Stearns was also involved in every part of the BSAM 
business28. For example, Bear Stearns Securities Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
the company, served as the prime broker for the hedge funds and PFPPC Inc., another Bear 
Stearns subsidiary, was the hedge funds’ administrator while BSAM was the investment 
manager for the HGCF and HGLF29. In hindsight, it is disappointing that these conflicts of 
                                                        
27 United States District Court, Southern District of New York: In RE: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 
Securities, Derivative, And ERISA Litigation; Consolidation Class Action Complaint for the Violation of the 
Securities Laws, p.21, Para 84, http://securities.stanford.edu/1039/BSC_01/2011119_r01x_08CV02793.pdf, 
Accessed 1 January 2012. 
28 United States District Court, Southern District of New York: In RE: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 
Securities, Derivative, And ERISA Litigation; Consolidation Class Action Complaint for the Violation of the 
Securities Laws, p.21, Para 83, http://securities.stanford.edu/1039/BSC_01/2011119_r01x_08CV02793.pdf, 
Accessed 1 January 2012. 
29 United States District Court, Southern District of New York: In RE: The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 
Securities, Derivative, And ERISA Litigation; Consolidation Class Action Complaint For the Violation of the 
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interests were never highlighted as a significant corporate governance failure and it is 
strongly believed that such inadequate governance principles within Bear Stearns were 
significant contributors to its demise.  
 
According to an SEC complaint in SEC v Ralph R. Coffi & Matthew M. Tannin30, filed in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the HGCF and HGLF collapsed after 
taking highly leveraged positions in structured securities based largely on subprime 
mortgage-backed securities. The collapse was a result of risky investment strategies which 
focused on complex financial instruments, heavily invested in illiquid assets without a 
consistent market. The funds were leveraged at 35 times their invested AUM, largely due to 
misrepresented valuations, and as the market conditions deteriorated the returns of the 
two funds dropped further below valuations increasing losses exponentially31.  There were 
numerous hidden financial risks within these two hedge funds and one of the main reasons 
for its collapse was misrepresentation and fraud where the managers of the fund mislead 
investors and counterparties through incorrect valuation and manipulated financial 
statement information32. Further, the managers had misrepresented fund performance to 
evade investor redemption requests in order to prevent a short-term systemic collapse of 
the fund. The hedge funds were subsequently bailed-out by the parent company, Bear 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Securities Laws, p.21, Para 84, http://securities.stanford.edu/1039/BSC_01/2011119_r01x_08CV02793.pdf, 
Accessed 1 January 2012,   
30 United States Securities and Exchange Commission v Ralph R. Coffi & Matthew M. Tannin (2008), United 
States Court Eastern District of New York, p.2-4.  
 http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20625.pdf, Accessed 1 January 2012. 
31 Denning, D. (2007), “Bear Stearns Hedge Funds in Trouble, Merrill Lynch Ready To Pounce”, The Daily 
Reckoning, dated 21 June 2007 http://www.dailyreckoning.com.au/bear-stearns-trouble/2007/06/21/, 
Accessed 21 June 2011. 
32 Cohen, W. (2000), “Inside the Bear Stearns Boiler Room”, CNNMoney, dated 4 March 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/02/magazines/fortune/cohan_houseofcards.fortune/, Accessed 1 June 2010. 
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Stearns, out of concern that the failure of these entities could raise investors’ concerns 
about the firm itself and create irreparable reputational risks, but this proved to be 
unsustainable (FCIC, 2011, p.240). 
 
The systemic risk posed by HGCF and HGLF to its counterparties was a result of the 
broader connection of Bear Stearns in the global financial system. It was an important 
prime broker globally, committed to numerous OTC contracts and transactions which 
subsequently led to a chain of liquidity risks and hence contagion to the financial system 
(King and Maier, 2009, p.289). It was a major counterpart in credit default swap 
transactions and the repo market which was interconnected between counterparties, 
forming complex relations with each other (Broughman, 2010, p.193). The risky exposures 
taken and made by Bear Stearns identify recklessness in due diligence and a disregard for 
compliance procedures. A crucial point to be made is that BSAM was known to have 
concentrated positions in the shadow banking system, taking on large amounts of risk by 
utilizing excessive leverage which was not disclosed but hidden from its balance sheets 
through special purpose vehicles (Pozsar, 2008, pp.19-24) . The existence of its connection 
with the unregulated shadow banking industry and financial contracts illustrates the 
potential problems which could arise due to the interconnectedness between the 
regulated financial system and the shadow banking system. A run on the bank was not 
the root cause of the collapse; rather, the fear that the “borrow short and lend longer” 
pyramid of credit used by the bank would crumble drove investors to withdraw capital 
and lenders to cease lending en masse, thus cutting off any source of funding and 
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increasing liquidity and credit risks for the bank and its eventual collapse (Broughman, 
2010, p.195). 
 
It is important to understand clearly the concept of systemic risk in the midst of the credit 
crisis which coincided with the global financial crisis. Chairman Bernanke clearly suggested 
that “the US credit crisis revealed glaring inadequacies in the regulatory and supervisory 
framework of the United States. One of the primary purposes of that framework should be 
to avoid having risk-management failures at individual institutions such as Bear Stearns 
engender systemic risk for the entire financial system”. Again, in Chairman Ben Bernanke's 
words, "the collapse of Bear Stearns was triggered by a run of its creditors and customers, 
analogous to the run of depositors on a commercial bank." Acknowledging that he was 
surprised by the run on Bear Stearns because its borrowings were largely secured, 
Bernanke went on to state that "the illiquidity of markets in mid-March was so severe that 
creditors lost confidence that they could recoup their losses by selling the collateral [on 
Bear Stearns]33" thus, precipitating a contagion in financial markets resulting in the GFC 
2008. 
 
There is no better explanation of the notion of a systemic collapse and its synonymity with 
counterparty risk management than from the statement written by Myron Scholes in an 
article entitled “Crisis and Risk Management” in May 2000, American Review Papers and 
                                                        
33 Makin, J. (2008), “Risk and Systemic Risks”, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, dated 1 
Sept 2008, http://www.aei.org/outlook/economics/financial-services/risk-and-systemic-risk/, Accessed 1 
January 2012. 
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Proceedings (Scholes, 2000, p.17) after the collapse of LTCM. Without regard to the 
consequences of excessively risky trading strategies, Scholes wrote that:  
 
The increase in volatility (particularly in equity markets) and the flight to 
liquidity around the world resulted in an extraordinary reduction in the capital 
base of the firm that I was associated with, Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM). This reduction in capital culminated in a form of negotiated 
bankruptcy. A consortium of 14 institutions, with outstanding claims against 
LTCM, infused new equity capital into LTCM and took over it and the 
management of its assets.  
 
Although the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) facilitated the takeover, it did not 
bail out LTCM. Many debtor entities found it in their self-interest not to post 
the collateral that was owed to LTCM and other creditor entities claimed to be 
ahead of others to secure earlier payoffs. Without the FRB acting quickly to 
mitigate these holdup activities, LTCM would have had to file for bankruptcy – 
for some, a more efficient outcome, but a far more costly outcome for society. If 
there was a bailout, it failed: LTCM has been effectively liquidated. 
 
The systemic risks posed by LTCM and Bear Stearns’ Hedge Funds identify the importance 
of CCRM and the need for effective due diligence to be carried out between regulated and 
unregulated financial intermediaries through tools such as margin requirements and 
collateral assurance practices. These practices are designed to reduce counterparty credit 
risk in leveraged trading by creating a buffer against increased exposure in volatile markets 
to the broker financing the derivatives contract (Carney, 2013, p.13). In general, a financial 
institution may be willing to extend credit to the hedge fund against the posting of specific 
collateral that is valued at no less than the amount of the exposure. This reduction in 
settlement risk in leveraged trading increases confidence and thereby promotes active 
financing of leveraged trading (Kambhu, at el, 2007, p.4). Margin can be seen as offering 
enhanced protection against counterparty credit risk where it is effectively implemented 
(BIS, 2012, p.3). However, the potential benefits of margin requirements must be weighed 
against the liquidity impact that would result from the need of counterparties to provide 
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liquid, high-quality collateral to meet those requirements, including potential changes to 
market functioning as a result of increased demand for such collateral in the aggregate, the 
variation margin (BIS, 2012, p.3).  
 
The variation margin is delivered when the exposure exceeds the nuisance or minimum 
transfer amount, for example a margin call triggered by extreme volatility (ISDA, 1996, 
p.41). Initial margin is the amount of collateral that is needed to cover potential future 
changes in the value of the contract (Dudley and Nimalendran, 2011, pp.1231-1233; ISDA, 
1996, p.41). Both types of margin requirements work to ensure that credit facilitators are 
protected against a default or liquidated trading position by maintaining sufficiency of 
collateral provided. Other forms of traditional CCRM include: the development of a broad 
set of risk metrics including internal ratings, ongoing monitoring and evaluation of 
exposures such as stress testing on a consolidated basis over a range of suitably stressful 
scenarios; due diligence to understand the strategies and history of the counterparty; limits 
on specific trades, exposures and settlement protocols which help control exposure and 
reduce the risk of the financial institution when dealing with counterparties (Kambhu at el, 
2007, p.5).  The risk-sensitive assessment of a potential future exposure to a liquidity crisis 
has focused on CCRM strategies between financial intermediaries and hedge funds. 
However, investors play an important role in the surveillance of hedge fund behavior and 
counteracting excessive risk taking though active participation in objective and strategy 
evaluation in particular, at the initial stages of investment decision making. 
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3.7 Investor Protection 
Hedge Funds have been allowed exemptions from regulatory scrutiny for various reasons, 
amongst them has been the “sophisticated investor rule” (Karmel, 2008, p.685; Smith, 
2011). As will be elaborated in Chapter Four, the overriding principles of this rule restricts 
hedge funds from soliciting investment contributions from the general public with only 
high net worth individuals and institutional investors able to gain access to the dynamic 
trading strategies which hedge funds profess in attaining absolute returns. The 
assumptions of this rule identify sophisticated investors as informed and knowledgeable 
participants of the sophisticated financial strategies which hedge funds undertake and 
accept the associated risks. The approach of financial market regulators has been to allow 
hedge funds to operate as private investment vehicles in the public domain, that is, the 
regulated financial system, without the necessary legislative controls to restrict their 
behavior. However, the complexities of hedge fund activities, especially with inherent 
informational asymmetries within the financial system, renders this philosophy untrue 
(Athanassiou, 2008, pp.256-260). Sophisticated or not, the collapse of numerous hedge 
funds and increasing criminal sanctions against those who engaged in fraudulent conduct 
such as insider trading proves that investors need protection from hedge fund activity. 
Further, the retailization of hedge funds has, directly or indirectly, exposed less 
sophisticated or retail investors to the same risks as their more knowledgeable 
counterparts, assisted by substantial changes in financial markets which have led to a 
consolidation of national exchanges, yielding fragmentation and the rise of alternative 
trading systems.  
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The exposure of retail investors to the risks of hedge fund investment strategies in financial 
markets has also increased through their holdings in pension funds and the types of 
financial instruments have multiplied through financial engineering (Burke, 2009, p.20). 
Today’s reality is that investing is no longer an optional activity amongst working adults 
who are increasingly expected to assume the responsibility of their financial security in 
retirement and thus have no choice but to invest in the financial markets, thereby exposing 
their savings to the same risks taken on by more knowledgeable participants (Black, 2008, 
p.305). 
 
Regulations based on investor protection have consistently featured amongst the main 
components of most financial market regulatory schemes, with national arrangements 
differing from one another in terms of the emphasis that they place on the individual 
investors assuming responsibility for the evaluation of which specific investments suit 
them best on the basis of information that product providers are mandated by law to 
disclose (Athanassiou, 2008, pp.52-53). The economic rationale for investor protection 
regulation by governments is to induce investors to undertake market risks and that the 
oversight provided by financial market regulators of ensuring that investor interests are 
guarded against market anomalies maintains confidence in the stability of financial market 
practices (Burke, 2009, p.10; Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008, p.11). Edwards (2006, p.38) 
distinguishes between investor protection regulatory regimes as either ‘top down’ or 
‘bottom up’. A top-down regime is characterized by the requirement that investment 
products or schemes be authorized together with rules about what that scheme can and 
cannot do. The primary purpose of these regulations is both to better inform investors and 
153 
 
to protect them by limiting exposure to financial loss. In contrast, a bottom-up regulatory 
regime is based on a disclosure-based regime where greater trust and reliance is placed on 
rules that require investment product providers to accurately describe the nature of these 
investment products and their potential risks. This information empowers investors to 
assess and adequately analyze their risk appetite with an acceptable investment strategy 
(King and Maier, 2009, pp.286-289). A fundamental caveat to this scheme is an acceptance 
on the part of both regulators and investors that some investment products will fail and 
that investors will experience significant financial losses, perhaps even their entire 
investments (Edwards, 2006, p.38). Thus, the responsibility of law-makers to investors’ 
dependent on a fair and transparent financial system, with preference for governmental 
intervention as opposed to self-regulation, is as much a driver for economic growth as is 
enabling innovation (Shadab, 2009, pp.17-19). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that 
investor protection rules and economic growth are interrelated (La Porta et al, 1997 
p.1131). 
 
Adequate investor protection regulations increase confidence within a financial system and 
consequently more participation, thus invariably making investor protection one of the 
most visible objectives pursued by financial market supervisors and law-makers 
worldwide (La Porta et al, 1999, p.471). This is more so in the context of institutional 
investment vehicles, such as mutual and pension funds, where “the overriding goal of 
public policy underlying regulation, is investor protection” (Edwards, 1999, p. 191). Hedge 
funds are investment vehicles which thrive on the ability to invest with utmost flexibility 
through the use of complex financial instruments and mandate riskier investment 
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philosophies as compared to most regulated funds. This complicates the ability of 
regulators to adequately uphold their investor protection mandate. These complications 
relate to the ability of assessing funds’ investment strategies and risk exposure, in 
particular the non-financial risks which hedge funds posed to investors for example, 
fraudulent investment schemes, misrepresentation and manipulation which will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter Five (Kaal, 2005, p.33; Shadab, 2009, p.41; Awrey, 2011). It 
is apparent from the collapse of LTCM, Bear Stearns Hedge Funds and numerous others 
after the GFC 2008 that these investment vehicles are not appropriate for retail investors. 
Furthermore, the rise of hedge fund activism has created added complications for the 
importance of investor protection and the adverse consequence of such activities which the 
following section will address. 
 
3.7.1 Hedge Fund Activism 
Ryan and Schneider (2002, p.555) define investor activism as “the use of power by an 
investor to either influence the processes or outcomes of a given portfolio firm or to evoke 
large-scale change across multiple firms through the symbolic targeting of one or more 
portfolio firms” (Schneider and Ryan, 2011, pp.352-353). The growth of hedge fund 
activism is attributable to a number of distinct developments within the industry.  These 
include the sustained growth in the volume of their assets, enabling hedge funds to hold 
substantial, highly concentrated positions that they can use to exert influence over their 
target companies (FSA, 2005, pp.1-2). The competitive pressures as a result of a relative 
decline in profits, force hedge fund managers to become actively involved in the 
governance-side of their investment targets (Schneider and Ryan, 2011, p.350; Farrell and 
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Lund, 2007, p.1). The growing acceptability of shareholder activism in the post-Enron and 
WorldCom era as well as the greater willingness of investors to hold underperforming 
boards accountable for their failings and the sweeping-away of protectionist barriers has 
facilitated a cross-border brand of activism unheard of in previous years (Athanassiou, 
2008, p,85; Briggs, 2007, pp.683-684). Hedge fund managers are also not faced with 
substantive legal requirements to diversify their investments and have the absolute 
discretion to focus substantial investments and resources on target firms, enabling them to 
engage in strategies which may not be available to regulated funds (Boyson and Mooradian, 
2011, p.172; Bessière et al, 2011, p.1226). Most studies on hedge fund activism document 
the positive implications of such activities. However, there are negative externalities 
experienced by less powerful investors and stakeholders as a result of aggressive changes 
implemented to achieve short term goals of profitability (Brav et al, 2008, Klein and Zur, 
2009, Clifford, 2008, Greenwood and Schor, 2009). 
 
Schneider and Ryan (2011, pp.350-351) find that hedge funds, being unfettered by conflicts 
of interest, market-value transparency, and a rigid regulatory environment that restrain 
other investors, often represent a form of control over potential managerial self-interests.  
They explain that this establishes a ‘principle-principle’ conflict in which the controlling 
shareholder extracts a disproportionate amount of a firms’ shareholder value because they 
hold substantial, highly concentrated positions and can use this to exert influence over 
their target companies. At other times, hedge funds’ conflict with other investors, who 
typically are ‘long-only’ investors seeking an increase in share price based on the fund’s 
oppositional intention regarding the value of the firm’s shares (Kahan and Rock, 2007, 
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p.1071). Brav et al (2008) provide an alternative view stating that research claiming hedge 
fund activism destroys value due to their short-term interests is based on sample evidence 
which is inherently plagued by various biases. They instead present evidence based on a 
large-scale sample over five years (2001-2006) and find that hedge funds seldom seek 
control and are generally non-confrontational. This stance is not being disputed, but rather 
the claim is laid that there are instances where hedge fund activism has been detrimental 
to investor interests (Klein and Zur, 2009, pp.225-226).  
 
It is the general view that the goals of a hedge fund are dramatically different from the 
long-term goals of large corporations and ‘long-only’ shareholders. There is concern about 
how this may affect capital markets and investors given that hedge funds target short-term 
gains rather than focusing on long-term growth and stability within a company or industry 
(Schmidt, 2003, p.169). One prime example of the potential impact of hedge funds activism 
on financial market participants occurred recently in the case when Deutsche Borse, a 
German bank made a bid to purchase the London Stock Exchange. The managers of funds’ 
which held a significant portion of stock in Deutsche Borse did not agree with the bank’s 
strategic goals. Using their collective ownership, they had the board members replaced and 
stopped the bid for the London Stock Exchange (Schmidt, 2003, pp.168-169). This move 
was clearly within their rights as shareholders, with disregard of the impact of such actions 
on other stakeholders, especially if the acquisition would have resulted in value creation 
(Menendez et al, 2012, pp.61-73). Thus the ‘short-termism’ of activist hedge funds with the 
mandate to increase profitability at all costs creates potentially negative effects on the 
target firms and eventually the value of investors’ holdings. These strategies contribute to 
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an increasingly vulnerable financial system and stakeholders, especially less powerful 
retail investors, end up most vulnerable to financial losses as a result of the ruthless profit 
motive of activist hedge funds which engage in self-interested behavior. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The hedge fund industry has grown in the last decades to be an important part of the global 
financial system and a contributory party to systemic risks. This has been particularly so 
because of the flexible nature of such investment vehicles which developed based on three 
distinct strategies: the use of leverage, short selling and to be incorporated as unregulated 
investment vehicles. Hedge funds do have a positive impact on financial systems as 
providers of liquidity, enablers of price discovery and enhancers of market efficiency. 
Hedge funds are an integral part of the global financial system. However, the numerous 
examples of irresponsible risky behavior by hedge funds has been detrimental to the 
financial well-being of economies and individuals worldwide. 
 
This thesis accepts the generous positive impact which hedge funds have had on financial 
systems and seeks to scrutinize the negative externalities which hedge funds contribute to, 
for example, systemic risks. The systemic risks which hedge funds pose remain the same as 
they were during the collapse of LTCM and then Bear Stearns in 2008 which led to the GFC 
2008. Excessive leverage, reckless investment strategies and lax due diligence are amongst 
the issues which will continue to influence investor wealth as will fraudulent and deceptive 
conduct. Informational asymmetry creates valuation discrepancies of such funds and their 
investment activities globally will possibly never be revealed because secrecy trumps over 
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transparency. In early 2010, regulators seemed poised to clamp down on the hedge fund 
industry. To a large extent, their instincts were right. At their peak, hedge funds controlled 
the derivative linked financial system more than they deserved, and they took risks that 
cost societies dearly. Regulation is about considering costs and benefits and in order to 
decide whether to regulate or not one must understand all the costs and effects of both 
regulating and not regulating which includes the social costs of such mandates in the public 
interest. A part of that is to properly assess the risks associated with the industry.  The next 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of hedge fund regulation in the US and the UK, the 
two major and most powerful financial systems in the world. It seeks to evidence the 
difference of the regulatory framework which governs the hedge fund industry before and 
after the global financial crisis and will provide a framework for recommended proposals 
for hedge fund regulation in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 4   
HEDGE FUNDS REGULATION IN THE US AND UK 
 
"Excessive deregulation is at the root of the current crisis, and there is a real 
danger that the pendulum will swing too far the other way. That would be 
unfortunate because regulations are liable to be even more deficient than the 
market mechanism itself. That’s because regulators are not only human but 
also bureaucratic and susceptible to political influences.” 
- George Soros, Speech to the U.S. Congress1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The regulatory environment in which hedge funds operate in the US and the UK has 
evolved over the past 70 years into what is envisaged to be a complex web of disclosure 
and compliance requirements which will not have the desired effect of investor protection 
and preventing systemic risks without adequate enforcement. Chapter Three established 
that the hedge fund industry was historically formed as privately managed investment 
vehicles, the purpose of which was to pool funds from high net worth individuals and 
financial institutions that were equipped with adequate financial sophistication to 
understand and accept the riskier nature of such investment vehicles. The legislative 
recognition of financial sophistication meant that these investors and institutions had the 
financial capacity and risk management acumen to manage or sustain possible financial 
losses and did not require the same form of regulatory oversight available to retail 
                                                        
1 U.S. Congress (2008), “House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Hedge Funds 
and the Financial Markets”, United States Congress, Serial No. 110-210, November 13 2008  p.116. 
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investors. This allowed hedge funds to take advantage of regulatory exemptions against 
registration requirements. Thus, one prominent motivation for the lack of direct oversight 
of the hedge fund industry has been based on the acknowledgement that financial 
regulation needed to be flexible enough to cater to a wide range of investor profiles and 
encourage innovation, promote progress and, hence, the availability of exemptions to 
facilitate such activities.  Furthermore, an important underlying reason for regulating 
financial markets is to instill investors with confidence in the financial intermediation 
process through which their investment activities are carried out. The efforts to promote 
this has been less than successful because much of the business activities have been 
conducted in the unregulated shadow banking industry which has been crucial in enabling 
hedge funds to obscure behind the veil of secrecy.  
 
The notion of financial sophistication excluded retail investors from investing in hedge 
funds as they were categorized by financial market regulators as less financially 
sophisticated, risk averse and needed protection from fraudulent and deceptive conduct 
through financial market regulation predominantly aimed at enabling smooth and efficient 
transaction flows and peace of mind in investing. However, the past decade has seen 
growing influence of retail investor funds investing in hedge funds, especially through 
pension funds. The integration of financial products and markets has blurred the line 
between the regulated and unregulated sphere which used to adequately protect retail 
investors. The GFC 2008, the collapse of numerous hedge funds and resultant systemic 
risks has proven that no individual, whether retail or sophisticated, is immune to financial 
losses due to reckless behaviour. Unfortunately, regulators had failed to keep up with the 
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rapid changes within financial markets and in ensuring the safety and soundness of 
financial systems globally.  
 
Critics have argued that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 
21st century financial markets2. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in the US 
effectively removed the separation that previously existed between investment banks and 
depositary institutions3. Many of those regulations were dismantled in response to an idea 
promoted by academics of the University of Chicago, School of Economics based on the 
theories underlying the efficient markets hypothesis. According to this view, unregulated 
financial markets promote economic efficiency and increase the welfare of all individuals in 
a society4. As a result, argues economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
Timothy Geithner, “the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation 
such as the increasing importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-
balance sheet financing5” and they identified hedge funds as the key players within the 
shadow banking system which contributed to the GFC of 2008, calling for improved 
regulatory scrutiny of the hedge fund industry.  The stance for increasing regulatory 
oversight of hedge fund activities globally was further heightened by the high profile 
indictment of Bernard Madoff (Madoff) after the collapse of his hedge fund, which was 
                                                        
2 G20 (2008), “Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy”, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081115-1.html Accessed, 28 Feb 
2012. 
3 President Barack Obama, Regulatory Reform Speech, 17 June 2009, “Remarks by the President on 21st 
Century Financial Regulatory Reform, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-
President-on-Regulatory-Reform/, Accessed 1 May 2010. 
4 4 Farmer, R. (2013), “A Sovereign Wealth Fund Can Save the UK from Market Meltdown” Financial Times UK, 
dated 18 July 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6a61d458-e7c7-11e2-babb-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ZSbcK6ZJ, Accessed 19 July 2013. 
5 Reuters, Daily News Staff Writer (2010), “Geithner Blasts Shadow Banking Demands More Powers for 
Regulators”, Reuters http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-05-06/news/27063649_1_banking-system-
financial-firms-financial-crisis, Accessed 28 November 2010. 
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eventually identified as a simple fraudulent ‘Ponzi’ scheme. However, it is yet to be 
determined where the true onus of responsibility lies in reference to the fraud as 
politicians and regulators continue debate to the best approach to regulating hedge funds. 
The regulatory status of hedge funds as compared to that of traditional financial 
intermediaries such as banks, mutual funds, brokerage houses or insurance companies, has 
always been ambiguous. On the one hand, hedge funds operate in regulated markets, utilize 
the infrastructure of regulated financial centres and deal with regulated financial 
institutions, for example brokerage firms and banks, to implement their investment 
strategies (Lhabitant, 2006, p.37). They are therefore, in a sense, indirectly regulated. As 
shown in Chapter Three, hedge funds tend to structure themselves in such a way as to 
avoid direct regulatory oversight and escape the registration or licensing requirements 
generally applicable to investment companies6 thus, effectively seeking to avoid direct 
regulation. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that the popular notion that hedge funds ‘evade’ 
regulation cannot be substantiated by recent experiences. Hedge funds do not evade 
regulation; they successfully take advantage of registration exemptions available through 
securities legislation. However, the exemptions available have allowed some hedge funds to 
conduct investing activities at a level of flexibility that has posed extreme risks to the 
integrity of certain financial systems. The chapter seeks to highlight the important and 
                                                        
6 EU, (2011), “Hedge funds: An Overview of Different Types of Hedge Funds and the Most Common Forms of 
Techniques They Use”, European Union, Briefing paper, European Parliament, Directorate-Generale Internal 
Policies of the Union-Directorate A, Economic and Scientific Policies, dated 18 Aug 2011,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201108/20110818ATT25104/20110818ATT25
104EN.pdf, Accessed 25 Dec 2011. 
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more prominent approaches taken by hedge funds through available legislation in seeking 
exemptions from registration requirements in the US and subsequently the alternative 
approach taken by the FSA in its risk based strategy to formulate supervisory approaches 
in the UK. The chapter provides a comparative analysis of the regulatory framework 
governing hedge funds in the US and UK, the legislation in place before the global financial 
crisis and the introduction of financial market regulatory reform initiatives until December 
of 2011, through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 
(Dodd-Frank Act) in the US and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 2010 
(AIFMD) in the UK. This chapter is not an exhaustive analysis of legislation pertaining to 
hedge funds in the US or the UK. Instead, it provides guidance on current actions taken by 
both jurisdictions in formulating more stringent oversight of hedge fund activities, an issue 
which has yet to be adequately addressed in Australia. An analysis of future proposed 
changes is conducted to identify the new regulatory approaches recommended up until 
December 2011. Hedge funds want to operate with maximum flexibility, achieving 
maximum profitability. Regulatory environments and industry solutions are intrinsically 
interdependent. Consequently, it is necessary to analyse both in order to understand the 
business landscape and scope for the future of financial markets worldwide. This will allow 
an understanding of these approaches which will serve in establishing guidelines so as to 
effectively critique the regulatory framework which applies in the regulation and 
governance of hedge funds in Australia. 
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4.2 Regulation in the United States before the Financial Crisis 
The US financial system is structured in a manner which advocates the free market 
economy philosophy where the onus is placed on financial intermediaries to conduct 
business with integrity and responsibility while considering the risks to their stakeholders. 
Hence, the regulatory authorities should only intervene as a remedy when market forces 
fail to properly address certain disruptions ((Lhabitant, 2006, p.39). This was the case in 
the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression which created a firm conviction 
that unregulated financial markets could lead to rampant speculation, eventual market 
bubbles, and ruin for unprotected investors (Lhabitant, 2006, p.39). The result was the 
imposition of strict federal regulation to control the access of investors to investment 
vehicles and constrain financial institutions with regard to the types of investment 
activities they could undertake. While all these regulations set rules that seemed to work 
well for traditional investment funds, they are often incompatible with the investment 
philosophies of hedge fund operations and investment strategies which utilise complex 
financial instruments and leverage to attain absolute returns. US hedge funds have 
therefore used some of the well-established exemptions that were built into the securities 
law regime to operate outside its scope. These exemptions are applied through a 
combination of relevant legislation within the Securities Act 1933, the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934, the Investment Company Act 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act 1940. 
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4.2.1 The Securities Act 1933 
The Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) is a disclosure statute directed at regulating 
the offering and distribution of securities7 sold to the public (Gibson, 2000, p.688). The 
provisions within the Securities Act emphasise the requirement for full and fair disclosure 
to a prospective investor, all material facts about a security’s issue and the securities being 
offered compliant with registration requirements for issuers of public securities with the 
SEC (Riviere, 2011, p.271). The disclosure obligations and restrictions are imposed on the 
sellers of the securities as opposed to the buyers, consistent with the motivations of 
enacting the Securities Act and its overall investor protection mandate which is focused on 
the distribution process, the broker-dealers, clearing houses and other financial 
intermediaries (Oppold, 2008, p.843). These provisions are further enforced by the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934, as will be discussed in section 4.2.2, which addresses 
mandates applicable to securities transactions and imposes obligations on both purchasers 
as well as sellers (Horsfield–Bradbury, 2008, p.25). The legislative history of the Securities 
Act reflects concerns that investors participating in financial markets were not sufficiently 
protected against inadequate disclosure, misrepresentation, and manipulative schemes8 
(Finger, 2009, p.737). Thus, anti-fraud provisions, registration and disclosure requirements 
                                                        
7 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (2000 & Supp. 2001). The term “security” means any stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, reorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or 
index of securities (interest therein or based on the value thereof), any put, call, straddle, option or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
forgoing. Note: The definition was amended to exclude security-based swap agreements but also to provide 
that such agreements, although not securities are subject to the securities laws’ antifraud provisions. See 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub, L. No. 106-54, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec, 21, 2000). 
8 S. REP. No. 73-792, at 3-4 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History of The Securities Act of 1933 And 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item No. 17 (J.S. Ellenberger and Ellen P. Mahar. Eds., 1973) 
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of the Securities Act compel the revelation of all facts that an investor would consider 
important in making a decision to purchase securities (Morrissey, 2010, p.651).  
 
There are important provisions addressed within this legislation which affect the 
investment activities of hedge funds. However, the flexible structure of hedge funds and the 
emphasis of private offerings restricted to sophisticated and accredited investors have 
permitted the majority of hedge funds to escape registration requirements (Natali, 2006, 
p.117). Hedge funds actively seek exclusion from registration of the fund’s securities 
through available exemptions which focus on the applicability of private placement9 
exemptions, the recognition of financial sophistication of investors and restrictions in 
relation to marketing such investments to the general public  (Edwards, 2003, p.5). Section 
4(2) of the Securities Act addresses the private placement exemption which is intended to 
enable issuers to negotiate with sophisticated investors the conditions under which capital 
commitments would be made and is based on the understanding that sophisticated 
investors have less need for protection from disclosure than the average retail investor 
(Oppold, 2008, p.843; Smith, 2011, p.230). The impetus of the private placement exemption 
can be traced to 1935 when the US Congress included these exemptions to allow for 
situations involving isolated sales of securities or sales where there was no practical need 
for the application of the Securities Act10. More specifically, exemptions allowed “an issuer 
                                                        
9 A private placement is a direct private offering of securities to a limited number of sophisticated investors. It 
is the opposite of a public offering. Investors in privately placed securities include insurance companies, 
pension funds, mezzanine funds, stock funds and trusts. Securities issued as private placements include debt, 
equity, and hybrid securities; Hunt Law Group, “Private Placement of Securities, Hunt Law Office of Clifford J. 
Hunt, P.A., http://www.huntlawgrp.com/sec-law/private-placements-of-securities, Accessed 1 July 2010. 
10 Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in determining the Availability of the 
Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), of the Securities Act Release No. 
285, Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 2, 740-2, 744 (Jan 24, 1935). 
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to make specific or isolated sale of securities to a particular person,” and was directed at 
transactions “where there [was] no practical need for [the bill’s] application or where the 
benefits [were] too remote”11 (Loss et al, 2007, p.1363; Riviere, 2010, p.87; Finger, 2009, 
p.738). 
 
The recognition of financial sophistication in the US was established in SEC v Ralston Purina 
Co12 where the Supreme Court of the United States held that in order to qualify for the 
private placement exemption, the definitive requirement was an investor’s ability to “fend 
for herself and have access to the kind of information that would be included in a 
registration statement” (Finger, 2009, p.738; Karmel, 2008, p.686). The court interpreted 
the exemptions in light of the statutory purposes of the Securities Act and stated that “the 
availability of the exemption should turn on whether the particular class of persons 
affected need the protection of the Securities Act. An offering to those who are shown to be 
able to fend for themselves is a transaction not involving any public offering13”. Thus, the 
recognition of financial sophistication meant that such investors would be privy to 
information and advice generally not available to the public and any financial transaction 
would not include a public offering14 of the securities15. 
                                                        
11 H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, 15-16 (May 4, 1933), as reprinted in Loss, Seligman and Paredes (2007), Securities 
Regulation, 2007, supra note 1, p.1363. 
12 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); available at 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=346&invol=119, Accessed 3 Feb 2010 
13 Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, ABA Section of Business Law (2010), “Law of Private 
Placements (Non-Public Offerings) Not Entitled To Benefits of Safe Harbors – A Report”, November 2010, 
p.89, 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL410000/sitesofinterest_files/04_SafeHarbors.pdf, 
Accessed 4 Feb 2010. 
14 Generally, the SEC has indicated that any “public advertising is inconsistent with a claim of private 
offering.” – Non-Public offering Exemption Sec. Act. Rel No. 33-4552, 1962 WI 3573. 1. Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH); 
2781 (Nov. 6, 1962). Accord, e.g., Waterman v Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 807 (E.D.N. C1986). Cf. 
Texas Capital Network, Inc., [19993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH); 76,857 (SEC No Action 
168 
 
In 1980, the private placement exemption was extended further as part of the Small 
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 to include recognition of accredited investors16 to 
be offered similar exemptions. The Act was enacted to enhance the ability of the SEC to 
assist small businesses in their efforts to compete in the capital marketplace and allowed 
small and limited securities offerings under USD$5 million to be made to such accredited 
investors, exempting registration requirements (Morrissey, 2010, p.655). Regulation D, 
Rule 501(a1-a8) of the Securities Act defines an accredited investor for a number of private 
placements17 applicable on the sale of securities. The SEC adopted two accreditor investor 
definitions; one based on net worth and one based on income. Under the net worth test, an 
accredited investor is one “whose net worth at the time of purchase is USD$1 million which 
may either be based on individual worth or combined net worth with the investor’s 
spouse”. Under the income-based definition, an accredited investor is one “who has an 
income in excess of USD$200,000, in each of the last two years and who reasonably expects 
an income in excess of USD$200,000 in the current year”, therefore expanding the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Letter Feb. 23, 1994) (non-profit corporation’s matching of business ventures with potential investors did not 
constitute a general solicitation). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (2000) Exempted Transactions, 
http://uscodebeta.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-
section77d&num=0&edition=prelim, Accessed 3 Jan 2010. 
16 Accredited Investor Definition: The US Federal Securities Laws define the term Accredited Investor in Rule 
501 of Regulation D as: A bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development 
company, or small business investment company; An employee benefit plan, within the meaning of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, if a bank, insurance company, or registered investment adviser 
makes the investment decisions, or if the plan has total assets in excess of $5 million; A charitable 
organization, corporation, or partnership with assets exceeding $5 million; A director, executive officer, or 
general partner of the company selling the securities; A business in which all the equity owners are 
accredited investors; A natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person’s 
spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase; A natural person with income exceeding $200,000 
in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years and a 
reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year; or A trust with assets in excess of $5 
million, not formed to acquire the securities offered, whose purchases a sophisticated person makes. US SEC, 
Accredited Investor Definition; http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm, Accessed 1 March 2010.  
17 Rule 504, 17 C.F.R §230.504 (2007); Rule 505, 17 C.F.R §230.505 (2007); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R §230.506 
(2007).  
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recognition criterion of private placements (Finger, 2009, p.742). The purpose of the 
financial considerations is to acknowledge the wealth and, hence, ability to withstand 
financial losses of a particular investor type as differentiated from retail investors. Hedge 
funds commonly seek exemptions under Rule 50618 of Regulation D, Exemption for Limited 
Offers and Sales Without Regard to Dollar Amount of Offering in conjunction with 
definitional interpretations of Rule 501 (Broaded, 2009, p.37). Under Rule 506, hedge 
funds which rely on the exemption requirements are restricted from selling their securities 
to more than 35 non-accredited investors who are required to be sophisticated in their 
understanding of the complexities in matters of business and finance (Shadab, 2009, pp.17-
18, 45). Consistent with the sophisticated investor definition, they must have sufficient 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to make them capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment19, although certain specified 
financial information20 must be made available to purchasers who are not accredited 
(Kripke, 1983, p.836). 
 
Hedge funds rely on Rule 144A of the Securities Act which provides an exemption from 
registration requirements of the Securities Act for resale of securities sold in private 
placements to qualified institutional buyers (Oztan and Greene, 2009, pp.10-11). The SEC 
                                                        
18 Rule 506, 17 C.F.R §230.506 (2007), the relevant portions of Rule 506 read: To qualify for an exemption 
under this section, offers and sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of [Rule 501] and [Rule 502]. 
There are no more than or the issuer reasonably believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers from the 
issuer in any offering under this section. Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or 
with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters 
that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably 
believes immediately prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description. 
19 Section 4(2); Regulation D; Rule 506, point 2, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm Accessed 21 July 
2010. 
20 Section 4(2); Regulation D; Rule 505, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm, Accessed 21 July 2010. 
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regards this rule as a step in achieving a more liquid and efficient institutional resale 
market for unregistered securities, particularly foreign securities (Karmel, 2008, p.688-
689). If a hedge fund offers its services to offshore investors publically, particularly non-US 
investors, under the Securities Act, the fund must make certain that any implications of 
jurisdictional restrictions or adherence to legislative requirements of its investors are met 
and that the fund does not engage in any activities that would subject it to US securities 
regulation (Wang, 2002, pp.351-352). However, there are exemptions available under 
Regulation S of the Securities Act where registration is not necessary if the offer and sale of 
a security takes place outside the US (Bradbury, 2008, p.24). In addition to the US Federal 
securities legislation, hedge funds have to consider the applicability of US State law that 
govern the offer and sale of securities and seek exemption should they structure in a 
specific region. These laws are alternatively known as ‘Blue-Sky’ laws after the preamble to 
an early Wisconsin law designed to prevent companies from selling ‘pieces of the blue sky’ 
or fictitious securities to unsuspecting investors. In theory, compliance with a state’s Blue-
Sky laws needs to be determined before any offer is made into or from the state to a 
resident of such a state (Lhabitant, 2006, p.55). A hedge fund being distributed in any 
particular state must meet certain requirements as set out in these statutes and the 
disclosures associated with the law are similarly referred to as ‘Blue Sky’ filings (Macey and 
Miller, 1991, p.348). However, there are exemptions from ‘Blue Sky’ registration and 
qualification requirements for issuers relying on Rule 506 under Section 18 of the 
Securities Act which would remove the need for a hedge fund to submit a filing to a 
particular state (Paredes, 2006, p.985). While state authorities are still permitted to 
investigate fraud, Section 18 prohibits individual states from regulating the substance of 
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offering documents and the conditions on securities that are part of offerings, thus the 
responsibility of mandating hedge fund registration requirements invariably lies with the 
SEC for effective enforcement (Liffmann, 2005, p.2154). 
 
4.2.2 The Securities Exchange Act (1934) 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) was enacted to regulate the secondary 
trading of securities which were issued under the Securities Act. The Exchange Act 
legislated for the establishment of the securities exchanges, brokers and dealers and, 
hence, imposes registration and continuous disclosure requirements on issuers of 
securities (Laby, 2010, p.402). Generally, continuous disclosure is required for three types 
of companies: those with securities listed on a national securities exchange pursuant to 
Section 12(b); those with assets in excess of USD$10 million and a class of equity securities 
held by at least 500 persons pursuant to Section 12(g); and companies with an effective 
registration statement under the Securities Act filed pursuant to Section 15(d) (Natali, 
2006, p.119; Edwards and Gaon, 2002, p.59-60). The Exchange Act has a much broader 
scope than the Securities Act in its regulation of securities distributions, including the 
regulation of day-to-day trading (Kambhu et al, 2007). It has an issuer registration 
requirement apart from the one found in the Securities Act which is not triggered by a 
particular transaction such as a public offering, but rather applies to virtually all publicly 
traded securities in the US (McVea, 2008, p.67). The Exchange Act in turn mandates 
periodic reporting requirements. Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act requires broker-
dealers engaged in interstate securities transactions to register with the SEC but, unlike 
investment advisers, broker-dealers are not categorically bound by statute, regulation or 
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precedent to a per se rule imposing fiduciary obligations on their clients (Varnavides, 2011, 
pp.205-207). 
 
Hedge funds, as issuers of securities, generally are not brokers.  A broker is defined under 
the Exchange Act as any person engaged in the business of carrying out transactions in 
securities for the account of others (Laby, 2010, p.403). In most cases, hedge funds trade 
for their own account rather than effecting transactions for other parties and hence will not 
need to undergo broker registration. A dealer is defined under the Exchange Act as any 
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, 
through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank or any person insofar as she 
buys or sells securities for her own account, either individually or in some fiduciary 
capacity21 (Horgan 2001, p.655). Hence, a hedge fund will not have to undergo a dealer 
registration provided its personnel do not practice any of the situations that encapsulate 
the actions of a dealer to an extent that they will qualify as dealers under the definition of 
the Exchange Act. These actions have been identified by the SEC through a series of no-
action letters22.  
 
The rules are of less consequence to hedge funds as investment vehicles as most of the 
regulation applies only to registered and reporting companies but hedge fund managers 
                                                        
21 SEC (2008), “Guide to Broker Dealer Registration”, Division of Trading and Markets, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, April 2008, at point (B), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm, 
Accessed 1 January 2010. 
22 See for example; Davenport Management Inc. SEC No-Action Letter (13 Apr 1993). The SEC provided relief 
from broker registration of the partnership’s general partner, based on the assertion by representatives of 
the partnership that all investments and other decisions of the partnership were under the direct control of 
the general partner and the general partner’s activities making decisions on behalf of the partnership to trade 
in securities were not considered the activities of a broker but rather activities in the general course of the 
business of the partnership.  
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are subject to the antifraud provisions which have to be strictly adhered to (La Porta et al, 
1998). There are two important rules as part of the general antifraud provisions of Section 
10(b) that are not so limited, in particular, Rule 10b-5 which makes it unlawful for a person 
to engage in fraud with regard to a securities transaction (Silverman, 2011, p.1795-1798). 
Rule 10b-5 has been central to many securities litigation cases (McVea, 2008, p.69). The 
second provision is the ‘tender offer’ antifraud provision found in Section 14(e) (Natali, 
2006, p.119).  There are some instances in which issuers do not have to register securities 
but nevertheless will be subject to its periodic reporting provisions (Cox and Hazen, 2003, 
p.1631). In addition, the Exchange Act requires brokers-dealers to register with the SEC if 
they are either physically located in the US or if, no matter where they are situated, they 
effect, induce or attempt to induce securities transactions with investors in the jurisdiction 
(Varnavides, 2011, p.205). 
 
4.2.3 The Investment Company Act 1940 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) regulates the organization 
of investment companies which by definition “are or hold themselves out as being engaged 
primarily, or propose to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting or 
trading in securities23” (Bullard, 2008, p.292). The legislative framework governing 
investment companies is in congruence with the overall investor protection mandate of 
financial market regulation which aims at protecting retail investors and preventing abuses 
such as fraud and misconduct by regulating the registration of investment companies and 
transactions between an investment company and its affiliates. In short, the aim is to 
                                                        
23 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(a)(1)(A)(2000). 
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establish rules within such organisations which will not pose risks to any of its 
stakeholders and maintain investor confidence. However, there are also provisions within 
the Investment Company Act which applies to privately managed investment vehicles from 
registration requirements which hedge funds generally seek.  
 
Hedge funds which primarily engage in investing in and/or trading securities fall within the 
definition of an investment company under Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company 
Act and, thus, in the absence of being granted an exemption, hedge funds must register as 
investment companies (Ordower, 2010, p.300). However, registered hedge funds are 
subject to a number of constraints because being registered implies restrictions on the 
types of investments that they may hold as well as on the investment strategy, in particular 
relative to the ability to leverage positions24, use derivatives, engage in short selling25, 
purchase less liquid securities or run a concentrated instead of diversified portfolio26 and 
imposes a considerable amount of disclosure on the content of portfolios. Thus, hedge 
funds seek to avoid being defined as an investment company under the Investment 
Company Act and seek exemption because, among other things, the regulatory regime 
limits investment flexibility, increases compliance costs and risks loss of proprietary 
information which is crucial to the success of any hedge fund. For example, transactions of 
registered funds with affiliates are restricted, leverage is limited, corporate governance and 
                                                        
24 Section 18(f)(1) of the Investment Company act generally allows open-ended investment companies to 
leverage themselves only by borrowing from a bank, and provided that the borrowing is subject to 300% 
asset coverage. 
25 Registered investment companies are required to disclose their short-selling activity in their financial 
statements that accompany their annual and semi-annual reports. 
26 Section 13(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act requires registered investment companies to obtain the 
consent of their shareholders before deviating from their fundamental policies, including to concentrate a 
portfolio in certain industries. 
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periodic disclosure reporting requirements are imposed. Private investment funds are not 
subject to these statutory requirements, but fund managers are subject to fiduciary 
standards requiring them to act in honesty and good faith. 
 
The primary exclusions from registration relied on by hedge funds are provided within 
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. Hedge funds relying on these 
exclusions are private funds that do not make offerings of their securities publically 
(Nelson, 2007, p.223). Section 3(c)(1) provides an exemption from the definition of an 
investment company27 to any issuer whose outstanding securities are beneficially owned 
by no more than 100 investors and the interests in the fund must be privately placed to 
investors (Riviere, 2010, p.14). Under Section 3(c)(1), each individual investor in the hedge 
fund is considered as a beneficial owner28 unless the investor is an investing entity where 
further compliance is required. Furthermore, the hedge fund’s ability to claim an investing 
entity as one beneficial owner depends on whether the investing entity owns 10 percent or 
more of the fund’s outstanding voting securities (Ordower, 2007, p.337). If the investing 
entity owns more than 10 percent of the hedge fund’s voting securities, then the 
Investment Company Act requires that the hedge fund ‘look into’ the investing entity and 
count each beneficial owner of the investing entity as a beneficial owner of the hedge 
fund29 (Gibson, 2000, p.695). The public offering provision is similar to provisions required 
                                                        
27 Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
28 15 U.S.C § 80a-3(c)(1)(A) (defining “beneficial owner). This provision was enacted to prevent parties from 
circumventing the requirement that an exemption is only available if the entity is limited to 100 beneficial 
owners. 
29 See Gibson (2010, p.695) Footnote 105; 15.U.S.C §80a-3(c)(1)(A) (determining when beneficial ownership 
shall be “deemed”). The hedge fund is required to apply a “look through” test whenever an investing entity 
acquires additional voting securities of the hedge fund. However, a hedge fund is not required to apply the 
“look through” test if an investing entity’s voting securities increase because of withdrawal by another 
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under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act and, hence, a hedge fund is deemed to have 
satisfied these requirements if it complies with the Securities Act. 
 
The second available exception from the definition of investment company, that provided 
by Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, any investment vehicle that sells its 
securities to ‘qualified purchasers’ and does not make any public offerings30. The 
exemption applies to an unlimited number of accredited investors as long as they have over 
USD$5 million in investable assets (Frankel, 2008, p. 663). However, although Section 
3(c)(7) theoretically allows a fund to admit an unlimited number of qualified purchasers, 
Section 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, Registration of Securities by Issuer; Exemptions, 
effectively limits the number of US investors in an offshore fund to 499. Offshore funds may 
also take advantage of Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) with respect to part of an offering sold to 
US residents. Thus, so long as a hedge fund has fewer than 100 beneficial owners, does not 
offer its securities publicly and accepts only accredited and/or qualified investors, it is 
exemption from registration requirements under the provisions of the Investment 
Company Act. 
 
4.2.4 The Investment Advisers Act 1940 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) requires an investment adviser with 
more than fifteen clients and over USD$30,000,000 in assets to register with the SEC and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
investor unless the withdrawal is planned to circumvent the “look through provision”.  An entity that is not an 
investment company can own then per cent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the hedge fund 
without applying the look-though test. 
30 PlI (Undated), “Fund Regulation”, Practicing Law Institute, Chapter 5, pp.5-9, 
http://www.pli.edu/public/booksamples/9308_sample5.pdf, Accessed 5 May 2010. 
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comply with its regulations unless exempt (Donahue, 2007, p.251). An investment adviser 
is defined as any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others 
as to the value of securities or as to the availability of investing in, purchasing or selling 
securities31.  The Advisers Act was enacted by the US Congress as mainly a registration and 
anti-fraud statute to protect investors by ensuring adequate disclosure by investment 
advisers and is often interpreted to hold investment advisers to a fiduciary standard on 
behalf of their clients and to have an affirmative duty to act in the best interests of their 
clients (Angel, 2011, p.9; Varnavides, 2011, p.211; Barbash and Massari, 2008, p.628). 
 
A fund manager was exempt from registration under  Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act 
known as the ‘private adviser exemption’ if she had fewer than fifteen clients during the 
preceding twelve months, did not advise registered funds and did not hold herself to the 
public as an investment adviser. The Advisers Act does not provide a definitive guidance as 
to what constitutes “holding oneself out to the public as an investment adviser” specifically 
stipulates. However, consistent with the Securities Act, this phrase can be interpreted 
broadly to include disseminating advertisements related to investment advisory activities, 
maintaining a listing as an investment adviser in a telephone or building directory, 
publishing the adviser’s willingness to accept new clients, and using letterhead or business 
cards referring to investment advisory activities. It should be noted that, even if a hedge 
fund manager was exempt from registration as an investment adviser under the Advisers 
                                                        
31 Section 80b-2(a)(11). This definition also includes those, for compensation and as part of a regular 
business, issue or promulgate analyses or reports concerning securities. This definition does not include 
those such as a bank which is not an investment company, the publisher of any bona fide newspaper or 
business publication of general circulation, or any lawyer, accountant, or teacher whose performance of such 
services is incidental to the practice of his or her profession; Mota (2006), p.61 footnote 47. 
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Act, the manager was nevertheless subject to the antifraud provisions under Section 206(1) 
of the Advisers Act which states that an investment adviser is prohibited from “employ[ing] 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client”. Section 206(2) precludes an adviser 
from “engag[ing] in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a 
fraud upon any client” and is also consistent with the antifraud provisions of the Securities 
Act (Barbash and Massari, 2008, p.630). 
 
The critical issue in determining the number of clients an investment adviser had was the 
manner in which ‘clients’ were counted. Rule 203(b)(3)-1 of the Advisers Act specified that 
an adviser to a limited partnership may count the partnership, rather than each of its 
partners, including foreign clients, as one client for purposes of the private adviser 
exemption. The rule also specified that a limited partner would not be counted as a client of 
the partnership’s general partner or any other adviser to the partnership if the interests 
were securities, the advice the adviser provided was based on the investment objectives of 
the limited partners as a group and the adviser was not the ‘alter ego’ of a registered 
investment adviser (Krug, 2010, p.667). Therefore, so long as a hedge fund was not 
registered under the Investment Companies Act and the fund managers met the criterion 
under the Advisers Act, they were exempt from registration requirements under the 
private adviser exemption rules. 
 
4.3 Regulation in the United Kingdom before the Financial Crisis 
London is Europe’s leading center for hedge fund management and second only to New 
York globally. According to the industry group ‘TheCityofUK’, an independent financial 
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service advisory, at the end of 2010, 80 percent of European based hedge fund investments, 
totaling US$770 billion, were managed from London32. The city of London has been 
marketed as a center for hedge fund service providers which predominantly caters to the 
European region and includes services such as administration, prime brokers and 
custodians. There is no specific regime for regulating hedge funds in the UK but a hedge 
fund manager will be subject to mainstream UK regulation and requires authorization33 by 
the FSA34. Thus, hedge fund managers are generally dependent on regulatory initiatives 
imposed by the FSA based on pre-determined, outcome-oriented supervisory strategies. 
 
The FSA has a statutory objective of maintaining market confidence, consumer protection 
and a reduction of financial crime35. It advocates a risk-based approach to financial market 
supervision where it focuses on three main sources of risks, namely external environment 
risks, consumer and industry wide risks and risks from individual institutions (Black, 2004, 
p.23). This approach prioritizes the sources of risks based on the probability that a 
particular risk will materialize and occur (Black, 2004, pp.22-23). Institutions are allotted a 
number of measures to identify the impact of risk and then classified under one of four 
impact bands; high, medium one, medium two and low (Kaal, 2005, p.101). This involves 
setting up a framework which is used to assess the probability that the risk might 
                                                        
32 TheCityUK (2011), “Hedge Funds 2011”, Financial Market Series, Hedge Funds May 2011 
http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Hedge-funds-2011.pdf, Accessed 26 Feb 2010. 
33 An “authorized person” is defined in FSMA 2000, Section 31 as (a) a person who has a Part IV permission to 
carry on one or more regulated activities; (b) an EEA firm qualifying for authorization under Schedule 3; (c) a 
Treaty firm qualifying for authorization under Schedule 4: (d) a person who is otherwise authorized by a 
provision of, or made under, this Act. 
34 FSA (2005), “Hedge Funds: A discussion of Risks and Regulatory Engagement”, Financial Services Authority 
UK,  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs06_02.pdf Accessed 26 Feb 2010. 
35 FSA, “Essential Facts about the FSA”, Financial Services Authority UK, Publication, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/media/facts Accessed 29 Oct 2011. 
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materialize and have an impact on FSA objectives, analyzing a risk profile for each 
institution from which an overall risk score is determined for each firm36. Financial market 
participants are therefore evaluated through this risk assessment model and the FSA 
prioritizes its supervisory capacity in accordance with their respective ratings. 
Consequently, institutions which are categorized as low risk would require less scrutiny 
and oversight as compared to high risk entities which would attract closer and regular 
supervision. This approach means a light touch and mutual agreement based on the level of 
risk exposure, ultimately putting trust in the fiduciaries within the organisations rather 
than prescribing hard rules to follow (Kaal, 2005, p.101). A discussion paper published by 
the FSA in August 2002 entitled “Hedge Funds and the FSA” investigated the need for hedge 
fund regulation in the UK. In particular, it tabled whether the regulations which applied to 
investment managers generally were applicable to hedge fund managers or whether 
special rules were required37. In its statements, the FSA expressed the view that due to the 
low risk and low impact38 nature of hedge funds, specific regulation was not required and 
this paved the way for the approach taken to manage oversight towards the hedge fund 
industry until changes were introduced after the GFC 2008.  
 
                                                        
36 FSA (2006), “Risk Assessment Framework”, Financial Services Authority UK, August 2006, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/bnr_firm-framework.pdf,  Accessed 19 Jan 2012.  
37 Article 15 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotions of Collective Investment Schemes 
Order) (Exemptions) Order 2001 (2001 No. 1060). A collective investment scheme, as defined in Section 235 
of the Act (Collective Investment Schemes), which is in summary: any arrangements with respect to property 
of any description, including money, the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking part in the 
arrangements (whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or otherwise) to participate in 
or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or 
sums paid out of such profits or income; and which are not excluded by the Financial Services and Markets 
Act (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001, http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/PERG/9/4, 
Accessed 21 Dec 2012. 
38 FSA (2006), “Hedge Funds: A Discussion of Risks and Regulatory Engagement”, Financial Services Authority 
UK, Feedback Statement 06/02, March 2006 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs06_02.pdf Accessed 
26 Feb 2010. 
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4.3.1 Hedge Funds and Financial Promotion 
Hedge funds in the UK are required to be authorized should they seek to promote and 
market their investment products to retail investors within the jurisdiction. This would be 
dependent upon whether the fund is considered to be a collective investment scheme39 
(CIS). In order to market to the general public, hedge funds have to adhere to CIS 
requirements which include that the funds  are  authorized  by  the  FSA  and that  
authorized  funds  report details  of  their  investment  scheme, something that most hedge 
funds are opposed to doing for fear of giving away proprietary investment strategies 
(Tiffith, 2007, p.520). Thus, most hedge funds have historically not sought authorization in 
the UK, restricting their investor base to sophisticated investors and classified as 
unregulated CIS under the Financial Services and Markets Act 200040 (FSMA). This 
requirement is complicated if the hedge fund manager is conducting regulated activities 
from outside the UK but targeting UK persons or trading on UK markets because, although 
they may be subject to indirect regulation, in the absence of a permanent place of business 
in the UK they may not be required to be authorized by the FSA and, hence, would escape 
from direct supervision or oversight41. If a hedge fund is domiciled within the UK, the 
incorporated structure of a fund vehicle affects the FSA’s approach to regulation and differs 
                                                        
39 CIS Order, Articles 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 
40 Office of Fair Trading, UK(2004), “Competition Review of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000”, 
November 2004, p.65, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/financial_products/oft757.pdf, Accessed 21 
June 2010. 
41 Morgan, P. and Robson, N. (2005), “Hedge Funds: FSA Consultation on Hedge Fund Regulation”, Kirkpatrick 
and Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP, August 2005, p.1, http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/3483c821-
bb33-4e2c-a11c-b6a0ddf5c983/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/71291b34-260b-400d-b87d-
fa0f7d9f68d1/HFA0805.pdf, Accessed 14 June 2010. 
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significantly depending on whether it is open-ended42 or closed-ended43.  An open-ended 
hedge fund will fall within the definition of a CIS, the operation of which is a regulated 
activity requiring authorization. In contrast, closed-ended hedge funds44 fall outside this 
definition and therefore do not require an authorized operator and cannot be marketed to 
retail investors without themselves applying to the FSA for authorization (Spangler, 2009, 
pp.99–112).  
 
The FSA has strict guidelines on the definition of financial promotions45 which focuses on 
the ‘motivations’ of the financial promotion made. According to the FSA, a financial 
promotion is a “communication that is an invitation or an inducement to engage in 
investment activity, and involves an element of persuasion46”. Emphasis is placed on the 
word inducement, without any restrictions on the method in which this information is 
                                                        
42 An open-ended fund is defined as a management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any 
redeemable security of which it is an issuer. A redeemable security is a security, other than short-term paper, 
under the terms of which the holder, upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person designed by the issuer, 
is entitled to receive approximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current assets, or the case 
equivalent thereof (Spangler, 2009, p.908, para.19.06). 
43 Closed-end funds are management investment companies that are not open-end funds, and hence, do not 
issue redeemable securities. Instead, securities of closed-end funds are often traded on exchanges, often at 
discounts (but sometimes at premiums) to their net asset value. Because closed-end funds are not 
redeemable for their net asset value, such funds do not have the same assurances that open-end funds have 
(Spangler, 2009, p.908, p.19.07). 
44 Whether or not a company is open-ended will depend on whether a reasonable investor would expect to be 
able to realize his investment based on the underlying net asset value within a period appearing to him to be 
reasonable. 
45 FSA (Undated), “Defining Financial Promotion”, Financial Services Authority UK, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/smallfirms/resources/faqs/financial_promotion.shtml Accessed 19 June 2012 COBS 4 
– Financial Promotions http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/cobs4.pdf Accessed 19 June 2010. 
46 Financial Services Market Act 2000, Post N2 Selling Restrictions, 
http://www.icmagroup.org/ICMAGroup/files/7d/7d414722-39a3-465d-b3fe-a339537112a5.PDF; Section 
21 of the FSMA (Restrictions on financial promotion) prohibits the communication of invitations or 
inducements to engage in investment activity by persons who are not authorized. As "communication" is 
defined to include causing a communication to be made, an issuer (who is not an authorized person) will be 
concerned to ensure that any communication made by it or which it may be said to have caused to be made 
(for example in an offering circular) is exempt from this prohibition. An issuer which is an authorized person 
will also be concerned to ensure that any communication made by it or which it may be said to have caused to 
be made is exempt from this prohibition as that will ensure that the communication is outside the scope of 
Financial Promotion Rules applicable to it made under Section 145 of the FSMA (Financial Promotion Rules). 
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communicated47. The financial promotion restriction under Section 2148 of the FSMA 
prohibits a person, in the course of business, from communicating an invitation or 
inducement to engage in investment activity unless she is an authorized person under the 
FSMA. The authorized person may issue a financial promotion or approve the issue of a 
financial promotion by another person but is obliged to comply with FSA rules in 
connection with such activities. Specifically, financial promotions made by authorized 
persons must comply with FSA rules in connection with Chapter 4 of the Conduct of 
Business Sourcebook (COBS) rules.  The basic requirement is that a financial promotion is 
given or approved by an authorized person in respect to an investment must be “fair, clear 
and not misleading”.  Hence, the onus is placed on the authorized person who bears 
responsibility for actions taken during such promotions without any requirements about 
assessing the investors understanding of the information or how qualified they would have 
to be in understanding sophisticated investment strategies. Contravention of the provisions 
of Section 21 of the FSMA and Chapter 4 of the COBS rules will render the authorized 
person guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years 
or a fine, or both49. 
 
There are a number of exemptions available for HNWI and sophisticated investors in 
relation to the financial promotion restrictions where an unauthorized person wishes to 
issue a financial promotion without the approval of an authorized person. This is similar to 
                                                        
47 FSA (Undated), “Defining Financial Promotion”, Financial Services Authority UK, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/smallfirms/resources/faqs/financial_promotion.shtml Accessed 19 June 2010. 
48 FSMA Section 21(1)-(15) – Restrictions on Financial Promotion, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/section/21 Accessed 19 June 2010. 
49 Section 25, FSMA 2000. 
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the position taken in the US whereby the investor sophistication argument has allowed 
exemptions from registration requirements to hedge funds. According to the FSA, the 
exemptions for HNWI50 and sophisticated investors51 are designed to reflect the typical 
characteristics of ‘business angels’ and other sources of informal capital for start-up and 
small companies52. This exemption applies to non-real time and solicited real time 
communications to an individual and relies on self-certification by the investor coupled 
with a ‘health warning’ by the person making the financial promotion (Spangler, 2009, 
pp.13-14). In summary, the FSA does not provide, unlike the SEC, a general exemption 
opportunity for hedge funds under legislation apart from exemptions to HNWI and 
sophisticated investors in regards to financial promotion. A hedge fund manager located in 
the UK would be subject to mainstream regulation within the jurisdiction and the same 
treatment is given to an entity incorporated as a fund vehicle, as any other investment 
vehicle. The US hedge fund manager and hedge fund is able to take advantage of 
exemptions which enables it to utilize investment strategies not available to fiduciaries of 
registered funds or investment managers. The FSA, on the other hand, provides a single 
legal framework instead of several different ones. As a result, it combines existing law and 
self-regulatory requirements in many areas. This in turn simplifies regulatory activities 
significantly and decreases transaction costs. Thus, the FSA can also be assumed to provide 
a state of equilibrium between costs and fulfilling regulations. This framework does have 
its downsides, including that there is no specific framework for hedge funds to follow and 
                                                        
50 Financial Promotions Order Art. 48. 
51 Financial Promotions Order Art. 50(A). 
52 ICAEW (Undated), “Financial Promotions – High Net Worth Individuals”, Institute of Chartered Accountants 
England and Wales, http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/financial-services/dpb-licence-and-fsa-
authorisation/is-it-investment-business/financial-promotions-article-3, Accessed 1 Jan 2010. 
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hence there may be complications and confusion in the manner in which they are regulated 
especially in light of the execution of complex investment strategies. 
 
The risk based approach of the FSA left it vulnerable at the height of the financial crisis 
because it was not operationally or financially ready with the required resources to 
supervise the implosion of hedge fund activity which thrive on volatility. There is a 
common theme within the approach between regulations of both jurisdictions, financial 
promotion. The manner in which a hedge fund is promoted must not constitute any form of 
general solicitation or general advertising and action is taken against a promoter or 
sponsor who fails to state a material fact or otherwise materially misstates the facts 
relating to the offer of securities, or engages in any other fraudulent activity. The sale of 
interests in a hedge fund must be conducted by means of a private placement of securities 
of the hedge fund to sophisticated or accredited investors and high net worth individuals, 
who met the conditions for exemptions. Following the global financial crisis, governing 
officials in both jurisdictions took immediate and decisive actions because of the increasing 
call for tighter regulation on financial markets and stricter scrutiny over hedge fund 
activities. The Dodd-Frank Act was legislated in the US on the 15th of July 2010 and in the 
UK the AIFMD was ratified by the European Commission on the 21st of July 2011 in a 
concerted response by both jurisdictions as a result of the need for greater oversight of 
hedge fund activities following the GFC 2008. 
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4.4 The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act 
The US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R 4172 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) on July 15 2010 in response to actions which needed to be 
taken to stabilize financial systems around the world and has been touted as the most 
ambitious financial regulatory reforms made since the Great Depression of 192953. A part 
of the reforms was the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 which 
directly impacts the manner in which hedge funds operate, both within and outside the US. 
A majority of the regulatory reforms affecting hedge funds will see amendments to existing 
legislation which focus on mandatory disclosure of hedge fund activities, increased 
supervision and registration requirements54 based on specified AUM thresholds. A 
significant change was the enactment of Section 402 of the Dodd-Frank Act which amends 
Section 202(a) of the Advisers Act by including definitions of the terms ‘private fund55’ and 
‘foreign private adviser56’, designed to address gaps in definitions which did not exist 
previously. The enactment of Section 402 was specifically directed towards hedge funds 
which would be recognized as investment companies under the Investment Company Act 
                                                        
53 News core (2010), “ Obama to Sign Historic Financial Overhaul Bill Into Law, dated 21 July 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/obama_to_sign_historic_us_financial_SAwstiV54zE7djqZoNtgWI, 
Accessed 1 June 2012. 
54 Reuters (2010), Fact box: What US Financial Overhaul Means For the Fed”, dated  18 June 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/18/financial-regulation-fed-idUSN1816228320100618, Accessed 
19 June 2012. 
55 A “private fund” is any issuer that would be an investment company under Section 3 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”), but for the exception provided by either Section 
3(c)(1) (it has no more than 100 owners) or Section 3(c)(7) (offers to qualified purchasers only) thereunder. 
56 Section 202(a)(30) of the Advisers Act defines a foreign private adviser as an investment adviser that 
meets all of the following conditions; (1) has no place of business in the US; (2) has in total, fewer than 15 
clients and investors in the US in private funds advised by the adviser; (3) has aggregate assets under 
management of less than USD$25 million attributable to clients in the US, including US domiciled private 
funds and US investors in private funds advised by the adviser; (4) does not hold itself out generally to the 
public in the US as an investment adviser; and does not advise registered investment companies or registered 
business development companies. An adviser that meets all of the conditions of the exemptions set above is 
not required to register as an investment adviser. 
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but sought exemptions from registration requirements available within Sections 3(c)(1) or 
3(c)(7)57 of the Investment Company Act. Importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the 
‘private adviser exemption58’, which exempted from registration, investment advisers 
providing advice to private funds who had less than 15 clients59, did not hold themselves 
out to the public as investment advisers60 and did not advise registered funds or business 
development companies61 which were subject to registration requirements under the 
Investment Company Act. The Dodd-Frank Act has included in it provisions for increasing 
disclosure and record keeping information of investment activities as well as permitting 
the SEC to declare rules which would require hedge fund advisers as defined by the Act62 to 
have adequate provisions in place to protect their client assets. The following provides 
details of the specific changes to the legislation that will have an impact on hedge fund 
managers domiciled in and out of the US in particular and the repeal of the private adviser 
exemption which will require most hedge funds to register with the SEC or respective State 
regulatory authorities, an important exemption which hedge funds have heavily relied on 
to successfully manage their operations and to execute their investment strategies. 
 
                                                        
57 Section 403, Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
58 Section 403, Dodd-Frank Act 2010; Elimination of Private Adviser Exemption; Limited Exemption For 
Foreign Private Advisers; Limited Intrastate Exemption. 
59 Section 203(b)(1), Investment Company Act 1940 (As Amended). 
60 Neither holds itself out generally to the public in the United States as an investment adviser nor acts as an 
investment adviser to any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 
“Investment Company Act”) or any business development company. 
61 Section 402(a)(30), Dodd-Frank Act 2010; Business development companies under Section 4 of the 
Investment Company Act are Small Business Investment Companies that provide venture capital to small 
independent businesses, both new and already established. 15 U.S.C. § 80a(54). 
62 Section 402, Title IV Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
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4.4.1 Hedge Fund Registration 
The Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the private adviser exemption from Section 203(b)(3) of 
the Advisers Act which has been the one key exemption used by hedge fund managers to 
escape direct regulatory oversight by the SEC (Sierra-Yanez, 2011, p.18). This will require 
most private fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act, subject to the AUM 
threshold, and is proposed to have a significant impact on the alternative investments 
industry63. Prior to these requirements, an investment adviser who was regulated or 
required to be regulated by a State regulator may register with the SEC unless the adviser 
had AUM of USD$30 million or was exempted from registration requirements under 
provisions of the Advisers Act. However, even with the repeal of the private advisors 
exemption, it is important to note that hedge funds can still seek to avoid registration 
under the Investment Company Act which has not changed because of the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act as they can continue to rely on exemptions available in sections 3(c)(1) 
and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act (Nichols, 2011, p.637). 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act sets out exemptions of and reporting by certain private fund advisers 
under Section 203 of the Advisers Act by adding that investment advisers who act solely as 
advisers to private funds64 and with AUM in the US of less than USD$150 million will be 
exempted from registration with the SEC65, raised from the previous USD$30 million. The 
Dodd-Frank Act raised the threshold for SEC registration to USD$100 million in AUM by 
                                                        
63 Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less than $150 Million in 
Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-
3222.pdf, Accessed 2 February 2012. 
64 Section 402(2)(a), Dodd-Frank Act 2010 – The term “private fund” means an issuer that would be an 
investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for 
Section 3(c )(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Act. 
65 Section 408 (1), (2), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
189 
 
creating a new category of advisers known as ‘mid-sized advisers’. A mid-sized adviser, 
which generally may not register with the SEC and will be subject to State registration 
requirements, is defined as an adviser who manages between USD$25 million and 
USD$100 million for her clients, would be required to register in the State where she 
maintains her principal office and place of business and would be subjected to examination 
by the State if required to be registered (Gilman, 2011, p.48). In order to determine if the 
adviser is required to register, one must look at the AUM thresholds. Since there are no 
specific provisions, the SEC has proposed that the adviser must include in its assets under 
management the value of any private fund(s) over which it exercises continuous and 
regular supervisory or management services, regardless of the type of assets held by the 
fund and advisers must also include in the calculation of regulatory assets under 
management the amount of uncalled capital commitments made to the fund (Sierra-Yanez, 
2011, p.18). An adviser who has clients other than ‘private funds’ for example, a pension 
fund, will be exempt from registration if its AUM is USD$100 million or less and provided 
the adviser registers with the State in which it has its place of business as principal office. 
There is a further provision for advisers who have offices in 15 or more States in the US 
and not registered with the SEC (Grafton, 2010, p.39). If an adviser does not meet the 
requirements for registration with the SEC due to the limits on its AUM but has to register 
in 15 or more States, they will be inadvertently allowed to be registered with the SEC, 
provided the abovementioned AUM criteria applies66.  
 
                                                        
66 Section 408(2), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
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Further, there are exemptions available to foreign registered advisers from the 
registration67 requirements in limited circumstances. To qualify for exemption, the Dodd-
Frank Act in Section 202(a)(30) requires that a foreign adviser must not have more than 15 
clients and investors and a registered place of business in the US. The foreign adviser is 
allowed to advise private funds which have less than USD$25 million in AUM but is 
restricted from marketing herself publicly neither as an investment adviser nor act as an 
investment adviser to any company which is registered under the provisions of the 
Investment Company Act. 
 
These changes will likely add further confusion to the already ambiguous registration 
requirements within the US and raise concerns of insufficient capacity and resources for 
states to regulate hedge fund advisers. For example, the provisions of the foreign investor 
exemption requirements reflect similarities with the regulatory approach taken by the SEC 
before the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act for US based hedge funds but subject to 
limitations in AUM thresholds. There has not been any advice released by the SEC on 
whether look-through provision requirements will be applicable to foreign hedge funds 
which would confuse the relevance of AUM requirement thresholds. The complicated 
threshold requirements also raises alerts on the possibility that funds can and may 
deliberately structure themselves to avoid registration, for example, through the use of 
multiple structures, special purpose vehicles and limiting or layering the amount of AUM in 
separate entities. These actions could very well be a source of extreme systemic risk within 
                                                        
67 Section 203(b)(3), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
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the financial system if hedge funds are able to structure themselves through multiple 
entities with financial capacities large enough to move and manipulate markets. 
 
4.4.2 Systemic Risk Disclosure Reporting 
A revolutionary change brought about by the US Congress was the inclusion of Section 404 
of the Dodd-Frank Act which amended provisions within Section 204 of the Advisers Act to 
require advisers to private funds to maintain records and reports which will also be subject 
to inspection by the SEC68. Information as stipulated by the Dodd-Frank Act as necessary 
and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors, or for the 
assessment of systemic risk by the Financial Stability Oversight Council69 (FSOC) include: 
the amount of assets under management and use of leverage, including off-balance sheet 
leverage70; counterparty credit risk exposure71, trading and investment positions72, 
valuation policies and practices of the fund73; types of assets held74; side arrangements or 
side letters, whereby certain investors in a fund obtain more favorable rights or 
entitlements than other investors75 and a hedge fund’s trading practices76.  The Dodd-
Frank Act requires the SEC to conduct periodic inspections of the records of private funds 
maintained by an investment adviser registered under the Dodd-Frank Act and also 
mandates for the SEC to conduct spot-inspections when it deems it necessary and 
                                                        
68 Section 204(3), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
69 Section 201(b)(1)(A), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
70 Section 204(b)(3)(A), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
71 Section 204(b)(3)(B), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
72 Section 204(b)(3)(C), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
73 Section 204(b)(3)(D), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
74 Section 204(b)(3)(E), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
75 Section 204(b)(3)(F), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
76 Section 204(b)(3)(G), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
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appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors, or for the assessment 
of systemic risk. 
 
The SEC is required to maintain confidentiality in reference to the information disclosed by 
investment advisers who will have the right to any legal property of such information 
under Section 404(2)(b)(2). To ensure confidentiality, Section 404 expressly exempts 
regulators from the provisions of 5 U.S.C Section 55277, which requires US Federal agencies, 
among other things, to provide certain information requested by the public under the 
Freedom of Information Act (Nichols, 2011, p.637). This crucial provision is intended to 
enable effective oversight of hedge funds as regulators are able to monitor a fund’s activity 
without compromising proprietary information and undermining a hedge fund manager’s 
ability to be competitive in financial markets, a point of contention which has been 
historically used by hedge funds as a means to discourage mandating registration and 
disclosure requirements. The US Congress also recognised that the value of money, 
inflation and future economic changes would require a need to change the definition of a 
‘client’ in relation to the type of individuals who would be eligible and considered 
sophisticated enough to invest in hedge funds 
 
4.4.3 Definition of Client 
The legislative definition of ‘client’ has been an important provision used by hedge funds 
seeking exemptions from registration. The manner in which ‘one client’ is defined for 
                                                        
77 Title 5 USC Section 552 - Public Information; Agency Rules, Opinions, Orders, Records and Proceedings, 
Cornell University Law, Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552, 
Accessed 16 March 2013. 
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purposes of the Investment Company Act has been crucial to maintaining an exemption 
status under the Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) and the cause of numerous debates and court 
disputes78. The Dodd-Frank Act maintains the current status quo definition of client 
includes only persons or entities that have a direct advisory relationship with the adviser. 
It prohibits the SEC from including in the definition of client an investor in a private fund 
managed by an investment adviser if such a private fund has entered into an advisory 
contract with an adviser. Section 413 of the Dodd-Frank Act recommended further changes 
to the definition of an ‘accredited investor’ and requested the SEC to undertake a review of 
the appropriateness of the current definition under Regulation D of the Securities Act as it 
applies to natural persons79, as the SEC may deem appropriate for investor protection80.  
 
Accredited investors have always been considered as individuals with the financial 
sophistication and wealth to understand the risks of particular investments and thus do not 
require regulatory protection. The essence of this rule remains however, the US Congress 
recommended adjustments to be made so that the “individual net worth of a natural 
person, or joint net worth with the spouse of that person”, at the point of investing in a 
hedge fund, has to be more than USD$1 million, excluding the value of the primary 
residence.  The exclusion of primary residence from the net worth calculations can be 
viewed from two opposing perspectives. Firstly, that the intent of the US Congress in 
providing for this is to protect individuals risking all assets they have title to and, 
alternatively, the subprime mortgage crisis has shown that real estate valuation 
                                                        
78 Goldstein v SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Lowe v SEC , 472 U.S. 151 (1985). 
79 The “natural person” distinction specifically includes individual investors only and excludes corporations 
or business entities. 
80 Section 413(b)(1), Dodd-Frank Act 2010 – Adjusting the Accredited Investor Standard – Initial Review. 
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methodologies in the US are inconsistent, subject to manipulation and hence residential 
values should be left out of any net worth calculations as it may be misleading to hedge 
fund managers. The Dodd-Frank Act specifies that the SEC can review the definition of 
accredited investor as it applies to natural persons to decide if the requirement of the 
definition should be adjusted or modified to protect investors and for the public interest81. 
The Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC not to further adjust the $1 million net worth standard 
for a period of four years following its enactment82, but tasks the SEC to undertake a review 
of the standard as a whole and make such other changes as it deems appropriate. Thus, as it 
stands, the new definition of accredited investors only applies to new investors in private 
funds and existing investors in private funds that make additional capital contributions. 
Existing investors in private funds who do not make any additional capital contributions 
will not require recertification83. 
 
The SEC as directed by Section 41884 of the Dodd-Frank Act introduced changes to the 
recognition of a ‘qualified client85’ by increasing the dollar amount threshold requirements 
of assets under management to USD$1 million and the investor net worth to USD$2 million 
from the previous USD$750,000 and USD$1 million respectively86. Further, Section 418 
amends Section 205(e) of the Advisers Act to require the SEC to adjust for inflation the 
USD$1 million assets under management, and USD$2 million net worth thresholds for 
                                                        
81 Section 413(2)(B), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
82 Section 413(a), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
83 Section 413(b), Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
84 Section 418, Dodd-Frank Act 2010 – Qualified Client Standard. 
85 Section 418, Dodd-Frank Act 2010 15 U.S.C. 80b-5(e). 
86 17 C.F.R. §25.205-3(2010); see also 15 U.S.C. 80b-5(e). 
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determining a client’s status as a ‘qualified client’ within one year after the date of the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment and every five years thereafter87.  
 
The extensive regulatory changes introduced after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act is 
viewed as a positive response to regaining investor confidence in the US after the GFC 
2008. It is hoped that the force of the law in supervising the activities of hedge funds and 
mandating disclosure requirements will curb financial exuberance and risky behaviour 
within the industry but the globalized financial system requires harmonization in 
legislative actions, especially in circumstances which give rise to regulatory arbitrage. In 
response to the challenges and the changes in the global financial market regulatory 
architecture and the need for harmonization in regulatory actions, the European Union 
introduced the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) in 2010 as its 
response to curbing risky behavior within the shadow banking sector and alternative 
investment industry. The following section details these legislative actions. 
 
4.5 The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
The AIFMD was unanimously approved by the Parliament of the European Union on the 
11th of November 2010. The Directive was enacted as the European response to what has 
been a global reaction for the need to regulate alternative investments funds as result of 
the fallout of the global financial crisis and to bring together the regulation of the 
alternative investment sector under a single market regulatory framework in the EU. The 
legislation has also created a means by which any Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
                                                        
87 Section 418, Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
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(AIFM) authorized under the directive will be able to ‘passport’ their funds freely across all 
Member States in the EU, harmonizing financial systems across the region once the funds 
have been authorized and, purportedly, reducing the risks of regulatory arbitrage. UK 
hedge fund managers who intend to carry out investing activities in any part of the EU will 
be required to adhere to the legislative requirements and which would possibly also be 
enforced by the UK authorities, although this has not been finalized at the time of writing 
this thesis.  
 
The Directive broadly defines an Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) as any collective 
investment scheme which does not require authorization under the existing Undertaking 
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive88 (UCITS) and has been 
designed to regulate investment vehicles within the alternative investment industry which 
were previously excluded from direct supervision or regulation because of exemptions or 
exclusions. This would include hedge funds, private equity firms, venture capitalist and any 
other managed investment vehicles intending to domicile within the EU and UK89. An AIFM 
may manage UCITS funds, however authorization to do so under the UCITS Directive is 
separate from that under the AIFMD and if a manager wishes to obtain authorization she has to 
do so separately (Crosognani et al, 2011, p.344). 
                                                        
88 Directive 2009/65/EC, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/ucits_directive_en.htm; Art, 3(a). 
89 Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (“AIFMD”): Frequently Asked Questions, 
Memo/10/572 (November 11th, 2010) (FAQ). The breadth of this definition is curtailed somewhat by a 
number of exceptions. Specifically, the Directive does not apply to collective investment schemes regulated 
under the UCITS Directive. EU credit institutions, pension funds, life assurance or reinsurance companies or 
sovereign wealth funds; Art 2, S. 2(c )-(g). The Directive also does not apply to an AIFM established in the EU 
but which does not provide management services to an AIF domiciled or marketed in the EU; Art 2, S.2(b). 
Further, the Directive contemplates the delegation of administration (but not management) function to 
offshore entities where (1) the third party is authorized to provide such services or is regulated in the third 
country and subject to prudential supervision, (2) there is an appropriate cooperation agreement between 
the competent authority of the AIFM and the supervisory authority of the third party, and (3) the procedural 
requirements of the Directive relating to the delegation of functions are fulfilled; Art 18 and 36. 
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The AIFMD mandates that any AIFM seeking to manage or market an AIF within the EU 
must obtain authorization from the relevant authorities in its home Member State90. The 
Directive contains minimum AUM requirements for managers with portfolios of total assets 
in excess of €100 million91, similar to the provisions provided under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
AIFMs with AUM over and above this threshold will be regulated under the provisions of 
the Directive. The basis of this threshold according to the EU Commission is that effective 
supervisory attention will be focused on the areas where risks are concentrated and a 
threshold of €100 million would capture roughly 30 percent of hedge fund managers, 
managing almost 90 percent of assets of EU domiciled hedge funds, would be covered 
by the AIFMD92. It would capture almost half of managers of other non-UCITS funds and 
provide almost full coverage of the assets invested in their funds93. Further, the AIFMD 
contains two de minimis exemptions for small managers.  
 
All AIFM managing AIF portfolios with total assets of less than €100 million will be 
exempt from the provisions as the funds are considered unlikely to pose significant risks 
and hence extending regulatory requirements to these would impose significant costs 
and administrative burden which would not be justified by the benefits according to the 
                                                        
90 AIFMD, Art. 4, S.1. An AIFM may be authorized to provide management services in respect of all or only 
certain types of AIF; AIFMD, Art. 4. S.2. 
91 AIFMD, Art. 2, S.2(a). There is a potential ambiguity in the Directive on whether the threshold applies to the 
“fund” as a collective or individual fund manager. The Commission estimates that the €100 million threshold 
will capture 30% of all hedge fund managers. 
92 Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Funds, 2009/0064 (April 30 2009)(AIFM Proposal), p.6, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm#proposal, Accessed 1 July 
2012. 
93 Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Funds, 2009/0064 (April 30 2009)(AIFM Proposal), p.6, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm#proposal , Accessed 1 July 
2012. 
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EU Commission94. Additionally, AIFM which only manage AIFs, which are not leveraged 
and impose a lock-up period of five years to investors will be eligible for a de minimis 
threshold of €500 million95. However, it is uncertain whether this threshold applies to the 
AUM of the ‘fund’ in its entirety or the individual managers as included in the Dodd-Frank 
Act and this could pose a problem of layering of funds and/or fund managers.  
 
Thus, the AIFMD implicitly mandates regulatory and supervisory procedures which AIFMs’ 
will be required to adhere to, firstly seeking authorization to manage alternative 
investment funds within the EU and, subsequently, comply with substantive requirements 
including capital adequacy, conduct of business, governance and risk management, third 
party independent valuation and initial periodic and even-driven disclosure to investors, 
the competent authorities and certain third party stakeholders. The AIFMD also empowers 
the EC to restrict the use of leverage by AIFs. 
  
4.5.1 Authorization and Capital Requirements 
All AIFMs are required to be authorized by relevant competent authorities of the 
jurisdictions in which the fund is domiciled before being granted permission to conduct 
their investing activities across the EU regions. An AIFM must apply for authorization with 
their home member state and submit detailed information to demonstrate qualifications 
and ability to fulfill conditions as required under the AIFMD96. The mandate for disclosure 
                                                        
94 Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Funds, 2009/0064 (April 30 2009)(AIFM Proposal), 
pp.5-6, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm#proposal, 
Accessed 1 July 2012. 
95 AIFMD, Art. 2, S.2(a). 
96 AIFMD, Art. 6.1. 
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of information is consistent with the US requirements as stipulated in the Dodd Frank Act 
and includes information pertaining to the valuation and safekeeping of portfolios assets, 
the fund’s organisational structure and management functions as well as qualifications of 
all AIFMs managing investing activities within the fund97. The authorization requirements 
are intended to act as an initial investor protection evaluation strategy whereupon grant of 
the status to AIFM will be able to conduct its business operations within any member 
state98. This includes the marketing of the financial products it manages to professional or 
sophisticated investors99 and the AIFMD also allows AIFMs to market their products to 
retail investors which are mandated under stricter investor protection provisions100. Along 
with authorization provisions, the AIFMD requires AIFMs to maintain initial ongoing 
capital requirements of at least €125,000101 with a supplemental capital requirement of 
proportionately zero-point-zero-two percent of aggregate AUM exceeding €250 million. 
The capital adequacy requirements dictated in this directive are very broad in nature and 
do not identify in detail the applicability of conditions, nor does it isolate any particular 
type of alternative investment strategy and places AIFMs in a difficult position. This is 
because certain strategies which would require more capital investments, for example, 
hedge funds which focus on arbitrage strategies, would be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage. Furthermore, regulatory agencies will be required to understand and apply 
                                                        
97 AIFMD, Art. 5. 
98 Either directly or via the establishment of a branch, subject to (1) the scope of its original authorization, (2) 
the communication of its intention to do so to the competent authorities in its home Member State, and (2) 
meeting the relevant procedural requirements; AIFMD, Art 34, S.1-3. 
99 As defined in Annex II of MiFID; Art. 2, S.1. http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_119.pdf 
Accessed 31 Aug 2010. 
100 AIFMD, Art. 32, S.1. 
101 AIFMD, Art. 14. 
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the various oversight requirements on funds with different structures and investment 
strategies, complicating the supervisory process further.  
 
4.5.2 Conduct of Business, Governance and Risk Management Requirements 
The AIFMD enforces requirements for authorized AIFMs in business conduct and ethical 
standards which were previously non-existent for hedge fund managers in the EU. It 
imposes fiduciary obligations on AIFMs, specifically to act in the best interest of the fund 
and its clients, with due care and diligence, honesty and maintaining market integrity102. 
This includes a prohibition against any undisclosed preferential treatment of investors or 
participating in side letter agreements, thereby highlighting a stance by the ECB against 
unfair collusion, a common practice amongst hedge fund managers across the globe. The 
AIFM has to ensure that conflicts of interest103 are not prevalent in business transactions, 
related parties and that all stakeholders are treated fairly and, thereafter, maintain and 
operate effective organizational and administrative arrangements with a view to 
preventing these conflicts from adversely affecting the interests of an AIF or its 
investors104. Art 10. S.1-2 of the AIFMD requires AIFMs to disclose to investors, any 
material conflict of interest within its operation or where it determines its conflict 
arrangements are not sufficient to ensure reasonable confidence that the interests of all AIF 
investors will not be adversely affected as to the risks of damage105 to investors’ interests 
as opposed to preventing the damage itself.  In the interest of investor protection against 
excessive risk taking, the AIFMD also requires AIFM to implement risk management 
                                                        
102 AIFMD, Art. 9, S.1(a)-(c). 
103 AIFMD, Art. 10, S.1. 
104 AIFMD, Art. 10, S.1. 
105 AIFMD, Art. 10, S.1-2. 
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systems which will enable adequate monitoring of investment strategies106. Risk 
management and monitoring will have to extend beyond financial modeling and will 
require the documentation and implementation of policies and procedures pertaining to 
due diligence, conduct regular stress tests of these systems under both normal and 
exceptional market conditions107 of investment positions  and to ensure that capital 
adequacy and the liquidity profile of its asset108 requirements are adhered to. The risk 
exposure of the fund has to be within the guidelines based on investment agreements. This 
will include risks in relation to short selling strategies109 and there is a separation of 
portfolio and risk management functions within the operational environment of an 
AIFM110.  
 
4.5.3 Third Party Valuation and Safekeeping Requirements 
Valuation of securities is directly linked to the NAV of a fund and, up till now, there have 
not been strict requirements for alternative investment vehicles to conduct independent 
valuation simply because of the light–touch approach by regulatory agencies on 
oversight111. The AIFMD now requires an AIFM to appoint an independent third party to 
value the portfolio assets and the issued securities of a fund to be conducted yearly at the 
                                                        
106 AIFMD, Art. 11, S.2. 
107 AIFMD, Art 12, S.1. 
108 AIFMD, Art 12, S.2. 
109 AIFMD, Art 11 S.4. 
110 AIFMD, Art 11, S.1. 
111 AIFMD, Art. 17, S.1(a)-(c), where an AIF is domiciled in a third country, Member States will allow it to 
delegate the performance of its functions to a sub-depositary in the same third country provided that the 
legislation of that third country is equivalent to the Directive and effectively enforced; Art 38, S.1, such sub-
depositaries must also, be (1) subject to effective prudential regulation and supervision which is equivalent to 
the relevant EU law, and (2) domiciled in jurisdictions where cooperation between the home Member State 
and the relevant authorities of the third country is sufficiently ensured; Art 38, S.1(a)-(c). 
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least112 and supervisory oversight of the valuation process. An AIFM must also appoint a 
single depositary113 for the purposes of receiving subscription proceeds from AIF investors 
and safekeeping of portfolio assets which has to be a financial or credit institution 
registered within the EU. AIFMs are allowed to maintain depositors in non-EU depositories 
so long as they are subject to compatible prudential regulation. For EU funds, the 
depositary must be established in the home Member State of the fund. For non-EU funds, 
the depositary must be established in the third country where the fund is established, the 
home Member State of the fund manager (Ferran, 2011, p.401). 
 
4.5.4 Disclosure and Transparency Requirements 
Regulation by disclosure places the onus of responsibility and accountability on the 
fiduciary and the motivations of the AIFMD to have increased disclosure transparency 
requirements suggests this stance. The AIFMD lays down a series of initial, periodic and 
event-driven disclosure requirements designed to enhance the transparency of AIF 
activities to all stakeholders including regulatory authorities (Awrey, 2011, p.11). 
Information such as a description of the relevant AIF’s investment strategy and 
objectives114, valuation and redemption policies, custody, administration and risk 
management procedures, and fees, charges and expenses115 has been mandated to be 
provided to investors. More importantly, AIFMs will be required to adhere to ongoing 
                                                        
112 AIFMD, Art. 16, S.1. 
113 AIFMD, Art. 17, S.3, An AIFM cannot, however act as a depositary; Art. 17, S.2. 
114 Including descriptions of (1) the permitted assets and techniques and their attendant risk, (2) any 
investment restrictions, and (3) the circumstances in which the AIF may use leverage and the types and 
sources of permitted leverage; AIFMD, Art. 20, S.1. 
115 AIFMD, Art. 20, S.1. 
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disclosure requirements such as an independently audited financial position report116 to be 
submitted to regulatory authorities of the home Member State117 and investors. This is to 
enable transparency and the consistent dissemination of information in an effort to 
maintain a high standard and regular supervisory practices. 
 
There are additional disclosure requirements stipulated by the AIFMD which reinforces its 
stance for greater transparency. AIFMs will be required to provide information about 
investing activities in relation to illiquid assets, any changes in liquidity, risk profiles and 
risk management systems. These transparency requirements are extended to information 
submitted to regulatory authorities whereby the AIFM will be required to submit aggregate 
information to the regulatory authorities on a regular basis respecting the principal 
markets and instruments in which its AIFs trade, their principal exposures and important 
concentrations of risk118 as well as the main categories of assets in which its AIFs are 
invested and the use of short selling, if relevant.119  
 
4.5.5 Leverage Requirements 
Lastly, the AIFMD empowers the European Commission to set leverage requirements of 
AIFs where it deems them necessary to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial 
system as a protection from systemic risks. It further empowers national authorities to 
restrict the use of leverage in respect to individual AIFMs and AIFs in exceptional 
circumstances. Article 4(1)(v) of AIFMD defines leverage as any method by which AIFM 
                                                        
116 AIFMD, Art. 21, S.39a). 
117 AIFMD, Art. 21, S.3(a). 
118 AIFMD, Art. 21, S.1. 
119 AIFMD, Art. 21, S.2(d)-(e). 
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increase exposure of a managed AIF, whether through cash of securities, or any leverage 
embedded through derivative positions (EC, 2012, p.5). However, the European 
Commission is still in the process of finalizing guidelines on the appropriate methods of 
calculating leverage and on methods by which an AIFM may increase the exposure of an 
AIF through leverage, intended to control excessive risk activities of AIFMs. AIFMs are also 
obliged to set maximum levels of leverage and make proper leverage disclosure to 
investors in an effort to reduce information asymmetry and assist investors in evaluating 
an AIFM’s investment mandate prudently (Fross and Rohr, 2012, p.3-9). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The mandate to regulate the hedge fund industry in the US and the UK has been a laborious 
task for financial market supervisors faced with the dilemma of upholding their 
responsibilities in promoting market integrity and protecting investors on the one hand, 
and at the same time, ensuring that financial innovation and economic growth is not 
impeded by too much regulation. 
 
Hedge funds in the US and the UK have historically taken advantage of exemptions from 
within financial market regulatory provisions or subject to light-touch supervision and 
structured themselves as privately managed investment vehicles. A common requirement 
to be granted these exemptions has been to refrain from marketing the fund or its financial 
products to the general public. Limitations on the number and type of investors meant that 
only investors of a certain stature were eligible, those who were financially sophisticated 
enough to undertake the risks involved and individuals who were classified as high net 
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worth individuals able to withstand financial losses arising from riskier investing activities. 
The numerical wealth requirements in place to define qualified or sophisticated investors 
did not, however, take into account that even investors who fulfill these numerical wealth 
requirements do not always have the adequate level of knowledge, understanding and 
sophistication required to invest in highly complex financial instruments. It is clear from 
the collapses of large financial institutions that even those equipped with the knowledge 
and expertise and hence financially sophisticated were unable to understand or manage 
the risks within their investment activities. The historical approach to risk management 
applied to hedge fund investment strategies requires a reassessment and also an 
appreciation that over-reliance on financial modeling without taking into account the 
operational risks within a funds management is inadequate. This historical method of 
analysis has not changed even after the ambitious regulatory reforms which have taken 
place in the US and UK.  
 
Although hedge funds themselves may have not caused the GFC 2008, nevertheless 
legislators in the US and the UK have taken enormous steps to ensure that such funds, 
which were previously considered the domain of the rich and resourceful, are regulated. 
One reason for this is the growth of retail investors interested and willing to invest in 
hedge funds, attracted by the above average returns attainable. Another reason could be 
the growth of the global pension fund industry which holds much of the net worth of such 
retail investors, investing in hedge funds.  The introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
AIFMD has been touted as a solution to protecting financial systems in the US, EU and UK 
against risks posed by hedge funds, thus legitimizing their availability to retail investors. 
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The effectiveness of these regulatory changes will only be truly tested if it prevents another 
financial crisis, which incidentally, will not occur if there is effective enforcement and 
supervision within financial markets. The Dodd-Frank Act requires registration by hedge 
funds managers with the SEC if their AUM exceeds USD$150 million while in the EU the 
AIFMD requires a registration for any fund with AUM of €100 million or more.  
 
Other dissimilarities between the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the AIFMD include 
EU-wide passport regime, limitations on compensation structure of EU AIFMs, fiduciary 
duties for AIFMs, and limits on the amount of leverage AIFMs can use. The differences in 
hedge fund regulations will have greater implications because they create legal uncertainty 
and significant transactional costs while opening up both markets to regulatory arbitrage.  
If hedge fund managers are subject to stricter rules in one jurisdiction while competing for 
clients and profit margins with funds in jurisdictions that impose less restrictive rules they 
could be placed at a comparative disadvantage and hence seek alternative structures or 
more favorable jurisdictions to conduct their investing activities. The only certainty 
brought about by these reforms is that there will be further ambiguity. The costs of 
compliance for hedge funds will increase with the heightened regulatory burden. Hedge 
funds managers authorized in the EU and UK will be eligible for its ‘passporting’ provisions 
as opposed to those in the US. These actions may be construed as protectionist and 
retaliatory actions may be encountered by funds outside the supervised regions. There may 
be a mass migration of funds out of the US into tax havens because of its stricter disclosure 
requirements, affecting its financial services industry. The point of financial reforms is to 
develop a system which better performs the previous one, a change where key economic 
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functions such as information generation and capital allocation, monitoring, governance 
and the management of risks is aligned to create a safer environment. The fact remains that 
although US and UK hedge fund operators utilize similar strategies and participate in the 
same markets, they will be subjected to different regulatory regimes.  
 
The one important issue that has never been adequately approached or addressed is the 
operational risks within hedge funds. On the assumption that hedge fund failure and fraud 
over the period of the global financial crisis were causes of the billions of dollars in savings 
lost, actions should be taken at the root of the problem, its operations. Chapter Five 
approaches this problem with a solution to mitigating and controlling the risks which 
hedge funds have within their operations through risk transparency and provides 
recommendations which can be used to dilute any contagion in the global financial 
markets, if regulators supervise effectively. The protection of financial markets against 
fraud and failure, deception and misconduct has to be a concerted effort which begins with 
the promotion of increased risk transparency, enhanced by co-operation oversight and 
enforcement of regulators and effective due diligence by investors in managing their 
investment portfolios. 
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CHAPTER 5   
HEDGE FUND TRANSPARENCY AND FRAUD RISK 
 
“There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are 
known unknowns. That is to say, things that we know we don’t know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns. These are things we don’t know we don’t know.”  
 
- United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (February 2002)1 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The mandate for greater transparency within hedge funds has been a strongly debated 
topic by legislators, financial market regulators and industry bodies for over 20 years now, 
in particular after the collapse of LTCM in 1998. The focus of these public debates and 
pronouncements have been for increased disclosure of hedge fund activities as 
opposed to more transparency which, whether intended or not, signifies an abstention 
from interference in the activities of the elusive industry. A hedge fund cannot be 
considered transparent without providing disclosure. However, it can disclose all its 
positions and yet the actions and activities of a hedge fund may not be transparent (Hedges 
VI, 2005, p.411). The level and depth of information on hedge fund investment strategies 
and operational activities to be publicly disclosed has been protected by the veil of its 
private organizational structure and the argument that such information is proprietary to a 
hedge funds’ performance and crucial in maintaining its competitive advantage. This stance 
                                                        
1 Rumsfeld, D. (2002), “DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers”, United States Department of 
Defense, dated Feb 12 2002, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636, 
Accessed 4 July 2013. 
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has been reinforced by exemptions available through legislation and no-action letters in 
the US and light-touch regulatory approach in the UK before the financial crisis.  
 
As presented in Chapter Four, the changes to the newly introduced regulatory approaches 
governing hedge funds in the US and the UK is set to enforce more stringent controls and 
eventually compliance requirements, intended to overcome this problem and has been 
widely publicized2 the as a response which will invariably increase the administrative 
burdens in relation to disclosure and transparency. However, the question of whether 
these regulations are sufficient to prevent another hedge fund failure due to fraud has not 
been tested and is subject to dispute, while implementation deadlines are extended as the 
focus of financial market regulators is shifted to solving the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
There is no argument over the need for more transparency and disclosure of hedge fund 
activities, especially as the generally opaque and secretive industry emerges out of the 
shadows into the retail investor environment. This, coupled with the extensive systemic 
risks hedge fund activities pose to the global financial system, warrants greater scrutiny of 
appropriate and sustainable levels of detailed information which should be made available 
to investors. The question is whether legislating risk management through disclosure is the 
answer. 
 
There are two types of legislative approaches which provide the basis for a legally 
mandated risk management environment. There are regulations that would demand hedge 
                                                        
2 Katz, D. (2013), “Dodd-Frank at Year Three: Onerous and Costly”, The Heritage Foundation: Leadership for 
America, Issue Brief 3993, dated 19 July 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/dodd-
frank-at-year-three-onerous-and-costly, Accessed 20 July 2013. 
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funds have appropriate risk management systems, which includes not only ensuring that 
the system is adequately maintained but consistently monitored, and there are regulations 
that would require the hedge fund to disclose information on the risks that the fund 
exposes to stakeholders and counterparties (van Daelen, 2010, p.98). The decision to invest 
in a hedge fund will depend on the level of risk which is acceptable to an investor, reliant 
on an assessment of calculated return profiles commensurate with such risks and is based 
on disclosed information available to investors. However, the popular investment advisory 
rhetoric of ‘higher risk for higher returns’ unconscionably places a caveat on the purpose of 
disclosure in which the ultimate responsibility of financial losses is borne by the investor 
based on their decision to invest rather than the onus placed on the hedge fund manager to 
act with prudence. Hedge funds extend this assumption by relying on provisions within the 
sophisticated investor rule which maintains that such investors are knowledgeable and, 
hence, able and willing to make risky investment decisions independently.  
 
The self-regulatory environment that hedge funds have long been accustomed to has also 
enabled them to evade disclosure requirements by promoting their investment strategies 
as uniquely proprietary and crucial to achieve absolute returns. This ability to attain above 
market returns is the criteria which ultimately attracts investors to the hedge fund 
industry. Thus, there is an underlying assumption which motivates certain investors to 
contribute to hedge funds, based on their reputation of achieving absolute returns as 
privately managed investment vehicles which operate in a self-regulatory environment 
with limited disclosure. This may have been understandable when investing in hedge funds 
was restricted to institutional and high net worth investors who were willing to take on the 
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risks for higher returns without the need to be defended by investor protection rules. 
However, as the industry expands its reach into the retail investor sphere this line of 
‘sophistication’ has been blurred and creates a moral hazard for regulatory agencies with 
‘unsophisticated investors’ possibly unknowingly, contributing capital to potentially 
reckless investing activities. 
 
The availability of hedge fund investing to retail investors also creates a dichotomy of 
irresponsibility where retail investors can be lured by hype and greed into such funds 
without necessarily understanding their risk profile, in particular the complex financial 
instruments in which hedge funds may invest. For example, it is estimated that the global 
over-the-counter derivatives market, in which hedge funds are active participants, is worth 
approximately USD$600 trillion3 and operates without the regulatory framework of most 
mainstream financial products. This exposes retail investors to the exact risks which they 
seek to avoid and, indeed, one which cannot be afforded. Higher returns is a simple 
measure to satisfy greed, but at the same time it is dangerously tempting if not seen in the 
context of risk, a multifaceted and elusive notion especially at a time when caution in 
financial markets is paramount and traditional risk management philosophies have proven 
to be ineffective. A lack of transparency within hedge fund activities exacerbates this 
problem and makes effective monitoring impossible, facilitating inappropriate behavior 
such as misrepresentation and manipulation motivated by performance pressures and the 
drive to maintain the high returns demanded by investors. 
                                                        
3 Murdoch, S. (2012), “Regulators Urge Derivatives Reform”, The Australian, dated 30 Oct 3012,   
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/financial-services/regulators-urge-derivatives-reform/story-
fn91wd6x-1226507007929, Accessed 1 Nov 2012. 
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This chapter focuses on efforts to mitigate the ‘unknown unknowns’ within the multi-
faceted risk profiles of hedge funds. Section 5.2 introduces risk transparency and details 
private and public initiatives undertaken to promote more transparent disclosure of hedge 
fund information, the success of which has been slow growing. Section 5.3 substantiates the 
unknown and unquantifiable risks within hedge funds and elaborates on the notion of 
hedge fund operational risks. The section begins with an introduction into the available 
research statistics of hedge fund failures and is followed by an analysis of the importance of 
mitigating operational risks within hedge funds. Although an area of limited academic 
research, the fallout from the GFC 2008 has brought to light the need for investors to pay 
much more attention to this principle of knowledge and, hence, increase awareness, 
especially the difficulties in precisely valuing a hedge fund portfolio and the vulnerabilities 
of its Net Asset Value (NAV) quantification to manipulation and misrepresentation, which 
is addressed in section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 analyses the collapse of Bernard Madoff 
Investment Securities, the largest hedge fund fraud to date which was the result of a Ponzi 
scheme. This fund was chosen as a basis of analysis because the fraud itself was uniquely 
different from the norm as it did not rely on sophisticated investment strategies to defraud 
investors and defies the feasibility of current regulatory and disclosure requirements 
tabled by regulators to adequately protect retail investors. 
 
5.2 Risk, Uncertainty and Hedge Funds 
There is distinction which needs to be drawn between what is commonly known as 
accepted risks and uncertainty. In 1921, the economist Frank Knight (1921, p.72) proposed 
a seminal difference between the terms ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. He stated that:  
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The practical difference between the two categories, is that in the former, the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known, either through 
calculation a priori or from statistics of past experiences, while in the case of 
uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible 
to form a group of instances because the situation dealt with is in a high 
degree unique. The best example of uncertainty is in connection with the 
exercise of judgment or the formation of those opinions as to the future 
course of events, which opinions and not scientific knowledge actually guide 
most of our conduct. 
 
 Hedge funds tread along the fine line between risk and uncertainty in the pursuit of 
absolute returns. Their investment strategies are marketed as contributing factors in their 
ability to generate superior risk adjusted return and it is that which essentially 
differentiates hedge fund managers from their counterparts. This superior performance is 
prevalent over and above the lucrative fees typical of the industry, averaging between 1.5 
to 2 percent of assets under management and 20 percent of any positive performance. As 
identified in Chapter Three, hedge fund investors invariably demand high returns in 
exchange for the corresponding fees paid and the risks that they are expected to bear. It has 
been unanimously accepted that hedge fund strategies are riskier and complicated to 
understand but surprisingly few investors and fiduciaries devote much attention to active 
risk-management and due diligence, especially in situations where there is co-investment 
within the fund by the manager. This co-investment criterion in turn tends to be widely 
viewed within the investor community as a default risk control and the acknowledgement 
that because the fund manager has her own money invested in the fund she will act with 
prudence and not take extreme risks to the detriment of the fund’s solvency. 
 
Vrontos et al (2008, p.741) state that potential hedge fund investors may know very little 
about the funds’ investment processes, the risks associated with the fund, or the skills of 
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the fund manager. While the former could be of little practical importance to the investor, 
the risks and, primarily, the capacity of the individuals managing the fund are not. They 
postulate that the skill and performance of a hedge fund manager in general is often 
summarized by an estimate of its ‘alpha’ or the intercept in the regression of the funds’ 
excess return on the excess return of one or more passive benchmarks (Vrontos et al, 2008, 
p.741). The choice of benchmarks is often guided by a pricing model in the spirit of Ross 
(1976) ‘Arbitrage Pricing Theory’. However, risk formulation methodologies which are 
based on traditional risk management models have proven to be unable to capture the true 
risk profiles of hedge fund investment activities and add further to these complications. Lo 
(2001, pp.17-21) points out that it is easy to understate the true dimensions of the risks to 
a portfolio of hedge fund investments in a bull market where asset prices are rising and 
investment strategies are depicted by uniform risk measurement methodologies such as 
Value-At-Risk4 (VaR) but generic risk assessment models cannot fully capture the spectrum 
                                                        
4VaR is a predictive (ex-ante) tool used to prevent portfolio managers from exceeding risk tolerances that 
have been developed in the portfolio policies. It can be measured at the portfolio, sector, asset class, and 
security level. Multiple VaR methodologies are available and each has its own benefits and drawbacks. To 
illustrate, suppose a USD$100 million portfolio has a monthly VaR of USD$8.3 million with a 99% confidence 
level. VaR simply means that there is a 1% chance for losses greater than USD$8.3 million in any given month 
of a defined holding period under normal market conditions. It is worth noting that VaR is an estimate, not a 
uniquely defined value. Moreover, the trading positions under review are fixed for the period in question. 
Finally, VaR does not address the distribution of potential losses on those rare occasions when the VaR 
estimate is exceeded. These constraints should also be kept in mind when using VaR. The ease of using VaR is 
also its pitfall. VaR summarizes within one number the risk exposure of a portfolio. But it is valid only under a 
set of assumptions that should always be kept in mind when handling VaR. VaR involves two arbitrarily 
chosen parameters: the holding period and the confidence level. The holding period corresponds to the 
horizon of the risk analysis. In other words, when computing a daily VaR, we are interested in estimating the 
worst expected loss that may occur by the end of the next trading day at a certain confidence level under 
normal market conditions. The usual holding periods are one day or one month. The holding period can 
depend on the fund’s investment and/or reporting horizons, and/or on the local regulatory requirements. 
The confidence level is intuitively a reliability measure that expresses the accuracy of the result. The higher 
the confidence level, the more likely we expect VaR to approach its true value or to be within a pre-specified 
interval. It is therefore no surprise that most regulators require a 95% or 99% confidence interval to compute 
VaR, Berry, R. (Undated), “Value at Risk: An Overview of Analytical VaR”, J.P. Morgan Investment Analytics and 
Consulting http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/email/1159360877242, Accessed 31 Dec 2012. 
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of risks that hedge funds exhibit. This is because their investment strategies are varied and 
the degree of overlap is too small to be captured by a statistical model that was originally 
designed for OTC derivative dealers to evaluate the risk exposure of portfolios of derivative 
securities (Lo, 2001, pp.17-21). Duc and Schorderet (2008, p.100) state that when facing 
such a problem the usual solution is to explain the returns through a factor model, the 
essence of which is that the risk embedded in any hedge fund can be split into two 
components; the first is a function of the systematic factors to which the manager is 
exposed to and, second, the risk that remains unexplained by these factors and as such can 
be referred to as specifically identified with a particular manager. Further, the comparative 
performance of hedge funds with other market players’ executing similar strategies is a 
difficult task as most investment strategies are uniquely proprietary and never disclosed. 
Therefore, the management of risks to obtain a defined return requires a highly methodical 
and multidimensional approach (Horowitz, 2004, p.74). Investors should consistently 
maintain caution that past performance is not indicative of future results and hence active 
due diligence should be a paramount requirement as part of risk management in ensuring 
that the continual alpha generation capabilities of a fund’s investing activities are based on 
a managers investment acumen as opposed to fraud, manipulation or misrepresentation. 
These issues can be often disregarded in volatile and unpredictable markets where an 
underestimation of risks results in substantial losses and complicates the decision making 
processes of investors who rely on traditional valuation methodologies. The lack of 
disclosure of hedge fund activities adds to these complications and has been demonstrated 
as a contributing factor to the failure of numerous hedge funds including the collapse of 
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LTCM which led to regulators in the US requesting increased disclosure of hedge fund 
activities from industry participants. 
 
5.2.1 Hedge Fund Disclosure and Transparency Debate 
The lack of information about the hedge fund industry before the GFC 2008 meant that a 
majority of academic researchers were unable to effectively determine specific 
requirements which would be useful in mandating transparency information and much of 
the initial work was carried out by governmental institutions and professional bodies in 
collaboration with fund managers and risk assessors. The first major actionable response 
to recommending mandated disclosure requirements of the hedge fund industry was 
tabled in the US by the Presidents Working Group on Financial Markets in its report 
entitled Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (PWG, 
1999) after the collapse of LTCM and the ensuing investigations. The recommendations 
advised on the need for legislative actions to require hedge funds to improve transparency 
through enhanced disclosure to the public as a solution to enable market participants make 
better, more informed judgments about market integrity and the credit worthiness of 
borrowers and counterparties, stating that there was limited information available about 
the financial activities of hedge funds (PWG, 1999, p.32). In a section entitled “Enhanced 
Private Sector Practices for Counterparty Risk Management”, the PWG Report stated that: 
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A group of hedge funds should draft and publish a set of sound practices for 
their risk management and internal controls. Such a study should discuss 
market risk measurement and management, identification of concentrations, 
stress testing, collateral management, valuation of positions and collateral, 
segregation of duties and internal controls, and the assessment of capital 
needs from the perspective of hedge funds. In addition, the study should 
consider how individual hedge funds could assess their performance against 
the sound practices for investors and counterparties (PWG, 1999, p.37). 
  
The motivations for these recommendations were mainly to improve public confidence as 
well as general market integrity and maintain stability within the financial system. 
However, there were no specific requirements provided on the level of depth in disclosure 
information and, hence, left to the discretion of hedge fund managers in a self-regulatory, 
voluntary disclosure model (PWG, 1999, pp.37-38; Horwitz, 2004, p.170-171). 
Subsequently, in response to the PWG findings and increasing debates on hedge fund 
disclosure, the Hedge Fund Working Group (HFWG), an industry representative body, 
submitted a report entitled, “Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers” (2000, p.22).  In a 
section entitled “Disclosure and Transparency” the Working Group stated that: 
 
Investors should receive periodic performance and other information about 
their hedge fund investments. Hedge fund managers should consider 
whether investors should receive interim updates on other matters in 
response to significant events. Hedge fund managers should negotiate with 
counterparties to determine the extent of financial and risk information that 
should be provided to them based on the nature of their relationship in order 
to increase the stability of financing and trading relationships. They should 
also work with regulators and counterparties to develop a consensus 
approach to public disclosure. Agreements and other safeguards should be 
established in order to protect against the unauthorized use of proprietary 
information furnished to outside parties. 
 
The submission of the HFWG emphasized a similar rhetoric to the PWG recommendations 
but highlighted the reluctance of hedge fund managers in revealing proprietary data and 
the determination to protect their investment strategies, advocating a preference towards 
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industry self-regulation. This was further supported by members of the Investor Risk 
Committee (IRC), a subset of the International Association of Financial Engineers, another 
industry body representing counterparties within the hedge fund industry. On the issue of 
disclosure, the IRC5 stated; “IRC Members agreed that full position disclosure by managers 
did not always allow them to achieve their monitoring objectives, and may compromise a 
hedge fund’s ability to execute its investment strategy”. They expressed significant 
concerns over the harm that full position disclosure could cause for many common hedge 
fund strategies, for example macro and risk arbitrage (Horwitz, 2004, p.172). 
 
The debate on increasing the transparency of hedge fund activities was subsequently 
addressed by the SEC in 2003 when it conducted a thorough investigation on hedge fund 
activities due to the sudden and increased growth of the hedge fund industry after the 
collapse of LTCM (Horwitz, 2004, p.172). In 2003, the SEC presented a Staff Report entitled 
“Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds Report to The United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission” and emphasized that the lack of disclosure within the hedge fund 
industry was a cause of concern, stating:  
 
Hedge funds are not subject to any minimum disclosure requirements. 
Although hedge fund advisers generally provide investors with a private 
placement memorandum, and while we acknowledge that there are often a 
range of other communications between hedge fund advisers and hedge fund 
investors, we are concerned that investors may not always receive disclosure 
about certain fundamental information relating to the investment adviser 
and its management of a hedge fund. We are also concerned that investors 
may not receive information about material changes to an adviser’s 
management of a hedge fund on an going and regular basis (SEC, 2003, p.83). 
  
                                                        
5 IRC (2000), “Committee, “Hedge Fund Disclosure for Institutional Investors”, Investor Risk Committee, p.2, 
https://iafe.org/html/upload/IRCConsensusDocumentOctober122000.pdf, Accessed 31 December 2012. 
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This view brought to attention the SEC’s increasing concerns about the risks which hedge 
funds pose to investors and the financial system due to a lack of disclosure but failed to 
mandate specific requirements. It stated that “hedge fund advisers may provide investors 
with a list of hedge fund securities positions and holdings or information about the risks 
associated with the hedge fund’s market positions. This information may be provided in full 
or in part and on a current or delayed basis” (SEC, 2003, p.49). More importantly, the 
potential of requiring hedge fund managers to register with the SEC was recognized for the 
first time in Chapter VII(A), of the report which stated, “the Commission should consider 
requiring hedge fund advisers to register as investment advisers under the Advisers Act, 
taking into account whether the benefits outweigh the burdens of registration” (SEC, 2003, 
p.89). However, the recommendations proceeded to provide assurances to hedge fund 
managers on its unrestrained stance of formally mandating disclosure by elaborating that: 
 
Registration would not place any restrictions on hedge fund advisers’ ability 
to trade securities, use leverage, sell securities short or enter into derivatives 
transactions. Nor would registration under the Act require the disclosure of 
any proprietary trading strategy. In addition, registration would not result in 
hedge funds and hedge fund advisers being subject to any additional 
portfolio disclosure requirements (SEC, 2003, p.92). 
 
The view taken by the SEC and related bodies in promoting guidelines to enhance 
transparency within hedge funds fell short of direct regulation, actions which were 
mirrored by other regulatory agencies globally. This was because the submissions were 
based on a voluntary disclosure model and subject to industry wide self-regulation, but 
eventually not implemented by the hedge fund industry at large to protect proprietary 
information. There were subsequent reports by hedge fund industry representative 
bodies such as the Managed Funds Association which issued annual ‘Best Practice’ 
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guidelines for hedge fund managers but none of these reports substantially emphasized 
the need for increased disclosure and transparency of hedge fund activities until the GFC 
2008. The aftermath of the GFC 2008 has identified exactly the same inconsistencies 
within hedge fund practices which have led to numerous hedge fund failures and 
collapses since 2008. These problems could have been mitigated should the supervisory 
bodies have implemented more stringent oversight on the industry after the collapse of 
LTCM.  
 
The key to creating a more transparent hedge fund industry is to improve the quality of 
fund reporting which will better inform investors and invariably promote greater 
disclosure discipline. However, as the industry has historically been privately structured 
and one which services predominantly sophisticated investors, enforcement of 
disclosure requirements has been difficult, even though voluntary disclosure in itself 
may be beneficial to the reputation of hedge funds. A survey6 conducted by EDHEC-Risk 
and Asset Management Research Center entitled “Hedge Fund Reporting Survey 2008” 
showed that the quality of hedge fund reporting is perceived to be an important signal of 
a fund’s overall excellence and a crucial investment criteria used by investors. However, 
investors consider hedge fund disclosure inadequate, especially with the quality of 
information on liquidity and operational risk exposure. There is a conflict between the 
perceptions of relevant informational disclosure from the perspective of hedge fund 
managers as opposed to investors who demand more information and improved 
                                                        
6 EDHEC (2008), “Hedge Fund Reporting Survey 2008”, EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research Center, 
EDHEC Risk Institute, p.8 http://docs.edhec-
risk.com/mrk/000000/Press/EDHEC_Publication_HF_Reporting_Survey_2008.pdf, Accessed I Jan 2013. 
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disclosure on operational risks and valuation policies and procedures. The idea of 
enhanced hedge fund transparency is not simply a matter of anticipating and meeting 
new regulatory obligations especially because in a market environment where investors 
are getting increasingly attuned towards risk management as they are towards 
achieving absolute returns, transparency has come to be seen as a critical differentiator 
for funds and those with a reputation for clarity, collaboration and transparency stand 
out and are prized by investors7. 
 
5.2.2 (Risk) Transparency and Disclosure 
Transparency in the context of hedge funds refers to the extent and frequency of 
disclosures about a fund or manager’s performance, operations and structure (Shadab, 
2013, p.30). It is the ease of availability of information, especially in business practices and 
revolves around the need for reliable information to be made available to retail investors. 
Retail investors need to be aware of the risk they are undertaking when investing in a 
hedge fund and should not solely rely on the advice of financial managers and advisers who 
may be motivated by self-interest. They should be cautious in understanding how hedge 
fund managers allocate their investments and whether this allocation yields positive 
results, in particular the ability of a fund to generate absolute returns via arbitrage 
opportunities rather than taking on excessive risk and leverage (AIMA, 2012a, p.34). This 
has been a contentious issue within hedge fund investing as most hedge funds derive alpha 
                                                        
7 Enos, G. and Hughes, P. (2010), “Defining Hedge Fund Transparency, The Challenge of Balancing Risk 
Management and Alpha Management”, 
http://www.statestreetglobalservices.com/wps/wcm/connect/f5fd4e00444ff2f990bff327a2dfc506/GC-
State-Street-SS-
2+(2).pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=f5fd4e00444ff2f990bff327a2dfc506, Accessed 1 Jan 
2013. 
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from investment strategies which are devised through extensive research and conducted 
with the use of complex financial instruments, predominantly transacted through over-the-
counter derivative markets. 
 
The main objective of hedge fund reporting is to enable assessment of the risk and return 
profile of the hedge fund under consideration (Goltz and Schroder, 2010). However, risk 
transparency or the disclosure of risk attributes are only useful if the information is 
reliable and investors understand the information they are provided with. As pointed out 
by Fung et al (2008, p.1778), submitting performance returns and related information has 
been voluntary and, hence, there is bias in data available especially because of the lack of 
uniform reporting standards. A study carried out by Liang (2000) through two major 
databases containing hedge fund data noted that 465 hedge funds had significant 
differences in reported information including returns, inception date, net asset value, 
incentive fee, management fee and investment styles. The study also found that 5 percent 
of return numbers and 5 percent of NAV numbers of hedge funds analysed were 
dramatically different. Depicting the truth about fund performance with conflicting 
reporting data presents complications (Gerber et al, 2011, p.12). This mystery has 
prompted various studies in replicating historical hedge fund investment strategies in an 
effort to isolate the alpha generation capabilities from excessive leverage and risk taking 
strategies (Fung et al, 2008; Agarwal and Naik 2004; Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2007). Stulz 
(2007, p.185) found that hedge funds generally produce an annual alpha return of 
approximately 3 to 5 percent due to superior performance. Proponents of hedge funds 
point out that this superior performance is possible due to their lightly regulated status and 
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the ability to use unconventional investment assets and strategies (Dichev and Yu, 2011, 
p.248). However, there are also reasons for skepticism about hedge funds’ actual investor 
returns. These superior returns have been disputed by studies which have found no actual 
outperformance or minimal alpha generation as hedge funds operate in highly competitive 
markets, where information and trading advantages are unlikely to be maintained (Fung et 
al, 2008; Amin and Kat, 2003; Divchev and Yu, 2011, pp.248-263). An important reason to 
the conflicting views identified above can be attributed to the lack of disclosure and 
transparency prevalent within the hedge fund industry.  
 
5.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Mandating Transparency 
The debate over the benefits and drawbacks of mandating more transparency in 
information from hedge funds can be contested from two different perspectives, the views 
of hedge fund investors who would like more information about the performance of their 
invested capital and the perspective of hedge fund managers who are motivated by 
protecting their proprietary investment strategies. The advantages of advocating 
transparency within hedge funds is based on the argument that there are numerous 
uncertainties involved within the mandate of hedge fund investment strategies and the 
ability of fund managers to maintain consistency in superior performance. Transparency 
will enable risk monitoring and aggregation which would allow an investor to keep track of 
any changes in the investment profile of the invested fund and may provide information 
which indicates inconsistencies and fraudulent activities (Anson, 2002, pp.79-80). For 
example, position-level transparency can be an important enabler of risk monitoring and 
aggregation which allows investors to be alerted to strategy drifts (Jorion and Aggrawal, 
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2012, p.109). Investors with transparent information can also manage their own portfolio 
and manage exposures to certain investments which the hedge fund manager makes. For 
example, should an investor be uncomfortable with a particular strategy executed by their 
hedge fund manager, the investor could choose to minimize against that risk by taking an 
opposing position through a derivative contract (Hedges IV, 2007, p.418). Although this 
would defeat the purpose of investing in a hedge fund and paying higher management fees, 
it may suit investors who are unable to withdraw their investments in volatile markets due 
to lock-up period restrictions. Furthermore, hedge fund managers can benefit from positive 
publicity by advocating transparency as it portrays faith in their investment strategies and 
research foundations. It can be an important message to investors where confidence within 
the fund is built through education and dialogue, thus creating a better a reputation 
amongst the investor community and building the foundations for long-term loyalty 
(Hedges IV, 2007, p.418). 
  
The most popular reason for opposing more transparency by hedge funds has been the risk 
of loss of proprietary investment information. Hedge funds managers are reluctant to 
provide detailed investment strategies; fund managers fear that thorough disclosure of 
their portfolio holdings would enable other fund managers to ‘free-ride’ by replicating 
hedge fund portfolios rather than performing their own investment research (Schwarz and 
Brown, 2010, p.3). The pursuit of absolute returns requires hedge fund managers to 
dedicate a lot of time to research. Analyzing securities with high degrees of complexity and 
investing in illiquid environments subsequently leads to picking valuable securities not 
covered by mainstream analysts and would require funds to risk more capital to take up 
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larger positions to be profitable (Hedges IV, 2005a, p.31). Forcing public disclosure by 
hedge funds could allow others to infer their trading strategies and information, inducing 
mimicking trade which could erode the profitability of strategies (Easley et al, 2012, p.1). 
Additionally, the large scale of hedge fund positions means that any position adjustment 
imposes liquidity demands on the market. Knowledge of fund positions could allow others 
to exploit this need for liquidity, thereby also reducing the profitability of hedge fund 
trading (Easley et al, 2012, p.1). This fear is extended to proprietary computer programs 
developed by hedge funds which would contain an algorithm that generates buy or sell 
signals on securities. Traders often develop these systems after conducting intensive 
research on historical price trends, volatility and other technical relationships. If 
competitors have access to the trades that a manager makes, they may be able to reverse 
engineer the models being used (Hedges IV, 2005a, p.31). Thus, although hedge fund 
managers acknowledge that more efficient means of information dissemination would be a 
reputational boon for the industry, there is fear amongst managers that their transactions 
and positions become known by other managers, putting them at a competitive 
disadvantage, jeopardizing their viability and continued existence. Furthermore, as will be 
analysed in the subsequent sections, more transparency does not necessarily mean that 
investors will be more protected against hedge fund failure or fraud. The information 
provided must be consistently analysed and active due diligence conducted on the 
operations of a hedge fund. 
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5.2.4 Standard Disclosure Model? 
Transparency can be a critical differentiator in investment decision making processes, 
however, the type of information disclosed and the level of complexity can also be a cause 
of much confusion for investors. The general consensus by hedge fund industry 
participants has been that enhanced transparency will be beneficial to the industry but this 
in itself is a difficult task due to the dynamism of the sector and complex investment 
profiles which span across multiple markets, strategies and fund structures. Developing an 
effective disclosure model to promote transparency is a more complicated approach than 
simply adhering to regulation set by authorities and industry bodies. An important part of 
the success of any hedge fund is the innovativeness of its investment strategy which is also 
an area where most of the fraudulent conduct can occur and hence the extent to which 
hedge funds disclose details about their investment portfolios can be influential in 
mitigating fraud and failure (Anson, 2002, p.79). 
 
There are four main types of transparency information available to investors identified by 
Anson (2002, p.80); disclosure transparency, process transparency, position transparency 
and exposure transparency. Disclosure transparency relates to the details generally 
provided by hedge fund managers to investors as part of their product disclosure 
statements or offer documents. Hedge fund managers are not known for their ability to 
dictate information about their investment mandate and comparative benchmarks 
succinctly, possibly due to fear of loss of proprietary information. This argument has been 
the main issue behind the lack of transparency within the industry and hence the purpose 
of disclosure information has been widely considered as a ‘necessary evil’. The information 
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provided is either too complex, too long or irrelevant to investors and exposes an 
important vulnerability behind the purpose of such information (Hu, 2012, p.1609). This 
perceived lack of transparency blurs the distinction of accountability whereby, should a 
hedge fund manager neglect her responsibilities, there is no mandated information 
detailed enough for which she could be held accountable. Hence investors are usually left in 
the dark in relation to legal recourse. Process transparency relates to information that the 
manager should convey about her investment process (Anson, 2002, p.81). Hedge fund 
managers usually describe their investment process as skills-based, an opaque approach 
which does not identify specificity, especially when the fund manager has unlimited 
discretion in executing investment strategies (Connor and Woo, 2004, pp.7-8). This 
presumes that the method of getting to those portfolio positions is not transparent. Hence, 
a fund essentially refrains from disclosing their investment strategy for achieving portfolio 
positions, thereby protecting their proprietary positions (Black, 2007, p.333). 
 
Position-level information can be used to understand and continuously monitor the nature 
of market risks the manager is undertaking and provide some safeguard against 
operational risks especially when compared to returns-based risk measures which are, in 
contrast, generally less effective because they fail to adapt to dynamic trading (Jorion, 
2009, pp.924-925). However, taking into consideration the complexity of hedge fund 
investing strategies across multiple sectors and jurisdictions, this information would 
possibly be more of a hindrance than assist in helping investors understand and estimate 
risks, especially because it would require a complex risk management system. In general, 
most investors do not have risk management systems sufficiently robust to accumulate all 
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of the detailed position information that might be received from a pool of hedge funds 
(Anson, 2002, p.81). Schwarz and Brown (2010, pp.17-19) found that there is also a 
potential for traders to front-run disclosed positions and events because of position 
disclosure and use of private information for profit. This model of hedge fund risk 
information was initially submitted by the Investor Risk Committee8  as identified in 
section 5.2. There have been numerous representations made by various other governing 
bodies since then, but what is of more importance to this section was the stance by the 
Committee that full, daily position reporting by hedge fund managers was not a cost 
effective and efficient solution for increased transparency. This was substantiated by a 
number of negative externalities, that such disclosure may compromise a hedge fund 
manager’s strategy and that investors may not be able to handle or use effectively the vast 
amounts of daily information available. The Committee proposed that exposure reporting 
combined with delayed position reporting was sufficient for risk monitoring and 
management purposes (Anson, 2002, p.82).  
 
Exposure transparency, which has been touted as an efficient method of relaying 
information to investors, is the reporting of summarized risk information as opposed to 
individual and detailed trading position by position reporting (Anson, 2002, p.82). Hedge 
funds could disclose information about the overall portfolio risk associated with their 
strategies without revealing proprietary information (Edwards, 2003, p.17). The 
information about a hedge fund’s exposure, usually known as ‘risk-buckets’, is the collation 
of aggregate investment positions held by the hedge fund into a summarized version which 
                                                        
8 IRC (2001), “Hedge Fund Disclosure for Institutional Investors”, International Association of Financial 
Engineers, https://iafe.org/html/upload/IRCConsensusDocumentJuly272001.pdf, Accessed 1 June 2012. 
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is meant to ease the understanding of this data. The practice of risk management is to 
measure and manage the aggregate risk exposures across a diversified portfolio and, hence, 
risk buckets accomplish this task by identifying the factors that most impact the value of an 
investment portfolio (Anson, 2002a, p.125).  
 
It is almost impossible to definitively develop a disclosure strategy which would cater to 
the requirements of all stakeholders within the hedge fund industry. The arguments for 
and against increased transparency of hedge fund activities circle around the publication of 
information. The fact that hedge fund managers demand that their proprietary information 
be protected against competitors means that position-level information or process-
transparency are not possible solutions because this would divulge too much information. 
Disclosure transparency on the other hand has been a practice within the hedge fund 
industry for a long time and its ineffectiveness can be shown by the numerous collapses of 
hedge funds due to fraud or simply excessive risk taking. For example, even with 
mandatory disclosure filing requirements introduced under the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, 
there are provisions which allow hedge funds to ‘opt out’ of disclosing information. In 
particular, Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act requires institutional investment 
managers to disclose their quarterly portfolio holdings on Form 13F, with an exception. 
The exception to the rule provides confidential treatment of certain holdings which enables 
hedge funds to delay the disclosure of those holdings for usually up to one year (Agarwal et 
al, 2012, pp.739-740). The ‘delayed reporting’ provision creates opportunities for hedge 
fund managers to evade providing more transparent information of their investing 
activities. Finally, exposure level disclosure, although considered the best option, also has 
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its weaknesses because the collation of aggregate information, which will be left to the 
discretion of the hedge fund manager, especially in the case of valuing illiquid assets, may 
lead to risks of misrepresentation or the information being manipulated to portray much 
more favorable results, thus defeating the purpose of mandating transparency. A possible 
solution to eliminating these problems is through the mitigation of operational risks and 
the following section analyses the causes of hedge fund failure which do not relate to 
financial risk alone. The focus is on the operational risks within hedge funds which has 
been a major contributor to investor losses and will assist in explaining the need for a 
multi-layered approach to effective risk management of hedge fund activities. 
 
5.3 Hedge Fund Failure 
5.3.1 Sources of failure 
The attrition rate within the hedge fund sector is substantially higher compared to any 
other privately managed investment vehicles within the alternative investment industry 
(Getmansky, 2012, p.34). A common cause identified is the use of extensive leverage and 
riskier investment strategies. Whilst hedge funds’ leveraged investments are perceived to 
have the ability to move markets, the extensive use of leverage in funds raises concerns 
about their liquidity and solvency in times of market stress especially where volatility sees 
extreme price swings in securities (Brown and Goetzmann, 2003). It may be contended that 
a solution to these inconsistencies is the use of effective risk management models, 
however, as identified in section 5.2, most of the standard risk management models which 
have been used in the financial services industry are inapplicable to hedge fund investing. 
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The continued positive performance of hedge funds during the 1990s when financial 
markets were considerably more stable inflated confidence in the industry. This was 
assisted by stricter regulation of the other investment vehicles such as mutual funds and 
pension funds and encouraged a shift of investments into the unregulated shadow banking 
sector. Secrecy within the industry restricted an understanding of the manner in which 
absolute returns were generated and how hedge fund operations were conducted. Publicity 
on hedge fund collapses was minimal, predominantly restricted to high profile collapses 
such as LTCM, and thus, there was little consistent attention given to the risks which hedge 
fund operations posed. However, this has changed in the wake of the GFC 2008 with a 
constant stream of hedge fund failures which investors have begun to take into account as 
financial losses of investments within such funds increase. The increasing number of hedge 
fund collapses over the past five years has shown the unpredictable survivability of hedge 
funds and is contrary to the belief that hedge funds are designed and marketed on the basis 
that they are able to generate absolute returns while providing downside protection for 
investors in times of crisis, without excessive losses, let alone failure. 
 
A majority of the research on hedge fund attrition has mainly focused on performance 
failures as a result of excessive financial risks (Liang and Park, 2010, Brown et al 2008, 
Amin and Kat 2003, Liang 2001). Bianchi and Drew (2006) examined return data on hedge 
fund attrition, biases and survivorship premium between 1994 to 2001 and found an 
estimated attrition rate of 9 percent per year, twice that reported by mutual funds. Brown 
et al (1999) state that the attrition rate for hedge funds is about 15 percent per year based 
on data from 1985 to 1989 and a large proportion of hedge funds do not survive more than 
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three years. Using a different dataset, Liang (2001, p.15) shows a lower attrition rate of 8.5 
percent per year for data analysed between the years 1994 to 1999. Amin and Kat (2003) 
investigated the attrition rate of hedge funds from 1994 to 2001 and stated that the rate 
was not only high but showed a defined and increasing trend over the years analysed. 
Further, they state that lack of size and performance are important factors behind hedge 
fund attrition and that the attrition rate is much higher among hedge funds with lesser 
AUM as opposed to the larger, more prominent hedge funds. These significant results have 
not affected the growth of the hedge fund industry even though the causal impact of 
excessive risks resulting in losses affirms poorer performance, operational failure and an 
inability to accumulate sufficient assets under management. Hence, the level of hedge fund 
attrition does not necessarily mean that it is because of those hedge funds which have 
failed, although, hedge fund failure certainly contributes largely to its attrition rate. 
 
Defining hedge fund failure can be a challenge because it is difficult to obtain detailed 
information on defunct hedge funds. Additionally, liquidation does not necessarily mean 
failure in the hedge fund universe. Liang and Park (2010, p.200) state that successful hedge 
funds can be liquidated voluntarily due to the markets, expectation of the managers or 
other reasons which does not necessarily mean failure or insolvency. For the purposes of 
the thesis, emphasis is placed on hedge fund failure as a result of operational risks and 
fraud which includes risks of misrepresentation, manipulation and misappropriation, an 
important problem which has been widely disregarded as a significant contributor to lack 
of survivability within the hedge fund industry. 
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The only substantive study on hedge fund failure as a result of operational risks was 
conducted by Kundro and Feffer (2003). They investigated 100 hedge fund liquidations and 
found that 54 percent of the failures had identifiable operational issues with nearly half of 
all fund failures due to operational risks alone. Of this number, 41 percent were caused by 
operational risks due to misrepresentation of investment performance, 30 percent 
involved misappropriation of funds and general fraud and 14 percent involved 
unauthorized trading and style breaches, 6 percent involved inadequate resources and 9 
percent involved other operational issues. Kundro and Feffer (2003) also found that 38 
percent of hedge fund liquidations could be attributed to investment risk only and the 
remaining 8 percent could be attributed to business risk or a combination of risks. This is 
further supported by a study on hedge fund failures by the United States Congressional 
Research Service which found three main reasons for hedge fund failure: unfavorable 
market moves depicting financial risks; operational issues, such as errors in trade 
processing or mispricing complex, opaque financial instruments; and fraud or misbehavior 
by fund management (Jickling and Raab, 2006, p.CRS3).  
 
Brown et al (2009) found that operational risk was a major cause of hedge fund 
underperformance, particularly when there were conflicts of interest between managers, 
investors and other stakeholders. They also found an adverse relationship between the 
structure of management concentration and returns. The more concentrated a funds’ 
management, the lower the returns and even though a funds’ operational risk 
characteristics seemed to be understood by those providing leverage to the funds, this did 
not mediate the naïve tendency of investors to chase past returns despite having a negative 
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impact on investor returns. According to a 2012 industry survey9 commissioned by a law 
firm, Labaton Sucharow and the Hedge Fund Association from the US, nearly half (46 
percent) of hedge fund professionals believe that their competitors engage in illegal 
activity, more than one third (35 percent) have personally felt pressure to break the rules, 
and about one third (35 percent) have personally felt misconduct in the workplace 
substantiating the need to investigate operational risks within hedge funds in an effort to 
mitigate collapses and the risks which could lead to systemic failure. 
 
5.3.2 Operational Risks 
Operational risk can be defined as losses that are neither due to market risk nor credit risk 
but rather arise from human error, internal and external failed processes, unlinked 
systems, megamergers and/or new technologies (Guizot, 2007, p.59). The advent of 
operational risks within hedge funds, if not circumvented, results in failure which can 
amplify system wide risk levels and has a greater potential to transpire into more harmful 
ways than many other sources of risk, given the size of leveraged positions and 
interconnectedness of the hedge fund industry (Jobst, 2010, p.47). The diversity and 
complexity of hedge fund investment management organizations means that investors 
cannot simply assume that a fund manager has an operational infrastructure sufficient to 
protect shareholder assets (Nahum and Aldrich, 2008, p.106). 
 
                                                        
9 HedgeWeek (2013), “More Than A Third of Hedge Fund Professionals Feel The Pressure To Break Rules In 
Pursuit of Alpha” HedgeWeek, http://www.hedgeweek.com/2013/04/03/182548/more-third-hedge-fund-
professionals-feel-pressured-break-rules-pursuit-
alpha?utm_source=MailingList&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Hedgewire+non-UK+04%2F04%2F13, 
Accessed 4 April 2013. 
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The International Association of Financial Engineers defines operational risk as losses 
caused by problems with people, processes, technology, or external events. More 
specifically, these include the risks of failure of the internal operational controls, and 
accounting systems, failure of the compliance and internal audit systems, and failure of 
personnel oversight systems, that is, employee fraud and misconduct (Brown et al, 2008, 
p.43). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision state that operational risk is the risk of 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from 
external events and excludes investment risks (BIS, 2011, p.3). Within hedge funds, 
operational risk is therefore the non-financial risks faced by an fund as a consequence of 
alternations in regular functions and is usually described as ‘risk without reward’ as it is 
the only risk that investors face that is not rewarded with potentially increased returns 
(Nahum and Aldrich, 2008, p.106). This attitude has led to complacency by investors where 
failure to place emphasis on the importance of operational risks controls has resulted in 
numerous frauds. Investors should appreciate that adequate and efficient operational risk 
management leads to positive overall returns as compared to a vulnerable, risky 
organisation. 
 
The importance of operational risk management in hedge funds has been neglected 
historically for various reasons and has not been an area of importance which clearly 
affects investor decisions (Brown et al, 2012, p.223). Investors have always been more 
interested in the quantification of risk where analytical information can be derived through 
metrics and which is perceived as a more valuable indication of risk and performance. 
Academics have followed suit by focusing research in this area, utilizing risk management 
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models such as VaR and the Sharpe Ratio, substantiated by historical data which according 
to Lo (2001) may not capture many of the risk exposures of hedge fund investments. This 
quantification of risk has enabled financial professionals and investors to evaluate the 
correlation of their invested income and the risk profiles of hedge funds based on 
investment strategies with consistency but little consideration has been given to instances 
of exceptional circumstances such as tail risks and shifts in investment strategies, a 
common occurrence within the hedge fund industry and a notable cause of financial losses. 
 
According to Grody et al (2008, p.142), accounting for operational risk exposure and 
accommodating the operational risk component into risk capital has been a challenge. The 
lack of any measure of operational risk exposure, the failure to incorporate the importance 
of data into risk measurement models and the lack of any cohesive mechanism to correlate 
operational risk exposure with historical operational losses has yet to be structured with 
an accepted model or methodology. This stance is supported by Holmes (2003) who 
outlined four reasons why operational risk quantification is a difficult task. The issues 
include a lack of position equivalence where it is difficult to construct a complete portfolio 
of operational risk exposures, loss data is affected by the continual change of organizations 
and the evolution of the environment in which they operate and lastly the difficulty in 
validating operational risk models (Sodhi and Holland, 2009, p.158). The inability to fully 
quantify operational risk will be an ongoing issue because the variables in question relate 
to, amongst other things, human behavior, an unpredictable component of any hedge fund 
investment management organization. 
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The operational and legal structure of a hedge fund opens it to conflicts of interest between 
the fund manager and its investors, something which can also arise with various 
counterparties in business relationships with the fund. For example, hedge fund managers 
are incentivized by performance fees and many hedge funds trade in complex financial 
instruments which often have greater valuation subjectivity, hence presenting them with 
the opportunity to structure asset values at their own discretion (Nahum and Aldrich, 
2008, p.106). This unregulated principal-agent relationship means that the fund manager 
may not act in the best interests of the investors. Investors have to be aware of rogue and 
irresponsible fund managers who may conduct their investing activities recklessly, 
resulting in investment losses. Past manager behavior indicative of risks may include 
previous fiduciary decisions, as well as previous legal and regulatory actions taken against 
the manager, and any other variable that might be correlated with the propensity to make 
future illegal or unethical decisions in favor of the hedge fund manager’s own interest at 
the expense of an investor, counterparty or other stakeholders (Brown et al, 2008, p.7). 
Brown et al (2012, p.226) state that an important question for investors is whether a fund’s 
operational controls compensate for any potential historical breaches of trust. Although 
corporate governance mandates such as internal controls and compliance procedures can 
be effective, the risk of fraud within a hedge fund is increased with opportunity and 
incentive in an operationally weak environment. In the context of a hedge fund where the 
limited partnership form facilitates the complete separation of control and ownership over 
invested funds, conflicts also arise in valuation methodologies, provision of side letters and 
in close broker-dealer relationships (Sklar, 2009, pp.3266-3267). 
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The ownership and organisational structure of a hedge fund may be an indication of 
possible operational risks problems as the ability for separation of responsibilities is 
reduced within a closed structure. Research by Brown et al (2008) found that funds with 
greater operational risks vulnerabilities have a “higher number of direct and controlling 
owners and that the number of direct owners in the form of non-individual domestic 
entities is higher for problem funds than it is for non-problem funds”. This suggests that 
funds which exhibit higher operational risk characteristics are more likely to structure the 
fund within a venture or partnership with another institution, allowing owners to 
obfuscate their direct effective ownership. The result of their findings indicates that a fear 
of expropriation will lead to the establishment of a more concentrated management 
structure. Operational risk factors are also correlated with lower leverage and 
concentrated ownership in hedge funds, suggesting that bank financial intermediaries tend 
to provide less leverage to funds with inherent operational risks problems and this can 
impact a funds’ creditworthiness (Almeida and Wolftenzon, 2006). Harvey et al (2004, 
pp.5-7) state that the ease of availability of external debt to hedge funds indicates a positive 
governance stance by lending institutions which translates into the effectiveness of an 
organisation’s governance mechanisms and, therefore, problem funds generally have lower 
leverage and less margin offered to them than non-problem funds. 
 
Hedge funds employ third parties, especially prime brokers who execute the trades 
ordered by the hedge fund manager10 as well as providing financing and risk management 
                                                        
10 EuroMoney (2006), “Prime Brokerage Debate: The Race to Keep Up With the Clients”, EuroMoney, Nov. 
2006, p.92, http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1083644/Prime-brokerage-debate-The-race-to-keep-up-
with-the-clients.html, Accessed 1 Oct, 2012. 
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facilities on transactions. Additionally, prime brokers act as marketing agents, raising 
capital for the fund by introducing the fund’s managers to some of the brokerages more 
important clients and are compensated by hedge funds based on the services rendered 
(Sklar, 2009, p.3269). The lack of separation between brokerage service and financing 
raises concerns of conflict of interest as to whether these prime brokers exercise 
independence or neglect their fiduciary responsibilities for self-interest while, at the same 
time, compromising the best interest of investors. For example, if the fund manager agrees 
to higher brokerage fees in return for additional services which will benefit them on a 
personal basis as opposed to the fund, the investors will stand to be disadvantaged. Hedge 
fund managers may also choose not to have brokers and operate solely for their own 
account which ultimately reduces independence. The processing of hedge fund trades is 
more complicated if the fund administrators responsible for shareholder registrations and 
fund accounting are located in offshore locations where technologies are difficult to 
integrate and more expensive to implement (Gizmot, 2007, p.61). Operational problems 
also arise from the lack of reconciliations between different parties involved in the 
reporting of risk exposures by brokers, hedge fund managers, and offshore operations 
(Gizmot, 2007, p.61). 
 
Integrating hedge funds’ operations is also more complicated because their strategies are 
more innovative and original than those of traditional mutual funds (Gizmot, 2007, p.61). 
The use of side letters by hedge funds leads to favorable outcomes for certain investors and 
not others. Further, side letters may provide a large influential institutional investor with 
better investment terms than available to others, for example, reduction in fees, more 
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frequent or detailed disclosures, better withdrawal terms, reduced lock-up period (Collins, 
2008, p.401). This discriminatory conduct while not illegal, could serve as an important red 
flag for investors that preferential treatment is afforded to certain investors at the overall 
cost of the funds’ profitability. Such vulnerabilities within the operations of hedge funds 
directly eventuate in loss of returns for investors. This deceptive conduct has never been 
adequately addressed and, over time, a small percentage of losses usually results in high 
negative returns. 
 
5.4 Valuation Risks and Fraud 
5.4.1 Net Asset Valuation (NAV) Risk 
The valuation process drives nearly every decision that a hedge fund manager makes, from 
risk management to how they will compensate themselves, which in turn will affect many 
aspects of the relationship between hedge fund managers and investors (Sklar, 2009, 
p.3298). The method with which a hedge fund manager values complex investments in the 
fund’s portfolio poses significant problems especially because there are no standards or 
rules that dictate valuation methods for hedge fund portfolios which are left to the 
discretion of the hedge fund manager (Gaber et al, 2004, pp.328-331). Investors’ base 
investment decisions on the performance of hedge funds and, hence, the motivation to 
maintain consistent growth poses significant risks to manipulation of financial 
performance, financial reporting, performance reporting and collateral requirements 
(Mangiero, 2006, pp.20-21). Moreover, the typical offer documents will grant the hedge 
fund manager the liberty of deviating from stated valuation policies and procedures when 
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it is deemed necessary, thereby further obfuscating the valuation process and making the 
potential conflicts of interest more pronounced (Sklar, 2009, pp.3268-3269). 
 
The value of an investment in a hedge fund, known as a hedge fund’s NAV, should be based 
on quantifiable and unquantifiable variables that investors have to take into account in 
determining their investment and forecasting decisions (PWG, 2008, p.43). However, 
Poniachek (2008, p.26) state that the NAV of a hedge fund only comprises the net value of 
its investment positions, after fees and expenses, and this is used by stakeholders as the 
basis for all subscriptions, redemptions, and performance calculations (Kundro and Feffer, 
2004, p.42). Factors such as the reputation of a hedge fund, the managers’ historical 
performance, track record and having adequate operational infrastructure are rarely 
included in determining the true value of the NAV because these unquantifiable variables 
are subjective and dependent on uncontrollable externalities even though they are an 
integral part of the equation. Furthermore, the value of securities within a hedge fund 
portfolio can also be subjective, predominantly based on market sentiment as opposed to 
its real value and has an impact on valuation methodologies and outcomes. To explain this 
Fishman and Parker (2010, pp.2-5) state that, in a credit boom all assets are traded and 
sufficiently funded. During a period of financial uncertainty where crisis occurs, there is a 
decline in trade, observed prices fall and real investment declines. The price decline occurs 
because unsophisticated investors leave the market and market power changes from one in 
which assets are in short supply to one in which the ability to conduct valuation is in short 
supply. There is a sort of flight to quality in two senses, only good assets are funded, and 
unsophisticated investors flee to the market opting to invest elsewhere (Fisher and Parker, 
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2010, pp.2-5). The scenario is further complicated with investing in the hedge fund 
industry where the fund manager has complete discretion over valuation methodologies. 
 
The success of hedge funds is based on proprietary knowledge protected by regulatory 
requirements which mandates that performance data be only provided to individual 
investors. As such, practices within the industry are extremely unstructured and inefficient 
(Horwitz, 2004, p.143). The issue pertaining to valuation in hedge fund portfolios concerns 
how to ensure that a fund uses fair and proper prices for positions that are held in a fund. 
Inaccurate or over-inflated asset valuations risk adversely affecting investors and investor 
confidence through incorrect redemption and subscription rates, and may also result in the 
payment of unjustified performance fees to hedge fund managers (McVea, 2008, p.131). 
The complexity and diversity of hedge fund portfolios and allocation into complex 
investments has resulted in significant efforts to formulate tools and processes for 
accurately valuing them (PWG, 2008, p.43). These efforts have not had the desired results, 
evidenced by the increasing cases of hedge fund fraud due to misrepresentation and 
manipulation since 2008. There have been various studies which have revealed that one of 
the primary cause of hedge fund failure due to fraud and misrepresentation is because of 
manipulation and deceptive conduct pertaining to the value of financial assets as well as 
resource problems resulting in an eventual inability to form an accurate price or risk 
within the funds book (Ingersoll et al, 2007; Agarwal et al, 2011, Bollen and Pool, 2011; 
Bollen and Pool, 2009; Jylha, 2011; McVea, 2008a). Furthermore, the compensation 
structure within hedge funds which focuses on attaining absolute returns and meeting high 
watermarks incentivizes managers not only to take on risks more aggressively but to 
243 
 
manage valuations and claim performance fees that are not in fact merited (Sharma, 2012, 
pp.4-5). 
 
Some of the more prominent causes of hedge fund fraud are perpetrated when managers 
participate in misrepresentation and price manipulation, for example by disclosing inflated 
asset value unjustifiably, and resisting conservative estimates by administrators.  The 
availability of leverage also enables managers to artificially move market prices on 
invested securities, inflating values and disregarding the potential of magnified losses 
(McVea, 2008a, p.133). Bollen and Pool (2011, p.15) state that fraudulent activities of 
hedge fund managers are more likely to be discovered during times of market downturns 
such as the recent financial crisis, where misappropriation, manipulation and fraud are 
revealed following an increase in investor withdrawal requests, since at that time it 
becomes clear that assets in the fund have been expropriated or valuations have been 
inflated. This is consistent with the view of Fisher and Parker (2010) who identified 
distinct variances in security prices between periods of excessive credit and that of 
financial uncertainty where crisis occurs. Moreover, in view of the emerging international 
regulatory consensus which emphasizes the monitoring skills of hedge fund counterparties 
in helping to moderate the risk-taking and general conduct of hedge funds, incorrect 
valuations are, as events in the recent subprime mortgage market debacle have shown, 
likely to result in a hedge fund’s total risk profile being mispriced (McVea, 2008a, p.131). In 
rapidly evolving financial markets, inaccurate valuations may quickly alter the implications 
for solvency and, more broadly, financial stability increasing the likelihood of financial 
losses borne by investors (IMF, 2008a, p.110). 
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5.4.2 Illiquidity and Return Smoothing 
Assets comprising of illiquid and/or complex instruments, which do not have a ‘public 
screen price’ means that managers are more likely to be involved in helping to facilitate 
valuations by, for example, providing information and price quotes (FSA, 2005, p.48). 
These valuations are difficult for hedge fund administrators to challenge because the assets 
are intrinsically hard to value (McVea, 2008a, p.134). Complex and illiquid financial 
instruments are often ‘marked-to-model’ rather than being ‘marked-to-market’ which often 
results in inaccurate valuations11 (Crotty, 2008, p.28). By definition, these models rest on 
assumptions and thus may provide forecasts which are highly subjective. There is also the 
risk of what is known as autocorrelation. Typically, a financial instrument is valued on the 
basis of a chosen methodology which is applied on a regular basis over a given period of 
time and in the case of complex, illiquid assets, whose values will inevitably vary over time, 
the repeated use of the same methodology is likely to result in the volatility of returns 
associated with understated valuations and a tendency to distort fund returns (McVea, 
2008, pp.10-11). Even in situations where valuation of thinly traded securities is 
substantiated by quotes from brokers and dealers, the methodology used would be affected 
by variations in assumptions. Kundo and Feffer (2004, p.42) claim that broker-dealer 
quotes for complex financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities may vary by 
as much as 20 to 30 percent, the prices quoted are unlikely to be reliable estimates of real 
value and the ‘bid-ask’ spread, which is the difference between the quoted buying and 
selling prices of a security, will vary substantially because of the absence of an active 
market for traded securities (Deloitte Research, 2007, pp.12-15). 
                                                        
11 Roubini, N. (2008), “How Will Financial Institutions Make Money Now That the Securitization Chain Is 
Broken”, dated 19 May 2008, http://www.roubini.com/analysis/45918.php, Accessed 19 May 2010. 
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Given the nature of hedge-fund compensation contracts and performance statistics, 
managers have incentives to ‘smooth’ their returns by marking their portfolios to less than 
their actual value in months with large positive returns so as to create a ‘cushion’ for those 
months with lower returns (Fong, 2005 p.29). Lo et al (2004, pp.545-546) pointed out that 
managers participate in return smoothing, or the deliberate and fraudulent manipulation of 
portfolio, to optimize fund returns and state that the only types of assets for which a hedge 
fund manager has sufficient discretion and latitude to manipulate NAVs are those for which 
there may not be a well-established market price and where a hedge-fund manager has 
considerable discretion in marking the portfolio’s value at the end of each month to arrive 
at the fund’s NAV. Goetzmann et al (2007, p.1504) take a similar view and state that if 
investors use specific performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio to evaluate 
investable hedge fund managers, then the managers have an incentive to take actions to 
enhance these measures, including manipulation. They show how traditional measures can 
be distorted through simple manipulation strategies by focusing on trading strategies that 
are conducted to affect the return distribution of a fund in specific ways to manipulate 
standard performance measures (Bollen and Pool, 2008, p.6). 
 
Cassar and Gerakos (2011, pp.1699-1701) investigated the extent to which hedge fund 
managers smooth self-reported returns by analyzing the mechanisms used to price a fund’s 
investment position and report the fund’s performance to investors as opposed to previous 
academic research which focused on the ‘anomalous’ properties of hedge fund returns, thus 
allowing them to differentiate between asset illiquidity and misreporting-based 
explanations. They find that using less verifiable pricing sources and funds’ that provide 
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managers with greater discretion in pricing investment positions are likely to have returns 
consistent with intentional smoothing. They state that the use of more reputable auditors 
and administrators is not associated with lower levels of smoothing as the primary 
responsibility of the auditor is in evaluating the fund’s annual financial statements as 
opposed to evaluating the fund’s monthly performance reports. Their findings suggests 
that overall, the reputation of those who calculate and review the fund’s financial 
statements and NAV play a relatively smaller role in the reduction of misreporting monthly 
returns than do the sources of prices and who prices the fund’s investment positions. 
Funds’ managing large risky portfolios with non-conventional strategies seek 
confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in those holdings are disproportionately associated 
with information-sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information 
asymmetry (Agarwal et al, 2013a, p.739). Together the evidence supports private 
information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality12. 
Further, Bollen and Pool (2008) state that managers are motivated by an incentive to 
smooth losses to delay reporting poor performance, and an incentive to fully report gains 
in their competition for investor capital (Straumann, 2009). Thus, the ability of hedge fund 
managers to manipulate NAV by intentional smoothing increases the more illiquid the 
assets they hold, since the opportunity to exercise discretion exists only when recent trade 
prices are not available (Bollen and Pool, 2011, p.9). Marking-to-model and deliberate 
smoothing makes it difficult to identify a hedge fund manager’s intent without additional 
                                                        
12 Krishnamshetty, M. (2012), “Why Do Hedge Funds Hide Some of Their Stock Picks”, InsiderMonkey, dated 
19 June 2012, http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/why-do-hedge-funds-hide-some-of-their-stock-picks-
13115/, Accessed 5 Oct 2012. 
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information as they both generate identical time series properties (Getmansky et al, 2004; 
Arnold, 2013, p.30). 
 
5.4.3 Misreported Returns 
The misreporting of hedge fund returns has been observed and analyzed in studies by 
Agarwal et al (2011), Bollen and Pool (2009), Cumming and Dai (2010) and Cici et al 
(2011). Hedge fund managers have varied motivations for misreporting returns for 
example, charging higher management fees, attracting future capital flows and wealth 
transfer. By overstating asset values and thus disclosing favorable performance of 
investment strategies, fund managers can charge a higher concurrent management fee, 
attract future investment flows, and hence higher future fees. Additionally, by overstating 
returns and hence asset values during periods of positive capital flows, a fund manager can 
overcharge new investors for their shares, resulting in a wealth transfer from new 
investors to old investors (Jylha, 2011, pp.2-4). Similarly, understating returns and asset 
values during negative capital flows will result in too little being paid out to the leaving 
investors, and hence a value transfer to the remaining investors (Jylha, 2011, pp.2-4). For 
example, Agarwal et al (2011, pp.3282-3284) using a comprehensive database of hedge 
funds show that funds manage their reported returns in an opportunistic fashion in order 
to earn higher fees. They focus on two types of incentives faced by hedge fund managers. 
The first one relates to the promise of rewards for good performance and second relates to 
the threat of penalties in the form of capital withdrawal by investors following poor 
performance. These incentives motivate funds to report better performance. 
Acknowledging that hedge funds are compensated annually, Agarwal et al (2011) research 
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indicates a spike in the December return results, leading to the conclusion that the spike is 
systemically related to the benefits and costs associated with returns management. 
Further, Bollen and Pool (2009, p.5) state that hedge fund managers have an incentive to 
report the most attractive returns possible to investors and that managers have discretion 
over trading strategies and reporting practices to affect the shape of the distribution of 
reported returns.  
 
Recent research by Cici et al (2011, pp.3-5) on the valuation of equity positions by hedge 
fund managers found that managers with more pronounced valuation deviations show a 
stronger discontinuity in their reported returns. The research found evidence consistent 
with the Strategic Valuation Hypothesis13 suggesting equity valuation deviations are not 
random but could be manipulated. The conclusion suggested firstly that valuation 
deviations are related to suspicious irregularities in reported returns, specifically hedge 
fund managers with more pronounced equity valuation deviations show a stronger 
discontinuity in their reported returns. Secondly, the documented valuation deviations are 
more prevalent among advisers with characteristics suggesting a stronger presence of 
incentives to engage in pricing irregularities. In particular, hedge fund managers who self-
report to commercial databases show more pronounced equity deviations. This is 
consistent with the analogy that managers use valuation as a tool in trying to impress 
potential investors that are exposed to the managers’ self-reported returns. In addition, 
they state that hedge funds domiciled in offshore tax havens also evidenced stronger 
                                                        
13  Valuation deviations reflect certain advisors strategically managing their equity position valuation to 
impress upon their potential or existing clients (Puetz et al, 2011, p.3). 
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valuation deviations with similar motivations due to greater discretion and possibly a lax 
regulatory environment. Lastly, they document a direct link between valuation deviations 
and past performance. More specifically, they show that hedge funds which show weak 
performance over “the last twelve months” the managers responded by marking up their 
positions. Conversely, when hedge funds show strong performance, managers respond by 
marking down their positions relative to standard valuations (Cici et al , 2011, pp.3-5). This 
evidence suggests that a component of the valuation behavior of hedge fund managers is 
directly driven by incentives related to performance considerations. 
 
Put these natural, inherent difficulties in pricing complex or illiquid investments together 
with a powerful incentive to show strong or hide weak performance, and then situate these 
factors in an environment with minimal regulatory oversight, or without strict discipline 
and internal controls, and there is a potential for trouble (Kundro and Feffer, 2004, p.42). 
On the one hand, existing rules and procedures for investor protection should provide the 
basis for effective regulation in the hedge fund industry, but it is not clear how those rules 
can always be made compatible with the non-transparent environment in which hedge 
funds necessarily operate. It is an open question whether stronger governance rules should 
be introduced for those hedge funds indirectly collecting retail investors’ money, either 
through professional codes of conducts, market mechanisms reinforced by a rating process 
or more compulsory and binding regulations. It is a fallacy to assume that the exclusivity of 
hedge fund investment management organizations servicing high net worth individuals 
automatically means that fund managers will have the most advanced and efficient 
operational infrastructure in place to protect investors. Evidence from investigated hedge 
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fund collapses has shown that this is a widely neglected area in the industry. Investors may 
be blinded by the returns of hedge funds and shielded in understanding the true 
infrastructural and operational deficiencies and related risks they pose. However, it is also 
extremely difficult to quantify with appropriate models, the loss distributions attributable 
by operational risks. In this regard, the work of International Organization of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) to develop a set of best practices for the valuation of hedge fund 
assets seems promising. In order to encourage hedge funds to apply them, financial market 
regulators and supervisors could take them into account in their requirements vis-à-vis 
prime brokers. 
 
5.4.4 Best Practice Guidance 
The failure and collapse of hedge funds and the impact of financial losses due to valuation 
discrepancies prompted reviews by industry groups, government bodies and various self-
regulatory organizations to comment on and make recommendations to provide best 
practice guidance on valuation procedures. As shown above, the valuation problem within 
hedge fund investment portfolios has been a re-occurring challenge mainly due to the 
illiquid nature of securities invested within these portfolios. 
 
The HFWG presented a report entitled “Hedge Fund Standards: Final Report January 2008” 
which provided guidance on disclosure advice to hedge fund investors motivated by a need 
to curtail loss of confidence in the industry. On the topic of valuation, the industry body 
stated that “it is important to recognize that investors need to be informed about the 
valuation process and have confidence in its breath and robustness” (HFWG, 2008, p.46). 
251 
 
Two particular issues highlighted which required greater scrutiny were the segregation of 
functions in valuation procedures and the problems associated with hard-to-value or 
illiquid assets. Its standard on segregation of valuation procedures recommended that a 
third party be responsible for valuing the funds’ assets and calculating the fees payable to 
the manager and emphasized the risks of conflict of interests in such circumstances where 
the hedge fund manager has a significant input in the valuation process (HFWG, 2008, 
pp.47-48).  
 
However, the HFWG did recognize that in certain circumstances it would not be feasible to 
employ an independent valuation specialist who may have the required level of knowledge 
or competence to conduct these responsibilities and in such circumstances it would be 
unavoidable that the hedge fund manager participates in this process, thus, maintaining a 
neutral stance (HFWG, 2008, p.48). Further, the standard highlighted the use of side-
pockets by a hedge fund manager and dictated that information on assets eligible for ‘side-
pocketing’ should be disclosed in valuation policy documents (HFWG, 2008, p.52). Hedge 
fund managers should ensure that management fees for ‘side-pocketed’ assets, if charged, 
are calculated on no more than lower of cost or fair value, and that performance fees for 
these assets are paid only at realization event or if a liquid market price is available (Kaal, 
2009, p.599). This stance of independence in valuation procedures was reinforced by the 
Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (CFA, 2010) in its policy document which 
recommended a professional code of conduct directly addressing performance and 
valuation problems applicable to hedge fund managers. The performance and valuation 
provisions of the code advise hedge fund managers to present performance information 
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that is fair, accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Managers must not misrepresent the 
performance of individual portfolios or of their firm. Moreover, managers should use fair 
market prices to value client holdings, and apply, in good faith, methods to determine the 
fair value of any securities for which no readily available, independent, third-party market 
quotation is available (CFA, 2010, pp.3-7). However, there was no detailed guidance 
provided on appropriately verifiable methodologies in determining the ‘fair-valuation’ of 
illiquid securities. 
 
The International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) committee provided a 
comprehensive, globally recognized set of benchmarks of good practice in valuing hedge 
fund assets as set out in its consultation report entitled “Principles for the Valuation of 
Hedge Fund Assets”.  The report identified nine best-practice principles which included 
documenting policies and procedures for valuation of financial instruments with the 
proviso that there were ‘certain issues’ indirectly related to hedge fund portfolios not 
addressed, including requirements for the timely disclosure for a hedge fund’s NAV, 
valuation of a hedge fund portfolio as a whole as opposed to the valuation of particular 
financial instruments, the valuation of investments in other funds held by a fund of hedge 
funds and compliance issues in relation to the accounting of these instruments (IOCSO, 
2007, p.6; Kaal, 2009, pp.600). The standard specified in broader terms that financial 
investments by hedge funds should be consistently valued according to policies and 
procedures and be reviewed periodically. It also recommended that the hedge fund 
governing body or compliance committee should ensure independence in the application of 
policies and procedures as well as a separation of responsibilities if the manager is 
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involved in the valuation process similar to the Hedge Fund Working Group 
recommendations. Recommendation 7 specifically identified ‘price overrides’ as a focal 
point in valuation procedures, a practice within the hedge fund industry where the value of 
an illiquid asset is disregarded if unfavorably quantified by an independent valuation 
specialist. It stated that the policies and procedures for price overrides should encompass a 
requirement for reporting to, and an appropriate level of review by, an independent party 
and that the reasons behind the override be documented contemporaneously, including 
evidence supporting the case for a proposed override (IOSCO, 2007, p.16).  
 
These recommendations fall short of dictating exact procedures involved which has been 
left to the discretion to the hedge fund manager and related parties and hence leaves much 
to be desired. McVea (2008, p.24) stated that such measures are ultimately flawed as they 
stood and either ignore or gloss over important aspects of a valuation process. Particular 
conflict-of-interest problems arise with respect to managerial discretion with the valuation 
of ‘hard-to-value’ assets and the use of side-pockets, thus falling short of recommending 
any substantial policies to protect investors against fraud risks in valuation procedures. 
 
The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets in the US submitted its report of the 
Investor’s Committee called entitled “Principles and Best Practices for Hedge Fund Investors” 
which developed guidelines that define best practice for the hedge fund industry using the 
PWG’s principles-based guidance. The Investor’s Committee addressed in broad context 
the need for a hedge fund to have specific valuation policy, governance of the valuation 
process, valuation methodologies and controls with an overall emphasis on transparency, 
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independence and oversight (Kaal, 2009, pp.600-601). One significant point in the 
recommendations was the committee’s specification of acceptable valuation methodologies 
in relation to hard-to-value or illiquid securities. It advises hedge funds to utilise valuation 
services in the case of less liquid securities such as loans or private placements. The use of 
independent third-party sources such as capable hedge fund administrators to verify and 
compare values assigned to particular securities as an alternative to valuation services was 
strongly recommended. In situations where financial modeling is utilized or required due 
to complexities in the securities, the valuation model should also be reviewed by an 
independent party to substantiate appropriate methodology. Finally, should none of the 
abovementioned methods be feasible and the hedge fund manager is ultimately the best 
person to advise on the value of such illiquid securities, the fiduciaries of the hedge funds 
will bear ultimate responsibility to verity the viability of the methodologies based on strict 
rules of independence and transparency (PWG, 2008, p.46-47). These recommendations 
reflect a similar stance by the other industry participants and regulators mentioned above 
and are focused on verification and due diligence to negate conflicts of interest rather than 
dictating specific methods or models to value hedge fund portfolios. 
 
A common theme identified in these recommendations is the focus on the separation of 
responsibility between the fund manager and the fund’s accounting and valuation process, 
a need for greater transparency and a reoccurring point emphasized was the requirement 
for “appropriate and independent valuation of hard-to-value assets”, an area which is 
subject to uncontrollable variables, vulnerable to fraud and manipulation. The problem 
here is that there is neither a standard model nor a requirement to disclose the precise 
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methodology used to value a hedge fund portfolio. These recommendations are flexible and 
the ultimate responsibility of valuation is left to the discretion of the hedge fund manager 
(Horwitz, 2007, p.145). Thus, it is in the best interest of the investor to comprehensively 
understand the valuation process. For example, the methods by which management and 
performance fees are calculated and the frequency of such calculations as this directly 
relates to the NAV of a fund. The expenses of a hedge fund should be scrutinized as well 
because discretionary spending without oversight often leads to abuse where even 
personal expenses could be charged to a fund. It is naïve to simply believe such activities 
will be conducted fairly. The key to managing risks to hedge fund operations and valuation 
fraud is effective due diligence. Operational due diligence can help address fundamental 
questions affecting investment decisions yet tends to be the least monitored of all hedge 
fund related risks as pointed out in the Capco White Paper (2003, p.9). Identifying a hedge 
fund that promotes transparency will enhance its reputation as a responsible investment 
entity which has the capacity to expand and hence maintain investor confidence and its 
continual survival.  
 
The development of a custodian for hedge funds where effective due diligence can be 
conducted frequently is a move in a positive direction  because the alternative of solely 
relying on regulation which is not far reaching and full-proof enables risks and 
vulnerability to fraudulent activities (Cheryl, 2011, p.639). The management of conflict-of-
interest within these operational processes is crucial to maintaining independence. The 
collapse of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), a hedge fund run by Bernard 
Madoff (Madoff) is an example of outright fraud which occurred over a 20 year period by a 
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notable fund manager in New York and proves that regulation alone is not the answer, 
especially in protecting retail investors from fraudulent hedge fund managers. It highlights 
the operational risks and valuation vulnerabilities within the hedge fund industry and the 
manner in which secrecy has become an enabler of fraudulent activities. The USD$50 
billion fraud was a very simple Ponzi scheme carried out over a 20 year period. If there was 
any case which could substantiate the need for transparency, more disclosure and 
stringent due diligence requirements, it would be the manner in which Madoff executed his 
Ponzi scheme relying on his reputation and taking advantage of the veil of secrecy 
prominent within the hedge fund industry. 
 
5.5 Bernard Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS) 
5.5.1 Mechanism of the Fraud 
A majority of the research on hedge fund fraud and failure has highlighted 
misrepresentation, misappropriation of assets and unauthorized trading as three of the 
main causes. The effects of the GFC initiated a domino impact of hundreds of hedge fund 
collapses14, including more prominent ones like Bear Stearns Hedge Funds15, where the 
fund managers misrepresented valuation information and mislead investors, Yorkville 
Advisers LLC16, which was alleged by the SEC to have misled investors by failing to adhere 
to Yorkville’s stated valuation policies, ignoring negative information about certain 
                                                        
14 SEC (2011) “SEC Charges Multiple Hedge Fund Managers with Fraud Inquiry Targeting Suspicious 
Investment Returns” United States Securities and Exchange Commission, (2011-252) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-252.htm, Accessed 5 Aug 2012. 
15 Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund and Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit 
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. 
16 SEC (2012), “SEC Charges Hedge Fund Adviser and Two Executives With Fraud In Continuing Probe of 
Suspicious Fund Performance, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, (2012-209) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-209.htm, Accessed 5 Aug 2012. 
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investments by the funds. The managers withheld adverse information about fund 
investments and performance from auditors which thus enabled Yorkville to carry some of 
its largest investments at inflated values. They misled investors about the liquidity of the 
funds, collateral underlying the investments, and Yorkville’s use of a third-party valuation 
firm. These allegations can be viewed as some of the more common methods used by hedge 
funds to carry out fraudulent activities. However, the cause of the Madoff fraud was not the 
consequence of any complex manipulation or misrepresentation but rather a Ponzi scheme. 
 
McDermott (1998, p.158) explains a Ponzi scheme as a term generally used to describe an 
investment scheme which is not necessarily supported by any underlying business venture. 
The investment returns are derived from the principal sums paid in by newly attracted 
investors. Usually, those who invest in the scheme are promised large returns on their 
principal investments. The initial investors are indeed paid the sizable promised returns 
which invariably attracts additional funds. However, for the scheme to continue being 
operational, more and more investors need to be attracted into the scheme so that a 
percentage of the principal investments can be used to repay initial investors their 
promised returns. The person who runs this scheme typically uses some of the invested 
money for personal use. Typically when a Ponzi scheme collapses the investors tend to end 
up losing their principal investments (McDermott, 1998, p.158). A Ponzi scheme is often 
confused with a Pyramid scheme which has similar characteristics but, as pointed out by 
Bhattacharaya (2003 pp.3-5), a fundamental difference is that in a Ponzi scheme a 
promoter has considerable control over every aspect of the scheme, including when to 
terminate the scheme. This allows the promoter to make money from every round of 
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capital raising. The initiators of Pyramid schemes, on the other hand, do not have control 
and they make little money, if at all, after the first round. In a Pyramid scheme, a recruit is 
asked to give a sum of money, x, to a recruiter, and then is asked to enlist n more recruits 
and collect x from each one of them (Bhattacharaya, 2003 pp.3-5). It is through the control 
and secrecy of the Ponzi scheme which allowed Madoff to succeed in his USD$50 billion 
hedge fund fraud. 
 
A point of contention is the profile of investors in this scheme. The regulatory requirements 
in the US which specified that only sophisticated investors were able to invest in hedge 
funds meant that all the individuals and institutions who committed capital with Madoff 
were substantially knowledgeable in their capacity to understand the risks they were 
taking on. However, they were deceived even with this acumen as Madoff managed to 
defraud them for a period of over twenty years. Three of the most important reasons why 
this was possible were his reputation, a unique investment strategy and the concurrent 
holding of several positions which facilitated the implementation of Madoff’s system. 
 
5.5.2 Madoff’s Reputation 
The success of Madoff’s hedge fund was largely related to his reputation on Wall Street and 
with the Jewish community where he was viewed as a charitable philanthropist. The 
perception he portrayed was one of a highly respected, well-established and esteemed 
financial expert. His reputation was bolstered by the fact that he helped establish the 
NASDAQ Stock Exchange and served as its Chairman, an institution which subsequently 
became one of the most successful stock exchanges globally and also helped him escape 
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numerous SEC investigations without any allegations being made17. His credibility and 
reputation were two of the reasons cited to explain irrational behavior of the agents who 
based their investment decisions not on some scientific study but on the reputation of the 
fund’s manager (Clauss et al, 2009, p.4). Citing Charles Kindleberger (1989), Clauss et al 
explained the notion of “sheep to be shorn” where, in financial markets, confidence and 
reputation remain essential factors to understand the mechanisms of a fraudulent Ponzi 
scheme as well as those leading to the development of a speculative bubble. 
 
5.5.3 Investment Strategy 
Madoffs true strategy was to keep the risk officers of investment firms in the dark18. He 
even advised risk officers on methods of dealing with the SEC should they be questioned, 
which was explicitly revealed in the 477-page report and transcripts in the SEC 
investigations of the Madoff fraud. Madoff was touted to pursue a split-strike19 conversion 
investment strategy, which involved taking a long position in a basket of stocks with a high 
level of correlation with the S&P 100 Index, buying out-of-the-money puts on the index and 
selling out-of-the-money index calls20. However, in a letter to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission in November 2005, fraud examiner Harry Markopoulos warned the 
total S&P 100 index listed call options outstanding was not enough to generate income on 
                                                        
17 Clark, J. and McGrath, J. (2012), “How Ponzi Schemes Work”, HowStuffWorks, dated 7 Dec 2012 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/ponzi-scheme5.htm, Accessed 8 Dec 2012. 
18 Watson, B. (2009), “How Madoff Got Away With It: SEC Report, Phone Transcript Reveal All”, Daily Finance, 
dated 09 Oct 2009, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/09/10/how-madoff-got-away-with-it-sec-report-
phone-transcript-reveal/, Accessed 3 July 2011. 
19 The split-strike strategy involves buying a basket of stocks, then writing call options against those stocks. 
The proceeds from writing the call options are then used to purchase put options. The R.W. Grand Lodge of 
Free & Accepted Masons of Pennsylvania v. Meridian Capital Partners Inc., Case No: 09-2430, U.S. District Court, 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), p.19, footnote 1. 
20 David B. Newman, et al. v. Family Management Corporation, et al, Case No: 08Civ115, United States District 
Courts, Southern Districts of New York (New York), p.2-3, pt4. 
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Madoff's total AUM which would have to be more than 100 percent of the total S&P 100 put 
option open interest in order to hedge its stock holdings21. He also noted it was unlikely the 
over-the-counter index options market would have been large enough to absorb all the 
trades necessary, given the size of the AUM and, importantly, the return stream was too 
smooth, coupled with lack of transparency (Clauss et al, 2009). Bernard and Boyle (2009) 
conducted back-testing on Madoff’s strategies and examined Madoff’s returns by analyzing 
the performance of Fairfield Sentry which was one of Madoffs feeder funds. They compared 
his investment performance with possible results which could have been obtained using a 
split-strike conversion strategy based on historical data and deliberately analyzed the split-
strike strategy in general deriving expressions for the expected returns, standard deviation, 
Sharpe ratio and correlation with the market of that strategy and found that Madoffs 
returns were well outside their theoretical bounds and should have raised suspicions about 
Madoffs performance. Clauss et al (2009, p.4) ratify these findings by analyzing the 
performance of six of Madoff’s feeders funds from 1990 to 2008 comparing it to the S&P 
500 Index and found “consistent ten per cent yearly rates of returns with low volatility and 
at least five times greater than the S&P 500” which proves that it was not possible for 
Madoff to sustain such returns in these market conditions. 
 
                                                        
21 United States District Court Southern District of New York, J.P. Jeanneret Associates, Inc et al, Class Action 
Complaint, Jury Trial Demanded Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federals 
Securities Law and Common Law, Master File No.09-cv-3907 (CM) pp.27-28, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/1042/JJAI09_01/20091116_r01c_0903907.pdf, Accessed 1 June 2012. 
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5.5.4 Conflict of Interests 
Madoff did not seek any management fees for his activities; he claimed that he earned his 
income on the trading deals via brokerage activities (Clauss et al, 2009, p.4). However, 
Madoff did not use a prime broker, nor did he borrow from banks or publish his returns 
and he never invested his clients’ money (Ionescu, 2010, p.244). The lack of operational 
infrastructure identified should certainly have been a red flag of operational risks which 
should have triggered investors’ cautionary attention but, as Arvedlund (2009, p.157) 
states, Madoff was able to exploit investors’ desire to “get in on the hedge fund craze” by 
offering low-risk, consistent returns year after year with no losses. His clients were so glad 
to be part of his fund that they did not bother to question the manner in which Madoff was 
able to generate the returns through his investment strategy, buying shares of large U.S. 
companies and entering into options contracts to limit the risk that no one else could 
duplicate. If Madoff was front-running and predicting market swings, no one seemed to 
care, if anything it confirmed his mystical prescience (Ionescu, 2010, p.244). The elaborate 
manner with which the Madoff fraud was executed presents a cautionary tale to all 
investors and market regulators on the ease with which deceptive conduct can be carried 
out, without the need of complexities popularly depicted as part of the sophistication 
inherent in the hedge fund industry. Bernard Madoff preyed on the greed of his investors, 
sold them a dream of wealth and manipulated these individuals successfully for over 20 
years while regulators sat on the sidelines simply trusting in his reputation. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Active asset management requires active due diligence. Risk transparency is a positive step 
towards a safer hedge fund investing environment, however quantitative risk management 
models alone have proven insufficient, too complex and provide information based on 
historical data which is a subset of past performance. Historical performance in no way 
guarantees future results even if it is relied on as an indicator of trends. The development 
of a trend does not necessarily mean that future performance will be in congruence with 
the past and hence should not be explicitly relied upon. Valuation and the risk of NAV 
volatility can be a particular problem within a dynamic financial market as, for example, 
illiquid assets which have been valued based on marked-to-model may be faced with 
misrepresentation, a lack of demand and autocorrelation while, on the other hand, marked-
to-market valuations may result in underestimation or be the target of insider trading and 
manipulation. The importance of accuracy in valuation directly impacts the quantification 
of portfolio returns for investors and fees to a hedge fund manager. Thus, it is imperative 
that an investor in a hedge fund considers the operational processes and controls relevant 
to obtaining such valuations and actively monitors these on an ongoing basis. This involves 
understanding the operational risks inherent in hedge funds. 
 
The fraudulent activities of numerous hedge funds over the last decade and increasingly 
during the aftermath of the GFC 2008 have identified gaps within the global financial 
market supervisory system that cannot be filled solely by regulation. These gaps deal with 
human behavior and perception and reliance on the integrity of gatekeepers. The ‘caveat 
emptor’ nature of hedge fund investment profiles mandates that investors conduct 
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adequate due diligence inquires to mitigate the risk of fraud. Thorough due diligence 
requires innovative methods of utilizing available information more efficiently by applying 
quantitative information with qualitative information and mandating adequate 
performance disclosure. Investors should not be required to adhere to excessive lock-up 
periods where fund managers are availed full discretion on the allocation of assets under 
management. Gatekeepers should consider thorough background checks on potential 
managers, including the minute details of substantiated qualifications and resumé checks. 
One important red flag against investing in a hedge fund is previous criminal offences 
which is never available on investment agreements. Comparative analysis of the US and UK 
legislation and proposals in Chapter Four leads to a tentative conclusion that applicable 
regulation can and should prohibit hedge fund managers from simultaneously fulfilling 
custodial functions. Regulators should look into custodians and depositories who have day-
to-day contact with hedge fund managers as an independent source of information on their 
activities, these measures could indeed be strengthened with better oversight on these 
custodians and depositories themselves.  
 
The following chapter investigates the unique approach which Australia has adapted in the 
supervision and regulation of hedge funds which is entirely different from standard models 
globally and diverges from views in the US and the UK. This comprehensive study will 
analyse the Australian regulatory framework and the Managed Investment Scheme Act 
1998, which was proven incapable of protecting investors against financial losses and 
resulted in one of the largest hedge fund fraud cases in Australia, the failure of Trio Capital 
Limited.  
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CHAPTER 6   
HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA 
 
“The sophisticated financial system of the 21st century was supposed to spread 
risk, but a lot of the risk ended up being concentrated on the books of highly 
leveraged institutions. High risk and high leverage proved to be a fatal 
combination. It always does. 
 
Some significant questions arise from all this. The main one, put at its broadest 
and simplest, is whether something can and should be done to dampen the 
profound cycles in financial behavior, with associated swings in asset prices 
and credit, given the damage they can potentially do to the economy.” 
 
 Mr Glen Stevens, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia1 
  
6.1 Introduction 
The Australian financial system was spared the worst of the GFC 2008, unlike that which 
has been experienced by financial markets in the US and the UK. There have been 
numerous reasons suggested for this resilience, including an effective financial market 
regulatory architecture, a stable political system and limited exposure to the sub-prime 
market and global financial system (Davis, 2011a, pp.301-303;335-337). The impact of 
devastating financial losses has also been cushioned by a higher than average rate of 
growth in the minerals and resources industry. However, as international asset managers 
begin, and continue, to shift their focus into the booming Asian region in search of yield, the 
                                                        
1 Stevens, G. (2008), “The Directors Cut: Four Important Long-Run Themes”, Governor Glen Stevens 
Addressing the Institute of Company Directors Luncheon, Reserve Bank of Australia, dated 17 Sept 2008, 
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2008/sp-gov-170908.html, Accessed 5 July 2013. 
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Australian financial system which is a major contributor to the Asian economy will become 
increasingly exposed and linked globally. 
 
The Australian funds management industry has one of the largest and fastest growing 
funds management sectors in the world. This growth has been underpinned by a 
government-mandated retirement scheme known as superannuation2, worth 
approximately AUD$1.7 trillion. In recent years, the industry has become more 
sophisticated and the asset allocation of institutional and retail investors has diversified. 
The market has expanded into new innovative products which have created opportunities 
for fund managers investing in a varied range of financial products, executing complex 
investment strategies domestically and internationally3. This investment fund asset pool 
has also attracted some of the world’s largest hedge fund managers, primarily from the US 
and UK. What is often disregarded is that risks within the financial system have also 
increased. In the context of its regulatory environment, the Australian market economy is 
considered as one of the more mature when compared to some of its global counterparts. 
This has enabled the political system to formulate and implement an elaborate legal and 
regulatory framework within which the creation, distribution and trading of financial 
instruments is carried out. It facilitates the operation of markets by providing the legal 
infrastructure where private parties’ contract with each other and regulate operations by 
licensing market operators and financial intermediaries, imposing proscriptive and 
                                                        
2 Austrade (2010), “Investment Management Industry in Australia” Australian Government, Australian Trade 
Commission, p.5. 
3 Austrade (2010), “Investment Management Industry in Australia”, Australian Government, Australian Trade 
Commission, p.6. 
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prescriptive conduct rules on entities and individuals dealing in the market and mandating 
disclosure of information to the market (Baxt et al¸ 2012, p.4). 
 
The main role of securities and market regulation in Australia is to eliminate the risks 
associated with fraudulent and deceptive conduct by certain market participants. Its 
purpose is to maintain market integrity and promote investor confidence through the 
development of a transparent and well-informed market where all types of investment 
securities could be freely available to both retail and wholesale investors. This approach 
has been the effect of over fifteen years of legislative reforms that began in 1998 with the 
introduction of the Managed Investments Act 1998, through which investment schemes 
operating within the Australian managed funds industry are uniformly regulated. 
 
The impetus of these changes was the government’s response to deregulatory actions of 
financial markets and recommendations made in 1993 by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission and the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee in Report No. 65 (ALRC 
Report 65) entitled Collective Investments: Other People’s Money and the Final Report of the 
Financial System Inquiry4 . It found that collective investment schemes were a rapidly 
growing part of the Australian financial system and of considerable importance to the 
economy. The report concluded that policy should therefore ensure the twin objectives of 
encouraging business activity while ensuring that investors were adequately protected. In 
identifying the types of risk that collective investors faced, the report proposed that 
although the government should not intervene to reduce investment risk, it should 
                                                        
4 ALRC (1993), “Collective Investments: Other People’s Money, Australian Law Reform Commission Report 65, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/report-65, Accessed 3 January 2013. 
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intervene to reduce or control compliance and institutional risk. Despite the reforms 
heralded by ALRC Report 65 to promote efficiency, there have been a number of inquiries 
pointing to deficiencies in the current managed investment scheme provisions which have 
not kept up with the growth and changes in financial intermediation processes, for example 
a 2012 Discussion Paper by the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 
entitled Managed Investment Schemes5 stated that: 
 
The failure in recent years of a number of high profile managed investment 
schemes has highlighted the difficulties that can arise where this form of 
commercial structure suffers financial stress. From a broader perspective, 
they also reflect developments in recent years in the use of schemes, from 
their original predominant role as passive investment vehicles, to their 
increasing use as vehicles to conduct entrepreneurial activities with 
enhanced investor involvement. The failure of some entrepreneurial schemes 
has generated legal problems that were not anticipated when the current 
legal framework for schemes was developed.  
 
The effects of regulatory gaps have led to numerous managed investment scheme collapses 
in recent years, for example TimberCorp6 and Great Southern7 in 2009 as well as the high 
profile fraud and misappropriation cases of Basis Capital8 and Opus Prime in 2008 and, 
more importantly, Trio Capital in 2009 (Steele, 2008, p.1132). In response to the enormous 
amount of monies misappropriated and loss of investor confidence, the Australian 
government and regulatory agencies launched extensive investigations and inquiries in 
                                                        
5 CAMAC (2012),” Managed Investment Schemes: Report”, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, July 
2012 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/Whats+NewManaged+Investment+Schemes+Repo
rt+Media+Release+Aug+2012?openDocument, Accessed 3 January 2013. 
6 KordaMehta (Undated), “TimberCorp Group of Companies – Liquidation Profile”, KordaMehta, 
http://www.kordamentha.com/creditor-information/australia/51, Accessed 12 May 2013. 
7 Knight (2009), “Inevitable Fate of Our Very Own Ponzi Scheme”, The Sydney Morning Herald Business Day, 
dated 21 May 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/business/inevitable-fate-of-our-very-own-ponzi-scheme-
20090520-bfrg.html, Accessed 12 May 2013. 
8 Washington, S. (2008), “Basis Capital Fund Collapse Provides Insight into Investor Risks”, The Age Business 
Day, dated 8 Jan 2008, http://www.theage.com.au/business/basis-capital-fund-collapse-provides-insight-
into-investor-risks-20080108-1kv1.html, Accessed 12 May 2013. 
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order to mitigate future problems. These included actions by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJC) whose Inquiry into Financial 
Products and Services in Australia9 in 2009 saw recommendations for an overhaul of 
financial advisory services in Australia through the enactment of the Future of Financial 
Advise10 reforms in 2010 and subsequently the Inquiry into the Collapse of Trio Capital11 in 
2011. The Future of Financial Advice reforms focused on improving the quality of financial 
advice and enhancing retail investor protection which was meant to regain investor 
confidence and trust in the Australian financial services industry12. The results and actions 
of these investigations and inquiries has been less than effective for such fraudulent 
schemes are still being revealed and investors continue to lose their income and retirement 
savings. The recent liquidation of LM Investment Management13 on March 2013, a managed 
investment scheme which saw investor losses of approximately AUD$400 million14 due to 
                                                        
9 PJC (2009), “Inquiry into Financial Products and Services In Australia”, Parliament of Australia, 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, dated November 2009, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/fps/report/report.pdf, Accessed 27 
March 2013. 
10 Australia Treasury (Undated), “Future of Financial Advise”, The Australian Government Treasury 
Department¸ Undated, http://futureofadvice.treasury.gov.au/Content/Content.aspx?doc=home.htm, Accessed 
27 March 2013. 
11 PJC (2012), “Inquiry into The Collapse of Trio Capital”, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, dated 16 May 2012, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=corporations_ctte/co
mpleted_inquiries/2010-13/trio/report/index.htm, Accessed 27 March 2013. 
12 UNSW Center for Law, Markets and Regulation (2009), “Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services: Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia (“Ripoll Report”), University 
of New South Wales, Australia¸ dated 23 Nov 2009, http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/resource/ethics/future-of-
financial-advice/parliamentary-joint-committee-corporations-and-financial-services-inquiry-financial-
products-and, Accessed 27 March 2013. 
13 ASIC (2013), “LM Investment Management Limited”, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 
https://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/LM+Investment+Management+Limited?openDocument#s
chemes, Accessed 12 August 2013. 
14 Schlesinger, L. (2013), “LM Investment Management Financial Services License Suspended by ASIC for Two 
Years”, Property Observer, dated 9 April 2013, http://www.propertyobserver.com.au/industry-news/lm-
investment-management-financial-services-licence-suspended-by-asic-for-two-years/2013040960259, 
Accessed 12 August 2013. 
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fraud, misappropriation and misrepresentation of which investigations are currently 
ongoing, is testament to this fact. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to comprehensively review and critique the effectiveness of 
the regulatory framework governing hedge funds in Australia. Hedge funds have not been 
identified differently within the Australian regulatory framework, unlike the US and the UK, 
and there has never been any recognition for the need for focused regulation up until the 
recent collapse of Trio Capital due to fraud and misrepresentation. Regulating the activities 
of the alternative investments industry is not an easy task, especially because of 
interactions with cross jurisdictional funds flow through the shadow banking industry into 
unregulated tax havens. As will be disclosed in subsequent sections, these complications 
can lead to huge investment losses and the possibility of uncontrollable systemic risks 
which could have devastating impact on the Australian economy, especially its 
superannuation fund holdings. Section 6.2 provides a detailed analysis to the regulatory 
architecture of the Australian Financial System. It explains the approaches to regulation 
and supervision following the recommendations of the Wallis Report in 1998 and ‘twin 
peaks’ regulatory and supervisory structure with the establishment of the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) responsible for upholding financial market efficiency and integrity. 
Section 6.3 explains the key requirements of the Australian Financial Services (AFS) 
licensing regime and the responsibilities of hedge fund managers as financial service 
providers. This is extended in section 6.4 which addresses the relevant legislation 
applicable to hedge funds in Australia as regulated under the Managed Investment Schemes 
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Act 1998 and its related conduct and disclosure requirements. Section 6.5 is a 
comprehensive study of the collapse of Trio Capital and, in particular, investigates the 
activities of Astarra Strategic Fund (ASF) of which Trio Capital was the Responsible Entity 
(RE). Section 6.6 concludes with an analysis of the findings of this chapter. 
 
6.2 Australian Financial Market Regulatory Architecture 
The Australian financial market regulatory architecture has evolved from 
recommendations formulated by the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) in April 1997, 
hereinafter Wallis Report15, tasked to examine the effects of deregulation in the Australian 
financial system. The regulatory mandate was developed based on principles of the 
efficient markets hypothesis theory, reflected in the Wallis Report16, which stated that “[In] 
designing regulatory arrangements, it is important to ensure minimum distortion of the 
vital roles of markets themselves in providing competitive, efficient and innovative means 
of meeting customers’ needs”. The approach to financial market regulation was influenced 
by a series of statutes17 in 1998 which ultimately shaped the Australian regulatory and 
supervisory approach of the 21st century. The Wallis Report identified three specific 
purposes for mandating financial market regulation: ensuring efficiency and appropriate 
oversight pertaining to market operations; a focus on safety and risk management by 
prescribing standards or quality of service, and achieving social objectives of equity and 
                                                        
15 Australian Treasury (1997), “Financial System Inquiry Final Report” (S.  Wallis, Chair), The Australian 
Government Treasury Department, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra; 
http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.asp, Accessed 25 Dec 2012. 
16 Wallis Report, 1997, p.15. 
17 The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth); The Financial Sector Reform (Amendments 
and Transitional Provisions) Act 1998 (Cth); The Financial Sector Reform (Consequential Amendments) Act 
1998 (Cth); The Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 (Cth); The Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 
1998 (Cth); and The Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 (Cth). 
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fairness for market participants18. Further, it recognized key principles for its regulatory 
approach which included competitive neutrality, cost effectiveness, transparency, flexibility 
and accountability19. This was enforced by promoting a culture of disclosure and 
compliance while accepting that any action should take into consideration that more costs 
are not imposed onto financial market participants that would eventually lead to a 
reduction in efficiency, effectiveness and growth20. 
 
The FSI introduced a revolutionary approach to financial market regulation. It endorsed 
financial deregulation and administered its mandate to promote a light touch regulatory 
regime in the promotion of financial services21 (Serpell, 2008, p.330). It advocated a 
functional approach where separate regimes for securities and financial products would be 
replaced by a single regime for the regulation of ‘financial products’ in which a principles-
based approach would ensure that functionally equivalent products be regulated in a 
similar manner to eliminate gaps and inconsistencies in the law (Saunders, 2010, p.36). For 
example, to promote informed decision-making, uniform transparency rules were 
mandated and investors disclosed information pertaining to risks and returns of financial 
products22. There were also obligations imposed on financial services licensees to act with 
integrity, honesty and adequately manage conflicts of interest23, maintain competence and 
professionalism24 and ensure that systemic risk is reduced through risk management 
                                                        
18 Wallis Report, 1997, pp.177-78. 
19 Wallis Report, 1997, pp.197-98. 
20 Wallis Report, 1997, p.196. 
21 Long, S. (2008), “Call for New Australian Financial System Inquiry”, ABC Australia, dated 9 Dec 2008, 
http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2441921.htm, Accessed 2 May 2013. 
22 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 1013D(1)(b)-(m). 
23 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(aa). 
24 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 912A(1)(e)-(f). 
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systems and the maintenance of adequate financial and operational resources25. McCracken 
and Everett (2009, p.12) found that the recommendations of this inquiry changed the 
regulation of financial intermediaries in four major ways. Responsibility for regulation of 
the finance sector was apportioned according to function rather than its individual status 
as a bank, a building society, life insurer or other type of financial corporation. A single 
licensing regime for deposit-taking institutions carrying on the business of banking was 
introduced. The stability of the payments system was enhanced and prudential supervision 
of the finance sector as a whole was formalized and strengthened (McCracken and Everett, 
2009, p.12). 
 
The FSI determined that the Australian financial system warranted specialized regulation 
due to the complexity of financial products, the adverse consequences of breaching 
financial promises and the need for low-cost means to resolve disputes26. That is, the 
underlying philosophy accepted that regulation is necessary to deal with factors that 
prevent the market operating efficiently, for example fraudulent conduct by market 
participants, information asymmetry and systemic instability. However, regulation should 
be the minimum necessary to respond to market failures27. The report acknowledged that 
there are occasions where even disclosure may be inadequate to sufficiently make 
informed judgments as certain market participants may lack the necessary financial 
acumen or cannot efficiently obtain such information (Harper, 1997, p.296). In such 
circumstances, it may be desirable to obtain the opinion of a third party specialist who 
                                                        
25 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 912(A)(1)(d)-(h). 
26 Wallis Report, 1997, p.175. 
27 Wallis Report, 1997, pp.189-194. 
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would have the resources necessary to attain required information28 (Harper, 1997, p.296). 
The report recognized that the largest part of the financial system comprises of financial 
intermediaries, broadly defined to include not only banks and insurance companies but 
also managed funds such as superannuation and managed investment schemes, and 
considered a number of approaches to the regulation and supervision of the Australian 
financial system (Weerasooria, 2000, p.4). These included: a statutory approach where 
specific and detailed laws are administered by a regulatory agency; a co-regulatory 
approach where legislation provides the general principles for conduct and protection and, 
transactions are regulated by codes of practices relevant to particular industries; and a self-
regulatory approach where industry schemes are not backed by legislation (Pearson, 2009, 
p.21). It concluded that, as all three have advantages and shortcomings, a combination of 
these regulatory approaches or co-regulation would be best for a cost-effective conduct 
and disclosure regime (Pearson, 2009, p.21). The current structure of financial market 
regulatory supervision in Australia is a reconfiguration of this framework to promote 
competition and efficiency by providing consistent regulatory treatment for financial 
products and services. 
 
The Wallis Report recommended changes to the structure of regulatory agencies within the 
Australian financial system with the establishment of the Council of Financial Regulators29. 
This initiative subsequently paved the way for the establishment of three agencies 
responsible for financial market and services regulation in Australia, namely, the Reserve 
                                                        
28 Wallis Report, 1997, p.191. 
29 RBA (1998), “Council of Financial Regulators”, Reserve Bank of Australia, Council of Financial Regulators 
Annual Report 1998, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/cfr/1998/cfr.html, Accessed 15 
Dec 2012. 
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Bank of Australia (RBA), the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (Mitchell et al, 2008, p.10). The RBA is responsible 
for monetary policy and systemic stability of the financial system. It also has a mandate to 
promote the integrity of the Australian payments system but is not directly involved in 
regulating the financial market and intermediaries which is the sole mandate of APRA and 
ASIC (Serpell, 2008, p.330; McCracken and Everett, 2004, p.9; McLaren and Williams, 2004, 
p.17). This structure had the advantage of creating two highly specialized agencies with 
clearly defined regulatory roles. The regulatory model proposed in the Wallis Report, 
known as the ‘twin peaks model’, separated responsibility for market fairness, in the 
context of the prudential soundness of a business, from the protection of consumers and 
investors in terms of the financial integrity and viability of the business operation. APRA 
regulates the former aspect and ASIC the latter as summarized in Figure 6.1 (Serpell, 2008, 
p.330; McCracken and Everett, 2004, p.9; McLaren and Williams, 2004, p.17). 
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The development of such a supervisory approach was effective in addressing the growth of 
financial conglomerates and mitigating any risks which would have evolved as a result of 
inappropriate activities, within the regulated financial sector. However, the overlapping 
responsibilities and potential conflicts ensuable did not prepare market regulators for the 
growth of innovative financial instruments, complex organisational structures and the 
advent of the shadow banking industry whereby different regulatory perspectives and 
objectives meant that the possibility of important regulatory issues being overlooked and 
pose enormous risk.  Thus, it is necessary to examine the roles and responsibilities of ASIC 
and APRA to gain an understanding of the twin peaks supervisory structure in Australia 
and analyse its effectiveness in tackling the innovative complexity which the hedge fund 
industry poses. This will also assist in understanding weaknesses within the structure 
which resulted in regulatory failures attributed to the collapse of Trio Capital. 
 
6.2.1 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority was established under the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 in July 1998 as a response to the Wallis Report 
which dictated its functions with express powers of supervision provided in the Banking 
Act 1959. In the words of the Wallis Report30:  
 
[P]rudential regulation adds an extra layer of oversight beyond regulation of 
disclosure and conduct but this should not constitute a guarantee. A 
prudential regulator is required to strike a balance between increasing the 
likelihood that financial promises are kept and being perceived as the 
underwriter of those promises (quoted in Rajapakse and Rajapakse, 2011, 
p.292). 
 
                                                        
30 Wallis Report, 1997, p.300. 
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The Wallis Report proposed that prudential regulation should occur according to the 
characteristics of the financial promise: “financial safety regulation will be required where 
promises are judged to be very difficult to honor and assess, and produce highly adverse 
consequences if breached and should encompass all institutions offering financial services 
that carry promises of similar intensity, regardless of their institutional label” (Pearson, 
2009, p.28). One of the strongest arguments for the establishment of APRA was the 
dominance of financial conglomerates within the Australia financial services sector and the 
increasing number of financial products being offered within these groups which extended 
through various financial intermediaries (Shuetrim, 1999, p.26). The Wallis Report argued 
that the prudential regulator could focus solely on the role of prudential regulation and 
there would be no conflict of interest between the financial market regulators, whose own 
reputation may be affected by the failure of a supervised institution31. 
 
APRA’s “Framework for Prudential Supervision” balances the need to take a structured 
methodological approach to the implementation of prudential requirements against the 
need to maintain sufficient flexibility to respond to new emerging risks32 within the 
financial system (APRA, 2010, p.4). This is set out in Section 8(1) of the APRA Act which 
states; “APRA is established for the purpose of regulating bodies in the financial sector in 
accordance with other laws of the Commonwealth that provide for prudential regulation or 
for the retirement income standards and for developing the policy to be applied to 
performing that regulatory role.” APRA’s primary mandate is the protection of policy 
                                                        
31 Wallis Report, 1997, pp.306f, 309f. 
32 APRA (2010), “The APRA Supervision Blueprint” Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Documents/APRA-Supervision-Blueprint-FINAL.pdf, Accessed 1 Jan 
2013. 
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holders and depositors instead of financial institutions and hence its focus is more 
proactive, on prevention rather than enforcement through penalties (APRA, 2012, p.14). Its 
risk-based objectives focus on the risk management of institutions and upholding fiduciary 
duties to stakeholders by promoting soundness of financial institutions33. APRA is faced 
with a balancing act of ensuring the continued viability of regulated institutions and that 
the Australian financial system remains competitive and innovative. To achieve this 
balance it must be able to identify financial risks early and intervene in a timely manner to 
effectively remediate these risks34. 
 
Prudential regulation is necessary as it ensures the viability of the whole financial system, 
protecting it effectively against systemic risks35. Regulating this involves establishing a 
suitable policy framework and effective supervisory processes dealing with a variety of 
issues such as authorization criteria, regulatory solvency, valuation of liabilities, regulatory 
reporting, disclosure of risk information, and strong governance arrangements (Pearson, 
2009, p.30).  Thus, APRA developed an approach to prudential regulation that promoted 
the overarching goals of prudence and risk management without imposing a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ set of prudential requirements on regulated institutions36’. 
                                                        
33 Productivity Commission (2001), “Review of The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 and 
Certain Other Superannuation Legislation”, Productivity Commission of Australia, Inquiry Report No. 18, p.77, 
dated 10 Dec 2001, http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/32515/super.pdf, Accessed 23 Nov 
2012.  
34 Littrell, C. (2003), “Prudential Risk Management: The APRA Approach”, Achieved Speech, dated 6 March 
2003, http://www.apra.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/03_04.aspx, Accessed 1 July 2012. 
35 Persuad, A. (2009), “Macro-Prudential Regulation: Fixing Fundamental Market (and Regulatory) Failure, 
World Bank Crisis Response, dated July 2009, 
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note6.pdf,  p.2, ,Accessed 3 June 2012. 
36 APRA (2012), “Protecting Australia’s Depositors, Insurance Policyholders and Superannuation Fund 
Members”, Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Publications, p.7, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Publications/Documents/APRA_CB_022012_ex_online.pdf, Accessed 1 
Jan 2013. 
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6.2.2 Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission was established in the same period 
as APRA as a statutory corporation enacted under Section 8 of the Australian Securities 
Commission Act 1989. Its functions are to administer laws in relation to the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) and relevant provisions under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act) (Baxt et al, 2012, pp.212-213). Pursuant to 
Section 1(2) of the ASIC Act, in performing and exercising its functions and powers, ASIC is 
responsible for the maintenance, facilitation and consistent improvement of the 
performance of the Australian financial system and all financial intermediary participants, 
promoting confident and informed participation by investors and consumers in the 
financial system and administering rules and regulations effectively with minimal 
procedural requirements. This extensive mandate revolves around the requirement to 
maintain stability and efficiency within financial markets through effective enforcement. 
Importantly, the Wallis Report advocated specialized regulation for financial services and 
emphasized the regulation of disclosure rules for product issuers, financial advisers and 
brokers and dealers37. The objectives of the agency are to promote confident and informed 
participation by consumers in the financial system by ensuring that investors have 
information, there is vigilant oversight of the marketplace, consumers have access to 
redress systems and there is a flexible approach to business regulation to remove 
unnecessary impediments where consumer protection goals are not compromised 
(Pearson, 2009, pp.42-43). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
37 Wallis, 1997, pp.75, 175. 
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 ASIC administers and enforces a range of legislative provisions relating to financial 
markets, financial sector intermediaries and financial products, including investments, 
insurance, superannuation and deposit-taking activities38. However, none of the statutes 
provide a complete statement of powers, leaving it to other legislation within the 
Corporations Act to confer express regulatory power in relation to particular financial 
institutions and corporations (McCracken and Everett, 2009, p.16). The approach to 
financial market regulation and supervision, though not without its critics, is perceived as 
resilient and reactive to changes in market conditions while maintaining equity and 
promoting efficiency. This proactive approach in the regulatory sphere has enabled 
Australia to be a pioneer in consolidating its regulatory agencies to focus on a functions-
based approach to market supervision.  
 
In addition to its regulatory role, ASIC develops policy and guidance about the laws that it 
administers, licenses and monitors compliance by participants within the financial system 
to provide comprehensive and accurate information on companies and corporate activity39. 
It is also responsible for investigating suspected contraventions of, and enforcing 
compliance with, the unconscionable conduct and consumer protection provisions that 
apply to the financial sector40. There is a licensing regime, a financial services disclosure 
regime; a requirement that financial services licensees have an internal dispute resolution 
                                                        
38 RBA (2001), “Australia’s Financial Regulatory Framework”, Reserve Bank of Australia Council of Financial 
Regulators Annual Report, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/cfr/2001/aus-fin-reg-
frmwk.html, Accessed 3 April 2013. 
39 RBA (2002), “Australia’s Financial Regulatory Framework”, Reserve Bank of Australia Council of Financial 
Regulators Annual Report, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/cfr/2002/aus-fin-reg-
frmwk.html, Accessed 3 April 2013. 
40 Rubenstein, P. and de Jong, L. (2004), “Australia”, Global Financial Services Regulators – Asia Pacific 2004, 
https://www.abl.com.au/ablattach/Australia.pdf, Accessed 3 Jan 2013. 
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mechanism and belong to an approved external dispute resolution body; and a 
requirement of compensation arrangements for breaches of financial services licensee 
obligations (Pearson, 2009, p.44). To carry out these responsibilities, ASIC adopted a risk-
based approach to compliance, that is, the systematic identification of important regulatory 
breaches such as patterns of non-compliance or emerging financial sector regulatory issues 
and engaging in collaborative partnerships with industry and consumers through a results-
oriented approach41. Thus, as a consequence of the changes advocated in the Wallis Report, 
the regulatory regime administered by ASIC aims to manage the balance between 
protecting investors and maintaining an efficient financial system designed to promoted 
conduct and disclosure regulation.  A very important mandate for ASIC is the regulation 
and supervision of the Australian financial services licensing regime in the supervision of 
financial services providers, including hedge funds. 
 
6.3 Australian Financial Services License 
The initial phase of incorporating a hedge fund in Australia and carrying out financial 
services within the jurisdiction is determination of the requirement to hold an Australian 
financial services license (AFS license) which authorizes a hedge fund manager to provide 
financial services42. In particular, any individual in the business of providing financial 
                                                        
41 ASIC (2000), “ASIC’s submission to the Senate Select Committee on Superannuation and Financial Services”, 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission, p.15, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/senate_paper.pdf/$file/senate_paper.pdf, 
Accessed 1 Jan 2013. 
42 An individual is considered to be in the business of providing a financial services if they ; (1) provide 
financial advice (s766B); (2) deal in a financial product (s766C);(3)  make a market for a financial product 
(s766D); (4) provide custodial or depository service (s766E) and (5) operate a registered scheme under 
Chapter 5C, Corporations Act 2001, Section 766A. 
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services especially to retail clients in Australia is required to hold an AFS license43. 
Licensing is a way to safeguard who provides financial services and imposes standards so 
that financial promises are reasonable and adhered to (Pearson, 2009, p.104). Martin and 
Mason (2009, pp.3-4) identified four main threshold requirements in determining whether 
an AFS license is required. The individual must determine whether they are providing 
‘financial products’ to investors defined broadly as securities, derivatives, interests in most 
managed investment schemes, insurance contracts, bank accounts and superannuation 
products. It must be determined whether she is providing ‘financial services’ in relation to 
a regulated financial product which in turn is dependent upon the individual providing 
financial product advice, or whether she makes a market for a financial product, operates a 
registered managed investment scheme, or provides a custodial or depository service. The 
third issue to consider is whether the person is carrying on a business of providing 
financial services in accordance with the common law indicators of the existence of a 
business which require the presence of system, repetition and continuity in a particular 
business endeavor. Lastly, Section 911D of the Corporations Act identifies a non-
exclusionary stance pertaining to jurisdictional limitations in relation to requirements for 
an AFS license (Martin and Mason, 2009, pp.3-4). In particular, any individual considering 
carrying out a financial services business in Australia is required to hold an AFS license 
even if such actions are likely to have an effect in other jurisdictions as well44. Thus, a no 
limitation rule pertaining to jurisdictions is applied. There are also numerous exemptions 
in Section 911A (2)(a)-(l) which generally do not apply to hedge funds incorporated in 
                                                        
43 ASIC (2013), “Regulatory Guide 121 - Doing Financial Services Business In Australia” Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission, July 2013, RG121, at 121.70-78. 
44 Corporations Act 2001; Section 911D. 
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Australia and interested in servicing the retail client industry. Central to the AFS licensing 
regime are distinct statutory fiduciary obligations of conduct and disclosure which are 
intended to encourage accountability and instill investor confidence in the Australian 
financial services industry (McCracken and Everett, 2009, p.156). 
 
Generally, an AFS licensee must do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services 
covered by its license are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly45. It must have in place 
adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest which may arise in 
relation to the activities undertaken by the licensee or its representative46. An AFS licensee 
is required to comply with requirements of the license47 and relevant financial services 
law48, have available adequate resources49 and maintain competence50 to provide the 
financial services which it is licensed to provide. It is also to ensure that its representatives 
are adequately trained and competent to provide the financial services, has a dispute 
resolution system in place for retail clients51 and adequate risk management systems52 and 
have in place adequate arrangements for compensating retail clients for loss or damage 
suffered because of breaches of the AFS licensee obligations by the licensee or its 
representatives53. An AFS licensee who provides financial services to a retail client is also 
required to provide disclosure documents in relation to the issue, sale and purchase of 
financial products as an offer of interests in a managed investment scheme, other than 
                                                        
45 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(a). 
46 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(a)(aa). 
47 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(b). 
48 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(c). 
49 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(d). 
50 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(e). 
51 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 912A(1)(f)-(g). 
52 Corporations Act 2001; Section 912A(1)(h). 
53 Corporations Act 2001, Section 912B(1). 
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where the scheme is the “one-off 20 person only” scheme which by definition is not a 
financial product54 (Jessup, 2012, p.203).  
 
The Corporations Act requires that a Product Disclosure Statement55  (PDS), Financial 
Services Guide56 (FSG) and a Statement of Advice57 (SoA) be provided to a retail client when 
the client receives or is to receive certain financial services (Hanrahan, 2007, p.127). These 
legal documents are intended to provide retail investors with sufficient information to 
make informed decisions in relation to the acquisition of financial products and services, 
including the ability to compare a range of products in the process of financial promotion 
(Pearson, 2009, p.152). Division 2 of Part 7.9, Corporations Act requires, in broad terms, 
that a PDS be provided to a person before they acquire a financial product, where the 
person is acquiring the product as a retail client (Baxt et al¸ 2003, p.185). The product 
disclosure statement needs to contain a wide range of information58 including: the benefits 
that the holder of the financial product will or may become entitled to; the risks associated 
with holding the product; information about the cost of the product; amounts payable in 
respect of the product after its acquisition; information with respect to fees, charges and 
expenses; as well as general information about significant taxation implications59 (Riley 
and Li, 2009, p.268). As well as the content of disclosure, the timing is also considered 
significant. Section 1012A(3) stipulates, that product disclosure statements must be given 
“at or before the time when the advice with respect to the product is given”.  
                                                        
54 Corporations Act 2001, Section 765A(1)(s). 
55 Corporations Act 2001, Section 1013C(3). 
56 Corporations Act 2001, Section 942B(6A). 
57 Corporations Act 2001, Section 947B(6). 
58 Corporations Act 2001, Sections 1013C-1013L. 
59 Corporations Act 2001, Section 1013D. 
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The FSG outlines information about the kind of services that are being provided and 
includes information about remuneration, benefits or other associations which may affect 
the quality of the service provided and information about rights that the client has under 
the requisite dispute resolution system60 (Kingsford-Smith, 2004, p.134). The SoA61 must 
be given when the financial service is personal advice and may be either the advice itself or 
a record of the advice (Pearson, 2006, p.123). It must contain information about the 
personal advice so that the client can make a decision about whether to acquire the 
financial product advised or to otherwise act upon the advice (Kingsford-Smith, 2004, 
p.135). Pearson (2006, pp.123-124) states that personal advice involves the consideration, 
or reasonable expectation of the consideration of the client’s needs, may only be given if 
three things are done. The provider must discover the relevant personal circumstances of 
the retail client and inquire about these, the adviser must also make a reasonable 
investigation of, and give reasonable consideration to, the subject matter of advice in light 
of those circumstances and appropriate subsequent consideration of the matter of advice 
(Pearson, 2006, pp.123-124). The combined effect of these provisions is to establish a 
“point of sale disclosure system62” whereby crucial information pertaining to making 
investment decision is available to prospective investors before they decide to acquire a 
financial product or service to negate information asymmetry and maintain integrity 
within the system (Riley and Li, 2009, p.269). The Australian hedge fund industry is not 
regulated directly by a specific regulation. Accordingly, to understand the regulatory 
approaches to hedge funds in Australia, it is appropriate to analyse the more important 
                                                        
60 Corporations Act 2001, Sections 942A-942E 
61 Corporations Act 2001, Sections 947A-947E 
62 ASIC (200), “Regulatory Guide 140 - Serviced Strata Schemes”, Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission, November 2000, at n.3, RG 140.121-140.130 
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provisions within the Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998 which gives effect to the 
conduct and disclosure rules enforceable as part of the Australian financial market 
regulatory architecture. 
 
6.4 Managed Investment Scheme 
6.4.1 Statutory Definition 
The regulatory framework governing the investment management industry in Australia 
does not define the term ‘hedge fund’ as a separate investment vehicle and such funds are 
not distinguished separately, unlike the US and the UK63. The purpose of the framework is 
to set out arrangements to protect investors through conduct-of-business and disclosure 
obligations imposed on the fiduciaries of investment schemes regardless of its legal 
structure. Thus, regulatory definitions characterize hedge funds as similar to any other 
investment vehicle regulated under the Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998 (Ali, 2001, 
p.419). A managed investment scheme can encapsulate different contexts and is used to 
describe a varied range of functions in financial services. The term broadly refers to the 
activities of specialist financial services that firms undertake, in return for a fee, to select 
and manage investments and to provide related administrative services to investors 
(Hanrahan, 2007, p.9). 
 
The statutory definition of a managed investment scheme is contained in Section 9 of the 
Corporations Act which defines a managed investment scheme by its activities. In other 
                                                        
63 AIMA Australia (2009), “Hedge Fund Booklet”, Alternative Investment Management Association Australia, 
dated January 2009, p.17, http://www.aima-australia.org/forms/AIMA_HF_BOOKLETJan09.pdf, Accessed 17 
March 2013. 
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words, in deciding whether an investment entity is a managed investment scheme, the 
definition requires a look into the purpose of which the arrangement is entered into, rather 
than the legal form that it adopts (Hanrahan, 2007, p.14). This approach is adopted in the 
interest of allowing for flexibility and diversity in the funds management industry (Moodie 
and Ramsey, 2003, p.44) The statutory definition is elaborated in Section 9 (a)(i)-(iii) of the 
Corporations Act which states a managed investment scheme64 as having the following 
features: people contribute money or money’s worth as consideration to acquire rights or 
interests to benefits produced by the scheme. Any of the contributions are to be pooled65, 
or used in a common enterprise66, to produce financial benefits, or benefits consisting of 
rights or interests in property, for the members of the scheme who hold interests in the 
scheme and the members do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the scheme 
(von Nessen, 1999, pp.2-4). The importance of the definitional distinction means that the 
                                                        
64 In ASC v United Tree Farmers Pty Ltd [1997] 15 ACLC 957; ASIC v Chase Capital Management Pty Ltd [2001] 
WASC 27 at [57], Douglas J in ASIC v Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd [2000] QCA 452; Brookfield Multiplex 
Limited v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte [2009] FCAFC 147. 
65 In ASIC v Drury Management Pty Ltd [2004] RSC 68, the issue contended was whether the method in which 
the Directors of Drury Management Pty Limited obtained investments constituted a managed investment 
scheme. It was found that the Directors of Drury Management Pty Ltd had obtained loans from private 
investors and promised returns of between 12% to 15% annually, raising approximately $8 million through 
promissory notes from 118 investors. These funds were invested at the discretion of the Directors in various 
financial instruments. Judge Jones concluded that because the funds were contributed from private investors 
and pooled together to conduct investing activities which were substantially not in the control of the 
investors, it had sufficiently satisfied the definition of a managed investment scheme under Section 601ED of 
the Corporations Act. In Brookfield Multiplex Limited v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 3) 
[2009] FCAFC 450; The court held that the litigation funding arrangements between International Litigation 
Funding Partners Pte Ltd and Brookfield Multiplex Limited constituted an unregistered managed investment 
scheme. The findings indicated that the promise of a return on investment by shareholders to allow 
International Litigation Funding a financial benefit at the successful resolution of their claims constituted a 
contribution of money’s worth and the money was pooled together for the benefit of all associated parties. 
Thus, it was held that the requirement for pooling of funds did not mean a physical pooling and could 
constitute promises made by investors whereby such promises were made for a common purpose of 
attaining a financial benefit through the activities of the scheme; InhouseLegal (Undated), “Compliance: 
Theory and Practice in the Financial Services Industry”, Inhouse Legal Solutions, Part 10. Compliance, 
http://www.inhouselegal.com.au/Compliance_Course/lecture_10.htm, Accessed 27 March 2013. 
66 Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW) [1981] 148 CLR 121, 133.  
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Australian consideration of a managed investment scheme is a statutory construct67 as 
opposed to reference placed on entity type.  As noted by Barret J of the NSW Supreme 
Court: 
 
In the Corporations Act, "managed investment scheme", like "company", 
refers to a statutory construct. The Act also refers, in various places, to 
‘association’ and ‘partnership’ but these, unlike ‘managed investment 
scheme’ and ‘company’, have a general law meaning as distinct from a 
statutory meaning, so that references to their formation (eg,  Section 115) 
and dissolution [eg,  Section 582(3)] are references to general law concepts 
rather than processes prescribed or contemplated by the Act itself (quoted in 
Jessup, 2012, p.16). 
 
The definition of a managed investment scheme in the Corporations Act also sets out 
specific exclusions. ASIC68 has pointed out that, generally, only investments that are 
‘collective’ are considered managed investment schemes and, thus, deliberately excludes a 
number of financial activities which do not carry out their commercial activities in 
accordance with the regulatory definitions of a managed investment scheme (Hanrahan, 
2007, p.15). These include regulated superannuation funds, approved deposit funds and 
the direct purchases of shares or other equities69, including body corporates, insurance 
statutory funds, retirement village schemes and partnerships70. Although there has been 
considerable case law on the meaning of managed investment scheme, it is not always easy 
to reconcile some of the decisions. Nevertheless, despite the differences of opinion, what is 
                                                        
67 ASIC v Takaran [2002] NSWSC 834 at [36] per Barrett J. 
68 CAMAC (2011), “Managed Investment Schemes”, Australian Government Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee, Managed Investment Schemes Discussion Paper, June 2011, p.11 footnote 10, 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/MIS_DP_Jun11.pdf, 
Accessed 1 Jan 2013. 
69 CAMAC (2012), “Managed Investment Schemes”, Australian Government Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee, Managed Investment Schemes Report, July 2012, p.26 footnote 66., 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+2012/$file/mis_report_july2012.
pdf, Accessed 1 Jan 2013. 
70 Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) Ex rel Corporate Affairs Commission (1981) 
148 CLR 121. 
288 
 
apparent from the case law is that the definition is very wide (Jessup, 2012, p.17). Managed 
investment schemes are further subdivided into those that are required to be, and are, 
registered with ASIC in accordance with Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act and those that 
are not (Hanrahan, 2007, p.23; Battaglia, 2009, p.3). This all-inclusive approach for defining 
managed investment schemes complicates the manner in which organizations consider 
registration requirements and a key issue of concern to hedge funds in Australia is the 
applicability and impact of these requirements to their investment mandate. 
 
6.4.2 Registration requirements 
The standard in relation to registration requirements for managed investment schemes is 
based on specific conditions under Section 601ED (1)(a)-(c), Chapter 5C of the 
Corporations Act. A managed investment scheme which has more than 20 members71 and 
is promoted by a person in the business of promoting managed investment schemes72 is 
required to be registered. There is also a look-through provision73 whereby if there is a 
group of managed investment schemes invested in one scheme, but the total is less than 20 
members, the fiduciary is required to look into the total number of members in all related 
schemes (Jessup, 2012, p.38; von Nessen, 1999, p.7). If that total number of related 
members exceeds 20, the registration requirements may be upheld subject to an ASIC 
determination through its discretionary powers in imposing or determining registration 
requirements74. This provision is to prevent entities or individuals from seeking to avoid 
                                                        
71 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601ED(1)(a). 
72 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601ED(1)(b). 
73 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601ED(1)(c). 
74 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601ED(3). 
289 
 
registration requirements by splitting the schemes into a number of different but related 
schemes with less than 20 members (Jessup, 2012, p.38; Broderick, 2006, p.186). 
There have been a number of legal cases75 in which the question of registration 
requirements has been contended where there were less than 20 members. The Courts 
held with overwhelming majority that the requirements of Section 601ED had to be taken 
into consideration in distinguishing registration requirements, in particular whether the 
scheme was promoted by a person or an associate of a person who was in the business of 
promoting a managed investment scheme (Zhen Qu, 2004, p.72). For example, in ASIC v 
Young & Others76 it was held that the investment activities of a collective group of real 
estate agents in raising finance from and selling property to members in what was known 
as an ‘Investors Club’ constituted the operation of a managed investment scheme, which in 
this case was unlawful as it was not registered. The Court found decisively that the 
promotion of seven property developments as part of the ‘Investors Club’ was sufficient to 
mean that the schemes were promoted by a person in the business of promoting managed 
investment schemes and therefore registration was required even though they were less 
than 20 members. The meaning of the term promoter was also clarified, citing, Whaley 
Bridge Calico Printing Co v Green77, Bowen J said:  
 
                                                        
75 ASIC v Young & Others [2003] QSC 029 at [50]; Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 215 at [19]. 
76 ASIC v Young & Others [2003] QSC 029. 
77 Whaley Bridge Calico Printing Co v Green [1880] 5 QBD 109 at [111]. 
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The term 'promoter' is a term not of law, but of business, usefully summing 
up in a single word a number of business operations familiar to the 
commercial world by which a company is generally brought into existence. In 
every case the relief granted must depend on the establishment of such 
relations between the promoter and the birth, formation, and floating of the 
company, as render it contrary to good faith that the promoter should derive 
a secret profit from the promotion. A man who carries about an advertising 
board in one sense promotes a company, but in order to see whether relief is 
obtainable by the company what is to be looked to is not a word or name, but 
the acts and the relations of the parties (quoted in Jessup, 2012, pp.38-39). 
 
Further, hedge funds seeking to avoid registration with ASIC can elect to conduct their 
investing activities pursuant to Section 601ED(2) where the registration of a scheme will 
not be required if the scheme only makes excluded issues of interest to wholesale investors 
and where a Product Disclosure Statement is not required78  as per Division 2 Part 7.9 of 
the Corporations Act. Excluded offers include offers made to sophisticated investors, that is, 
where the minimum subscription for interests in the scheme is AUD$500,000, or where the 
investor has net assets of at least AUD$2.5 million or, for the last two financial years, a 
gross annual income of at least AUD$250,00079 (Haigh, 2006, p.192). 
 
This provision is similar to exemptions available in the US and the UK in recognizing the 
financial acumen of sophisticated investors and high net-worth individuals. Therefore, if all 
of the persons who invest in the scheme fall within any of these categories then the scheme 
is not required to be registered as a managed investment scheme and availed exemptions 
                                                        
78 A PDS is not required to be given to a person if the person is not a retail client [CA, s1012A(3) and/or 
s1012B(3)]. For example, a person will not be a retail client in situation where; the person (referred to as a 
“wholesale client”): Invests more than $500,000 [CA s761G(7)(a) and Corporations regulations, reg. 
7.1.18(2)] or is a business that is not a “small business” and the financial product is provided in connection 
with that business [CA 761G(7)(b)] or has provided a certificate by a qualified accountant not more than two 
years old that certifies that either: The person together with any company or trust controlled by that person 
have between them a total of net assets of at least AU$2.5m (CA, s761G(7)(c )(i) and (7A), as inserted by reg. 
7.6.02AC with reg. 7.1.28(2) of the Corporations regulations. Corporations Act 2001; Section 761G(1)-(12); 
Corporations Act; Section 1012D. 
79 Corporations Act 2001; Section 708(8). 
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from disclosure and stricter fiduciary obligations. There is, however, a powerful economic 
incentive under the Corporations Act for the registration of exempt schemes. Registered 
schemes are prohibited from investing in unregistered managed investment schemes and 
considering a bulk of investment income in Australia originates from registered schemes80 
such as superannuation funds, a hedge fund manager will need to carefully consider 
whether the regulatory burden consequent upon registration outweighs the disadvantages 
flowing from reducing the potential pool of investors in the hedge fund (Ali, 2001, p.420). 
Another important consideration for a hedge fund manager intending to carry out business 
activities in Australia is the manner in which the fund is structured which will directly 
impact its fiduciary obligations as per requirements of the Corporations Act. 
 
6.4.3 Structure 
In Australia, hedge funds are usually structured as trusts81, although company structures, 
typically unlisted and domiciled in offshore tax havens are also used82. Hanrahan (2011, 
p.288) states that although the managed investment scheme laws do not mandate a 
particular legal structure, schemes that hold assets for investment purposes are 
incorporated as trusts. In its simplest form, a trust exists when the trustee is required to 
hold or invest property on behalf of another (Woodward et al, 2001, p.18). The essence of a 
                                                        
80 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601 FC(4). 
81 Heydon, J.D. and Leming, M.J. (2006), Jacobs Law of Trust In Australia, p.1 [101]. “A trust is an institution 
developed by equity and cognizable by a court of equity. A trust is not a juristic person with a legal 
personality distinct from that of the trustee and beneficiary, nor is it merely descriptive of an equitable right 
or obligation. Instead, it is a relation between trustee and beneficiary in respect of a certain property. More 
particularly, a trust exists when the owner of a legal or equitable interest in property is bound by an 
obligation, recognized by and enforced in equity, to hold that interest for the benefit of others, or for some 
object or purpose permitted by law.  
82 RBA (2004), “The Australian Hedge Fund Industry” Financial Stability Review, Reserve Bank of Australia, 
p.58, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2004/sep/pdf/0904-2.pdf, Accessed 2 Jan 2013. 
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trust is the separation of legal and equitable ownership that is achieved by imposing an 
obligation on the trustee to hold the trust property on behalf of and for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries (Heydon and Lemming, 2006, pp.8-9). The investment trust splits this trust 
obligation into the custody and the management of the trust corpus which effectively 
creates a tripartite relationship between manager, trustee and beneficiary that is governed 
by trust law (Loxton and D’Angelo, 2013, p.148). In modern times, the basic trust structure 
has evolved to become a popular commercial vehicle for investment and financing 
purposes because of its ability to be flexible in design and to be structured to meet the 
demands as a tool for commerce (Goonetilleke, 2011, p.421). Hedge funds that are 
structured as trusts are regulated as managed investment schemes principally under the 
Corporations Act; Chapters 5C and 7. The respective rights and obligations of the hedge 
fund, its officers, and the investors are determined by a combination of contract, equity and 
trust law, company law, financial services regulation, financial product regulation and 
prudential regulation (Hanrahan, 2007, p.5). These various sources of law overlap and 
interact to determine the responsibilities and liabilities of a hedge fund and its officers for 
the conduct of its investing activities and for the provision of funds management services to 
retail and wholesale clients (Hanrahan, 2007, p.5). In all instances, the manager of a hedge 
fund must be an Australian financial service licensee, with the consequent obligation to 
comply with the duties imposed on such licensees, or must attract the operation of an 
exemption or relief from the need to be licensed (Martin and Mason, 2009, p.3).  If a hedge 
fund is structured as a registered managed investment scheme, there are added obligations 
whereby the fund will be required to appoint a Responsible Entity consistent with the 
requirements of the Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998. Eventhough many hedge funds 
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in Australia generally seek to be exempt from registration and hence there would be no 
obligation to the appointment of a RE, it would be appropriate to analyse the roles and 
responsibilities of an RE for completeness. This will also assist in attaining a better 
understanding of failure within regulatory infrastructure which contributed to the collapse 
of Trio Capital which will be analysed in section 6.5. 
 
6.4.4 Responsible Entity 
A key requirement of a registered managed investment scheme is that it has a single 
Responsible Entity (RE), also known as the scheme operator, responsible for the operation 
of the scheme and who is to perform the functions conferred to it by the constitution of the 
scheme which it is required to establish, and relevant provisions of the Corporations Act83 
(Jessup, 2012, p.46; Goonetilleke, 2011, p.425; Pearson, 2009, p.330; Zhen Qu, 2004, p.74). 
In registered managed investment schemes, the RE holds legal title to the scheme property, 
unless a custodian is employed, and the equitable or beneficial legal title is held by the 
scheme members in proportion to their share of the individual assets of the scheme 
(Battaglia, 2009, p.4). As such, there is a trust relationship between members of the scheme 
and the RE84. The RE is subject to the statutory fiduciary duties set out in Section 601FC 
and the duties imposed by equity on trustees generally (Ranero, 1999, p.423). Section 
601FC(1)(a)-(m) specifies the duties of the RE which include the obligation to act honestly; 
to act in the best interest of members, to ensure all payments out of scheme property are 
made in accordance with the scheme’s constitution, and to ensure the scheme property is 
valued at regular intervals appropriate to the nature of the property (Zhen Qu, 2004, p.74).  
                                                        
83 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601FB(1). 
84 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 601FC(1)(a)-(m). 
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A fiduciary obligation is one of undivided loyalty where a fiduciary may not act in any other 
way than in the best interest of the persons to whom the duty is owed85. Fiduciary duties 
are primarily used to protect economic and proprietorial interests and as such, attached to 
this obligation are two negative duties, a duty to avoid conflicts86 and a duty not to profit 
(Dal Pont and Chalmers, 2007, p.93; Donald, 2009, pp.53-54). The duty to avoid conflict of 
interest disallows a fiduciary to engage in any conduct or activity which would directly 
affect those whom she has obligations to protect and a fiduciary is barred from using her 
position to obtain a benefit to herself or a third party (Dal Pont and Chalmers, 2007, p.93; 
Zhen Qu, 2004, pp.78-83; Battaglia, 2009, pp.7-8).  
 
In addition, an RE is required to appoint a Compliance Committee which can be either the 
board of the RE or a separately established committee and a compliance plan through 
which compliance procedures of the managed investment scheme are established 
(Pearson, 2009, p.330; Zhen Qu, 2004, p.74). The Compliance Committee is intended to 
serve as a monitoring and reporting intermediary between the area performing the 
primary compliance functions and the board of the RE (Moodie and Ramsey, 2005, p.170). 
The role of the Compliance Committee is to monitor the operation of the scheme, assess the 
adequacy of the compliance plan, and report real or suspected breaches or non-compliance 
to the responsible entity and, if there is no remedy, then to ASIC (Pragnell, 1998, p.55). The 
scheme’s compliance plan must adhere to requirements as established in the Corporations 
                                                        
85 Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy [1999] 48 NSWLR 2 at 46–47; Gibson Motorsport Merchandise Pty Ltd v 
Forbes (2006) 149 FCR 569 at [107]. 
86 Wilden Pty Ltd v Green [2009] WASCA at [38]. 
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Act and signed by the directors of the responsible entity87. The directors are required to 
sign the compliance plan to show that they accept responsibility for the measures to ensure 
compliance by the RE with its constitution and the law in general (Jessup, 2012, p.133; Ali, 
2001, p.420). The directors of an RE, as fiduciaries, are required to take all steps that a 
reasonable person would take, if they were in the position of an officer88 and to ensure that 
the responsible entity complies with the schemes compliance plan89. These obligations 
place the onus of responsibility of any wrongdoing directly onto the directors and the RE. 
The Corporations Act is not strictly prescriptive as to what is required to be dictated in a 
compliance plan but the overriding requirement is that the compliance plan must set out 
adequate measures that the RE is to apply in operating the scheme. Thus, an RE is required 
to undertake a structured and systematic process which considers the RE’s obligations 
under the law and the scheme constitution; identify risks of non-compliance; and establish 
measures designed to mitigate those risks90. These measures include arrangements 
ensuring that all scheme property is clearly identified as scheme property and held 
separately of the RE and property of any other scheme and details concerning a compliance 
committee which must be established if less than half the directors of the RE are external 
directors91 (Moodie and Ramsey, 2005, pp.173-176). There must also be arrangements to 
                                                        
87 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 601EB(1)(f) and (g). 
88 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601FD(1)(f). 
89 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601FD(1)(f)(iv). 
90 ASIC (1998), “Regulatory Guide 132 -  Managed Investment Schemes Compliance Plan” Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission, Related Instruments [CO98/50], Chpt 5C – Managed Investment Schemes, 
November 1998, para 132.15; 132.2. 
91 The Compliance plan must set out the arrangements the responsible entity has in place in relation to the 
following matters: (a) In order to ensure that the scheme property is clearly identified as scheme property 
and is held separately from property of the responsible entity and property of any other scheme, in 
accordance with the statutory duty to do so, the compliance plan must contain the measure for ensuring all 
scheme property is clearly identified as scheme property and held separately from property of the 
responsible entity and property of any other scheme; (b) If the scheme is required to have a compliance 
committee (which it will be required to have if less than half of the directors of the responsible entity are 
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ensure that scheme property is valued at regular intervals as appropriate given the nature 
of the property and that compliance with the plan is verified and audited accordingly, 
which requires that adequate records of the scheme’s operations are kept (Martin and 
Mason, 2009, p.11). The RE is permitted to amend the compliance plan92. Indeed, the 
practice of ASIC is to require regular reviews of the compliance plan and to make 
amendments where appropriate (Jessup, 2012, p.133). Thus it can be interpreted that the 
RE is ultimately responsible to investors and is bound by requirements under the 
Corporations Act to uphold is fiduciary obligations with upmost integrity. 
 
It is common for a RE who is responsible for the operation of a scheme to appoint an agent 
to carry out investment or operational management functions93 if the responsibility for the 
delegation is assumed by the RE (Battaglia, 2009, p.4). One example is to enlist the 
expertise of specialist firms to carry out valuation and due diligence functions of the 
scheme. There is a risk of conflict of interest and attenuation of liability by the RE whereby 
agents are appointed in a position of trust to carry out activities which are crucial to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
external directors, as defined), the compliance plan must contain the measures for ensuring that the 
compliance committee functions properly, including adequate arrangements relating to; (a) The membership 
of the committee; and (b) How often committee meetings are to be held; and (c) The committee’s reports and 
recommendations to the responsible entity and (d) The committee’s access to the scheme’s accounting 
records and to the auditor of the scheme’s financial statements; and (e) The committee’s access to 
information that is relevant to the responsible entity’s compliance with this Act’. (f) To ensure compliance by 
the responsible entity with its statutory obligation to ensure that the scheme property is valued at regular 
intervals appropriate to the nature of the property, the compliance plan must contain arrangements for 
ensuring that the scheme property is valued at regular intervals appropriate to the nature of the property; (g) 
To ensure compliance by the responsible entity with its statutory obligation to ensure that at all times there is 
a registered company auditor, an audit firm or an authorized audit company engaged to audit compliance 
with the scheme’s compliance plan who is required to audit the compliance plan within three months after 
the end of each financial year of the scheme with the report to be lodged with ASIC – the compliance plan 
must contain the measures for ensuring that compliance with the plan is audited, (h) The compliance plan 
must contain the measures for ensuring adequate records of the scheme’s operations are kept, and (i) Any 
other matter prescribed by the regulations (of which there is none at the time of writing) (Jessup, 2012, 
pp.132-133). 
92 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601HE(1). 
93 Corporations Act 2001; Section 601FB(2); Corporations Act 2001; Sections 601FC(1)(a) – (m). 
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viability of a scheme. However, there is legislation94 which provides for indemnity if the 
responsibilities of an agent are not upheld as a result of negligence or wrongful and 
deceptive conduct and distinct conditions for the purpose of liability to members of a 
managed investment scheme. There is a second level of recourse where a sub-agent who is 
appointed to carry out authorized activities of the RE and treated in exactly the same 
manner as agents hence ensuring the RE holds ultimate responsibility95.  According to the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Managed Investment Scheme Bill 199796, the effect of this 
provision is to ensure that the RE is ultimately liable to the members for any act or 
omission in relation to the affairs of the scheme (Jessup, 2012, p.47). The onus is placed on 
RE to make good to scheme members any losses suffered by a scheme as a result of the 
conduct of persons engaged by the RE in relation to the scheme97 and where the scheme is 
structured as a trust, this provision will override any inconsistent provisions in the State 
and Territory trustee legislation (Jessup, 2012, p.48).  
 
The RE may also be required to appoint a custodian to hold the legal title to assets under 
management and is particularly common where the managed investment scheme is 
structured as a trust (Hanrahan, 2007, p.34). The Corporations Act defines custodial 
services in Section 766E(1) as an arrangement where a financial product, or a beneficial 
interest in a financial product, is held by the provider on trust for, or on behalf of the client, 
in the case of managed investment schemes, the RE. The purpose of such an appointment is 
                                                        
94 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 601FB(3)(a)-(b). 
95 Corporations Act 2001; Sections 601 FB (4)(a)-(b). 
96 Explanatory Memorandum to the Managed Investments Bill 1997 at para 8.7. 
97 Explanatory Memorandum to the Managed Investments Bill 1997 at para 8.6. 
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to segregate the trust assets from the RE’s proprietary assets98. The role of a custodian is to 
hold the assets managed by the RE as bare trustee99 and to act on proper instructions from 
the RE in respect of those assets (Goonetilleke, 2011, p.430). However, in Corumo Holdings 
Pty Ltd v C Itoh Ltd100, it was pointed out that as a matter of strict logic almost no situation 
could be postulated where a custodian in some circumstances does not have active duties 
to perform by, for example, being immediately bound to transfer the trust property to the 
beneficiary who was absolutely entitled (Heydon and Leeming, 2007, p.48). Thus, the 
motivations behind custodial requirements is to counter-balance in the interest of investor 
protection whereby an independent custodian should hold scheme property and such an 
arrangement would be more effective in preventing any fraudulent or deceptive conduct by 
the RE which may result in the misappropriate of the scheme’s funds (McLaren and 
Williams, 2004, p.110; Goonetilleke, 2011, pp.431-433).  
 
These regulatory mandates have been effective in the supervision of the managed funds 
industry during a period where the influence of financial innovation was low and the 
shadow banking industry was non-existent. The progress of financial markets and its 
interconnectedness globally has enabled efficiency within the funds flow process but this 
has also enhanced risk levels which such a regulatory system was not designed to cope. The 
                                                        
98 ANZ (2011), “Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services – Inquiry into the 
collapse of Trio Capital Limited and related matters, , 
http://www.anz.com.au/resources/0/7/0716d50049a7b484bb83bfc3936870f6/2011+ANZ+Submission+-
+PJC+inquiry+on+Trio+Capital+(October+2011).pdf?CACHEID=0716d50049a7b484bb83bfc3936870f6; 
Accessed Jan 1 2013; Section 601FB(4); Trustee Company of Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue 
(2003) 77 ALJR 1019 at 1034. 
99 ASIC (2012), “Custodial and Depository Services In Australia”, Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission, Report 291, July 2012, p.19, para 45, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rep291-published-5-July-
2012.pdf/$file/rep291-published-5-July-2012.pdf, Accessed 1 Jan 2013. 
100 Corumo Holdings Pty Ltd v C Itoh Ltd [1991] 24 NSWLR 370 at [398]. 
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following analysis on the collapse of Trio Capital Limited and the gaps within the 
regulatory system which enabled the fraud to materialize proves that significant changes to 
the regulatory architecture need to be made to cater to the growing influence of hedge 
funds and the shadow banking industry in the Australian financial system and tougher 
preventive measures are required to protect the ever growing Australian superannuation 
funds industry. 
 
6.5 The Collapse of Trio Capital Limited 
The collapse101 of Trio Capital has been sighted as the largest fraud in the history of the 
Australian funds management industry with approximately AUD$176 million in 
investments lost from two managed investment schemes, AUD$123 million from the 
Astarra Strategic Fund (ASF) and AUD$53 million from the ARP Growth Fund102 (ARP). 
Investigations into the collapse of both funds were still ongoing at the time of writing but it 
has been established that ASF was a fraudulent investment vehicle while there are 
questions about the legitimacy of ARP103. The investment scheme central to this analysis is 
ASF which was used to deceptively transfer investment funds into overseas tax havens and 
defraud investors. The case involving the fraudulent conduct of ASF provides significant 
insight into the disregard of operational risks within managed investment schemes and 
potentially the broader funds management industry in Australia. Trio Capital was licensed 
as a superannuation fund trust and the responsible entity of various managed investment 
                                                        
101 ABC News (2012), “Call for urgent probe into Trio Super collapse”, dated 16 May 2012 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-16/call-for-probe-into-trio-collapse/4015354, Accessed 1 Mar 2013. 
102 Alembakis (2013), “APRA Bans Five Former Trio Capital Advisers” Global Custodian, dated July 10 2013, 
http://www.globalcustodian.com/au/news/news_article.aspx?id=2147484623, Accessed 11 July 2013. 
103 PJC (2012), p.16, para 2.5. 
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schemes with complex structures incorporated in Australia and linked to tax havens in 
various jurisdictions including British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, St Lucia, the Cayman Islands, 
Belize, the Cook Islands and Nevis104 (Goonetilelke, 2011, p.421). Figure 6.2 details the 
relationship between the numerous entities within its fund structure.  
 
                                                        
104 Trio Capital Limited (Admin App) v ACT Superannuation Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] NSWSC 941, at 
[3] and [5]. 
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Wright Global Asset Management (WGAM) and Astarra Fund Management (AFM) were the 
ultimate holding companies of all the schemes associated with Trio Capital in Australia and 
the funds were layered with a series of cross-investments between superannuation funds 
and registered managed investment schemes. The investments of ASF were ultimately 
managed by Astarra Asset Management105 (AAM), its appointed investment manager, and a 
company which was also an associate of Trio Capital106. There were approximately 6090 
Australian investors in Trio Capital who lost their life and retirement savings107, 5400 of 
those investors had invested in Trio Capital through superannuation funds which were 
regulated by APRA and received financial compensation based on provisions for losses as a 
result of fraudulent conduct or theft, provided in accordance with Part 23 of the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act (1993) (SIS Act). It has to be pointed out that the 
uniqueness of such a provision contributes to moral hazard within the superannuation 
fund industry which can mislead retail investors, financial advisers, custodians and 
auditors into taking an inactive approach in money management and due diligence with the 
belief that any financial losses due to fraud can be easily recuperated, placing the onus of 
responsibility on the government and ultimately the tax-payers. The worst causalities of 
this debacle were approximately 690 investors who were ineligible for compensation, 415 
                                                        
105 Moore, B. (2013), “Ex-Director Banned for Life for Involvement in Trio Capital”, MoneyManagememt, dated 
7 March 2013, http://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/investment/funds-management/astarra-
eugene-liu-banned-trio-capital-involvement, Accessed 17 March 2013. 
106   The Trust Company In Response to The Parliamentary Joint Committee On Corporations and Financial 
Services, 19 August 2011, Schedule 1, pg.3, 
http://www.trust.com.au/pdf/news/research_papers_and_publications/white_papers/documents/TheTrust
Co_Redacted.pdf, Accessed 1 January 2013; Martin, N. (2010), “Letter to Unit Holders As Addressed: Trio 
Capital Limited (formerly known as Astarra Capital Limited)”, PPB Advisory, dated 12 Jan 2010,p.3, 
http://www.triocapital.com.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=vdC1j0y7qCo%3D&tabid=373, Accessed 18 August 
2013. 
107 Australia, House of Representative Debates, Committees, Corporations and Financial Services Committee 
Report, Speech, 21 May 2012, Ms Deborah O’Neill MP, p.4762,  
http://www.openaustralia.org/debates/?id=2012-05-21.107.2#g107.3, Accessed 1 Jan 2013. 
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of them were direct investors while 285 invested in Trio Capital through their self-
managed superannuation funds (SMSF)108. 
The gravity of the financial losses highlighted significant vulnerabilities within the 
Australian funds management industry and weaknesses in its twin-peaks model of financial 
market supervision and regulation. The failure of gatekeepers with the responsibility to 
protect investors and provide assurance on the validity and viability of investments 
emphasizes faults within various segments of the regulatory framework. Ineffective due 
diligence, conflict of interests and poor internal controls simply enabled the fraud to carry 
on as long as it lasted. More importantly, the ease in which investment funds were 
transferred to offshore tax havens through custodians and the ability of its directors to 
invest globally in risky financial instruments at their own discretion evidences inherent 
misinterpretations in the motivations of appointing RE’s as the ultimate gatekeepers of 
managed investment schemes. The question of whether this was a government failure or 
regulatory failure remains to be answered as investigations into this complex web of 
manipulation continue. 
 
The events leading up to the revelation of fraudulent conduct within Trio Capital and its 
related entities can be construed as one which was carefully planned to fraudulently 
transfer investor funds into overseas tax havens. This bold statement was emphasized by 
Justice George Palmer109, in his statement of facts, which stated: 
                                                        
108 Australia, House of Representative Debates, Committees, Corporations and Financial Services Committee 
Report, Speech, 21 May 2012, Ms Deborah O’Neill MP, p.4762,  
http://www.openaustralia.org/debates/?id=2012-05-21.107.2#g107.3, Accessed 1 Jan 2013. 
109  Trio Capital Limited (Admin App) v ACT Superannuation Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] NSWSC 286, 
Palmer.J at [22]. 
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A large proportion of the Scheme funds have not been used to acquire readily 
identifiable assets located in easily accessible jurisdictions. Rather, the funds 
have been invested in purchasing from an entity whose substance is 
impossible to ascertain an unsecured promise to deliver assets. Those assets 
comprise interests in investments whose existence, nature and value are, 
likewise, impossible to ascertain by any convenient means because they are 
managed or administered by companies incorporated in the British Virgin 
Islands, Anguilla, St Lucia, the Cayman Islands, Belize, the Cook Islands and 
Nevis. Anyone even slightly acquainted with the commercial world knows 
that if one wants to conduct financial operations as far away as possible from 
the scrutiny of tax authorities, investment regulatory authorities and 
investors themselves – in short, if one wants to conduct financial operations 
dishonestly or illegally – then it is to those jurisdictions that one goes to 
incorporate puppet companies with puppet directors in order to operate 
fraudulent schemes and to move money around the world in secrecy. 
 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into The 
Collapse of Trio Capital110 revealed significant weaknesses within the Australian financial 
system and it was of the view that a key element of the scheme was to move the funds of 
Australian investors overseas which made it much harder for Australian auditors and 
others to verify the existence of the funds, for Australian liquidators to recover any 
remaining funds, and for Australian regulatory authorities to investigate and to pursue 
those who have carried out criminal conduct111. Most critically, these weaknesses 
highlighted a lack of transparency within the hedge fund industry in Australia. This is 
amply confirmed by Mr. Shawn Darrell Richard (Mr. Richard) a Director of Trio Capital, in 
his response to claims by the PJC where he stated that “upon reflection, the establishment 
of the Astarra Strategic Fund as fund of hedge fund may have allowed my employees to 
                                                        
110 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2012), “Inquiry into The Collapse 
of Trio Capital”, Parliament of Australia, dated 16 May 2012, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=corporations_ctte/co
mpleted_inquiries/2010-13/trio/report/index.htm, Accessed 27 March 2013. 
111 Lynch (Undated), “Trio Collapse Investigation Report Makes 14 Recommendations”, FindLaw Australia, 
http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/6468/trio-collapse-investigation-report-makes-14-recomm.aspx, 
Accessed 4 Mar 2013. 
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take advantage of the lack of transparency that comes with dealing in the hedge fund 
industry”112. More importantly, it identifies the lack of oversight and understanding by 
regulators of the intricacies associated with the shadow banking industry which has thus 
far become a prominent part of the Australian financial system. 
 
6.5.1 Astarra Strategic Fund (ASF) 
ASF was heavily invested by all the other schemes within the Trio Capital portfolio with a 
mandate to mirror the investment performance of “various overseas hedge funds113” the 
details of which are vague. Trio Capital was the responsible entity of the ASF managed 
investment scheme and purported to provide investors with “consistent long-term capital 
appreciation in both rising and falling market conditions aiming to produce returns closely 
matching equity markets with less volatility”114. In accordance with the terms of the 
investment management agreement, Astarra Asset Management (AAM) was appointed as 
Trio Capital’s agent and investment manager with specific requirements, amongst other 
things, to invest and manage all property of ASF, including identifying investment 
opportunities in the hedge fund market within the investment guidelines as set out in ASF’s 
product disclosure statement115 and provide Trio Capital with regular reports in writing116. 
According to Mr. Richard, once the management agreement was concluded, the first 
investment as well as every other investment was executed without requiring any further 
                                                        
112 Mr Shawn Darrell Richard, Answers to questions on notice, received 27 April 2012, p.1. 
113  Trio Capital (Admin App) v ACT Superannuation Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] NSWSC 286, 16 April 
2010, Palmer.J, at [28]. 
114 Timothy Steven Frazer, WHK Audit & Risk Assessment, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission, paragraph, 5.2, p.4. 
115 David O’Bryen, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph, 5.2 
(a), p.3. 
116 David O’Bryen, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph, 5.2 
(b), p.3. 
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discussions with the RE117. The RE was in breach of its fiduciary obligations. It did not 
participate in investment decisions crucial to fulfilling its obligations in the best interest of 
investors apart from acting as a ‘bare fiduciary’ and carrying out AAM’s instructions to the 
custodians. For example, the process for sending monies to overseas hedge funds was for 
AAM to e-mail the RE an instruction to invest in a particular fund which they then 
forwarded to the custodian for execution on the same day without appropriate 
verifications118. The RE compromised the interest of the investors by acting in the interest 
of the promoter and carried out its duties without adequate independence, a requirement 
implicit in the single responsible entity regime ushered in by the Managed Investment 
Scheme Act 1998119. 
 
ASF purchased financial exposures to various offshore hedge funds domiciled in tax haven 
jurisdictions120 and significant monies from these schemes were invested in the British 
Virgin Islands in hedge funds controlled by a Hong Kong based American lawyer, Mr. Jack 
Flader121 (Mr. Flader). These financial exposures were committed under Deferred Purchase 
Agreements122 (DPA) signed by the directors of Trio Capital, ASF and related hedge funds. 
                                                        
117 Mr Shawn Darrell Richard, Answers to questions on notice, received 27 April 2012, p.2. 
118 Mr Shawn Darrell Richard, Answers to questions on notice, received 27 April 2012, p.2. 
119 The Trust Company, In Response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services, (2011), “Re: Inquiry into the Collapse of Trio Capital and Other Related Issues”, p.4, point 1, 19 
August 2011, 
http://www.trust.com.au/pdf/news/research_papers_and_publications/white_papers/documents/TheTrust
Co_Redacted.pdf, Accessed 1 January 2013. 
120 Timothy Steven Frazer, WHK Audit Risk Assessment, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission, paragraph 5.2, p.4. 
121 PJC(2012), Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.10, pt.18.  
122 A Deferred Purchase Agreement (DPA) is a warrant listed or unlisted retail investment product offered by 
financial institutions with the following features: (a) an investor enters into an agreement to purchase a 
number of assets (Delivery Assets) from the issuer; (b) the value and number of Delivery Assets is 
determined at a specified future date (Maturity Date), typically 3 to 5 years after the date of contract; (c) 
Delivery Assets comprise a number of a nominated security, which is typically a share or unit listed on the 
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As shown in Figure 6.3, there were complicated contractual relationships between the 
schemes, ASF and hedge funds, identified as ‘Underlying Funds’, to receive financial assets 
known as ‘delivery assets’ pursuant to the DPA which subsequently operated under a 
Master Deferred Purchase Agreement (Master DPA).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX); (d)  the number and value of securities that is delivered to the investor 
is dependent on the performance of an nominated share market index or basket of indices (Reference 
Indices) from the date of contract until the Maturity Date; (e) soon after the Maturity Date, the issuer satisfies 
its obligations under a DPA warrant by effecting a transfer of the Delivery Assets to the Investor; (f) the value 
of the Delivery Assets is based on the DPA warrant's 'Maturity Value'; (g) the Maturity Value is worked out by 
increasing or decreasing the investor's initial investment by the percentage change in the performance of the 
Reference Indices from the date of contract until Maturity Date; and (h) the number of the securities 
comprising the Delivery Assets is equal to the Maturity Value divided by the market price per security at the 
Maturity Date or such later date stipulated in the DPA warrant. A DPA warrant may also have the following 
features: (a)  a capital guarantee ensuring that at Maturity Date, the Maturity Value will be at least the initial 
amount invested; (b) the investor may receive a right under the DPA warrant to receive coupon payments 
during the investment period (coupon payments are assessable under section 6-5 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997)); and (c) a facility under which, after taking delivery of the Delivery Assets, 
the investor can appoint the issuer to sell those assets on the investor's behalf. 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=DXT/TD2008D4/NAT/ATO/00001&PiT=99991231235958, 
Accessed 1 January 2013. 
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A DPA is a structured product where an investor agrees to purchase from the DPA issuer a 
nominated delivery, typically, listed securities or managed investment products. The 
investors pay the purchase price to acquire the delivery products at the time they enter the 
DPA but the delivery products are not delivered until the maturity date, being at least 12 
months after the date of the initial DPA agreement123. 
The legal relationship established meant that under the DPA structure, ASF used investors’ 
funds to acquire contractual rights from EMA International Limited (EMA), a company also 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands124. Those rights required EMA to, in the future, 
deliver to ASF certain delivery assets, the value of which related to the performance of 
units in the underlying funds purportedly purchased by EMA125. EMA appointed Global 
Client Services Limited (GCSL) to administer EMA’s operations under the DPAs (See Figure 
6.3 above). AAM, EMA and GCSL provided valuations to Trio Capital for the investments 
made by ASF through the DPA structure which was invariably used by Trio Capital to 
determine the unit prices for ASF126. Trio Capital accepted the valuations received from 
these entities at face value, despite there being no market for the rights acquired by ASF 
under the DPA structure, and no other means of readily ascertaining the value of these 
rights contrary to industry practice applicable to the valuation of illiquid assets127. Further, 
                                                        
123 ASIC Class Order [CO 10/111] Explanatory Statement, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ES%20co10-111.pdf/$file/ES%20co10-111.pdf, 
Accessed 12 Jan 2013. 
124 Natasha Beck, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 6.1-
6.3, p.4. 
125 Keith Rex Finkelde, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 
6.1, p.4. 
126 David O’Bryen,  Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 6.1-
6.3 p.4. 
127 David O’Bryen,  Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 6.1-
6.3 p.4. 
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the DPA structure did not provide AAM as investment manager for ASF, Trio Capital as 
responsible entity of ASF or the custodian appointed by Trio Capital any legal or beneficial 
interest in any units in the Underlying Funds which may have been purchased by EMA with 
funds provided by ASF128. The counterparties to the Master DPA were AAM as the 
investment manager for ASF and EMA. EMA was assumed to be performing investing 
activities in connection with the Master DPA which was in the best interests of Trio Capital 
investors where EMA was contractually obligated to AAM, as investment manager for ASF, 
to deliver assets commensurate with the returns of the hedge funds overseas.  Figure 6.4 
explains the funds flow arrangements of the DPA structure of ASF where investor funds 
were transferred from Australia through the National Australia Bank (NATL) Custodian 
Accounts to the Standard Chartered bank account held by EMA in Hong Kong.  
 
                                                        
128 David O’Bryen, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, David O’Bryen, 
paragraph 6.4, p.5. 
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These funds were subsequently transferred into a GCSL bank account in Hong Kong and 
related hedge funds in several tax havens.  
 
The fraudulent transactions were out of the control and any influence of the RE as soon as 
such transference was made from Australia by the custodians. The published balance sheet 
of ASF included in the 2009 financial report showed that almost all of ASF’s assets for the 
financial year ending 30 June 2008 and 30 June 2009 were made up of investments in 
offshore global markets, specifically hedge funds. It showed that investments in the 
underlying offshore based hedge funds as at 30 June 2009 totaled approximately 
AUD$114.691 million representing 96% of total AUM of AUD$118.997 million and as at 30 
June 2008 totaled AUD$42.015 million representing 98% of total AUM of AUD$43.016 
million129. This was a substantial proportion of its AUM and in contravention of its 
investment mandate. The biased portfolio allocation should have raised concerns and 
prompted further investigations by its fiduciaries for lack of portfolio diversification. 
 
EMA had vested interests in five underlying funds namely, Exploration Fund Limited, 
Tailwind Investment Fund, SBS Dynamic Opportunities Fund Limited Pacific Capital 
Markets Cayman LDC and Atlantis Capital Markets Cayman LDC130. All these funds had 
characteristically similar structures and incorporated in tax havens with a majority of the 
funds domiciled in the Cayman Islands with separate administrators and investment 
                                                        
129 Timothy Steven Frazer, WHK Audit & Risk Assessment, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission, paragraph 5.8, p.5. 
130 Singleton (2010), Letter to Unit Holders, Astarra Strategic Fund, PPB Advisory, dated 26 Feb 2010, 
http://www.triocapital.com.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ppKumUs0fqY%3D&tabid=373, Accessed 4 July 
2012. 
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managers, spread across different jurisdictions131. Investigations found that the 
investments of ASF linked to EMA and the underlying funds were a fraudulent scam with 
non-existent investments, questionable officers and directors, misrepresented and 
manipulated financial and disclosure information132.  
 
The maze of fraudulent transactions carried out by ASF was a result of the lack of 
transparency within shadow banking industry in Australia. The level of due diligence 
conducted was insufficient to substantiate the existence of transactions and accepted by 
the RE without appropriate verifications. This was also inherent in the valuation 
methodologies of financial assets and unit prices of investments within ASF. There was 
little evidence that conflicts of interests were managed by Trio Capital with the degree of 
caution in which a responsible fiduciary would exercise in discharging its obligations even 
with mandated compliance and governance frameworks. Thus, the establishment of ASF as 
a fund that invests in other overseas hedge funds resulted in the standard due diligence 
and assurance becoming significantly diluted once investment monies left Australia, the 
main contributing factor which resulted in the Trio Capital fraud133.  
 
6.5.2 Fraud and Regulatory Failure 
The fraud in itself was complex and involved the schemes investing in numerous hedge 
funds based in tax havens enabled by misrepresentation, manipulation and collusive 
                                                        
131 Trio Capital Limited (Admin App) v ACT Superannuation Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] NSWSC 286,  
Palmer.J, paragraph 36, p.8. 
132 Washinton, S. (2010), “Judge Says Trio Fraud”, Sydney Morning Herald, dated 17 April 2010, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/judge-says-trio-fraud-20100416-skin.html?skin=text-only, Accessed 4 July 
2012. 
133 PJC (2012), “Appendix 3, Responses from Mr Shawn Darrell Richard”, p.170, paragraph 7. 
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conduct between the perpetrators. There were a number of failures by the gatekeepers 
within the Australian financial system: the regulators, ASIC and APRA and the Officers of 
Trio Capital. The auditors who verified its financial statements without checking the 
existence of its assets, and the financial planners who inappropriately recommended Trio 
Capital’s risky investment strategy to their clients contributed to this failure. In his 
response to the PJC Inquiry, Mr. Richard identified specific weaknesses within the 
Australian financial services regulatory framework. In his statement, it was explicitly stated 
that “there was simply a lack of understanding in of the hedge fund industry in Australia 
and the complexities of its different structures and investment strategies134”. Hedge funds 
were exempt from being required to disclose any form of transparency as compared to 
other asset classes within the managed fund industry and effective due diligence 
requirements inherently non-existent135. For example, hedge funds were not required to 
disclose their overall investment methodology when selecting 3rd party fund managers and 
there was an overall neglect in attaining a significant understanding of the investing 
activities of hedge funds which directly resulted in an inability to detect any fraudulent and 
dishonest conduct136. The question which remains unanswered even after extensive 
forensic investigations is who was ultimately responsible for the failure of the Trio Capital 
as a result of fraud? 
 
Trio Capital had a fiduciary and statutory responsibility to maintain independence while 
acting in its capacity as an RE. It was the responsibility of its officers, namely Mr. Shawn 
                                                        
134 PJC (2012), “Appendix 3, Responses from Mr Shawn Darrell Richard”, p.171, paragraph 8. 
135 PJC (2012), “Appendix 3, Responses from Mr Shawn Richard”, p.171, paragraph 8. 
136 PJC (2012), “Appendix 3, Responses from Mr Shawn Richard”, p.171, paragraph 8. 
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Darrell Richard, Mr. Cameron Anderson and Mr. David Millhouse to maintain independence 
while acting in their capacity as directors. Figure 6.5 shows the complex maze of 
incorporated structures utilized by Trio Capital and the interaction of investments which 
led to failures in the compliance and corporate governance mandates between related 
parties and organisational structures associated with Trio Capital.  
 
The investments by Trio Capital in funds controlled or operated by Trio Capital’s directors, 
senior management team and associated entities and individuals created conflicts of 
interests.137 Under Section 601FD(1)(f)(iv) of the Corporations Act, the officers were 
required to take all reasonable steps that a reasonable person in the position of the officer 
would take to ensure that Trio Capital complied with provisions of the ASF compliance plan 
in relation to the selection and performance of fund managers, including to ensure that Trio 
Capital’s investment committee undertook a quarterly review and reported its finding to 
the board138 in the best interest of its investors. This was evidently not the case. The 
responsible officers had substantially failed to carry out their duties and responsibilities to 
investors and all related stakeholders in a web of deceit and collusive conduct led by Mr. 
Richard. 
 
For nearly four years between November 2005 and September 2009, Mr. Richard as 
Director of AAM, and other related entities of Trio Capital, had dishonestly operated the 
business in a way which was designed to, and had the effect of, diverting monies which  
                                                        
137 David O’Bryen, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 8.2, 
p.6. 
138 Rex John Phillpott, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 
8.19, p.5. 
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were invested in superannuation funds in Australia into overseas funds located in tax 
havens domiciled in the Caribbean. The overseas funds were of questionable value and 
were wholly inappropriate superannuation investments. This was made possible 
particularly because of the various directorships and board positions held by Mr. Richard 
in related entities of Trio Capital139. 
 
There were conflicts of interest140  which arose from Mr. Richard’s company AAM acting as 
ASF’s investment manager between 26 August 2005 and 22 December 2009 in 
circumstances where WGAM a company also controlled by Mr. Richard acquired all the 
shares in AFM, the parent company of Trio Capital, in 2003141. Mr. Richard was a director of 
Trio Capital and a member of Trio Capital’s Investment Committee at the time AAM was 
appointed142. Mr. Richard was, at various times during AAM’s engagement, concurrently a 
director of parent companies, AFM and WGAM143. ASF investing, through AAM, in Tailwind, 
one of the underlying funds related to Mr. Flader when AAM was also the investment 
manager of Tailwind144. The underlying funds being controlled by individuals who were 
associated with Mr. Richard, had previously held roles with Trio Capital or its parent 
companies, or held roles with EMA and GCSL145. Mr. Richard deliberately falsely 
                                                        
139 Justice Garling J, Regina v Shawn Darrell Richard [2011] NSWSC 866, 12/08/2011, paragraph 1. 
140 Rex John Phillpott, Enforceable Undertaking, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, paragraph 
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represented himself to investors and other stakeholders, including regulators, that he was 
a director and owner of AAM and Wright Global Investments’ (WGI) holding companies as 
well as controller of Trio Capital, WGI and AAM146. These false representations were 
substantiated by the fact that Mr. Flader was the ultimate controller of these entities and 
the business of all entities related to Trio Capital147. From July 2004 onwards, Mr. Richard 
knowingly put into effect Mr. Flader’s instructions in relation to the operation of a scheme 
whereby Mr. Richard used his positions in respect to AAM, Trio Capital, WGI and AFM, to 
arrange the transfer of Australian investors’ monies from managed investment schemes 
and superannuation funds148. Trio Capital was either the trustee or the responsible entity to 
overseas funds controlled by Mr. Flader namely; Exploration Funds Limited, Pacific Capital 
Multi-Arbitrage Fund Limited, SBS Dynamic Opportunities Fund Limited, Sierra Multi-
Strategy Fund Limited149 (Flader Controlled Funds). This was carried out to purchase 
shares in US companies from foreign companies controlled by Mr. Flader (Flader Vendor 
Companies) at prices which realized significant profits for the Flader Vender Companies150. 
The GSCL Group of which Mr. Flader was the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, was the 
custodian of the assets of the Flader Controlled Funds at all material times. In addition, the 
GCSL Group, provided administration services to EMA151. Mr. Richard used his positions of 
trust in AAM, Trio Capital, WGI and AFM to arrange for investments to be transferred to 
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hedge funds controlled by Mr. Flader and this was subsequently used to purchase high-risk 
securities in US companies linked to Mr. Flader at manipulated and inflated prices152. More 
importantly, the securities purchased were over-the-counter, highly risky in an 
unregulated environment and were vulnerable to share price manipulation, thus 
deliberately exposing investors in Australia to significant financial losses. 
 
A large proportion of profits received by Flader Vendor Companies as a result of returns 
from investments into Flader Controlled Funds were subsequently used to provide funds 
back into Trio Capital, WGI, AFM and AAM by way of loans153 from other companies 
controlled by Mr. Flader where Mr. Richard falsely represented to auditors of Trio Capital, 
WGI, AFM and AAM154, a form of Ponzi scheme. Further, Mr. Richard falsely represented to 
Trio Capital and ASF investors that he was diversifying the portfolio. In August 2006, the 
directors of Trio Capital became concerned about exposure to a particular Flader 
Controlled Fund, namely the Exploration Fund. Mr. Richard subsequently participated in 
the creation of new offshore funds for Trio Capital to invest in, all of which were still under 
the control of Mr. Flader155. Between April 2007 and October 2009, Mr. Richard was aware 
that there were questionable and risky derivative transactions obtained through Flader 
Companies which were not disclosed156. This was also the case in regards to his 
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relationships with Mr. Flader and related network of companies and investment funds. The 
financial advantage that he gained from these manipulative activities has not been 
evidenced as all these funds are considered unrecoverable. 
 
The valuation of financial assets invested by Trio Capital was misrepresented and the 
directors of Trio Capital were negligent in their duties as officers to ensure valuation was 
conducted with adequate due diligence.  For example, in his role as an non-executive 
director of Trio Capital and Chairman of its Risk and Compliance Committee, Mr. David 
O’Bryen was not aware of the methodology which formed the basis of the valuation of ASF 
unit price and made no enquires to ascertain the methodology157. He did not ask for 
independent valuations to be undertaken for ASF158, a crucial responsibility within risk 
management and compliance. He made no inquires in relation to whether the unit price 
reports were in accordance with relevant provisions of ASF’s constitution and compliance 
plans159, and did not conduct any due diligence, monitoring or supervision of agents and 
external service providers to ASF160. ASF’s investment structure was set up and continued 
to operate without any due diligence or monitoring by Trio Capital as was required by the 
ASF Compliance Plan. Trio Capital did not, nor did Mr. Jack Phillpott161 during his 
directorship, take any steps to ensure that Trio Capital obtain or have available any due 
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diligence reports relating to the ongoing monitoring and supervision of AAM, EMA and its 
associates either as investment manager in AAM’s capacity or perform any obligations 
under the Master DPA and Supplemental Agreements in relation to EMA162. ASIC’s 
investigations revealed that Mr. Phillpott should not have permitted transactions whereby 
ASF’s funds were invested under the DPAs when there was no or inadequate information as 
to the valuation and value of the rights under the DPAs, the fund managers or the 
underlying funds163.  
 
The Committee found that APRA and ASIC had failed in carrying out their responsibilities 
as prudential and market regulators, especially in the slow response to the fraud. As 
identified in sections 6.2.2 and 6.3 earlier, a key responsibility of ASIC is to oversee the 
registration of managed investment schemes and the issuance of AFS License to financial 
service providers. These requirements mandate that ASIC carry out appropriate due 
diligence to account for the integrity of licensees and viability of managed investment 
schemes. ASIC had issued an AFS License to Mr. Richard of Trio Capital which was in turn a 
registered managed investment scheme. This would have invariably misled investors to 
believing that Mr. Richard was of good character and hence would not pose a significant 
risk, placing their trust in him of their investments. However, it was identified during the 
proceedings164 of the PJC Inquiry that Mr. Richard had numerous previous convictions of 
securities fraud in the US and Canada prior to the AFS license being granted by ASIC and 
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such important information should have been identified as a red flag to Mr. Richard’s 
character, warranting greater scrutiny. Further, APRA had conducted five prudential 
reviews between 2004 and 2009165 but no enforcement action was taken while ASIC only 
conducted investigations166 after a tip-off from a member of the public in October 2009. 
Both authorities had proven less than effective in market surveillance and the length of 
response time which resulted because of a lack of communication between ASIC and APRA 
was emphasized. As stated in the PJC Report167: 
 
It seems that APRA had not communicated to ASIC its request for Trio Capital 
to provide information. As a result, when ASIC commenced its active 
surveillance of the hedge funds in June 2009, it did not seem aware that Trio 
Capital was not providing the prudential regulator with basic facts about the 
existence of assets and their value. This information should have been 
communicated. 
 
The inherent failure of the ‘twin-peaks’ regulatory model and regulators in carrying out 
their duties as gatekeepers of the Australian financial system brings into question their 
readiness in adapting to an ever changing globalized financial system. The regulators had 
missed key events in the fraudulent conduct which was being perpetrated, in particular the 
activities of AAM which included misrepresentation with respect to incorrect disclosures 
made in the ASF Product Disclosure Statement, providing misleading information 
regarding a research report about ASF and hiding where ASF investment money would 
ultimately be placed168.  
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A review of the role of auditors, custodians and research houses showed that there were 
significant gaps of what was expected by stakeholders and the actual responsibilities of 
relevant parties, statutory and otherwise. For example, the Committee stated that auditors’ 
approval of financial statements did not necessarily mean that the actual assets underlying 
the financial statements existed, neither did the auditor’s assessment of Trio Capital’s 
compliance plan nor the work of the compliance committee implicitly imply that the 
investment scheme was viable but rather that these procedures existed169.  This is contrary 
to the belief of investors and financial advisers that effective due diligence was being 
carried out. Furthermore, ASIC’s investigations revealed that with respect to the 2008 
Audit and 2009 Audit of Trio Capital and related entities, the Principal Auditor, Mr. 
Timothy Frazer (Mr. Frazer) of WHK Audit and Risk Assessment, failed to carry out or 
perform adequately and appropriately, the duties of an auditor within the meaning of 
Section 1292(1)(d)(i) of the Corporations Act.  He did not, as lead auditor of the 2008 Audit 
and the 2009 Audit, ensure that each of the audits was conducted within the requirements 
of Australian Auditing Standards because he had failed170 to ensure that sufficient and 
appropriate audit evidence was obtained in relation to the existence and valuation of 
investments171. Nor did he attain a sufficient understanding of ASF and its environment, 
including the operations of EMA and GCSL and the investments they made, in order to 
identify, assess and respond to risks of material misstatement172. For example, EMA 
appointed a Hong Kong based auditor to audit EMA for the period from its incorporation 
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from 3 January 2006 to 30 June 2009. Within the investments of EMA was a major 
investment in Exploration Fund Limited (EFL). EFL in turn appointed a US based auditor to 
verify the fair value of its investments as at 30 June 2009 and to report to EMA173. As at 30 
June 2009, EMA’s Hong Kong based auditor was responsible for verifying the existence and 
valuation of the investments held by EMA174. Mr. Frazer relied on the work of the Hong 
Kong based auditor in relation to the existence and valuation of EMA’s investments175. The 
Hong Kong based auditor also appeared to have relied on the US based auditor of EFL, as to 
the existence and valuation of approximately AUD$74.907 million out of the total 
investments of EMA as at 30 June 2009 of approximately AUD$114.567 million176. At the 
time of signing the 2009 Audit, Mr. Frazer had a draft completion memorandum by EMA’s 
Hong Kong based auditor which noted that the US based auditor had not completed its 
audit of EFL177. Mr. Frazer had received correspondence from EFL’s auditors confirming 
that nothing had come to their attention regarding further adjustments in reference to the 
carrying value of EFL’s investments178 and did not pursue the matter with adequate due 
diligence. In respect of the 2009 Audit, there were concerns by ASIC that Mr. Frazer failed 
to ensure that sufficient work was performed to adequately consider the professional 
competence of the other auditors upon whom the principal auditor relied on in the context 
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of the specific assignment179 and that the work of other auditors was adequate for the 
principal auditor’s purposes in the context of the specific assignment180. A disclaimer of 
opinion was expressed on account of the work of the other auditors upon whom the audit 
relied in relation to the existence and valuation of investments which had not been 
concluded as at the date of issuance of Mr. Frazer’s opinion181. Further, Mr. Frazer as 
principal auditor, failed to ensure that each audit was planned and performed with an 
attitude of professional skepticism182 and did not carry out his responsibilities adequately. 
 
The financial advisers of Trio Capital investors also played a contributory role in the loss of 
investor funds by providing financial advice without performing adequate due diligence in 
breach of their fiduciary responsibilities. More importantly, there were inherent conflicts of 
interest as the financial advisers received generous commissions for advising investors to 
invest in Trio Capital. The role of custodians in a managed investment scheme is generally 
limited to that of a ‘bare trustee’ which acts under the instructions of the RE. Generally, 
custodians are required to undertake regular valuations of their clients’ assets and report 
the details of these assets to the client as per requirements of the respective custody 
agreements. However, they are not required to confirm the existence of the underlying 
assets183. Hence, the custodian was not responsible for the protection of investor funds 
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neither was it required by law to independently verify transactions before transferring 
money offshore. This is also true in the case of research houses and in this case, 
Morningstar, which relied on information provided by Trio Capital in formulating its 
ratings and recommendations. The RE is ultimately responsible for providing information 
and acting with diligence and responsibly and hence, if this line of defense is broken the 
entire system fails. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The PJC Inquiry heading the investigations on the collapse of Trio Capital concluded by 
recommending greater disclosure benchmarks and principles for hedge funds to improve 
investor awareness of the risks associated with hedge fund investing activities. It is 
believed that such actions will improve the conduct of gatekeepers for managed investment 
schemes, strengthen the regulatory requirements applying to hedge funds and in turn 
assist in the earlier detection of fraud184. In its statement185 it stated; “It seems likely that 
had the regulators and gatekeepers had information about the underlying assets of the Trio 
Capital funds, the significant delay in APRA’s requests for information in 2009 would not 
have occurred.” Although increased disclosure provides more information to all 
stakeholders including retail investors, there will remain a gap in understanding such 
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information. The degree of complexity involved in the investing activities of hedge funds 
can even baffle the most sophisticated of investors. If this was not the case we would not be 
experiencing continued financial crises. Research conducted on the acceptability and 
understanding of financial information by retail investors found that retail investors are 
generally unengaged by financial matters without the right level of education to 
understand and analyze financial information and rely on advice which they expect is true 
and fair in their best interest (Hung et al, 2008, p.20). There may be arguments that seek to 
promote the use of finance professionals such as auditors and financial planners in 
providing assurance to less sophisticated investors to mitigate this problem. Although this 
has a certain degree of merit, the issues revealed from the investigations of the Trio Capital 
fraud point to expectation gaps and failure of responsibilities, conflicts of interest and a 
general lack of knowledge in understanding the complexities associated with hedge fund 
investing activities by such trusted individuals.  
 
In the US and the UK, only investors who are considered HNWI and institutional investors 
are allowed to invest in hedge funds based on the ‘sophisticated investor rule’ which 
recognizes the net worth of such investors as opposed to educational qualifications in 
determining financial acumen. In Australia, the approach is not as stringent and retail 
investors are not restricted from investing in hedge funds, especially through SMSFs. The 
regulatory approach to managed investment schemes which encapsulates all forms of 
investment vehicles such as managed accounts, private equity firms and hedge funds, 
places the onus of responsibility on the fiduciary obligations of REs through mandated 
disclosure requirements and conduct-of-business rules to ensure that investors are 
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adequately protected. The implementation of conduct and disclosure obligations does not 
necessarily mean that they will be adhered to if not strictly enforced. Indeed, in many cases 
of fraud and collapses, this has been the case. Although managed investment scheme 
structures do have their benefits to retail investors, as they offer expertise, economies of 
scale and a level of diversification that an individual portfolio would not be able to easily 
attain, a disclosure based regime which emphasizes a self-regulatory method of 
safeguarding financial assets does not negate the possibility of misleading and deceptive 
conduct and the omission of information. Unfortunately, these fraudulent practices and the 
risks which still remain, five years after the GFC of 2008, will not fade away even after the 
implementation of extensive regulatory oversight. There will always be loopholes in the 
regulatory architecture and financial system susceptible to fraudulent activities.  
 
The most recent financial debacle within the funds management industry in Australia is 
that of managed investment scheme LM Investment Management, a Gold Coast based fund 
manager with approximately AUD$400 million in funds under management. As of the 20th 
March 2013, the fund is under administration for failure to meet creditor obligations. 
Investigations carried out highlight possible fraudulent conduct within the fund and by its 
directors. The allegations suggest inherent conflict of interest between the directors and 
investors, misappropriation of the scheme’s invested capital and misrepresentation of its 
PDS in contravention with the scheme constitution. A substantial proportion of 
investments by retail investors will not be recoverable186. Deceptive conduct cannot be 
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easily traced if regulatory agencies have a light-touch approach to supervising these 
investing activities. In the past five years from 2007 approximately AUD$10 billion187 have 
been lost in dubious investment schemes due to failures in regulatory enforcement and 
protecting retail investors in Australia. This was the case in the Trio Capital fraud and 
indeed as investigations are carried out there is a possibility that this will also be evident 
within LM Investment Management. As the Australian population ages and many investors 
look into managed investment schemes to increase the net worth of their retirement 
income, the risks to the superannuation industry will also increase significantly. 
 
A key problem is that discrepancies in the valuation methodology of investments and gaps 
in regulatory oversight have contributed significantly to such frauds. A recent US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations substantiates this point. A report on the 
“JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades” provides a startling case history of how synthetic credit 
derivatives have become a multi-billion dollar source of risk within the U.S. banking 
system188. Subcommittee Chair Senator Carl Levin identified189 how vulnerable the global 
financial system still is, going on five years after the GFC 2008, stating: 
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Our investigation brought home one overarching fact: the US financial system 
may have significant vulnerabilities attributable to major bank involvement 
with high risk derivatives trading. The four largest US banks control 90 
percent of US derivatives markets, and their profitability is invested, in part, 
in their derivatives holdings, nowhere more so than at JPMorgan. 
 
The investigations revealed significant fraudulent practices which were inherent within 
JPMorgan. The executive summary in the report190 stated that: 
 
Inadequate derivative valuation practices enabled traders to hide substantial 
losses for months at a time; lax hedging practices obscured whether 
derivatives were being used to offset risk or take risk; risk limit breaches 
were routinely disregarded; risk evaluation models were easily dodged or 
stonewalled; and derivative trading and financial results were 
misrepresented to investors, regulators, policymakers, and the taxpaying 
public. 
 
Finally, as a case in point, it has to be stated that economies based on transnationalism are 
always vulnerable to fraud. There is approximately USD$600 trillion worth of outstanding 
derivatives contracts within the global financial system compared to a total Global GDP of 
USD$60 trillion. This translates to 10 times more debt on a nominal basis and the growth in 
financial liabilities far outstrips that of underlying real economic output191. The risks to 
future financial crises are increasing at a rapid pace and so is the exposure of investors to 
fraudulent conduct by rouge financial professionals who take advantage of unsuspecting 
individuals in uncertain times. One solution is increased regulatory oversight, but this will 
be fruitless if enforcement is not expanded.   
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
“It is inconceivable that anyone will divulge a truly effective get-rich scheme for 
the price of a book. There is ample opportunity to use wealth in this world, and 
neither I nor my friends, nor anyone else I have ever met, has so much of it that 
they are interested in putting themselves at a disadvantage by sharing their 
secrets”. 
 
Victor Niederhoffer, US Hedge Fund Manager and Statistician1 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The concluding chapter reintroduces the main research issues that this thesis set out to 
explore. The argument is that the light touch regulatory approach taken in Australia 
towards supervision of hedge funds exposes retail investors and the superannuation 
industry at large to tremendous risks which can be exacerbated into system wide risks 
should fraudulent conduct be large enough to result in a contagion impact on 
counterparties. The risk of fraudulent conduct by rouge hedge fund managers is further 
substantiated by the findings of the case analysis on the collapse of Trio Capital due to 
misrepresentation, manipulation and misappropriation.  
 
The Australian financial regulatory architecture is uniquely different, a system which does 
not distinguish hedge funds as separate investment vehicles and where retail investors are 
not restricted from investing in hedge funds so long as such funds are registered, have the 
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relevant AFS licenses to conduct financial services and adhere to regulatory requirements 
as provided under the Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998. The collapse2 of LM 
Investments in early 2013 due to fraud proves that these risks are an ever increasing threat 
to the integrity of the Australian financial system. The chapter begins with a summary of 
the findings of this thesis and moves to distinguish future research perimeters. 
 
7.2 Financial Market Regulation, Intermediation and Risk: The Rise of 
the Shadow Banking Industry 
 
Financial market regulation is a construct of disclosure mandates and conduct-of-business 
rules bound together as tools to empower regulators tasked with the responsibility of 
protecting economies against irresponsible and reckless behavior by certain market 
participants. The role of maintaining the integrity of financial markets is onerous and the 
ever expanding range of financial products and services along with complex financial 
intermediation processes extending into the unregulated shadow banking sector has 
exacerbated the difficulties in sufficiently monitoring financial systems and protecting 
investors. The tools and regulatory approaches currently available to financial market 
regulators sufficiently cater to the traditional form of financial intermediation where the 
most complex of structures have been financial conglomerates which participate in 
commercial and investment banking activities within a regulated environment. In these 
structures, market supervision strategies have generally been effective and the 
approaches, be it the functional, institutional or twin peaks regulatory structure, have 
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enabled regulators in the US, UK and Australia to sufficiently supervise as well as facilitate 
growth. However, the evolution of complex financial linkages extending into the 
unregulated shadow banking sector has undermined this approach and become a 
significant cause of impediments to the effective operation of traditional financial 
supervisory models as the boundaries of jurisdictional oversight becomes increasingly 
blurred. Further, making a choice between a rules-based or principles-based regulation 
fails to address the dynamism in financial systems of the 21st century and its enforcement 
requisites. 
 
Financial commitments can now be packaged and repackaged into securities of value 
through credit intermediation and risk transformation processes which have been 
developed to converge with traditional funds flow channels within the unregulated sphere 
of financial systems where the majority of business dealings are conducted over-the-
counter. These financial contracts are subsequently transacted by non-bank financial 
institutions such as hedge funds and in turn funded by private investors and banks 
investing in a myriad of risky derivative instruments currently valued at approximately 
USD$600 trillion dollars globally. The risk transference strategies have resulted in an 
exacerbation of risks within the global financial system where one risky asset is managed 
by another, comparable to what may be construed as a Ponzi scheme3. Financial market 
regulators are in turn charged with the responsibility to manage this complex maze with 
outdated enforcement tools and strategies formed for a system within closed economies 
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which are not reactive to the evolving nature of financial innovation in a constantly 
developing global financial system. 
 
Regulatory approaches in the modern financial market system require an appreciation of 
the functional dynamics of financial intermediation and the funds-flow processes and, 
indeed, the acceptance by market regulators that financial transactions extend into the 
shadow banking sector. Hedge funds have become an integral part of this intermediation 
process and the cases of irresponsible, risky and fraudulent conduct by hedge fund 
managers have been detrimental to the financial well-being of economies and investors. 
The risks which hedge funds pose remain the same as they were during the collapse of 
LTCM in 1998 and then BSAM in 2008 which contributed to the GFC 2008, although the 
forms and methods may change. The subsequent collapse of Madoff LLC in the US and Trio 
Capital in Australia during 2009 confirms the above assertion. Excessive leverage, reckless 
investment strategies and lax due diligence are amongst the issues which will continue to 
influence investor wealth as will fraudulent and deceptive conduct if enforcement is not 
sufficiently mandated. An overall objective of supervising the hedge fund industry should 
emphasize a flexible, network integrated supervisory approach which enables regulators to 
react instantaneously in this constantly evolving environment while maintaining adequate 
controls through private monitoring. 
 
7.3 Hedge Fund Regulation, Disclosure and Transparency 
Hedge funds in the US and UK have historically been able to escape direct regulatory 
oversight by taking advantage of exemptions within provisions of securities legislation or 
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subject to light-touch regulatory supervision, structured as privately managed investment 
vehicles. In early 2010, as a reaction to the excessive risk-taking by hedge funds before the 
GFC 2008 and in an effort to restore investor confidence, regulators in the US and the EU 
including the UK, took actions to clamp down on the hedge fund industry. The introduction 
of the Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act 2010 in the US and the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in the EU and the UK have been touted as 
solutions to protecting financial systems against the risks posed by hedge funds, an effect 
which has also been aimed at legitimizing the availability of hedge fund investment vehicles 
as an option to retail investors. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act paved the way for the elimination of the ‘private adviser exemption’ 
from registration requirements which hedge funds in the US had previously relied upon. 
Hedge fund managers with AUM of USD$150 million or more will now be required to 
adhere to strict rules and registration requirements which were formerly non-existent. An 
important mandate within these new provisions is actions taken to increase transparency 
of hedge fund activities which will require hedge fund managers to keep and disclose to the 
SEC certain specific information. This includes, information pertaining to the amount of 
assets under management and use of leverage including off-balance sheet leverage, 
counterparty credit risk exposure, trading and investment positions, valuation policies of 
the fund, types of assets held, side letter arrangements and the fund’s trading practices. The 
submission of records and reports in relation to a hedge fund’s investing and operational 
activities has been stated as necessary for the purposes of assessing the systematic risk 
posed by a hedge fund, subject to a requirement that the FSOC maintain confidentiality of 
333 
 
such information, in particular, any proprietary trading information and investment 
strategies of the hedge fund manager. The provision of this requirement seeks to subdue 
the long-standing fear within the hedge fund industry of revealing proprietary information 
which could be detrimental to the viability and profitability of hedge funds. 
 
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act saw amendments to the definition of an ‘accredited 
investor’ and ‘qualified client’ to address discrepancies in the sophisticated investor rule 
and net worth standard which has not kept up with inflation and growth in disposable 
income. However, there was no mention of any requirement for HNWI to be financially 
sophisticated or have sufficient knowledge about finance as criteria to be identified if 
investors are to take the opportunity to invest in hedge funds. This gap remains a crucial 
point of contention as the onus of responsibility for financial losses is ultimately borne by 
the investor and, hence, requiring the need for investors to have a sufficient level of 
financial knowledge and recognizing the complexities of hedge fund investing would be 
useful for effective decision making. There is also the argument that financial advisers play 
a crucial role in filling this gap. However, there needs to be sufficient oversight and 
assurances that financial advisers are held accountable should they not act in the best 
interest of their clients or relay the wrong financial advice and that there is no conflict of 
interest in carrying out their duties. An in-depth understanding of hedge fund investment 
strategies and the risks they pose is crucial to any investment decision and without actions 
mandated on adequate financial literacy for investors this problem will remain as a point of 
dispute, especially in times of fraud, financial crises or ‘black swan’ events. 
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The Dodd-Frank Act also provided exemptions from registrations under the Advisers Act 
for ‘foreign private advisers’ and mid-sized hedge funds with assets under management of 
between USD$25 million and USD$100 million. The ‘foreign private adviser’ exemption will 
leave US regulators with significant obstacles to obtaining the data necessary to identify 
which foreign hedge funds may add to systemic risk and would frustrate the ability of US 
regulators to fulfill their legislative charge to manage systemic risk (Overmyer, 2010, 
p.2227). There is also a risk that hedge funds will deliberately incorporate and structure 
themselves with smaller AUM to maintain exemptions from registration requirements and 
continue with their investing activities under the purview of regulators. 
 
The EU response to the regulation of hedge funds was the enactment of the AIFMD. The aim 
of the AIFMD was to harmonize the regulatory framework governing hedge fund managers 
who conduct business activities within the EU. It captures open-ended and closed-ended 
funds with minimum exceptions available to fund managers for example, a de minis 
exemption for managers with AUM less than the €100 million threshold. The introduction 
of the AIFMD will see increased regulatory and compliance obligations for hedge funds and 
their managers similar to actions in the US, including mandated capitalization thresholds 
and the requirement to appoint an independent depository or custodian to hold the fund’s 
assets. There are specific disclosure requirements which will require information in 
relation to detailed risk and liquidity management obligations. The AIFMD has also dictated 
compensation guidelines for the remuneration of employees which will see such 
compensation be paid over a period of time, as opposed to immediately, as a measure to 
discourage excessive risk taking and financial exuberance. This is intended to curtail 
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misrepresentation and manipulation of portfolio investments which may result in a 
temporary performance enhancement (Farrell et al, 2013, p.29). There will be ‘passporting’ 
arrangements in place whereby authorized hedge funds and their managers will be able to 
market and provide financial services across EU authorized jurisdictions as a measure to 
improve harmonization within the EU and encourage growth.  
 
The differences in hedge fund regulations in the US, and the EU, which directly affects 
hedge fund managers in the UK, will have greater negative externalities because they create 
legal uncertainty and significant transactional and compliance costs while exposing the 
markets to regulatory arbitrage. These actions may also be construed as protectionist and 
retaliatory actions may be encountered by funds outside the supervised regions. If hedge 
fund managers are subject to stricter rules in one jurisdiction while competing for clients 
and profit margins with funds in jurisdictions that impose less restrictive rules, they could 
be placed at a comparative disadvantage and, hence, seek alternative structures or more 
favorable jurisdictions to conduct their investing activities. There is the potential for large 
scale migration of hedge funds into tax havens because of stricter regulation and disclosure 
requirements elsewhere, affecting financial services industries in regulated jurisdictions. 
 
The one consistency between future legislation of both the US and the UK to be enforced is 
the mandate to increase transparency and disclosure of information on hedge fund 
activities, which although a step in the right direction, do not totally negate the risks of 
fraudulent conduct, a problem arising from the operational activities of a hedge fun. 
Disclosure is designed to solve the informational asymmetries that exist between hedge 
336 
 
funds, investors and regulators. The logic is that by arming investors with information, 
mandatory disclosure promotes informed investor decision making and market efficiency. 
Once they are empowered with information investors are then said to be able to protect 
themselves against corporate abuses and mismanagement, while regulators can effectively 
monitor and provide oversight to maintain market integrity (Parades, 2003, p.418). 
However, the disclosure of information does not necessarily mean that it will be accurate, a 
problem which will be difficult to address and enforce by regulators. The idea of hedge 
fund transparency is not simply a matter of anticipating and meeting new regulatory 
obligations but one which has to include constant monitoring in congruence with the 
actively managed and dynamic investment activities of hedge funds. 
 
Hedge fund risk transparency is presented as a positive approach towards a safer investing 
environment and can include the provision of information such as portfolio positioning, 
operational reports, asset pricing and reconciliation, stress-test analysis, portfolio 
volatilities, correlations and counterparty exposures4. However, quantitative risk 
management models and information alone have proven insufficient, too complex and 
provide information based on historical data which is a subset of past performance. The 
assessment of historical performance in no way predicts future results even if it is relied on 
as an indicator of trends, for the development of a trend does not necessarily mean that 
future performance will be in congruence with the past and hence should not be explicitly 
                                                        
4 Enos, G. and Hughes, P. (2010), “Defining Hedge Fund Transparency: The Challenge of Managing Risk 
Management and Alpha Management”, StateStreet Company, 
http://www.statestreetglobalservices.com/wps/wcm/connect/f5fd4e00444ff2f990bff327a2dfc506/GC-
State-Street-SS-
2+(2).pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=f5fd4e00444ff2f990bff327a2dfc506, Accessed 2 July 
2013. 
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relied upon. This statement is supported by Owyong (2011, p.126) who asserts that hedge 
fund managers often adapt their trading strategies in response to changing market 
conditions and so past realized returns may not sufficiently reflect their current actions or 
performance. Furthermore, there is also a risk of information overload. That is, the risk that 
investors will actually make less accurate decisions in the face of more information as they 
adopt less complicated decision strategies in an effort to simplify their investment 
decisions (Parades, 2003, pp.483-484). 
 
The one important issue that has never been adequately addressed in the detection of 
fraudulent conduct is the operational risks within hedge funds. This includes issues related 
to middle and back office functions such as its trade processing, accounting and, more 
importantly, valuation and reporting. Valuation and the risk of NAV volatility can be a 
particular problem within a dynamic financial market as, for example, assets which have 
been valued based on a marked-to-model may be vulnerable to manipulation, a lack of 
demand and autocorrelation while, on the other hand, marked-to-market valuations may 
result in underestimation, incorrect pricing and misrepresentation or be the target of 
insider trading or trading outside of the hedge fund’s operating mandate. The importance 
of accuracy in valuation directly impacts the quantification of portfolio returns for 
investors and fees to a hedge fund manager. Thus, it is imperative that an investor in a 
hedge fund considers the operational processes and controls relevant to obtaining such 
valuations and actively monitors these on an ongoing basis. This involves understanding 
the operational risks inherent in hedge funds’ and encouraging the employment of 
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independent fund administrators who are proficient in forensic accounting analytics and 
able to actively detect fraud risks. 
 
7.4 Hedge Fund Regulation in Australia: The Independent Forensic 
Fund Administrator 
 
The Australian approach to regulating hedge funds has not been as direct as the US and the 
UK. Hedge funds have not been uniquely recognised by the Australian regulators as 
separate investment vehicles but rather regulated uniformly under the provisions of the 
Managed Investment Scheme Act 1998 and the Corporations Act 2001. One example of the 
different regulatory approach is the ‘sophisticated investor rule’ recognition in the US and 
the UK which restricts retail investors from investing in hedge funds, recognizing the risky 
nature of such investment vehicles and the inability of retail investors to sustain financial 
losses. In Australia, the approach has not been as stringent and retail investors have not 
been substantially restricted from investing in hedge funds especially indirectly through 
their superannuation fund holdings. 
 
The regulation of managed investment schemes encompasses all forms of investment 
vehicles such as managed accounts, private equity firms and hedge funds and places the 
onus of responsibility on the fiduciary obligations of Responsible Entities through 
mandated disclosure requirements and conduct-of-business rules to ensure that investors 
are adequately protected. Although managed investment scheme structures do have their 
benefits to retail investors as they offer expertise, economies of scale and a level of 
diversification that an individual portfolio would not be able to easily attain, a disclosure 
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based regime which emphasizes a self-regulatory method of safeguarding financial assets 
does not negate the possibility of misleading and deceptive conduct and the omission of 
information. The implementation of conduct-of-business and disclosure obligations does 
not necessarily mean that they will be adhered to if not strictly enforced and indeed in 
many cases of fraud and failure, for example, the collapse of Trio Capital in 2009, this has 
been the case.  
 
The fact that hedge fund investment activities have not been considered riskier in Australia 
is itself a cause for concern while the collapse of Trio Capital substantiates the need for 
more stringent and careful oversight by regulators and promoting the use of independent 
hedge fund administrators with requisite skill. The interim recommendations of the PJC 
Inquiry heading the investigations on the collapse of Trio Capital, which was ongoing at the 
time of the writing of this thesis, concluded by encouraging greater disclosure of portfolio 
assets as a means to provide more information to investors. However, there will remain a 
gap in the ability of stakeholders in understanding such information attributed to the 
complex investment strategies of hedge funds. The lessons from the collapse of Trio Capital 
proves that even with a substantial level of monitoring and protection by regulators, 
auditors, financial planners and custodians, the fraud risks still remains. 
 
The fraudulent activities of hedge funds analysed in this thesis identified gaps within the 
financial market supervisory systems of the US, UK and Australia that cannot be filled 
solely by regulation. These gaps deal with human behavior and perception and reliance on 
the integrity of gatekeepers. Regulating risk within a complex financial system is an 
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onerous task for regulators who have to dig into the depths of financial transactions to 
distinguish activities and conduct which may eventuate in fraud. In turn, it is this task of 
‘controlling the uncontrollable’, the ‘unknown, unknowns’, that has precipitated the rise of 
excessive risk taking and the utilization of derivatives and complex financial instruments. 
Investors are often misled to believe that the best investing strategy is as simple as finding 
a successful hedge fund manager who has a solid investment track record. The financial 
media in turn, advances this view by featuring the managers of top-performing funds5. 
Requiring greater disclosure from hedge funds is only a first step. Individual investors 
should make it their own responsibility to analyze the information carefully rather than 
just rely on authorities to monitor and regulate hedge funds.  
 
A key finding of this thesis is that active asset management requires active due diligence 
and that thorough due diligence in turn requires innovative methods of utilizing available 
information more efficiently by applying quantitative information with the more 
qualitative and mandating adequate risk taking and performance disclosure. These efforts 
which can be heightened by the use of forensic accounting analytical tools will enhance the 
ability of hedge fund administrators in providing investors with the required information 
and protection to achieve their desired investment goals without compromising the risks of 
financial losses as a result of fraud, manipulation or misrepresentation. 
 
                                                        
5 Illian, M. (2013), “The Cost Matters Hypothesis Wins Again”, Marotta on Money, dated 31 July 2013, 
http://www.marottaonmoney.com/the-cost-matters-hypothesis-wins-again/, Accessed 1 August 2013. 
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7.5 Implications of this Study for Future Research 
The introduction to this chapter established three main contributions this thesis makes to 
the literature of hedge fund fraud and regulation. Two empirical contributions which have 
not been explored before were an investigation on the fraud risk posed by hedge funds 
through the analysis of prominent cases of hedge fund fraud and failure while demystifying 
the mandate for increased disclosure and transparency as a solution to circumventing 
fraud. A comparative analysis of the approaches to hedge fund regulation in the US, UK and 
Australia was carried out and the research applied a cross-disciplinary approach which 
included the fields of Law, Economics, Finance and Forensic Accounting in its examination. 
This material has not been analysed before in any study of hedge fund regulation nor has it 
been the object of much academic interest in forensic accounting. This thesis, therefore, can 
be seen as an original contribution to the studies of hedge fund regulation and forensic 
accounting. The need to promote an investor protection mandate in the regulation of hedge 
funds was supported throughout the thesis by the public interest theory of regulation. This 
section briefly analyses implications of these contributions for future research.  
 
The major contribution of this thesis for future research is the recognition that it has given 
to the governance of hedge funds which emphasize operational risk management in a 
global and interconnected financial system. The thesis has argued that the growth of the 
shadow banking sector leaves current regulatory approaches ineffective and more needs to 
be done to stem such risks. By critically engaging with the disclosure mandate currently 
being implemented in financial markets globally and the ineffectiveness of this in 
mitigating fraud, this thesis has shown the need to propose private monitoring through 
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independent fund administrators who are proficient in forensic accounting analytical tools 
which can be designed to identify red flags as a proactive measure to mitigate fraudulent 
practices by rouge hedge fund managers and its implications for the future. Future research 
will focus on extending the findings of this thesis into the discipline of forensic accounting 
analytics by collating hedge fund fraud cases and collaborating with industry participants 
working within the forensic accounting movement through interviews on best possible 
approaches to identifying red flags, investigating hedge fund fraud and analyzing the 
myriad of hedge fund investment strategies paying particular attention to risky, illiquid 
investment models. This thesis can also be seen as an attempt to foster cross-disciplinarily 
cohesion between the neighboring fields of forensic accounting and law. Major implications 
for future research are expected to come from the comparative analysis of critical 
perspectives in Finance, Economics and Forensic Accounting Analytics. 
 
In conclusion, the future of the hedge fund industry has changed tremendously with the 
onset of stricter rules and regulatory oversight. The flexible nature in which hedge funds 
operated before the GFC 2008 is no longer a viable option and hedge funds globally will be 
required to adhere to increased compliance requirements and transparency rules. 
Reputational risks have taken center stage and a hedge fund which is perceived with a 
positive governance mandate by investors will attract confidence and growth. This is the 
future of financial markets in a globalized environment and will be that of the Australian 
financial system as we move forward into the 21st century.  Exemplary governance, a good 
reputation and innovative investment approaches will be the investment philosophy of the 
future. 
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